INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIAN AMALGAMATION SINCE 1914

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Abstract
This work examines the politics surrounding the idea and process of amalgamating the areas later to be known as Nigeria. The central problematic of the work rests on the attempt to answer, how, the politics of the two Nigerias was a means to achieving political and economic ends by the amalgamators. Using both primary and secondary data predicated on the Realist Theory, the work has attempted to establish the historical relationship between the Great Britain i.e. the amalgamators and the United Nigeria, as the amalgamated. The paper argues that, since 1914 the interaction between the two entities is characterized by statism, self-help, and survival, with Nigeria been the junior partner at the receiving end and worse-off. The paper found that the triad conspiracy between the Nigerian traditional leaders, the former colonial rulers and the current military and political forces is still alive and kicking at the detriment of the citizenry. Finally, the work recommend that Nigeria should be rational in formulating and executing both its domestic and foreign policies so as to forestall the chances of losing the next century as it did the last one.

Keywords: International political economy, Nigeria, Amalgamation, Realist Theory, Means to an End

Introduction
A classification of international forces in launching a successful unification endeavor requires clear conception of the kinds of integrating forces that exist. The following threefold classification seems to be satisfactory; (1) Integrating forces, we suggest, are either coercive (e.g. military forces) or (2) Utilitarian (e.g. economic sanctions) or (3) normative (e.g. propaganda) the classification is exhaustive; each concrete power (E.g Imperial British taking on Nigeria) is either one of the three or is composed of their various combination. The classification covers both “real” (Coercive and Utilitarian) and “ideal” (normative) elements. It directly represents the
three sociological schools: the Italian school of Pareto and Mosca, which is especially concerned with force; the economic-Marxist one; and the Weber-Durkheim tradition, which emphasized sentiments and ideas. However, it avoids a flaw common to all three; the tendency to see one set of factors—means of violence, ownership, or sentiment and ideas— as the major determinant of history and hence, also of international relations. Unification processes are directed by all three kinds of powers. Some unions are largely forced, as in the case of Nigeria, some are “encouraged” mainly by economic motives, as in amalgamation of two Nigerians. Still others are initiated chiefly by propaganda pressures as in civilizing mission and trade. So one can see all the classification fitting Nigeria alone. (Etzioni, 1962).

Theoretical Framework

The paper adopts realist theory of international relations in explaining Nigerian amalgamation in 1914. The basic assumptions of the theory are that realism explains international relations in terms of power, they differ with idealist on their assumption about human nature, international order, and the potential peace. According to realist power can be conceptualized as influence, or as capabilities that can create influence. The most important single indicator of a state power is its GDP, where short term power capabilities depend on long term resources, both tangible and the non-tangible. Realist considered military force, as amalgamating Nigeria as the most important power capability. They believe that international anarchy—the absence of world government—means that each state is a sovereign and autonomous actor pursuing as in exploiting the resources since 100 years ago. Their inspiration is Machiavellian and Hobbesian, where survival, rationalities, self-interest, antagonism, and anarchy is the defining character of the interactions.

Pre-Amalgamation: Policy and Legal Basis of the Reluctant Nigerian Amalgamation

Joseph Chamberlain startled many in Great Britain in 1895 when he informed parliament that he “regarded many of our colonies in the condition of underdeveloped estates.” At the same time he announced the British Government’s intention to consider “the judicious investment of British money” in British Crown Colonies to develop them “for the benefit of their population and for the benefit of the greater population which is outside” (Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates House of Commons, 22 August 1895: 640–44, cited in Carland, 1980).

Lord Grey, Colonial Secretary (1846–1852) in Lord John Russel’s administration said that “the surest test for the soundness of measures for the
improvement of an uncivilized people is that they should be self-sufficing. (Robinson, et al 1961).

Grey’s view had become policy by the time Chamberlain became secretary of state for the colonies in 1895. In Robinson’s word such “inherited notions of policy in mature bureaucracies sometimes carry ministers along with a logic and momentum of their own”, they believed a colonial government should “cut its coat according to the cloth of its revenue. The expenditure on a colony, not its revenues, is the best gauge of the degree of the commitment by colonial official to economic development.

Unfortunately, in the West African Department, which supervised Southern and Northern Nigeria and Lagos shared with the rest of the colonial office an odd attitude toward colonial expenditure: Obsessive penny-pinching modified by rare fits of generosity. Their major concern was that crown colony budget should balance – a familiar and opt-reported cry was that of Charles Strachey, Head of the West African Department, who said in 1905 that “estimated expenditure should be brought within estimated revenues.” If an imbalance occurred, it was a sign that the colony’s governor was not estimating properly; an error that was only acceptable if revenue exceeded expenditure. They were determined, if not actually to cut back a colony’s expenditure, then to impose on it a steady, no-growth rate of spending.

Frederick Butler, a clerk in the West African Department, frankly admitted that the colonial office’s responsibility was to throw cold water on development proposals made by the colonial governors. But in fact, the permanent officials did more than this, they actively discouraged such proposals.

There was a general rise in the money spent on public work extraordinary from 1906 to 1909. Public works extraordinary expenditure peaked during the year of the great deficit, 1909. After that, the percentage of such expenditure went down sharply and rapidly from a high of almost 22% to under 12% by 1912. See table 2. This drop shows the declining willingness of the colonial office to give priority to what Egerton had called, many years before, developmental expenditure.

However, 1912 was Egerton’s last year in southern Nigeria. He was replaced by Sir Frederick Luguard who was appointed governor-general of both southern and northern Nigeria to effect an amalgamation of the two – before leaving, Egerton made the unrepentant boast that “one of the things I am proudest of in West Africa is that I found southern Nigerian with hardly any debt and I left it with a debt of five million pounds.”

This work of engineering one country out of three colonial territories begin in 1898 with the appointment of the Selborne (or Niger) committee, which first deliberated on the matter. In its report, the committee portrayed
the administration of Nigeria as one colonial territory as a goal to be aimed at for the future, rather than achieved at once. There were two reasons for the conclusion. For one, the large territory did not have the appropriate network of communication (roads and railways) to make administration from one center possible and effective. Second, the man to head such an administration should not only have rich experience in colonial administration, but should have youth on his side because of the climate. For these reasons, the committee recommended that, for the time being the territory be split into two: a northern province (later northern Nigeria) and a maritime province (later southern Nigeria), each to be run as a separate administration, until condition would justify their amalgamation. (Uzoigwe, G.N. 1968).

Whereas the Soudan province may be said to have emerged two years later (in 1900) with the creation of the protectorate of northern Nigeria, the maritime province did not materialize until 1906 when the protectorate of southern Nigeria was amalgamated with the colony and the protectorate of Lagos. This amalgamation meant more or less the assimilation of the protectorate of southern Nigeria into the administrative methods and traditions of the colony and protectorate of Lagos, with its legalism and materialism, and with its tradition of bitter conflict and rivalry with the northern protectorate. With this move, the three traditions were reduced to two-one centered in Lagos and the other in northern Nigeria. The dangerous duality that marked the politics of colonial Nigeria and that eventually determined the structure of independent Nigeria was also born at this time.

The next stage was to see the attainment of the distant goal sketched out in 1898 by the Selbourne committee, that is, the amalgamation of the different Nigerians into one Nigeria under one administration. The reasons for this consolidation were, as all students of the subject agree, administrative convenience and economy – that is, the quest for administrative rationality and efficiency. Amalgamation would solve, or at least put into cold storage, the problem of the borders. It would rationalize railway policy by bringing the railway under one authority. It would cure the financial insolvency of northern Nigeria by making the resources of its southern neighbor fully available to it. Thus, making unnecessary further subventions from the imperial exchequer. It would rationalize administrative policy both at the centre and at the local level through uniform pattern.

The creation of northern Nigeria in 1900 was brought about by the revocation of the Royal Niger Charter; the company was reconstituted as a private firm, while the British established a protectorate over the larger part of the Sokoto Caliphate. The attitudes displayed by both sides show how at times commercial and government interests had differing agendas for the
commercial exploitation of the North and different perceptions of their respective roles vis a vis the caliphate and its people. (Swindell 1994).

The most serious rift in the European camp was the conflict between government and the Niger Company, because of the company’s monopoly position. The lack of funds and the intransigence of the company hampered the government in the early years of colonial rule; the commercial transformation that was to mark the colonial period of British control of the caliphate was slow to get underway.

The opening years of the British administration of the North were concerned with the conquest of the caliphate and the establishment of colonial rule, which meant a shift in the content and form of management from that exercised by the former Royal Niger Company. The task fell to Frederick Lugard, who was appointed High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, with the company and was a friend of Sir George Goldie, the company’s director. One of Lugard’s primary aims was to limit expenditures, since the North was denied access to the custom duties levied at the ports and hence, central funds were limited. (Swindell, 1994).

The colonial masters used this money to create infrastructure, as a means of further exploitation of what was later to be Nigeria to achieve their economic and commercial ends.

Table 1. Combined figures for southern Nigeria and Lagos the year they were amalgamated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PUBLIC WORKS</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL</th>
<th>PUBLIC WORKS EXTRAORDINARY</th>
<th>EXTRAORDINARY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL EXPENDITURE</td>
<td>REVENUE</td>
<td></td>
<td>EXPENDITURE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>£532,902</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>£1,1056,290</td>
<td>1,088,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>242,065</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>1,217,336</td>
<td>1,459,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>238,016</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>1,648,684</td>
<td>1,361,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>358,453</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>1,648,684</td>
<td>1,361,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>211,087</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>1,592,282</td>
<td>1,933,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>216,375</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>1,717,259</td>
<td>1,956,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>246,355</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>2,110,498</td>
<td>2,235,412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One of the inner dramas of colonialism was finding means to pay for itself: Colonial rule had to be cheap, which is well borne out by the early
years of Northern Nigeria. An immediate concern was to develop the North commercially while preserving the administration’s interest and what is asserted were those of Nigerian producers. The government needed the company, but the company also needed the government and both needed a reasonably satisfied Hausa-Fulani aristocracy and settled population. The company depended upon the agricultural output of the settled population in order to collect produce and in order to find a market for its goods. The government looked to the commercial development of the country in order to extract surplus from the peasantry in the form of taxes to run the administration. The introduction of coinage became one of Lugard’s primary concerns.

The Royal charter obtained by George Goldie in 1886 authorized the new Royal Niger Company (formerly the National Africa Company) to govern all territory acquired by treaties with local rulers, with the possibility of expansion through the negotiation of further treaties. The company had authority over British subjects and foreigners, and its mission was to be imperial, commercial and humanitarian (including the discouragement of domestic slavery). But nothing in the charter gave the company a monopoly of trade, and indeed article 14, forbade the differential treatment of foreigners in their access to markets. However, the company was allowed to impose custom duties to defray the costs of administration. It has been argued that this was a document conceived with deliberate ambiguity. (Swindell, 1994).

It was announced that the company would be able to collect customs, to which account the cost of treaty – making from 1881 – 1886 would be charged. The question of why the company needed political rights came the answer that treaty had to be made with native princes, and if they were backed by the authority of the charter then, this would be the means of excluding competition and further financial advantages would accrue, because the company would have the power to reduce prices paid to producers as a result of its new status as de-facto, if not de-jure monopoly trader.

The company had handed over most administrative functions to the West African Frontier Force (Led by Lugard), but it retained its right to impose customs. In effect the company was allowed to have its cake and eat it. At the time of the revocation of its charter at the end of 1899, the company was in a strong position. Goldie had managed to secure compensation of £86,000 from the British government. The company’s assets, including compensation, were worth £3 per £1 of paid – up capital. The company also managed to maintain its monopoly for several years after 1900. The reasons for the persistence of the monopoly severally, first of all, is that it possessed a large stock of goods which had been accumulated in Africa before the
British administration assumed control, and were therefore free of duty. Secondly, the infusion of new funds from the government buy-out enabled the expansion and modernization of its plan. Thirdly, the company’s stations and wharves were exempt from government charges. John Holt, whose Liverpool firm hoped to compete with the Niger Company accurately, observed that the revocation of the Charter strengthened the company’s trading position. Such was the situation in 1900 when Lugard took up his post as High Commissioner for Northern Nigeria. (Swidell, 1994).

As a means to an end, the agenda for commercial development of the protectorates was of a major priority for the Lugard amalgamation. The trans-Saharan trade linking Kano and Tripoli trade only deteriorated after the railway reached Kano in 1912. Similarly, Jega, which was second only to Kano as an entrepot, was a meeting place for caravans from Lagos, Asante, Asben and Adar. If the Maxim gun defeated the caliphate militarily it took the railway to subdue the caliphate commercially. Much of this trade was tied to Kano, which Lugard referred to as “reportedly the greatest trading emporium in Africa” (Note re: Kano, Lugard papers. Pp. 232 – 38).

Lugard also wanted to divert the Tripoli trade southwards from Kano to the river. In order for this plan to succeed, Lugard needed the assistance of the Niger Company, but he doubted whether the company had the expertise and was convinced that the Niger Company’s local agents know nothing about the caravan trade. Brigandage was also a problem, which Lugard attributed in part to the weakness of local officials who had been appointed by the former Royal Niger Company.

The limitation of competition through the amalgamation of companies purchasing produce was beneficial, as this was the means of keeping price low. While amalgamation of merchant interests had its attractions for the company. Compulsory labour, or political labour was formalized, and six days per quarter could be required of adult males. Headmen of villages were paid 10 shillings for recruitment, but if labour was not provided they were fined £50, while a fine of £1 or one month in jail was the punishment for any man who refused induction. (Sir P. Girourd, High commissioner, Northern Nigeria, to the secretary of State for the colonies, July, 2. 1907). In his political memoranda of 1906, Lugard suggested that Residents pay labour by the day, and if possible by the job done, as a means of keeping wages down (Minute by .D. Lugard on the pay of privates, July, 19 1901). As far as Lugard was concern, the key to commercial progress was a large population and a cheap labour market, on that, lugard said: “we have the first and I am doing my best to achieve the second”. (Lugard, Annual Report for Northern Nigeria, 1905 – 06. Para.128). From his perspective, Northern Nigeria compared unfavorably with India, where it was possible to “get half much gain for half as much pay”.
**Royal Niger Company as the first stage of Nigerian State**

At its first meeting on December 31, 1914 the Nigerian Council under Luguard was inspired to incorporate $6,000,000 of the British national debt into the public debt of Nigeria. British under the influence of Luguard’s Dual Mandate emphasized the obligation of the colonial power to exploit the resources of its dependency for its benefit as well as for the (few) benefit of the local population. In Nigeria, indeed, one of the main criticisms of indirect rule was the obstruction which it apparently posed and continues to poses to economic development.

Clifford considered that the role of British in the colonial economy should be limited to capital intensive areas such as marketing, transportation and processing or to economic projects where skilled management was indispensable. He also made a strange suggestion that they should establish local mills to manufacture goods “which will kill local manufacture in Nigeria.” More significant, however, was the threat which development of this type would have posed to British textile interest. Lord Milner, the secretary of the colonies reminded Clifford:

> That it is not to be supposed that mills erected in Nigeria would shut down when they had killed local competition. On the contrary, it is probable that they would then turn their attention to competing with Lancashire itself in the Nigerian and other similar markets (Milner to Clifford, May 29, 1920, cited in Cookey, 1980:545).

Supporting – even to the extent of $25,000 of southern Nigeria’s money in an abortive search for oil in that territory. England also provided a series of non-repayable monetary grants to Nigeria. These began around 1900 and by 1918 totaled nearly five million pounds. The money was primarily to meet administrative costs and for purposes of defense (Annual Reports, Northern Nigeria 1900-1911, Lagos Federal Government Printer). The grants were discontinued in 1919, and then were reinstated in 1930 on a more modest scale. From 1930 to 1945-46 just over one million pounds was given to Nigeria.

The Germans living in Nigeria were deported and their trade passed to the hands of British merchant (Luguard, Report on the Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria 1912-1919:30). In 1916 British parliament became fearful that the newly acquired trade would revert to Germany after the conclusion of the hostilities. Hence, it devised a scheme for permanently diverting these shipments to England. An export duty of two pound per ton was recommended on all palm kernels shipped from British West Africa not destined for processing within the empire. British parliament further recommended that if this duty were found “insufficient to divert the trade to this country, the amount should be raised. (Edwin 1967).
Royal Niger Company pressured native chiefs into signing away the lands occupied by their villages in order fully to insure the exclusion of competitors. The only outside merchant who successfully established themselves in the area were brought out by the company. The prices paid to the natives were so low that a considerable amount of smuggling took place and resentment rose to the point of armed attacks on the company’s trading posts. The protected position was retained until 1900 when the charter was revoked. British parliament paid the company its cost plus $150,000 as compensation. Of more potential significance, the company was given a ninety-nine year right to one-half of all royalties and rents which the government might collect on minerals mined in its former area of operation. The area in which the company retained mineral royalty rights include the whole of Nigeria’s subsequently developed tin and columbite fields. The terminal payment enabled the company to make a special distribution to its shareholders of 145 percent from 10 percent to 20 percent. (Edwin 1967).

Two specific colonial policies were instituted to protect the interest of the colonizers as the minerals began to flow from their colonial lands. First, it was decided that the land itself was not to be salable to non-Nigerians. Second, the mine operators were required to pay rent and tonnage royalties to the colonial government. The mines were owned by Europeans, the Nigerians being effectively excluded by the high capital requirement. (Ukpabi, 1970).

The average royalty paid by the mines from 1910 to 1940 was well below 10 percent. In addition to royalty payment, the operators paid rents to the colonial government, the real payment constituted about 4 percent of the value of ore won during the 1930s and about 7 percent after World War II. The colonial government retained one-half of all rent and royalty receipts and paid the other half to the corporate successor of the Royal Niger Company from which the land had been reclaimed in 1900.

Nevertheless, England’s record showed specific and not infrequent instances of willingness to subordinate the economic advantage of Nigerians to the interests of British producers and consumers, moreover, as seen by the Nigerians, the economic gains to Nigerians under the colonial and post colonial governments would seems to have been more or less continuously accompanied by even larger gains to foreigners. Much more obvious than the economic benefits of British control would be examples of legal restrictions or tolerated monopolies which appeared to exist for the sole benefit of the amalgamators. (Administration and progress in Nigeria 1914). Below is the full text of Lugard as the first governor-general of Nigeria showcasing British interest in Nigeria:
From the governor to the people of Nigeria.

"His majesty the king has decided that from today (3rd Jan. 1914, 9am) all the country from the sea to near the desert in the north, and from the French country in the west to the German Kameruns in the East, shall be one single country under Governor-General, so that there may be no jealousy or rivalry between the North and the South, and all may co-operate together for the advancement of peace and prosperity. His majesty has been pleased to appoint me, Sir. F. Lugard, as Governor-General, and by the help of God I trust that I may be able to obtain wisdom to discharge this responsible task worthily. It will be my earnest endeavour to promote peace and justice for all men, to protect everyman in the observance of his own religious faith, and to administer equal justice alike for great and small. The southern provinces, hitherto called southern Nigeria will be under the immediate charge of Mr. Boyle, C.M.G., as Lieutenant – Governor, and the northern provinces under Mr. Temple, C.M.G. as Lieutenant Governor, and the Colony of Lagos under Mr. James, C.M.G., as Administrator. These three high officers will be under my orders. The colony of Lagos will as heretofore have a legislative council, whose functions will be limited to the colony. There will also be a council for Nigeria upon which the Europeans holding highest offices in Nigeria will have seats and also natives representing each part of Nigeria. These will be nominated by me. There will also be an executive council consisting of the principal officers of the administration to assist the Governor-General with their advice. There will be one supreme court for Nigeria, and Sir Edwin Speed is appointed Chief Justice of Nigeria. I trust that under the new method of Government Nigeria will increase in prosperity and wealth, and its people in happiness."

Verbatim report of Sir F. Lugard’s inaugural speech as Nigerian Amalgamator and Governor General.(Administration and progress in Nigeria 1914).

The Colonial office felt uncomfortable with the doctrine of financial restraint, and duty bound to apply it. It was the colonial office control of colonial budgets that established the limits of colonial development. The colonial office supported amalgamation between northern and southern Nigeria for financial and developmental reasons. The forced success of the northern administrators in raising emirate revenues from new sources of trade and improved land taxes, which encouraged the British treasury to make the essential grant-in aid, until 1911, when their Lordships ruled that this largesse would come to an end and concentrated colonial office minds on administrative amalgamation. Sometimes the colonial office were innovative (for railways and amalgamation schemes); mostly they were
The study of Nigerian Federalism (or Amalgamation) is marked by sharply contrasting perspectives. Scholars sympathetic to the British cause argue that the decision to clamp a federal structure on Nigeria arose from British sensitivity to the divisive, primordial features of indigenous Nigerian society. Scholars sympathetic to the cause of Nigerian nationalism argue that the British decided on a federal structure for Nigeria in order to protect their interests by making sure that the emergent state would remain unstable and weak. Of late, a faction of the latter school has sought to stake out a claim for the primordial, federal features of indigenous Nigerian society in the making of the Nigerian Federation in order to establish that Nigerians were not, during the period in question, an inert lump, but did take some initiative in determining their own future. (Afigbo, 1991:13).

However, Nigeria is not a “federation of nations”, of “culture areas” or of “linguistic areas”. The constituent units have not been delimited as national or ethnic states. To draw attention to the reluctance and incapacity of the imperial government to delineate for its local servants any clear objectives as a result of which policy making was largely left to the man-on-the-spot. (Afigbo 1991).

Thus, by 1900, the haphazard manner in which the British pursued their interests in the area had resulted in the emergence of three blocks of colonial territory, each of which was administered separately and dealt with directly by the home government, even though they occasionally cooperated, especially when the need arose, to mobilize troops to conquer any Nigerian state or community that was seen as posing serious threat to the consolidation of British authority and the expansion of British commerce. It was basically these three colonial administrative units, with some adverse changes in boundaries in the case of the protectorate of southern Nigeria, that formed the basic building blocks of the Nigerian federal arrangement that is, its member-states regions. Each of these three colonial administration came into being purely for reasons of administrative convenience rather than out of concern for maintaining the integrity of geographic, cultural, and/or linguistic areas. It was for this reason that acrimonious disputes over their boundaries helped to contribute to the polarization of the British colonial servants in Nigeria to the point where they were no longer quite able to see and manage the affairs of Nigeria as the affairs of one people or one country (Afigbo, 1991).

Lagos and its environs were acquired in 1862, a time that was described as the age of optimism, romanticism and liberalism. For this reason, what later became the colony and protectorate of southern Nigeria, which were acquired in the 1880s, had to be constituted into protectorates in
which the British took charge of the external relations of the native states, while the rulers of these states took charge of their internal affairs – mainly the maintenance of law and order – with the advice and support of the British. This meant discarding the projected alliance with the western educated elite (where they existed) and making common cause with the traditional elite. In other word, material development was no longer considered an adequate criterion for measuring the success of an administration. Law and order, for its own sake, was becoming a sufficient end (Afigbo 1991:19).

Grooming the traditional rulers to maintain law and order in an environment protected from the rapid social and economic changes associated with English law and lawyers, missionaries and their schools, detribalized natives, and even, to some extent grasping traders, became a consuming passion of the British. Consequently, even though the three administrations subscribed to the theory and practice of indirect rule, that system became, in northern Nigeria, the main thing against almost all changes, no matter from what direction such change came. To equip it for that role, it was endowed with an elaborate philosophy and mystique some idea of which can be gained today from reading Lord Frederick Lugard’s “The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa” and C.L. Tempel’s “Native Races and their Rulers.”

**Major reasons for amalgamation as a means to an end and to ward off the French.**

There was the growth of hard feelings and suspicion among these three administrations namely, the Lagos colony southern protectorate and northern protectorate, a fact that would make the uniformed observer believe that these three (after 1906, two) neighboring colonial territories belonged not to one imperial power but to rival imperial powers. There were many sources of irritation, but only three will be mentioned here to illustrate the point that, the 1912 amalgamation was a means to end not an end in itself. First was the boundary question. The bordering shared by the three administrations in 1900 were rough and ready lines on the map drawn without any definite, systematic intent to respect the integrity of linguistic and ethnological unit or of indigenous politics, it was a display of force and power by the British suzerainty at the detriment of what was to be called a united Nigeria. Not surprisingly therefore, when each administration began to consolidate its authority and influence over the territory assigned to it, there arose rival claims to hamlet, villages, states along the borders. The protectorate of southern Nigeria had a problem with northern Nigeria in the Igala area and in southern Idoma. These problems were tame, however, compared to the intense disputes with the colony and protectorate of Lagos.
had with northern Nigeria in the Ilorin and Kabba areas. The Lagos government argued that Ilorin and Kabba were Yoruba in language and culture and were former provinces of the Oyo Empire and, thus, should be excised from northern Nigeria and added to the protectorate of Lagos.

As a means to an end, there was another source of hard feeling especially between Lagos and northern Nigeria, as was the issue of “Caravan tolls” which was also an aspect of the boundary issue because it raised the question of whether this convenient administrative line on the map should function as a custom barrier. When northern Nigeria came into existence in 1900, and because it had no access to the coast, it was decided that all goods imported into what came to be known as Nigeria should have customs duties added at the ports of Lagos and southern Nigeria and enter Northern Nigeria free of duty. The imperial government would then determine from time to time what fraction of the receipt should go to Northern Nigeria. However, in 1903, northern Nigeria instituted what it called “Caravan tolls”, which had to be paid by merchants carrying certain specified merchandise across the northern border in either direction. The Lagos administration saw this as an attempt by Lugard to kill the carrying trade between northern Nigeria and her southern neighbors, a charge that gave credence to the suspicion that Lugard wanted to channel the trade of the north, if he could, across the Sahara. Again, this led to many angry exchanges when Lugard left northern Nigeria, the tolls were abolished by the imperial authority because both northern and southern Nigeria now agreed that the tariff damaged trade, did not bring in much money and had caused other inconvenience besides. (Afigbo, 1991).

During meetings of the committee of the Africa trade section of the incorporated Chamber of Commerce, Liverpool, in January 1910, concern was expressed about the continued increased in expenditure in Nigeria, as the table below shows and lugard has sought to manipulate the commercial activity in favor of the north. It was from this revenue that the Nigerian railway was built.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1920</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Import Duties</td>
<td>£1,086,625</td>
<td>£861,692</td>
<td>£896,415</td>
<td>£1,221,150</td>
<td>£2,278,863</td>
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<tr>
<td>Export duties</td>
<td>£57,624</td>
<td>£339,639</td>
<td>£490,917</td>
<td>£612,124</td>
<td>£837,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total customs duties</td>
<td>£1,144,249</td>
<td>£1,201,331</td>
<td>£1,387,332</td>
<td>£1,833,274</td>
<td>£3,116,716</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The third source of hard feeling was rivalry over railway policy, especially between Lagos and northern Nigeria. Lagos began, in 1898, an
energetic railway construction program. By 1909, her railway reached the Niger at Jebba. In 1907, and with financial support from the colony and protectorate of southern Nigeria, northern Nigeria began building a railway line to link Baro and Kano. The northern and southern lines soon met at Minna, but northern Nigeria insisted on continuing its line in Baro in order to use the Niger as its main port of entry, thus side-tracking Lagos. Lagos resisted this because it wanted to capture the carrying trade of the vast Northern Nigeria hinterland. This led to the paralyzing conflict that had to be settled by the intervention of the imperial government, which ruled in favor of the amalgamation of the two territories under one administration as a way of either solving or side-tracking this and other problem. (Afigbo 1971).

With this background, it is now easy to understand how and why the work of engineering the political and constitutional structure of the country was done the way it was. (Afigbo, 1991).

Sound as the argument for amalgamation were on paper, the actual implementation further entrenched the conflict and rivalry between the northern and southern administrations. First, Luguard, who had been party to these conflicts and who made no secrets of his belief that northern administrative traditions and practices were in all respects superior to those of the south, was chosen as governor and amalgamator. To protect this heritage of which he was very proud, Lugard dismissed with a wave of the hand all suggestions that the two protectorates be broken into smaller units and all effectively brought under the central government. Instead, he created a Lagos province, which he placed under an administrator, and then placed each of the two protectorates under a Lieutenant – governor, each of whom was appointed by the imperial government. Each Lieutenant-governor had his own secretariat through which he controlled the political, medical, public works, forestry, agriculture, education, prisons, and mines department. The Lieutenant – governor of southern provinces had, in addition, control over the maritime, customs, and printing departments. The governor-general had under his direct control the railway (including the colliery), the army, the audit, the treasury, post and telegraphs, the judiciary, and, from 1919, the geological survey. To help him in his work, he had the colonial secretary. In other words, in Luguard’s scheme of amalgamation, it was governor or governor-general who united the two groups of provinces or the two former protectorates. There was no central secretariat properly so-called, and no central legislative council. Under this structure, the north was able to pursue its chosen path of separate development.

Luguard went further to extend to the south the system of indirect rule that he introduced in the north and which his able Lieutenants, such as C.L. Temple, had further entrenched and converted into a kind of administrative fetish. He introduced into the south the supreme and
protectorate courts ordinance of the north in a bid to control the influence of Lawyers and English legal practice there. He introduced an amended version of the Native Courts Ordinance to bring the native court system of the south closer to what he was accustomed to in the north. He also sought to impose the Native Revenue Ordinance as a basis for introducing direct taxation along northern lines. However, he was prevented by the colonial office from doing so universally in the south. He could introduce it only in Yorubaland, but even there he had to deal with serious anti-tax riots in Abeokuta in 1918. Furthermore, before he took some of these steps, he sent his inspector of native revenue, H.R. Palmer (a third-class resident from the north), to report to him on the system of native administration then obtaining in the south. Palmer produced a wholesale condemnation of the system. These proceedings infuriated and alienated the officers of the old southern Nigeria administration who saw themselves and the system they had labored so hard to build as being written off as worthless. The result was that many of them adopted an attitude of passive resistance to Luguard and his reforms.

In other word, amalgamation, when it came and because of the way in which it was implemented, consolidated the tradition of emotional and psychological distance between the northern and southern administrations. Lugard’s attempt to construct Nigerian unity on the basis of uniform systems of indirect rule failed, but this did not deter his ablest Lieutenants in the north from continuing to put forward the same gambit in the future.(Afigbo 1991).

The Pattern of Amalgamation, 1898-1919

The British expansion in Nigeria became increasingly ad hoc and pragmatic after 1880, straying further away from earlier notions of nation-building on the Niger. Two major occasions arose for broad structural planning, but in both the Selbourne committee report of 1898 and Luguard’s amalgamation of 1914 the motivation for reorganization was narrow and the conceptions of design were correspondingly narrow. In 1898 the problem of replacing the Royal Niger Company’s administration of Northern Nigeria raised the first opportunity for laying down British policy in Nigeria as a whole. Joseph Chamberlain, who had himself made the first attempt to design a coherent policy of colonial development, appointed the Selbourne committee to consider the future administration in Nigeria. The committee agreed on the financial desirability of uniting British acquisitions in Nigeria once communication permitted, and it favoured an administrative policy making use of existing African political institutions so as to keep British expenses at a minimum. The stress was an immediate problems and their solution at a minimum cost. In the event, Nigeria was left in three separate parts, by 1906 reduced to two units, northern and southern Nigeria, and in
1912 placed under Luguard’s single administration in anticipation of amalgamation.

Sir Frederick Lugard, as first High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria, decided unilaterally upon the military conquest of major Fulani Emirates. Then, over extended in staff and finance, and already pre-disposed towards building upon the elaborate emirate systems of administration and taxation, Lugard developed a set of administrative policies based on the experience of his residents, policies which became known as the system of indirect rule.

In southern Nigeria, on the other hand, long-term contact with Europe had created an educated African professional and entrepreneurial class at Lagos, as well as thriving foreign trade which supported the extension of railways, commerce and administration of the interior. Lugard himself, returning as Governor General of Nigeria in 1912, characterized the divergent policies of the two units: “that of Northern Nigeria may be described as a native policy whose main was primarily administrative, while that of southern Nigeria was commercial, and directed primarily to the development of natural resources and trade” (Kirk-Greene, 1968:225)

In appointing Luguard to plan and direct the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, the colonial office was concerned to combine the North’s financial deficit with south’s annual surplus, and to unify competing railway networks. Within these limited goals, Luguard was free to shape his own arrangements. He conceived his task as one primarily of unifying the laws and administrative practice of North and South, and, although he talked of taking the best from both, the North was ostensibly much as he had left it in 1906 while the south, for Luguard, was an “Augean Stables” of administrative chaos. He swept away the southern provinces, court and legislative council, as well as the variety of native administrative systems, and in their place erected a scaffolding of institutions and legislation based on those he had developed in the North: Centralized native administrations supervised by presidents responsible to a chief, executive untrammeled by legislative or judicial restrictions.

If Luguard’s experiences in the North decide the content of amalgamation as it affected the south, it was his personal convenience and working habits which dictated the superstructure of amalgamated Nigeria. Disdainful and determined to maintain his ‘scheme of continuous administration’ under which he remained in active command though spending half of each year in England, Luguard imposed one-man amalgamation. Proposals for re-dividing Northern and Southern Nigeria into units of greater ethnic and economic coherence were rejected since they would each have broken the continuity of the existing institutions, upon which Luguard’s one-man control depended. (Kirk-Greene1968). Thus, there
was minimal amalgamation of institutions, providing initially for unification of only the transport and communication departments, the military forces, and emasculated Supreme Court, and a purely advisory Nigerian council, meeting three days annually. The colonial office insisted also upon unification of the treasury, despite Lugard’s objections that this would undermine the integrity of the separate administration in North and South.

That Lugard saw his system of amalgamation as definitive is clear from the finality of tone of his political memoranda of 1918, laying down instructions on all subjects to administrative officers, and his “Amalgamation Report”, written on his retirement in 1919. But both were essentially practical administrative blueprints, and even in his rationalizing statement of 1922, “The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa” Lugard refrained from long-range political and constitutional projections. Thus, in the very process of law-giving, Lugard’s approach was essentially pragmatic, concerned with the immediate. By the time he left Nigeria, he had ensured that indirect rule was orthodox policy in Nigeria, but the content of indirect rule was still open to wide variation in application and in its ultimate purpose was undecided.

As a means to an end, the Lugard successor, Clifford had this to say on assuming office:

If the ideal at which we should aim is, as I hold it should be, the eventual evolution, not only of an “amalgamated”, but of a united Nigeria, it is essential that the co-ordination of all administrative work, political and non-political alike, should be directed from a single centre... co-ordination does not mean uniformity; the past few years have seen an attempt at uniformity with mischievous results... uniformity has been sought by endeavoring to level down the southern provinces rather than by leveling up the northern provinces... unless the northern provinces of Nigeria are to remain unique among the tropical possessions of the British Empire, as a country where free immigration is not welcomed, where commerce is suspect and subject to hampering restrictions, and where administration and the opening up of the country are recognized as mutually destructive and incompatible activities, the inspiration and impulsion that will bring about the necessary changes in facts and in ideas in this part of Nigeria must come from the central government at Lagos. It would be idle to look for it from the little bureaucracy at Kaduna, the spirit of which is well illustrated by the fact that it has been carefully segregated from all the political and commercial life, even of the Northern provinces (Clifford to Milner, 3 Dec., 1919 cited in Ballard 1971).
Lord Milner, the British Secretary of State, agreed to only half of the scheme. He recognized the need for a strong central secretariat and was willing to accept that Lagos, rather than Luguard’s choice, Kaduna, should remain Nigeria’s capital, but he refused to abolish the Lieutenant Governors and put “the whole vast country under a single pooh-Bah, with only superior clerks to help him.” As for indirect rule, he felt “the Luguardian system” should be upheld in the North, seeing no reason why this should prove incompatible with encouraging development of resources of the country (Minute by Milner, 29 May, 1920 cited in Ballard, 1971).

Bourdillon issued a “memorandum on the future political development of Nigeria”, as a basis for further discussion, Bourdillon, who had been appointed governor of Sudan intended this as farewell contribution, but the beginning of the second world war prevented his moving and he stayed on as governor and as chairman of the West African Governors’ Conference. Consequently, the pattern of Luguard’s governor-generalship, that of imposing some measure of amalgamation upon a resistant north, was repeated by each successive governor with varying degree of determination and success.

The two problems which Luguard did not deal with – provincial regrouping and future constitutional development – where those which his successors also found easier to avoid than to confront. The expenses of relocation and of the reorganization of staff and files were sufficient to delay the long mooted separation of eastern and western provinces for almost two decades, and two years were required to implement the decision once it was firmly decided upon. Constitutional development on the basis of a united Nigeria was certain to conflict with the one closely guarded dogma around which many decisions were forced to turn, that of the recived tradition of indirect rule in the Northern provinces. The result was that the Richards constitution echoed Luguard’s scheme of amalgamation in shaping the constitutional and administrative superstructure of Nigeria to fit a conception of local native administration through regionalism as a means to end in British’s favour.(Olukoju, 1995).

The Political economy of Nigerian amalgamation

Although scholars acknowledge the centrality of the state in the colonies, (Smith 1979).They differ on the characterization of its role in the contest between indigenous and expatriate economic interests in the colonies. The conventional view (Crowder, 1968:305) depicts the colonial state as the “Great White Empire” which limited itself to mediating between these competing interests. The opposing school of thought (Rodney 1972) posits that the colonial state was interventionists; it collaborated with expatriate business groups to exploit the colonies in the imperial interest. The weight of
empirical evidence clearly tips the scales in favor of the latter position but the relationship between these dominant actors in the colonial economies was much more complex than this. It is characterized in Nigerian case by crisis and contradictions.

The business community in colonial Nigeria comprised three major (essentially racial) groups – Europeans, Africans and Asians. Members of the first group, drawn from Britain, France, Holland, Germany and Austro-Hungary, had commercial relations with Nigeria since the fifteenth century. They made the transition from the slave to trade in the nineteenth century and, by the opening decade of the twentieth, had established wide-ranging enterprise in merchandise trading, shipping, commercial banking and mining. (Ekundere, 1972). This group of traders dominated the colonial economy given the huge capital at their disposal and their affinity with imperial power.

The second group, comprising the Asians, included the Levantines – Syrians, Lebanese and Greeks – Indians and Japanese. Though North African Arabs had settled in Kano in Northern Nigeria from the fifteenth century and had dominated the Kano- Tripoli trade, the impact of the Levantines was greatest only in the present century. As from the 1920s, they offered an effective challenge to the European firms in the distributive trade of Nigeria. (Falola, 1990).

African traders were the most numerous but the least influential in the business community. Hence, it was not until 1929 that the Lagos chamber of commerce produced its first African President, Peter Thomas. Most African traders were importers as there were severe constraints on their entry into the produce export trade. Very few Africans were engaged in the direct export trade owing to the greater risk involved in the produce trade, their lack of access to substantial capital, and the intense competition in the business.

The European group was not monolithic as there were different nationalities and variety of business interests, secondly, the firms also varied in size from small sole proprietorships to joint stock companies. This reflected the size of capital they controlled. Until the twentieth century, there was virtually no vertical integration among them but the tendency to combine became manifest in the century as the case of the Royal Niger Company exemplified. (Flint, 1960). On the eve of the First World War, the company had become the “effective king of the Jos Plateau tin field” in Northern Nigeria, and was able “to raise it capitalization from $500,000 to $3,000,000.” (Freund 1981:111). It was later purchased in 1920 by Lever Brothers, the soap manufacturers, for $8 million. The combination of the Royal Niger Company and Lever Brothers, in the words of Lord Leverhulme himself, brought “the largest exporter of raw material in Nigeria into
combination with the largest manufacturer of our principal products. By 1929, John Holt was the only surviving independent British firm of substance in Nigeria.

The pre-eminence of the Niger Company in the tin mining industry was replicated by that of Elder Dempster in the shipping industry. Elder Dempster and Woermann Linie of Germany were in firm control of the West African trade by means of their deferred rebates and control of lighterage services which effectively excluded competitors, especially tramp shipping. The banking business was dominated by Bank of British West Africa (BBWA) which was established in 1894. It contended with competition from the Bank of Nigeria and the colonial Bank with great success, and was the sole supplier of coinage until the establishment in 1912 of the West African Currency Board. Although there were cleavages within the business community on the basis of differences in nationality and competing interest the merchants did achieve consensus on issues of common interest. Hence, regardless of their differences, they formed chambers of commerce and utilized these and other platforms to ventilate their views in Britain and Nigeria as a means to an end.

It should be noted that the colonial chambers were mere appendages of the metropolitan ones and had a limited scope for independent action. This prompted Frederick Luguard to lament that there was “no chamber which can promptly voice the opinion of the commercial community” (Kirk-Green 1968:105). In this connection, fiscal policy was designed to achieve trade and commercial goal as tariffs were used to channel produce to the mother country.

The interaction between the colonial state, postcolonial state and business were characterized by tension and contradiction, while the government, for example, favoured open competitions to raise prices which would boost producers’ purchasing power and, by extension, the volume of imports and government’s revenue from import duties, the business community derived greater profits from import duties, the business community derived greater profits from the operation of pools or price-cutting arrangement. However, the question of taxation, more than any other, generated open conflict between both parties because of their irreconcilable positions. Taxation was the lifeblood of the colonial state but it was the veritable scourge of the merchants. The latter resented any form of official intervention in business which taxation epitomized and it is in this context that the sustained opposition to the export duties during this period has to be appreciated. This classical laissez-faire attitude exploited Nigeria then as now.

We should note, however, that certain measure of subservience to metropolitan interests was and is evident in certain actions of Nigerian state.
Punitive expedition: some of these nationalists accused the British government of all kinds of military crime and held it responsible for the lack of economic development and scanty population which, they contended, originated from the depredations of British troops. Some Nigerians has since been clamoring for Repatriation claims.

Joseph Chamberlain was the colonial secretary who was quoted in 1895 addressing the British parliament that “expedition were the only system of civilizing and practically of developing the trade of Africa. (Ukpabi, 1970, 1970:384) in his view, the only way in which all the evils which desolated Africa in the past could be wiped out by the use of force. (proceeding of the Royal Colonial Institute, Vol. xxvii, 1897-7, Annual Dinner, 31 March, 1897:236-7). When he was assailed in parliament for raising the West African Frontier force, he pointed out that, in future, this force would be the instrument for bringing recalcitrant Africans to order.

As a means to an end, the amalgamators see themselves as the vanguard of civilization that should spare no effort in bringing their colonies under control, the end being an increase in trade and the orderly government of the subject people. It was hardly surprising therefore that the colonial annual reports generally began with an exhaustive analysis of trade prospect in each colony, for the governors themselves genuinely believe that a prerequisite for efficient and satisfactory administration (which in turn would lead to the material advancement of the governed) was flourishing commercial enterprise which would also increase the revenue of the government.

Table 2. Southern Nigeria: Revenue and Expenditure, 1900-1913

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Surplus/Deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>£535,902</td>
<td>£424,257</td>
<td>£+111,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>606,431</td>
<td>564,818</td>
<td>+41,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>801,737</td>
<td>619,687</td>
<td>+186,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>760,230</td>
<td>757,953</td>
<td>+2,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>888,123</td>
<td>863,917</td>
<td>+24,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>954,748</td>
<td>998,564</td>
<td>-46,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1,088,717</td>
<td>1,056,290</td>
<td>+32,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>1,459,554</td>
<td>1,217,336</td>
<td>+242,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>1,387,975</td>
<td>1,357,763</td>
<td>+30,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>1,361,891</td>
<td>1,648,684</td>
<td>-286,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,933,235</td>
<td>1,592,282</td>
<td>+340,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1,956,170</td>
<td>1,717,259</td>
<td>+238,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>2,235,214</td>
<td>2,410,498</td>
<td>+124,914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>2,668,198</td>
<td>2,096,311</td>
<td>+571,887</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Colonial Reports-Annual: Southern Nigeria, 1907-1912.
Therefore effort made by the inhabitants to interdict trade and to close the trade route were always frowned upon by governors, who did not hesitate to take military action even before all peaceful means had been explored. The Ijebu war of 1892 was necessary, in Carter’s view, in order to open the trade routes. Similarly Moor, the high commissioner of southern Nigeria, did not allow passing unnoticed the efforts of the Aros to preserve their status as middlemen and to prevent the agents of the colonial government from gaining access to the hinterland. In Northern Nigeria, Lugard and his officials viewed the action of the Emirs in closing the trade routes with resentment, and used it as a cause of war. (Edwin1967).

**Socio-Economic Consequences Of Amalgamation In Post Amalgamated Nigeria**

In Nigeria, secessionist threats or separatist agitations, have been attributable to a number of factors – the country’s heterogeneous ethnic composition, cultural diversity, vast size, difficulties of transport and communications, carried administrative practices, and controversial political and constitutional arrangements, beside all the problems connected with the introduction of federalism, personality clashes between Nigerian leaders before and after independence, and the absence of a strong ideological magnet. (Takena, 1970).

Up to May 1906, the British authority had totally different administrative structures to the East, West and North of the Nigeria. But the 1914 Amalgamation, which tried to remedy these defects, created problems of its own. This is a rough demarcation. The internal boundaries of the three British administrations in Nigeria were much more complicated than that. Erroneously, these boundaries later gave rise to ideas of national internal demarcation, particularly during the period of the Biafra agitation. Some prominent Nigerians has since lamented about amalgamation, example, Sardauna called the amalgamation of Nigeria as a “mistake of 1914”. And the rejection was on economic grounds. (Bello,1962:133-135).

In a special contribution to the Africa supplement of the New York Times in 1968. Gowon stressed that: “There is no alternative to Federation of Nigeria. The only possible alternative fo several armed group in the country … Nigerians are, therefore, fighting to ensure that, long after the present ugly events shall have passed into history, there shall remain a strong forward – looking and prosperous Nigeria. A Nigeria which will then be assured of the stability necessary for economic development to uplift the dignity of man in this part of the world. (Fed. Mins. of Info. Soldier of Honor Lagos 1968 pp. 27 at 22 – 3).

Nigeria in the post-independence years has seen its share of hardship. Politically dominated by military dictatorships, economically dominated by
internal ethnic tensions and external stereotyping, Nigeria certainly seems to have suffered from an over abundance of problems and a dearth of solution in the last fifty plus year.

Inter-reliance was so profound that boundaries were fluid, and cultural overlap was on such a level that it was impossible to tell geographically were one group of people ended and another begin.

Formal British colonialism brought permanent transformation to Nigerian identity formation by creating arbitrary and illegitimate boundaries in the region, partly due to the fact that British knowledge of Nigerian societies was not comprehensive or entirely accurate, but partly because even if their knowledge had been comprehensive and accurate they would have found it difficult to tell where one significantly distinct group of people ended and another began.

The amalgamation of the Northern and southern Provinces in 1914 and the extension of indirect rule from the Northern provinces into the southern provinces contributed to ineffective colonial rule in Nigeria and laid the foundation for many of the problems that Nigeria experiences even today.

Afigbo criticized Luguard’s indirect rule as adamantly opposed to Europeanizing Nigerians, and so did not focus heavily on development or western education. Unfortunately, Luguard’s system also failed in its sacrosanct goal to protect the traditional cultures of southern Nigeria. Luguard had perfected his brand of indirect rule in northern Nigeria, forming it around longstanding Islamic institutions of governance. He believed that this system should be adopted to administer the non-Muslim societies of southern Nigeria, without considering the significant cultural differences between these two regions. Luguard’s indirect rule also failed to take into consideration the cultural differences within southern Nigeria, and made no allowance for local circumstances to influence variations in the policies of indirect rule.

In effect, what Luguard did in the south was to substitute a form of alien governance based on western ideals with a different form of alien governance based on Islamic method imported from the north, but without providing the means for general indigenous population to make sense of it. Under the indirect rule, the local indigenous elite still had to do business with British administrators through an inorganic process, yet no attempt was made to reorganize the indigenous social structure so that the average person could understand the newly-imposed political process as per the goals of the original progressive colonial administrations in southeastern Nigeria. In many cases, the elite chosen by the British to rule a given area had no traditional claim to such authority, a significant transformation of the political structure. This unlikeing of the general population from the local elite
resulted in an administrative system almost completely disengaged from the needs of the populations whose political and cultural tradition it was supposed to be preserving. These became the new political tradition of Nigeria, and exist to this day according to Afigbo.

Overtime, more and more privileged youth received the benefit of western education, but the British regime of indirect rule never intended it to be available to the entire Nigerian population. Western education was seen as a necessary evil that created the indigenous middlemen necessary to maintain the “empire on the cheap” philosophy behind indirect rule.

The Nigerian elite continue to rely on Europe and the United States for solutions to Nigeria’s problems. This is the root problem that must be remedied in order for Nigeria to improve its political and economic prospects for the future. Because there is a direct link between the political and cultural transformation of the Nigerian elite created by indirect rule, and the crisis of underdevelopment that plagues Nigeria today. And colonialism is not to be blamed for all Nigeria’s contemporary problems. (Afigbo, 1991).

The main problem, however, is that Nigeria while continuing to blame many of its problems on its historical relationship of dependence on the west, continues to seek answers to its problems from the very places that it claim caused those problems in the first place. In government, this reliance on western methods has resulted in failed policy after failed policy. In academics, it has tended to recreate Nigeria’s past in a way that conforms to European models of state development and empire-making, while focusing too heavily on the role of large kingdoms in the development of precolonial societies.

The stratified ethnic identities entrenched by colonial rule have stunted political discourse in Nigeria and have caused many Nigerian to believe that they have clear, present and longstanding enemies within Nigeria’s borders, and therefore more responsibility to the survival of their lineage than their country. This is attributable in part, for poor service extension in the public sector, and hints that it also contributes to the generally slow pace of development in Nigeria.

The problem with indirect rule is that it was not only based on a static conception of traditional society, but that it thought that society could be kept static and that change could be carefully controlled. The very effort to control society and the process of change removed the chief from the restraints of the traditional political processes and transformed him into a bureaucrat. In fact, what emerges from this fine collection is a pattern of constant change before, during and after colonial period.

Loyalty to the crown and belief in British values were upheld by even the fieriest early nationalists, of whom Herbert Macaulay is an excellent example. He was a constant thorn in the side of authority from 1908 till his
death in 1946. Yet in the constitution of Nigeria’s first political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party, founded by him in 1923 as a climax to various triumphs won in the immediate post-war years, party’s objects are described thus:

“To secure the safety or welfare of the people of the colony and protectorate of Nigeria as an integral part of the British imperial commonwealth and to carry the banner of “Right, Truth, Liberty and Justice” to the empyrean heights of democracy, until the realization of its ambitious role of “A government of the people, by the people, for the people”... and, at the same time, to maintain an attitude of unswerving loyalty to the throne and person of His majesty the King Emperor, by being strictly constitutional in the adoption of its methods and general procedure.(Coleman,1960).

Designed in large part by Frederick Lugard to incorporate northern Emirs into indirect rule durbars were typically described as dazzling spectacles, featuring traditional rulers, caparisoned entourages, and regimented colonial fighting forces. An usually rich description by Lugard himself of a durbar staged in 1913, however, reveals not just the aesthetics of imperial authority, but a deeper visual logic of mutual recognition which brought the structures and categories of the colonial encounter into negotiated alignment... In mimic warfare to celebrate their protection under colonial eyes, the African contingent of native administration were this brought to a central viewing stand where they were officially recognized by the colonial state ‘in order to importance’. The colonial durbar was a ritual of rebellion signaling potential opposition while confirming allegiance to colonial authority. It was the emirs and chiefs who recognized the colonial state by their very acts of ultimate subservience. (Apter, 2002).This prompted( Kirk-Greene 1989) to argue that, the situation led to “the colonial administration of native races and their rulers into a celebration of native rulers and their races.

From the perspective of empire, the colonial durbar provided a visible evidence of a successful implementation of indirect rule (Apter, 2002).

After a close examination of the Nature treasury (by the colonial treasury), designed to inculcate a sense of fiduciary responsibility, so essential to the exercise of self-government, the conclusion is reached that: ‘the native treasury is an attempt to make a working connection across the wide gulf which separates African societies from the material progress of the western world.Even the primitive pagan appreciates the rendition of a portion of his tax for local expenditure.

The attempt to graduate the native tax on the principle of “capacity to pay” is of special interest.” In Ibadan, taxation average about 8 shillings per
male adult though some of the most wealthy citizens are women the tax-revenue is about 80,000 of which 60 percent is taken by the Native Authority it is collected with smoothness and regularly by honest officials, due to “the policy of first, and of preserving traditional functions” (Lugard, 1922).

Upon these diversities powerful new economic forces have been imposed. The land must now produce crop for export, to pay the cost of European Government, and for the ever increasing imports which have now become necessities.

Indirect Rule recognized tribal institutions as the basis of a slow and gradual evolution and Lugard found the bitterest resentment among whose co-operation is essential to the success of their rule. Ikimi, (1971).

How much did colonial regimes interfere with or ignore traditional succession rules? How much did they alter with traditional frontiers and functions and how did colonial rule affect the chiefs popularity and economic position reflects a concern for legitimacy and continuity more than with changes introduced by both colonial rule and independence. The concern with continuity indicates that chiefs remain an important group in Nigeria and are seen as the embodiment of a traditional political order. The question of how to treat chiefs still stirs passion.

Conclusion

In pre-amalgamation Nigeria, there was the uncoordinated manner in which the British dominion in the area asserted due to the vagaries of imperial politics, during the amalgamation, the method, pattern and politics of amalgamation adopted in 1906 and 1914 helped to entrench further the differences that had developed among the separate administrative units. It was a means to an end in favour of the imperial power at the detriment of the natives. In the post amalgamation the rivalry and suspicion still exist as can be seen in the personal animosities of the chief actors.

During the crucial period beginning from Lugaurd’s amalgamation of 1914, the threat of secession had come from all parts of the country except the mid west, which became a distinct region later state only in 1963. That threat was in some cases a result of unwelcome aspects of political and constitutional arrangements: For example, the opposition of northern emirs to the 1914 amalgamation, the A.G. disapproval of the status of the federal territory of Lagos; the N.P.C. reaction to the self government-in-1956 motion, and the resultant Kano riot and the creation of new states in May 1967. The NCNC leaders who threatened secession had other grievances, which arose from the controversial election of 1964 and 1965. The disaffected Tiv, for whom Sha’bu demanded secession in 1965, felt that they were unwanted and unprotected persons in the former northern region. The proclamation of the abortive Delta Peoples Republic in February 1966 was
intended to allay long standing ethnic minority fears and grievances among the Rivers people before the creation of more states. The Ibo-inspired and largely Ibo-led ‘Biafra’ movement between 30 May 1967 and 11 January 1970 provided yet another crucial test for the solidarity of a culturally heterogenous, newly emergent African state as a constraints of amalgamation. (Takena, 1970).

By introducing regionalization into Nigeria and reversing the earlier British policy of unity and centralization symbolized by the amalgamation of 1914, that constitution largely fanned the flame of ethno-centricism and ethnic rivalry which lie at the root of the Nigerian Civil War. Even as amalgamation has brought Nigeria as a composite and geographic reality to which Nigerians can lay claims as their home and attendant infrastructure and despite the centrifugal forces, the centripetal initiatives continue to elude both the British benefactor and Nigerian leaders at the detriment of the citizens, as ethnic politics, religiosity, border disputes, economic mismanagement and political corruption, resultant from amalgamation of Lagos colony, southern protectorate and northern protectorate, has conspire to shift Nigeria to the brink of collapsing.

References:


