Between Secularist and Jihadist Bodes, Egypt and Sudan in Crossroads

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Abstract

The societal conflicts between Secularist groups and Jihadist militants on the role religious orientations played in the state democratization, social justice, human rights, and population development posited national exigencies un-decisively met by governments of the African and Arab regions. Part one of our research theorized three typologies shaping the challenges of similar conflicts in the Arab-African states of Egypt and Sudan. The typologies symbolized a Sufi culture perpetuating Muslims’ humanitarian relations; Secularist thought excluding the politics of faith; and Jihadist reactionaries manipulating symbolic representation of religion in the striving for power domains. Lacking in serenity the Sufi culture maintained for ages by popular prevalence, the Jihadist reactionaries sponsored a theocratic militancy that generated instability by excessive violence. Entrenched in non-democratic authoritative systems, the state failed in both countries to end peacefully the deepened tensions of the ongoing contradictions. Preserving the popular culture and supporting democratic governance, the Sufi/Secularist groups would probably continue to resist the theocratic dogma that evidently penetrated the region. Part two of the research proposed a study on the typologies’ dynamics to project the extent of political integrity in the future of Sudan and Egypt. This paper comprised a brief summary of part one of the analysis.

Keywords: Societal conflict – Jihadist – Secularist – Sufi – social justice – human rights - democratization – population – development

Introduction

This research consisted of two parts: 1) analyzing a societal conflict in Egypt and Sudan in religious, political, and developmental terms; and 2) proposing a follow-up field research to rationalize a predictable future from the findings. In introduction, Part one discussed major features of the state’s hegemony over societal relations, and popular uprisings in the African and
Arab regions. Part one would briefly inform about the research significance and objectives; the Jihadist (also reactionaries), Secularist, and Sufi movements; issues of societal inequalities; the escalated ideological confrontations; and conclusions.

The unabated conflicts between governments and communities to remedy the tensions on social injustices and anti-democratic governance, as well as the quest for social stability and even development moved largely African countries, including the Arab League states of Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Somalia, Sudan and Libya, unto the 21st century with much more difficulties than they had experienced in the 20th century. Moreover in Syria, the civil war soaked the country in brutal ferocities alongside multiple diplomatic and military actions by Iran, Russia, France, the United States, and Turkey. This state of affairs was a symptom of deep striving for societal equalities and social justice in all aspects of life. The United Nations, the African Union, and the Arab League emphasized the terrorist side of the escalated tensions between governments and the contending parties. Security Council Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006) recommended “tackling the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; preventing and combating terrorism; and ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law while countering terrorism.” On December 15th, 2015, 34 Saudi-led Muslim nations joined a military alliance to fight terrorism; Iran, Iraq, and Syria did not join the alliance (BBC News, 2015). Nonetheless, the situation moved on to a ceaseless war.

This global crisis had been erupting over an East-West ideological differential and a developmental ridge accumulating for decades in the post-war era of the 20th century up to contemporary decades of the 21st century. In the 1990s, it was evident that African societies, communities and families, held stronger coherency and integrity than their ruling states: ‘Irrelevant to others,’ the persistence of grinding poverty, ethno-regional cleavages, and the cult of presidents for life reduced Africa to “a symbolic presence on the world stage… On the global level, African governments lack resources and are perceived as ineffective, corrupt, and undemocratic” (Bradshaw & Wallace, 1997:83). Oil discoveries swelled some states in corruption and civil wars. By 2000s, the common denominator of prevailing contradictions pointed to a mounting trend of unprecedented struggles between militant groups and the systems of rule in Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Mali, Congo and Niger, etc.

In the Middle East and North African “Arab Spring” movements, the state with bureaucratic structures, influential functions, and authoritative managers had been a key stimulus of the events that led to massive popular movements and an actual mover of the consequences that resulted in the harassment of labor by new bureaucratic managements. This occurred instead of new state structures that revolutionaries anticipated eagerly in accordance
with Marx’s prophesy. Formal power structures transcended the traditional and charismatic models of authority by excessive bureaucratization, as Max Weber would have firmly professed, since “the inhumane rationalizing trends of the modern world order could not be brushed aside by a political movement” (Ashley & Orenstein, 2001:247). Being the most overbearing power, apart from civil militancy, the same and one state structures and managerial sectors were also heirs of the revolutionary climates the disenchanted labor originated and took to the streets after generations of suppressed unions, only to prepare the grounds for a new take-over by adaptive governmental rupture in the absence of a well-orchestrated political juncture.

This portrayal was not confined to a single country in the Arab region; it was indeed accommodative of the Arab Spring chain that exploded in Tunisia, moved unto neighboring nations, and went as far as Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and Sudan in varying degrees (Davis, 2013; Gana, 2013). There were certainly earlier uprisings among these and other Muslim nations (Hafez, 2003) exhibiting “individual characteristics” of each case from earlier times (Moore, 1970); nevertheless, the commonalities of culture, social structure, and state functions in these societies made it possible to focus closely on Egypt, the biggest population of the Arab nations, to analyze major features of the spring popular uprisings, as well as Sudan, the biggest country in African space (before independence of South Sudan in 2011), whose popular movements continued unrelentingly to resist succeeding dictatorial regimes from within a few years after the country’s independence in 1956 up to the current dictatorshipship (1989 to the present).

We reflected our research project closely on Egypt and Sudan – Arab-African peoples sharing long periods of political melees to attain a democratic life free from despotism of the single-party single-candidate presidential systems (Ibrahim, 1996; Lobban Jr., 2010; Davis, 2013). The World Bank (2016) located the two countries among the lower middle income African nations. There were obvious variations, however, in the population size (EG 89.58 million; SU 39.35 million); urban population (EG 43%, SU 34% of total); economic status (EG GDP at market price $301.5 billion at 2.2% annual growth; SU $73.81 billion at 3.1% annual growth); and industry (EG 39% of GDP; SU 20.4%); but they shared similar agriculture percent of GDP (EG 11.1; SU 10.5). Education, health, life expectancy at birth, and poverty indicators showed some similarities and a few differences: EG’s adult literacy, 15 + years both sexes, was 75 by 2013; SU’s was 74; SU’s health expenditure was 8.4% of GDP; EG’s 5.6%; EG’s life expectancy at birth total years was 71; SU’s was 63 years. EG external debt (first quarter of 2016) $53.4b total; and SU’s was $45.1b by end of 2013. EG’s poverty trend by national standard, headcount ratio% was 25.2 by 2010 whereas SU’s ratio was 46.5.
Sharing long centuries of ancient relationships, River Nile geopolitics and colonial history, Egypt (in agreement with Great Britain) granted Sudan the right to self-determination in 1955. The two nations collaborated closely during the national liberation movement in the Arab and African regions throughout the Cold War Era, and exercised political attempts with little success to become a unified state by al-Takamul (economic integration) agreements. The advent of the Jihadist military rule in Sudan since 1989 marked a deteriorating trend in the political and diplomatic relations. The U.S. Department of State’s fact sheet (2015) stated that “Sudan established links with international terrorist organizations resulting in the United States to designation of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993.” An assassination attempt on president Mubarak in Addis Ababa (June 25, 1995) was directly linked with Khartoum (Reeves, 2004); and later in 2009, the international Criminal Court (2010) accused Omer al-Bashir, the Brotherhood’s coup leader and state president, of crimes against humanity in Darfur.

Following a popular uprising that toppled Mubarak, the enthusiasm of Khartoum to support the Jihadist successor colored the bilateral relations with suspicions and caution, despite recent coordination to come to agreement on Ethiopia’s dam across the Blue Nile, the vibrant tributary of the River Nile. Earlier in 1978, Sudan honored the Camp David’s peace agreement of Egypt with Israel and allowed mass flights of the Falasha Jews to Israel (National Public Radio, 2013). Although never normalized, the Sudanese-Israeli relations worsened along the Red Sea coast by Israeli air attacks on arms cargo claimed to have been shipped from Sudan to Hamas in Gaza, and the killing of civilians in Port Sudan. BBC News (2011) reported “The then Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, appeared to give credence to the idea that Israel was involved in the attack” and the New York Times (2011) informed that Sudan “would take the issue to the United Nations Security Council.” The Sudanese-Egyptian borders postulated unrelenting national issues, especially a chronic dispute since 1955 over the eastern Hala‘ib Triangle of which Egypt assumed unilateral sovereignty in 1998, irrespective of Sudan’s partnership.

The Research Significance and Objectives

Our research aimed to explore strategic implications of the national experiences that culminated in the actual seizure of the state’s power or the threat of such seizure by Jihadist militants. Major national players had been engaged in the fight: Jihadists aiming to control the state and civil society by coercion; modern Secularists and Sufi traditionalists competing independently to shape the public mind by peaceful activities; and a state pragmatism yearning to strike a balance between the contrasting complexities and the vested interests of administration by security actions and political reactions,
especially when the conflict extended outside the national border to the whole world.

Because armed opposition exploded over the structures, policies and suppression of societal inequalities, it was expedient to understand the political environment and the roles international and regional powers played in the dilemma. The magnitude indicated increased involvement of global powers under a broad anti-terrorism coalition enforcing large-scale military, diplomatic, and economic sanctions to resolve the problem, far beyond the geographic border (Schaeffer, 2009). Instead of ameliorating the situation, the warring efforts failed to touch deeply upon obstacles of democratization and the failures in the center-region intra-relations. Added to the large-scale inequalities of globalism (Forst, 2009; Solahudin, 2013), besides the tensions of inimical rivalries in the region, the crisis was basically exacerbated by unresolvable disputes, minorities’ expulsion, religious tensions, and state apprehensions.

Our contention was centered on the assumption that the uprisings erupting between labor groups and the primary appropriators of labor functions evolved around the issue of political power rather than class struggles over control of the means of production. Until the 1970s, the state constituted the actual controller, commissioner, and owner of the key means of production (land and most agricultural and industrial resources) and maintained the upper hand in trade, development, and investments. The private sector reaped huge advantages from privatized state businesses; however, it lingered behind by a prevalent tendency to invest in services and real estate. The loudest voice of the uprisings was not to eradicate capitalism of the private sector whose banks, businesses and other assets had been mainly enhanced and protected by the government. Rather, the most popular slogans asked for democracy and societal reforms (public freedoms, political participation, employment, education, health care, and housing, etc.) by firm commitment of the state to the public needs.

The achievement of a comprehensive policy-relevant assessment of the role of doctrinal percepts in national and global politics was an ultimate target of our analysis. Related to several similarities in the socio-economic and political settings of Egypt and Sudan, added to their ideological frameworks, we made an attempt to clarify the inter-connectedness of state policy-making, development planning, and religious orientation in light of the ongoing striving. To explore the future of democratization, we focused upon different trends of thought and the plans for the future that the Jihadist reactionaries, Secularist/Sufi parties, and state authorities most particularly promoted in the area: who of these national players struggled constantly to ensure the full enjoyment of the freedom of expression and religious tolerance to restrain the state’s exclusionary policies and forcible practices. The possible correlations
between ideologies, cultural beliefs and political principles; Jihadist coercion; the levels of fair distribution of national resources; and the performance of state managers and bureaucracy would be deducible in Part two of the research by reliable data from advanced cognitive methodologies, community conferences, comprehensive public debates, and academic sources.

**The jihadist, secularist, and sufi movements**

To illuminate the research focus, we located three major typologies of the contenders facing the challenges of societal equalities: 1) The Shari’a holy teachings and practices were genuinely real, applicable core of faith to the Believers who perpetuated the Sufi culture; 2) The Secularist thought and activities posited an independent praxis from Shari’a, partially inclusionary, still exclusionary to the full Shari’a ideals; and 3) The Jihadist reactionary doctrines and state collaborative policies applied a symbolic reification of the early Muslim Jihad (to defend Islam) in order to manipulate political competition by religious tensions. The differences between these typologies were quite distinct; albeit, they had been typically blurred. Although the differences had been quite distinct, they were often underestimated or ignored.

Jihadism struggled against *al-Jihad al-akbar*, i.e., the greatest self-contained perseverance of believers, to force Muslim societies to conform to a doctrine antagonizing diversity and prohibiting egalitarian co-existence with opponents. Secularists emphasized the separation of the state from religious institutions. Sufism stressed humility in the service of humanity for the sake of God. Before 2015, secularist groups in Egypt included mainly the middle and working class parties of al-Wafd, al-Tajamu al-Watani al-Taqadamuni, Nasserists, independent trade unions and human rights’ groups, and the former Mubarak’s NDP. In Sudan, the Communists, SPLM-North, trade unions and human rights’ groups voiced the secularists; the Sufi-based Umma and DUP were secularly organized sectarian parties. For centuries, the Sufi tariqas permeated the countryside and urban areas with enormous following. In Egypt today, they included al-Rufaiya, al-Shazaliya, al-Ahmediya, al-Burhamiya, al-Daifiya, as-Sa’diya, al-Mirghaniya al-Khatmiya, and al-‘Azmiya, etc. In Sudan, the major Sufi tariqas included al-Mirghaniya al-Khatmiya, Ansar al-Mahdi, al-Qadiriya, as-Samaniya, al-Ismailiya, al-Idrisi and al-Buraiya, etc.

In societies sharing a history of inimical colonialism and resilient nationalism, the conflict had been expanded by superimposed Shari’a-claimed ideologies that generated subtle results upon state authorities and civil societies. Egyptian Jihadists spread out resentments by effective media campaigns to curtail the Secularist and Sufi activities. Somalia witnessed ethno-political aversion in complex situations in which both secular and religious groups participated in the feuds by inter-tribal troops. In Tunisia, the al-Nahda Islamists ascended to a liberal political structure opened to secular
competitiveness. In Sudan, Sufi-based liberal and secular parties created a National Democratic Alliance to combat a Jihadist coup that Iran, China, Turkey, and Qatar supported to subdue the People of Sudan for economic and political gains.

Our concept of Jihadism was not confined only to the Egyptian-born al-Akhwan al-Muslimeen, i.e., the organization established in the 1920s as a voluntary social body. In broad ideological terms, rather than specific organizational terms, we would be using the concept interchangeably with religious radicals or reactionary conservatives since they supported a full-fledged political movement aimed to change bureaucracies of the Muslim nations to a theocratic empire by all necessary means, including the use of force (Mahgoub, 1967; Tal, 2005; Wickham, 2013). ‘Abd al-Khaliq Mahgoub (1967), the Sudan Communist Party secretary-general, was one of the first to depict the Akhwan philosophy “as dangerous as cancer.” The Republican Thought (2011) held that Ustaz Mahmoud Mohamed Taha and the Republican Brothers rejected the same thought and issued Haza ao al-Tofan critique on 25 December 1984 to abolish the Nimeiri-Akhwan’s September Laws 1983 that “contradicted and disfigured the Shari’a.”

Excepting perhaps the al-Nour al-Salafi Party, which competed in the 2011 elections with a moderate program recognizing religious tolerance and promising to eradicate poverty, even then prohibiting usury and observing gender differentiation, the Jihadist bodies in Egypt and Sudan exacerbated extremist anti-democratic sections amidst liberal groups. Besides al-Jihad al-Islami and the Takfeer and Higra armed off-springs, the movement influenced a variety of militant groups of which Sudanese NIF, Algerian FIS, Nigerian Boko Haram, al-Shabab Somalis, Palestinian Hamas, al-Qa’ida, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, and ISIS shared ideological and/or political concerns under different programs, leaderships, and agenda. All of these aimed to establish a “peculiar” Caliphate that would guarantee them, in the first place, exclusive upper-hand powers over the citizenry as excluded non-competing adversaries, with no mention of women. The contemporary militants of the caliphate advocated indiscriminate violence to terrorize all opponents by ideas and actions entirely denounced by both Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. The Muslim heritage of religious tolerance and peaceful co-existence with non-Muslims was well-documented in medieval and contemporary literature (al-Saboni, 1981; Sakr, 2012). Therefore, the Jihadist contemporary caliphate should be distinguished from the classical caliphate of the Muslim heritage, which experienced religious tolerance with the Jews and Christians in Dar al-Islam dominions under Muslim control, and co-existed peacefully with the Dar al-Harb neighboring or distant territories, by peace treaties.

Egypt witnessed decades of Mubarak’s policy to restrict the Brotherhood’s prowess; but they prospered in businesses and social activities.
Despite formal banning and arrests, the group’s independent candidates “captured 88 seats” in 2005 and won democratic elections in June 2012 (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014). Setting to convert Mubarak’s secular state into a requisite caliphate by legislature, “Morsi decreed that the courts could not challenge his decisions nor hear any lawsuit against the Constituent Assembly;” also issued a repressive new law to protect the Revolution (Amnesty International, 2013). In Islamic jurisprudence, however, the judiciary was independent from the Caliph and governors (Mahmoud, 2013). The U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (2013: 2) read, “On rare occasions the Morsy and interim governments prosecuted persons, including security personnel, who committed human rights’ abuses … Nongovernmental actors killed several hundred persons, including 146 security forces personnel, and attacked government buildings, police stations, and Coptic Christians and their property, including churches.” Encyclopedia Britannica (2014) relayed, “Morsi’s administration faced increasingly vocal opposition in 2013, led by activists who accused the incumbents of inaction regarding Egypt’s weak economy, failing public services, and deteriorating security situation. A massive protest calling for Morsi’s resignation was held on June 30, 2013, the first anniversary of his inauguration.” In reaction to violent suppression of the protests, a subsequent seizure of political power by the armed forces came about for fear of converting the state into a chaotic fate. The jubilant rallies that filled the streets in millions of supporters dealt a decisive blow to the presidency (The Economist, 2013).

The Sufi represented anti-Brotherhood groups in religious and social terms. Ideological rivalry and political hostility had often ravaged their relationships. Reactionary media attacks on Sufi leaderships included the Azhar scholar ‘Ali Jum’a (also Gomaa), the ex-Mufti of Egypt (AlJazeera Net, 2013). On August 5th, 2016, Dr. Jum’a survived an assassination attempt by the Brotherhood’s Hasm movement (BBC News, 2016; Al-Arabiya Net, 2016). Earlier in Sudan, the Jihadist regime outlawed freedom of the press and cultural activities by governmental decrees amidst a series of egregious violations of international and national laws (SHRO-Cairo, 1996-2016). Adopting the Prophet's peaceful guidance of the Muslim world in a simple way commensurate with the native cultures, the Sufi tradition resembled a bottomless philosophical practice of Islam, a spiritual force protecting the poor and the powerless; thus becoming an irreconcilable foe to the power-thirst Jihadists who venerated the wealthy and glorified the powerful. Mostly running a life of austerity and simplicity, the Sufi tariqas existed nearly in every Muslim village or town, maintained peaceful relations with non-Muslims, and enjoyed the high status of religious guides, spiritual mentors, and health healers (Mahmoud, 2006). The lacking of Sufi leaderships in the
modern economic and political tournaments led them to engage in alliances with the Secularist parties and civil society groups that shared their concerns for peace, religious tolerance, and public freedoms.

In Egypt, such alliances supported the al-Wafd middle-class party in parliamentary elections and might have potentially sympathized with the Tajamu al-Watani working class forums, while a few tariqas collaborated with Mubarak’s elections as well. In Sudan, the Khatmiya and the Ansar Sufi constituted the popular foundation of the Democratic Unionist Party and the Umma sectarian parties which ruled the country repeatedly by democratic elections. This political reality was founded on the results of the parliamentary elections by geographic constituencies: 1953, 1958, 1965, and 1986; Umma won 63, 62, 90, and 100 seats and the DUP won 44, 42, 59, and 67 seats respectively. Since 1965, the Umma and DUP made several alliances with the post-uprising coalition of Jabhat al-Hay’at, the professional unions’ front that toppled ‘Abboud dictatorship in October 1964; the unions-led April Uprising 1985 that overthrew Nimeiri dictatorship; and the National Democratic Alliance forums that continued to combat al-Bashir dictatorship up to this day. The intermittent periods saw the Umma/DUP/Brotherhood coalition governments (Khalid, 1990; Daly, 2010; Digplanet, 2016).

The state ruling bodies had been historically rooted in ancient systems of tyranny characteristic of pharaohs, kings, royal aristocracies, oligarchic centers, colonial masters (Adams, 1997; Lobban, Jr., 2013), and the leaders of today who governed by coup d’état or authoritarian governments. The centuries’ disaster of these nations reproduced political pathologies antagonizing governance relations, the tolerance of ethnic and religious diversity, and the respect for human rights and public freedoms. The state structures and political ventures never truly reconciled with the cultural and religious systems of the largely Bedouin or farming peoples they repressively ruled. The people made the effective force that geared and engineered popular uprisings; yet, many a time, the power reaping the outcome was nothing but the state itself, namely the bureaucratic apparatus planning, reacting, and acting on behalf of Authority.

Upholding strong traditions of autonomy with patriotism, bravery, and generosity, the indigenous peoples engaged in lasting antagonisms versus the coercive role of the state which often reacted with hostilities to subdue the populace. In transitional periods, following a few popular uprisings that forced temporal changes in the government’s hierarchy and performance, succeeding rulers would promise to modify the system; notwithstanding, progression was never accessible in the absence of popular participation in national decision-making. Evidently, the state and her managers figured out in the public mind as a symbol of corruption, mentor of civil wars, generator of uneven development, and a permanent depressant of democracy and national unity.
The Sufi and Secularist groups believed that this situation was particularly true of the Jihadist ideologues that never ceased to plan on holding the power of state by all means possible.

Evaluating the shortcomings and failures of the potential to popularize state performance, the most effective tool of social change, this research mirrored real concerns of a popular movement over doable ways to recover the democratic participation and well-being of all those opposing the Jihad single-minded advocacies. This included explorations on the root causes of coercion and the use of force which worsened over-arching ethno-religious engagements by the Jihad suppression and state repression, while failing the possible remedies to eradicate them. Unfolding complex correlations of these variables was significantly helpful within our theoretical framework to assess the national and international pursuit of peace and stability. To probe into these issues, we analyzed the defaulted aspects of development and democratization.

**The issues of societal inequalities**

Grossly violated human rights, anti-democratic politics, and wasteful expenditures constituted deficiencies of the repressive regimes that factorized protracted inequalities in the Arab-African context (AOHR, 2015). On the other side, the short-lived democracies that made the effort to advance societal equalities did not yield sustainable development to promote the living standards of people. Taking advantage of the failures, the growth of Jihadist organizations, as well as extensive formulations in several Asian countries and Gulf States, motivated the state to circumvent civil and political rights to consolidate power relations.

International humanitarian law and the teachings of Islam exhibited a wide range of consistency by overlapping provisions of the right to life and the freedom of faith and religious tolerance, etc. This promising consensus was frequently broken by political invasion in juxtaposition with legal indoctrination. The Jihadists believed that international human rights’ norms contradicted the fundamental rules of Muslim jurisprudence on obligations; the laws of inheritance; polygamous marriages; and physical punishments. They also considered anti-religious the model of regular democracy vis-à-vis the Muslim thought that recognized individual responsibilities and public consultancy in the state policies. To monopolize the national decision-making, they struggled fiercely to install theocratic governments to undermine democratization processes, the most reliable guarantee of public freedoms in modern societies. In a few democracies, systematic planning had been enforceable to enhance popular participation; all the same, the Jihadist denial of the Secularist inputs in the transition to democratic rule (e.g., Sudan 1964-
69; 1985-89) disrupted the efforts to bring about peace and national reconciliation.

These partisan stands spawned a wide rift between the forces of secularism, civil society, and the Sufi traditionalists on one side, and the state managers aligned with theocratic ideologies on the other. In the meantime, uneven development, high levels of impoverishment, and the failure of governments to develop marginal regions created the largest pool of jihadist recruitment to overpower the authorities amongst the rural population and their membership in the public service. The complete absence of regular democracy exposed society to unparalleled enmity by the contending parties while the state acted desperately to strike a political balance in its own right. The state managers under Mubarak, at some point, seemed to allow reactionary leaderships to thrive economically in lieu of a final withdrawal of the political scene. Ironically, the isolated group utilized the resultant financial leverage over businesses and real estate to control a wide range of social and religious networking; only to dominate democratic elections as soon as the Authority gave way to popular uprisings.

The final outcome culminated in the Brotherhood’s takeover of the state by a military coup in Sudan (1989). The legitimate Command of the Sudanese Armed Forces reported immediate attacks by the coup forces on the commander-in-chief General Fathi Ahmed ‘Ali and his assistants; the extra-judicial killings of officers and regulars in the holy month of Ramadan/April 1990; and a long list of criminal killings and tortures of civilian and/or military opponents (SHRO-Cairo, 1992). Parmar (2007: 2) mentioned that,”In 2000, Bashir was re-elected, and his NC/NIF political party won 340 out of 360 seats in the Parliament in deeply flawed elections boycotted by all major opposition parties. NC/NIF members and supporters continued to hold key positions in the Government, security forces, judiciary, academic institutions, trade unions, professional associations, and the media.” The domination of the state’s executive, legislative, and judicial powers occurred in Egypt by a democratically elected rule (2012-13), and the unrelenting Jihadist striving to control the political arena persisted in Syria, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Gulf States, Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, etc. The Jihadists’ seizure of political power did not evidently fulfill the human rights of people. Instead, the security policies of the Morsi shortened governance and al-Bashir prolonged rule empowered reactionary groups to unsettle the civil values and secular systems of the public life. The anti-democratic orientations were aggravated further by civil wars and heavy security expenditures, additional to unresolvable animosities in the center-urban and periphery relations.

The January 2012’s Uprising and the as-Sisi succeeding regime revealed that a growing popular movement supported the peaceful Sufi culture and the secular legal activism as a viable Path to advance democratization. In
2013, the Tamarud youth movement gathered millions of supporters to vote down the Morsi governance (Al-Arabiya Net, 2013). In the 2015’s parliament, 350 Independents strengthened as-Sisi coalition fi Da’m Misr (Alyaum, 2016). To run a healthy life for the whole populace, mounting cooperation was quite evident between the Muslim and non-Muslim groups, and the means for manifesting national amalgamation seemed at least intellectually possible between the Church and the Mosque. Such integration was required to curb the Jihadist exclusionary policies and their theocratic mentors in the Morsi reign. The Brotherhood’s TV channels and media (e.g., al-Tha-ro and the Turkey-based al-Sharq channels), supported by the AlJazeera TV of Qatar, had been rampant with innumerable programs denying legitimacy of as-Sisi regime and advocating extreme intolerance to Egypt’s secularism. The state’s media and a number of non-governmental organizations countered these channels vehemently. Here, further steps might have been approved to maintain robust standards of democratization, had the state abandoned security viciousness to be able to adjust to the full terms of peaceful co-existence with all contenders. Nonetheless, the bureaucratic-authoritarian structure of the state would soon restrain the popular movement by restrictive measures on the freedom of journalists and demonstrators, even in post-revolutionary times. Despite national consensus on a democratic constitution and elections in 2014, concrete bonds of trust remained to be seen between the popular movement and the new government.

The human rights’ record in Africa had been notorious for gross violations of both international and national laws by intrusions of state managers, armed forces and intelligence agencies, as well as revolutionaries in battle with the state (Mahmoud, 2005). The colonial policies had earlier laid the ground by ethno-regional, administrative, and political divisions for Africa to suffer low levels of living standards, embedded poverty, high unemployment, deteriorated health conditions, high infant mortality rates, poor educational levels, and corrupted officials. An urban-rural dichotomy became the source of immense inequalities when the concentration of modern services and amenities marginalized vast populations and pushed the rural residents to live in shanty towns surrounding the debilitated centers. This incapacitating environment, in its turn, exacerbated high unemployment, low incomes, and endemic illnesses as indicated in the World Bank statistics on sustainable development (Freestone, 2012).

The African nations were caught by the yoke of suppressive rulers (Hameso, 1997; Zoubair, 1999; Mwakikagile, 2009). The scope of the violations amounted to cases of genocide and other crimes against humanity in Rwanda and Darfur, in addition to the abuse of authority by heinous extra-judicial killings, women’s degradation, tortures of political opponents, arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions, and economic crimes. From their
part, the opposition forces followed suit, as they initiated attacks or responded to suppression. Long years of deep mistrust between law enforcement agencies and the political opponents and human rights’ activists continued uninterruptedly even in the transitional periods to democratic rule (Sudan: 1985-1989; Egypt: 2012 to the present). Amnesty International had been reporting gross violations in Sudan, as well as activists’ disappearances and tortures in Egypt; the authorities denied all violations. Moreover, the country reports of the U.S. State Department, AOHR, and Human Rights Watch (1990s-2000s) affirmed that a great many innocent civilians bore the brunt of battles launched by the warring parties in disregard of international norms.

The post-independence governments maintained the same trend of uneven development. Receiving most development projects versus the underdeveloped Sa’eed (South), Egypt’s Delta, north of the country, enjoyed modern life and the bulk of industry and agriculture. In Central Sudan, the agricultural Gazira and Rahad permanent irrigation schemes made up the main infrastructure of the national economy together with sugar, textiles, and other investments. Both countries suffered highly corrupt public sectors. Transparency International corruption perception index (2015) indicated in a scale of 100 Egypt’s score was 36; Sudan’s score was 12. Alongside consumer support programs to reduce poverty, es-Sisi presidency imposed harsh measures to deal with corruption. Sudan National Audit Chamber’s annual reports on stolen public money in millions of dollars were never heeded by the state’s competent authorities. Both countries were heavily burdened with debt; by December 2014 Egypt government debt to GDP amounted to 90.50 percent of the country’s GDP and Sudan’s was 79 percent (Trading economics, 2016). Most provinces remained basically pauperized, even though they contained substantial manpower of the country and a large reservoir of minerals and agricultural land. Both countries were oil-producing; albeit the Sudanese oil became a North-South source of resentment soon after it had been discovered in the mid-1980s.

The national finances of the Nile beneficiaries would furthermore complain from huge expenditures of warfare and security operations to eliminate the recruits of impoverishment: the challenging militants in Sudan and the Jihadist militias in Egypt. An ever-increasing population growth (UN estimated 93.2 million Egyptians in 2016; fertility rate 3.3) continued, inter alia, to deplete the national resources. Additionally, tourism had been a target of terrorist attacks that did not help to sustain the revenue. In this context, our research questioned the eligibility of the Sufi/Secular groups that recognized the ethics of religion and the need to abide by international norms to lead the state to advance societal equity by permanent peace, religious tolerance, and even development. The accomplishment of these agenda would have possibly helped to enhance democracy and human rights. It might have equally
strengthened the peaceful co-existence of the Christian Copts with the majority Muslims.

**The escalated ideological confrontations**

The Shari’a fundamental sources defined as the Holy Qur’an and the Prophet’s authentic Sunna, regardless of different views within the *madhhab* (a multiplicity of jurist schools with legal insights) had been recognized by the Muslims as pure ideals over space and time. These ideals fixed the construction and permanent sustenance of an ultimate universal society, necessarily founded on the devout belief in God and His Messenger Muhammad and a peaceful exercise of individuality and gender equality within a godly-defined cosmology. This cosmology was succinctly explained in daily media programs by the al-Azhar jurists (interviews in Egypt T.V., 2015-16). In the case of Sudan, “Shari’a symbolic status is still retained” (Fluehr-Lobban, 2012, p. 22). Under the Jihadist rule, nonetheless, gender equality had been eliminated by women’s enslavement (CNN, 2014), harassment (Al-Arabiya, 2012), and beatings (Syriapromise, 2010).

Was it possible to move Sudan, Egypt, and the nations victimized by inextricable failures to adopt the genuine tenets and noble teachings of the Shari’a *fitra*, instead of the Jihadist and the state’s vehemence? To what extent would Sufism, Secularism, Jihadism, and the Authority’s instrumental symbolism of the Shari’a *zahir* [evident rules] come to terms with the Shari’a *batin* [Truth]? Such movement could have been possible within a principled acceptance of the authentic concepts and interpretations of Islam. Egypt’s al-Azhar University had been recognized as the state’s guardian of this heritage. The Azhar Grand Imams, Mohamed ‘Abdu, Mahmoud Shaltut, ‘Abd al-Halim Mahmoud, Mohamed Sayed Tantawi, as well as today’s Imam Ahmed al-Tayeb, led progressive campaigns to correct the Jihadists’ dogmatic thought. And yet, the debate persisted in political crossings for which inclusionary solutions couldn’t have been solely pursued by the Imams’ capacity which received profound support only recently from as-Sisi presidency.

The unabated conflicts in the Muslim world between the authorities and the opposition communities and organizational bodies might possibly continue in the 21st century the way that many of them escalated in the 20th century. While the challenges awaiting the three typologies touched upon the way long-enduring disputes might have been peacefully ended in the domestic life, misconceptions became part of the global strategies to combat the prevailing tensions. As happened, some critics asked for “changes” in the texts of Islam to be fit for coexistence with the critics’ culture, while others portrayed the Prophet of Islam by sarcastic cartoons - an offensive that fueled negative reactions and unleashed revulsion. Calls aiming at Muslim concepts to change their support to Islam (Counter Jihad Report, 2012) did not match
the authenticity of ‘Ali ibn Abi-Talib; the eloquence of Abu Hanifa, Mohamed ‘Abdu and Mohamed Abu-Zahra; the scholarly works of ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Wahid Wafi, ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Owda, Radwan al-Sayed, and Roje Garody, among many others; or the plans to authenticate Shari’a concepts by Muslim contemporary jurists (BBC News, 2008).

In Sources of Islamic Jurisprudence (2013), we reviewed the literature on Islamic Justice from the first Muslim Medina state in the history of mankind to contemporary debates on the future of Islamic succession, whether a strict return to the Medina model state or a multifarious adoption of modern constitutional forms. The findings of our journey aimed to help the non-Muslim world to understand this unique thought towards a new era of mutual understanding. The shared issues of human development would be attainable by a broad, well-versed knowledge to end the deep discrepancies that divided mankind across the South-North geopolitics and the East-West dichotomies (Halliday, 2003; Khan, 2006; Schaeffer, 2009). Not only that many Muslim and Western nations, in general, suffered a dire need to promote East-West mutual understanding in all aspects of modernity. Muslim societies, in particular, yearned to enjoy a great deal of mutual understanding between the Sunni and Shiite doctrines, as well as the secularist and non-secularist adversaries. So much as needed to appreciate the secularist thought and strategic plans to ensure stability, it was equally essential to understand the Shari’a fitra, ideals and principled teachings for the same purpose.

Conclusions
The civil society and human rights’ pressures to secularize political life in Sudan and Egypt associated state democratization with the struggle for public and individual freedoms. Our research examined major features of the Sufi and Secularist dynamism versus the Jihadist activism for a theocratic state. We argued the Sufi and Secularist popular competencies had historically shaped the behavior of individuals and groups via a wide spectrum of cultural practices in peaceful political exchange. While most governments failed to reduce the political contradictions, or to ease authority abuses by security options, the Jihadist reactionaries spread chaos and violence. The overthrow of the Brotherhood rule in Egypt (2013) marked a significant sign of inevitable decline in the theocratic planning to rule, even by democratic elections. In Sudan, whereby the authorities aligned with reactionaries to suppress liberties, the ensuing alliance increased societal instability for it lacked the secularist support and the bonds of social trust Sufi groups maintained over centuries for the vast majority of the populace. Inversely, the Sufi and the Secularists lined up in subtle gatherings to protest the sponsored theocracy. Secularist groups had already predicted a speedy fall of the theocratic ideology to convert the state’s autonomy to a religious polity. Still, many observers were suspicious
of this expectation in doctrinal terms based on the resistance of deeply-rooted loyalties that would unlikely surrender to a secular regime.

International humanitarian law and Shari’a ideals shared a wide range of acceptability to the right to life, work and religious beliefs, and the civil rights and freedoms that seldom were firmly legislated or guaranteed by state bureaucracies (SHRO-Cairo, 2010). For example, the Bill of Rights in Sudan’s Transitional Constitution postulated a high status of human rights which never were seriously manifested by the Jihadist-indoctrinated administrations, let alone the security, intelligence, and armed forces. Because Sufi Islam was the nearest to the Shari’a teachings that were partially shared with secular groups, we argued that a viable way to correct the symbolic manipulation of the Shari’a could be properly maintained by a broad, community-based recognition of the culture and structure of Sufism in the Muslim nations. This strategy might be successfully accomplished in equal terms with the secularism that recognized the benevolent originality of Islam - a far-sighted strategy to realize intersection of the Muslim batin Truth and the international human rights’ norms.

Academic research on these areas had not been adequately known, and, as noted, some works were awfully misinformed. In light of several movements resisting the central government in the countryside (Sinai Jihadists in Egypt and the armed groups in Sudan), our analysis of the societal crisis raised critical questions on the destinies of the Jihadist, Secularist, and Sufi entities, as well as horizons of the state’s unity and integrity. Evidently, there was a parallel need to forecast the future of these typologies in the long run: other than the Sufi, who of the contenders would most likely transcend adversities to elevate the social equalities? Would a reversed movement by the Sufi groups from cities and towns to the countryside pacify, or rather reify the popular resistance to the Center’s suppression? What if the Sufi tradition acquiesced to the Jihad sedition to eradicate secularism and democratic ideals all together? The 2015 parliament contained 65 Misriyeen Ahrar, 50 Mustaqbal al-Watan, and 85 seats for more than 10 new groups. Old parties won 45 Waf, one Tajamu, and Nur as-Salafi won 11 (Alyauam, 2015). What factors weakened the Tajamu programs in Egypt and undermined the Communist secularism in Sudan? How sustainable would it be for the popular movement vis-à-vis the state’s centripetal power?

Part one of the research analyzed the state Jihadist-Sufi/Secularist crisis which, nevertheless, was not entirely domestic. Competing for the resurrection of a caliphate over Muslim nations for material interests, Iran, Turkey, and their surrogate Qatar supported the Jihadist reactionaries in Sudan and Egypt. Contrariwise, the U.S. and the EU provided lucrative support to Hosni Mubarak secular regime; but they showed restricted aid to the newly elected government which re-established civility of the state’s judicial,
executive, and legislative regularities by a plebiscite road-map, and declared war on terrorism in the region. The as-Sisi restoration of the Egyptian state would successfully make a Saudi-led deal with the Emirates and Kuwait and a series of trade agreements with India, Russia, China, and Germany (HSBC, 2013; Arabi 21, 2016) to boost the economy in a new political environment. We noted that the Sudanese-Egyptian Takamul, Hala’ib dispute, and other border tensions were not finally resolved. The Jihadists’ government reactivated relations with Egypt, broke a lifelong dependency on Iran, and supported the Saudi war in Yemen. Implications of these maneuvers might help to initiate follow-up studies in Part two of the research to project the future of the two nations, as they moved into crossroads in a quagmire of conflicting bodes.

References:


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