THE ROLE OF GERMANY IN EUROPEAN SECURITY AFTER REUNIFICATION

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Abstract
The end of the Second World War brought a new kind of system and of stability in Europe that they never had experienced before. The war, occupation, and postwar European institutions transformed Germany profoundly both internally and externally by linking its foreign and security policy to multilateral frameworks. The new Germany is not a major military power like the old German empire, rather the most powerful civilian, economic and political actor that have the capability to influence policies in Europe and beyond without employing military power.

Keywords: Security, German nationalism; reunification, multilateralism, Ostpolitik, realism, institutionalism

Background
Europe for centuries and perhaps till today continued to be a region of great importance to greatly impact the world at large. There had been continued imperial aspiration for the domination and subjugation of one another. To that end each European power run to command preponderant military might as a means to secure the survival of sovereign states. At the heart of this rivalry the most important and powerful actor in the continent had been Germany.

The virulent nationalism that grow up in Germany and the ‘distinctiveness of its national identity’ thought to be led to two devastating world wars in the first half of the 20th century resulting incalculable damage and destruction both in human and material terms. German expansionism in these wars threatened the European balance of power system where it tried to subjugate other countries. Given the historical rivalry among European powers, Europe
never had long period of peace and stability, and their history is the history of war and violent competition.

The Germans often had hostile relationship with its neighbors leading centuries of conflict over various territorial, religious, ideological and identity concerns. The Sonderweg¹ (Special path) or the German historical aberration distinguishes Germany from the rest of European countries. To achieve its supremacy it tried at different times to control different states. The German ‘special path’ therefore sows the seeds of its own destruction. In the post war period it divided into two, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and German Democratic Republic (GDR). Their division along their ideological allies reflected the division of Europe into two.

Such divisions were paradoxically both sources of stability and insecurity in light of the ideological rivalries between the two superpowers in w/c the two Germans are frontline states. This situation is rightly stated that,

During the early post war decades GDR-FRG relations were sources of permanent insecurity and even presented a temporary danger of war in Europe.² At the same time, the very existence of the two German States and their affiliation with different alliances are components of stability and are part of the international balance of forces i.e. security in Europe.³

Such status quo was considered as a precondition for military and political stability in Europe. Under occupation the role of Germany for its affair is undertaken by the occupying forces which denied independent foreign and security policy. The period of occupation had fundamental impact on FRG which helped to establish a pluralistic security community through integrating in to NATO & European Economic Community and other multilateral frameworks. Lacking a sense of positive national identity after the war West Germans are willing to accept the transfer of sovereignty to intergovernmental institutions if sovereign rights to conduct its foreign policy could be secured with in these institutions.⁴

As a result FRG’s political and security system has been determined by the West integration ever since 1950s where by it accepted restrictions on its independent policy in return for the security guarantee of the Alliance (Western). The project of West integration is

¹ See how the German Path and Nationalism is different from other European States in, Ummu Salma Bava’s, West German RealPolitik, Unification, EU & European Security, 1949-1995, Kanishka Publishers, New Delhi.
² Schmidt, Max, ‘the Two German States and European security’ in Stephen Larrabee’s Ed. the Two German States and European Security, pp.112.
³ Ibid, pp.119.
not just an alternative given to FRG but was as part of its rehabilitation. There was a belief that European integration would resolve the ancestral enmity and dangerous interstate rivalry in the continent. In this regard ‘the FRG’s commitment to West integration was a result of the need to overcome the historic Franco-German competition for hegemony in Europe and the animosities which had resulted from the two world wars’.  

Since FRG was a frontline state in the ideological, politico-economic rivalry of the East-West block, its security can only be guaranteed by ‘its integration with NATO and the presence of Western troops and weapons (both conventional and nuclear) on its territory’. This was true of fearing soviet dominance and its use of force to extend its sphere of influence given the Korean and East European experiences. Thus in military strategic terms its integration to the western defense and security arrangement is translated into the end and means to effectively defer the adversary, i.e., aimed at containment of Soviet Union.

In the Bonn Convention of 1954, the three wartime allies France, the United Kingdom and the US undertook the contractual obligation to promote the reunification of Germany, although this was not materialized until the end of the cold war.

Now it became clear that FRG deeply integrated to the West, join NATO (1955) began looking the US (West) as friends and allies rather than occupiers and branding USSR as enemy. It also recognized that its gradual reclaim of full sovereignty and eventual removal of all constraints imposed by the occupation can only be attained, if FRG integrated firmly in a Western alliance which could serve both to contain Germany and harness its strength to the benefit of the common security of the West.

The difficulty however is that given GDR was controlled by USSR, Westintegration seems elusive to achieve German reunification. In Soviet view reunification might be possible if Germany were to accept restrictions on her foreign policy, implying withdrawal from western alliance and complete neutrality. This idea was rejected by Adenauer, the first chancellor of FRG, he rather had a belief that reunification was to be achieved through his policy of ‘reunification from a position of strength’ (politik der starke). This implies reliance on military power that could not however likely in view of the past Germany’s behavior of rearmament that caused extensive destructions. Anti militarism was very strong as a result of the horrors of the War. Reunification and German security can not be possible in the cold war.

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5 Bluth, Christoph, Germany and the Future of European Security, pp.128.
6 Salma, Ummu, ‘United Germany, EU and Changing Pattern of European Security’ (Theses), pp.197.
8 Bluth, pp.6
9 Ibid, pp.7
framework in unilateral engagement with one bloc. Adenauer’s policy of unification through strength was very dangerous where nuclear parity was vivid between the two superpowers. In such a situation military conflict would not leave a chance to survive the two Germans as both blocs stationed lethal nuclear war heads in the German soil. Thus the left side of political spectrum saw the practical problems of one side engagement, began to advocate contacts with the East to reduce tension and preserve peace. A relation with France was also critical along with the Atlantic alliance.

Therefore in the 1960s a new window of relations with the East was embarked (Ostpolitik) to avoid the impasse of East-West relations. In the nuclear age power politics alone was insufficient to achieve Germany’s objective. Of course the nuclear stalemate created a sort of stability by maintaining the status quo and prevented any movement to overcome the division of Europe.

Multilateralism was seen as a way out to instability. One such measure was the establishment of the conference of security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE) established in 1975, after the signing of the Helsinki Accord. It is a pan European Security arrangement with membership in both blocks intended to regulate East-West conflict by creating institutions that would reduce tension. However, it remained ineffective because of confrontation between the two blocs and their respective security organizations NATO and WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization).

The practical challenges in the post war period made FRG to play itself a role as a guardian of détente and continued to promote cooperative security as the way forward. At the same time ‘a deep aversion to war and militarism had taken root in the West Germany which was encouraged and consolidated by the social radicalism of the 1960s and policies of détente of the 1970s’.  

In sum, the primary feature of European security from 1945-89 was characterized by the emergence of a phenomena called the overlay. This is a condition when “great power interests dominate a region so heavily that the local pattern of Security relations virtually ceases to operate”. Obviously the end of the cold war mean the break up of the overly and in particular FRG’s dependence on external security guarantee diminished.

West Germany with more than four decades of West integration made it successfully get rid of its unilateralist and militarist inclination to effectively socialized and locked in a network of international institutions which changed its foreign and security policy. Not only

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10 Ibid, pp.31
11 Cited in Ummu Salma Bava’s, Theses , pp.185
that the unified Germany in post cold war period become the driving force behind European integration to include all European Countries, politically, economically and military as a potential sources of stability the continent.

**Conceptual and Theoretical Framework**

The meaning, nature and concern of security have been evolved significantly with the change and fundamental transformation of world politics. Security traditionally was directly associated with state security and hence a national concern. And the means to preserve it was through the accumulation of hard/military power. This was the dominant trend till the end of the cold war. In such context stability was seen as absence of war. It implies that ‘lowering one’s probability of defeat by increasing one’s military power made for greater security’. But this situation leaves states in a security dilemma. It means that when states arm themselves (even for self defense) they weaken the security of neighbors or other states by shifting the military balance in their favor. This will compel others states especially neighbors to increase their military capabilities to restore equilibrium.

With the demise of the East-West conflict, much of the debate on the security architecture of Europe has stressed the need to go beyond the traditional cold war focus of military power and national territorial defense. The concern shifted to new structures and relations that avoid real politik approaches to security that would enable to reduce the possibilities for new security dilemma that could escalate arms race. There is a clear recognition of the real factors of in security and is property observed that, 

The inadequacy of traditional security to cop the changing environment led to a comprehensive approach to security theory. The new theory is characterized by high degree of unpredictability and incalculability. This has necessitated a holistic concept of the security encompassing the non-military aspects such as economic, political and societal sectors from where the basic insecurities arise.

The primacy of securing states through military is substantially minimized and security issues are increasingly defused. The non-military aspects like human rights, environmental degradation, political stability and democracy, social issues, cultural and religious identity and migration are becoming ever more important for security and stability.

13 Ibid., Robert Jevis said such dilemmas as a situation in which ‘the means by which states tries to increase it security decrease the security of others Cited in the same page.
14 Salma, Unnu, ibid, p.198 (Theses)
The concept of societal security has been proposed as a means to understand the importance of political identity for security particularly ethno national identity. The societal and ethnic dimension is important in the post cold war period especially in view of the most mortal ethnic violence and insecurity in the Balkan and Eastern Europe.

Security now has two dimensions: avoiding war (negative dimension) and building peace (its positive dimensions).

There are several theoretical approaches to the study of security. But for my purpose I will take the three dominant approaches which I thought have influential in security areas: Realism, liberal institutionalism or in short (institutionalism) and constructivism. Each of them has diverse variants so for the sake of clarity I well use them in general.

**Realism** – the basic assumption of this theory is that states are the main actors in world politics which is characterized by anarchy. In such a situation states are obsessed with power and security, conflict and competition and often failed to cooperate even in the face of common interests. So in the unforgiving self-help nature of the system the struggle for survival is the utmost concern of all states. Security is primarily gained in through power politics and military might. Security in this sense is ‘national security’. In a multi-polar system states can get its security through aligning with powerful actors and maintained through balance of power.

If the system is dominated by hegemony, the dominant power able to impose its will on weaker members of the system. ‘Hegemonic stability’ theory assumes the existence of a regional hegemon able and opt to impose its domination upon weaker members of a region and to limit the inherent political anarchy and economic instability of the international system.

**Institutionalism** – traditional realism is increasingly challenged by liberal institutionalists from the 1970s onwards. It accepted many realist assumptions notably the anachic nature of the international system, but rejected its conclusion. They stressed the potential for international cooperation especially through multilateralism and institutional integration. Their focus on the emergence complex interdependence also led them to highlight the importance of economic and political dimension of the international system and thus move away from the realist’s power politics and military force. They argue that in a system

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15 Ibid.

characterized by complex interdependence military (hard power) was of declining importance relative to economic, political and social (soft power) forms of power.\textsuperscript{18}

This encouraged the growing importance of non-military security dimensions and accelerated an associated shift from ‘strategic to security studies’.\textsuperscript{19} This has been influential in the security studies in Europe which reflected in the debates of multilateralism and democratic peace theory. Since Europe is increasingly democratized, a special peace zone is establishing so the possibility of conflict among democracies according to Kantian approach is absent. States increasingly view one another not as enemies but instead as partners needed to secure greater comfort and well being for their home public. Thus, they reject realisms pessimism about international institutions.

\textbf{Constructivism} - Stresses that security cannot be objectively defined without reference to inter-subjective perceptions any more than can individual or state interests. Perceptions of security and insecurity cannot be divorced from the values, beliefs and identity of the person or thing concerned.

Security must be seen in terms of a reflective interaction between subjective perceptions and material structures, between what is observed and what is imagined. Security like interests and identities are constructed. They are socially constructed. ‘An operational concept of security must acknowledge the constructed nature of social reality’.\textsuperscript{20} Constructivism shares neo-liberals conclusion that cooperation is possible under anarchy but offers a very different account of how that outcome emerges.

The premise that democratic states have not fought each other is shared by constructivists. But constructivism could offer a more general account of zones of peace, one not limited to democracies.\textsuperscript{21}

In sum constructivists attempt to show that realist assumption of ‘power politics’ is socially constructed and hence capable of being transformed by human practice. They analyze international relations by looking at the goals, threats, fears, cultures, identities and other elements of ‘social reality’ on the cultural stage as the social constructs of the actors. They are more optimistic about progress in international relations than realists who are loyal to a purely materialist ontology.

Social constructivism focuses on the power of ideas in defining the international system. The international structure is not only a constraint on state action, but in fact

\textsuperscript{18} Cited in Hyde-Price’s article, pp.30.
\textsuperscript{19} Hyde-Price, ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, pp.48.
\textsuperscript{21} Hopf, Ted. ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, International Security, 1998
constitutes state action through constituting the identities and interests of state agents. Yet the constructivists criticized because of their ignorance of other factors such as ethnicity, class, race or gender. It also forgoes many positivist assumptions.

In light of such theoretical and conceptual frameworks the nature of European security changed dramatically in the post cold war periods as threats of insecurity are multiple and defused. Germany identifies its role in Europe as facilitators of interactions and integrations, among European States through broadening and deepening interactions. Germany’s role in Europe can best be explained in institutionalists framework and no doubt have also several constructivist element influenced it. The realist’s assumptions although can be reflected in some aspects can no longer dominates Germany’s as well as European Security issues.

**Reunified Germany as Agents of European Security**

Ever since Germany reunified on October 1990, it along with France played a leading role in European Security and integration where external constraints imposed on its sovereignty eased with the collapse of the Soviet Union. It marked also the unification of Europe as well. It can be said Germany’s stability and security is directly related to the security of Europe. In terms of its behavior the German of the pre-war period was no longer existed. And the new Germany comes with new role and responsibility abandoning reliance on national security to dependence on supranational institutional security structures.

The end of the cold war as such does not mean the end of conflict and removal of security threats in Europe. Rather displayed new dangers to the continent in the form of ethnicity, nationalism, religion and other non-military sources. The greatest sources of danger come not from internally but from ex-soviet dominated regions of the continent, i.e., Central, Eastern and South Eastern parts of Europe. These states have been mired with social, economic and political crisis following the collapse of communism. Since Germany regained its location as the heart of Europe, she became more venerable because of its proximity.

FRG’s security is no longer threatened by Russian invasion or others, but instead by diverse external uncertainties in the post cold war period. The systematic change and its unification have forced Germany to redefine its future regional and global role both economically and politically and this will naturally affect its security policy.\(^{22}\) To offset the emerging security challenges both to Germany and Europe, Germany heavily relied on

\[^{22}\text{See Ummu Salma, (Theses), p.203.}\]
institutions of Europe through multilateralism and integration that in turn removes the suspicion of United Germany as a potential threat to the continent, a fear shared by many European countries following its reunification.

For Germany the European Union (EU) constitute the core of the Western peace community in which with France always advocated an Europe strong, united, both economically, politically and military as the only guarantee for establishing peace and security on the continent.\(^{23}\) Its uninterrupted and explicit support for EU institutions entails that Germany is ready to transfer its sovereignty to supranational European institutions and determined towards political union.

The new Germany is interlocked with multiple networks of regional and international institutions as well as domestic constraints.

Domestically the basic law of Germany curbed expansive unilateral security policy. Article 26 of the Basic Law declares unconstitutional any activities apt or intended to disturb peaceful international relations, especially preparation for military aggression’. Article 24 permits the government ‘with the view to maintaining peace’ to ‘become a party to a system of collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations on its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world’. Article 23 which was completely revised after unification states that ‘with a view to establishing a United Europe the FRG shall participate in the development of the EU … To this end the federation may transfer sovereign powers by law with the consent of the Bundesrat’. Article 87 authorizes the federal government to establish armed forces for defense purpose.\(^{24}\)

The above mentioned articles are clearly constraining German Foreign and Security policy in providing legal grounds in the form of permitting its involvement in multilateral security institutions as well as curbing its ambition of unilateral aggressive foreign and security policy.

The political culture of the German society has also been changed in fundamental ways as a result of decades of occupation and rehabilitation programmes. That behavior continued to dominate the post unification German identity. In this respect, Duffield pointed out that;

\(^{23}\) Ibid, pp.182.

\(^{24}\) Duffield, Johns, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, International Institutions and German Security Policy after Unification. pp.60
In the post war period, German society as a whole and German political elites in particular can be characterized as possessing distinctive, widely shared and rather elaborated set of beliefs and values of potentially great relevance to national security policy, which were little altered by unification …. These attitudes are shaped primarily by two sets of historical experiences of the Nazi dictatorship and world war second. These events discredited much of Germany’s previous political culture and increased German receptiveness to alternative beliefs and values, creating a situation in which a new political culture could take root.25

The negative historical memories they had, therefore, will continue to shape their political culture both in present and of the future.

Integration as a means to European Security

The Unified Germany has the third largest economy in the World and the first in Europe with largest population. As a geocentre of Europe and neighbored by Stable democracies of the West and unstable post communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, its strategic goal in Foreign and Security policy is based on strong interest in deep and extending integration. Its very location exposed to the dangers of instability in its eastern frontier. As the cold war subsidies the traditional west integration policy has been increasingly matched by interests to expand integrated economic and security structures eastward. Undoubtedly the Unified Germany is the most beneficial in the post war arrangements, now interested in achieving integrated and stable Europe from the Atlantic to East of Russia based on plural democracy, stable political cooperation and market economies. This outstanding interest in the enlargement of integration is deeply rooted in the constants of Germany’s strategic pattern: a centered European location, many neighbors, economic capability, dependence on foreign trade and exchange as well as the moral burden of the nation’s past, positive experiences of integration and negative experiences with “special paths”.26

Integration move is beneficial not only for Germany but also for its partners as well. ‘Only through integration can Germany’s critical size be self-beneficial and benefit its neighbors’.27 Thus, Germany is aware of its importance and considered its unity and European unification as two sides of the same coin, i.e., inseparable, hence committed in the processes. From the German perspective, the EU is a basis for a pan European order and an

25 Ibid., p.61.
27 Frenkler, Ulf, ‘Germany at Maastricht: Power Politics or Civilian Power?’ in ‘Germany as Civilian Power?’ pp.26
‘anchor of stability’ has fundamental importance for the peaceful development of the whole continent which get consistent German support for its enlargement.\textsuperscript{28}

Germany supported peaceful changes and has a strong aversion to the use of force because of the hard experiences of the previous wars. Multilateralism and institutionalism is the immutable foundation to its foreign and security policy. At times even sacrifice its vital interest for the sake of Europeanization. The threats now particularly from its eastern side includes political turmoil, economic collapse, ethnic conflict, nationalism and environmental degradation caused by socialism would eventually spill over into Germany via civil war or mass migration.

Its deep concern for stability in Eastern Europe has not doubt go beyond self-interest. Since the nature of security is dynamic, sources of instability and conflict are multiple and defused largely of non-military, no country will remain unaffected. So each countries security is interdependent.

For the purpose of stability in the region Germany strongly defended the accession of central and Eastern European countries (CEE) to various institutions of the West including the EU, NATO, WEU (West European Union) etc. Apart from this Germany provided huge generous financial and economic support to CEE countries including Russia in order to facilitate peaceful transition. Such deliberate deployment of financial resources to bring about change and political stability has become know as ‘Chequebook diplomacy’.\textsuperscript{29} Volker Ruhe, former defense minister of Germany once rightly said, ‘if we don’t export stability, we will import instability’.

On accounts of its economic influence, Germany performs the most important role in the EU and has major external influence on the new democracies of central and Eastern Europe because of its trade relations which have the largest share.

One of the most powerful resources that helped Germany for its success in integration derives is that Germany is considered as ‘Civilian power’. Civilian power replaces the military enforcement of rules (politics base on power) with the internationalization of socially accepted norms (politics based on legitimacy). According to Harnisch and Maull, although it has several distinct roles three norms have proven essential for a civilian power role concept.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid, pp.36
\textsuperscript{29} Bluth, Ibid, pp. 152
\textsuperscript{30} Harnisch, Sebastián & Hanns W. Maull, Ibid. P. 4
First, the willingness and ability to civilize international relations including promoter or initiator of international action. Second, the willingness to transfer sovereignty or autonomy to supranational institutions as a promote of collective Security and opponent of unilateral actions; and Third, the eagerness to realize a civilized international order even if it implies to forego short term national interests (power or plenty)

This civilian power role property fits to the unified Germany’s foreign and security policy as we have already seen earlier because Germany is relying primarily on non-military instruments, supporting democratization, even willing to relinquish sovereignty if it promotes common interests and heavy dependence on multilateralism and institutionalism.

Its civilian power role creates credibility to Germany in view of some suspicions that the unified Germany may took inward and follow the renationalization of its foreign and security policy. By and large Germany was successful in its policy towards the CEE countries.

**Unified Germany’s Contribution in Strengthening European Security Institutions**

Norms and values of national political culture of Germany evolved profoundly over the past five decade. Its post war security policy of regional and international institutional allegiance shows remarkable continuity after unification. It continued working on political union that includes the development of common foreign and security policy, Economic and monetary union, widening EU to include CEE countries.

With the end of the cold war Germany’s dependence on Superpower military protection is weakened with clear reduction of threats especially of invasion. At the same time its interest in regional stability rises. Germany used multilateral institutional both regional and global, to advance its interests. It looked Europeanization as a solution for its particular strategic dilemma. A strong common foreign and security policy would allow Germany to escape from its foreign policy dilemma either to take a low profile (the ‘political pigmy’) or conduct a ‘Gaullist’ foreign policy and revive old minorities. The latter obviously is out of Germany’s currency of power now.

The security policy now focus on maintaining and strengthening Europe’s post cold war security institutions like CSCE/OSCE, NATO, WEU, EU and some bilateral arrangements. In addition to that promotion of arms control, disarmament and non-

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31 Cole, Alistair, Ibid, p.110-111
proliferation has constituted a central objective of German security policy after unification. So it destined to play important role in the formation of a common European security and defense identity (ESDI) based on EU & the WEU.

The Maastricht summit of 1991 accorded CFSP as the second pillar of the EU (pillar one-the European community, pillar two-the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and pillar three, cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)). This treaty for the first time attributed a treaty based role to the EU in security policy.\(^\text{32}\) Germany and France strongly advocated in favor of strong European role in security matters, Germany however is also keen to avoid any potential conflict with the US about the future Euro-Atlantic alliance. On the Atlantic alliance the two countries has divergent strategic heritage where France is against stronger US involvement in the European sphere. Whereas Germany stressed the inseparable twining of European integration and Atlanticism.

European integration needs a CFSP that would eventually helped in the establishment of a common defense policy though not yet moving head. Common Defense is also proposed by Germany to be the fourth pillar of EU.

**European Union-** For Germany it embodies at best a functioning economic and peace order even without providing a hared military defense and peace order for its member states.\(^\text{33}\) European integration provided a moral framework which Germany could develop its identity as a member of international society on the basis of rejection of militarism and nationalism that led to disaster. The EU as a base for European security order would contribute in searching for a common ground in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management. It should also develop a coherent security posture which will cover the whole range of nonmilitary and if required also of military means.

**West European Union-** It performs only minor roles in European security. For long it has been overshadowed by the predominant role of NATO in western defense during the cold war. It has no direct link with the EC. So Mitterrand (French President) and Kohl (Chancellor Germany) proposed a link between WEU and European political union with greater operational capabilities to become part and parcel of the EU.

Germany supported the absorption of WEU by the EU. Defense would become the Fourth pillar of the EU. This would mean that defense policy would be coordinated at the

\(^{32}\) Ibid. p. 113  
^{33}\) Giessmann. pp.51
European level and decisions could be made by qualified majority. All member State of EU would have to become full membership Of the WEU (All EU members are not full members the WEU).34

However, this common defense would not mean the creation of a common European army or loss of control over national armed forces, Members of WEU can abstain from joint military actions. It was seen as the defense arm of the EU. The Maastricht Treaty had established a legal link between the two. It has been seen as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

Conference for security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE)- It was established in the high time of the cold war to be the cornerstone of European security order. It is inclusive & pan-European in nature. With the end of the cold ear CSCE transformed in to an organization (OSCE) and transcend the original function of settling and mediating roles to adopting operational conflict prevention and crisis management. Yet it failed to perform its functions given weak legal basis. None the les it could not be underestimated particularly in the operational field of democracy building,preventive diplomacy that include early warning of conflicts and the deepening of collective security structures. German support for the OSC after unification is largely to overcome Russian opposition to NATO enlargement.35

With regard to NATO, Germany give special attention unlike France which is against US dominated NATO. Despite the proliferation of diverse security institutions in Europe, none of them are truly functioning and have the capacity to address real security challenges effectively. In the absence of such security institutions that are capable of enforcing both non-military and if necessary also military means make NATO remain the only credible security instrument and hence they give continued support for its existence.

Germany and Britain wanted the US presence in Europe. So NATO provides a legal and institutional framework for the military presence of the US in Europe which saw it as essential for the security and stability of the continent even supported by most European nations whether or not member of the Alliance. That is because only the US had the means and capability at hand to provide sufficient protection for Western Europe. From the German perspective this will allow neighbors to feel more comfortable with the new and larger Germany.

34 Bluth, pp. 36
35 Duffied, Ibid, 117
NATO expansion at the beginning was opposed strongly by political parties domestically like social democrats, and Greens apart from Russia the main external actor opposing its enlargement. Partnership for Peace (PFP) was devised to address the security concerns of Germany and its CEE neighbors. It did not involve however, the extension of security guarantees but designed as preparation for membership. It was offered to all members of the OSCE, and thus clearly would involve states that would not be offered NATO membership at an early (or any) stage. They can participate in many of its activities. Domestic opposition gradually lost ground and Russia’s position is ambivalent in NATO expansion in some cases.

Eurocorps is another security arrangement established by France and Germany. It becomes operational in 1995 with troops drawn from France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and Luxemburg. Germany policy maker presented Eurocorps as part of a Europeanization of NATO and as a means of pulling back France to NATO orbit while promoting a more autonomous European defense capacity. Eurocorps would opened to other Europeans states and could form the basis of a multinational, European corps. It is subject to French-German Security Council and is administered by WEU planning cell. However its precise relations with other security organizations were left ambiguous. Yet it was intended to provide international institutional framework in which the constitutional and political limitations of German participation in out of area mission gradually overcome by a network of commitments. Its demand to draw France closer to NATO was finally fulfilled by the French decision to rejoin NATO military committee in December 1995. The Franco-German relationship could mitigate the effect of European division.

The Evolving shift of German security policy

We have seen that the military dimension of security after the cold war has been less emphasized. However its necessity since unification grows as a result of events in the 1990s. So security policies continued to be ultimately concerned with violence, the use of force and their possible consequences due to military conflicts, ethnic cleaning, violent dislocation of people, genocide and human right abuses in eastern and south eastern parts of Europe in some ways that can not be addressed with out the use of force.

36 Bluth, Ibid. 113
37 See Bluth, Ibid, pp. 38-39
Most German leader and the public at large are reluctant to see their country assume a leadership role in international affairs especially regarding security even with in multilateral institutions. Yet since 1990s we see also a progressive change in the attitude of German’s towards security issues. So the political culture may change gradually overtime and even on rare occasions sharply.\textsuperscript{38}

Thus the events of the 90s profoundly affected the German public’s regarding the use of force. Despite the post war which sufficiently socialized FRG into the Western liberal camp and altered its militaristic behavior, in military areas in particular important changes are taking place. This change however continued to be under strict European and international institutional restrictions.

Initial abstention and reluctance to use force was because the basic law did not allow out of area operation (outside of NATO area). This coupled with bitter resentment of the use of force by the people and reluctance of its leaders kept Germany not to focus on the military, only to have limited army for limited purpose. So that it can’t play a leading role in this sphere which means that its credibility for joint enforcement is questionable.

Even if there are clear provisions, Germany was not willing to take the lead, rather maintain low profile, and shoulder the responsibility to its partners and institutions like the European and Atlantic alliance. Germany is also staunch supporter of NATO along with the strengthening of ESDI. This helped to persist US-German Security compact in which,

Germany was a security consumer, though the extent to which it consumed security has declined because it was no longer a frontline state the way Federal Republic had been and because no nuclear security issue become increasingly important.\textsuperscript{39}

Germany now learned that the new Europe has facing challenges that made soft power perspective alone meaningless. New demands and risks are to be taken into consideration. The constitutional court decided in June 1994 that military action beyond self-defense (according to Article 87) was in fact consistent with the constitution presumably if taken under the norm of Article 24, and if in each single case a supportive majority of elected representatives to the Bundestag has voted for action.\textsuperscript{40} So the opposition of left leaning parties and the Greens gradually subsidies as German participation in peace keeping and peace enforcement according to Chapter VII of the UN and Article 24 of Basic law could be conceivable task for political and also for moral reasons.

\textsuperscript{38} Duffield, ibid, p67
\textsuperscript{39} Tewes, Henning, pp.148.
\textsuperscript{40} Giessmann, pp.17
We see therefore remarkable change in public opinion regarding the use of force inline with party positions. It implies also the widenning of support for the strengthening of the army/ Bendeswehr. Thus, we see total abstention in the case of Gulf war concerning out of area operation has shifted to limited engagement in Somalia and the enforcement of the Yugoslav embargo to the participation in NATO stabilization and implementation force in Bosnia under a UN mandate and recently to engagement in NATO’s war against Yugoslavia to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo whose legal basis is unclear.\textsuperscript{41}

Pressure on Germany to play a greater role in world politics grew in the aftermath of the Gulf War I. The demand to develop a CFSP in Europe lacked credibility if Germany itself was constitutionally unable to participate. So the July 1994 court decision will avoid such obstacles and Germany need to play a role commensurate with its economic and political power.

The Bosnian massacre had a greater repercussion for the support of armed intervention and led to the reconsideration of the German’s traditional position, not only among almost all political parties but also the public at large. Military operations have become broadly accepted as a means of last resort.\textsuperscript{42} The fear of German Unification to be the most dominant and assertive power in Europe as well as in the world led some states oppose its reunification like Britain, France, Israel among others. The fear of German hegemony, remilitarization and re-nationalization of FSP (Foreign and Security Policy) has proven to be not true. On the contrary Germany was unwilling or utmost impotent to contribute militarily for its allies because of less emphasis given to its military. The surprising thing is that the US and Israel among others condemned Germany for not contributing military against Iraq in the first Gulf War.\textsuperscript{43}

Not only the allies but also other nations even the UN demand a more assertive role from Germany, a willingness to play powers ‘positively’. That is to assume power with responsibility. Still f most Germans want power to be remained soft or civilian.

For the first time since the Second World War Germany was involved in its first war in Kosovo. It started to act like other states and is a clear recognition that non-military means can not always achieve the intended target unless backed by military enforcement. Its assertiveness is circumscribed by different institutions and circumstances. Germany’s principle of ‘never alone’ (reliable partner of the western alliance and multi literalist) and

\textsuperscript{41} Philippi, Nina, pp.49-50.  
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 56.  
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 51.
‘never again’ (never again war originating from the German Soil) is a stumbling block for its security policy.

For instance in the Kosovo crisis Germany wanted a cooperative multilateral approach including Russia and China, International legitimacy through the UNSC Resolution and stabilizing the whole of South East Europe through a comprehensive approach. This is because without involving influential actors in that region it will not bring the intended target with least cost both in material and human terms. A stability pact was proposed by Germany intended to dissolve intra and inter state conflicts through socio-economic development, democratization, regional cooperation and integration; and its ultimate incentive is the promise of membership for the South East European countries in the EU and NATO. 44

Here we observe that Germany continued to adhere to its institutionalist and multilateralist credentials, and its concern for the possible damage to the credibility and effectiveness of regional and international institutions, as had been seen in Bosnia, if it is not adequately controlled led Germany to involve militarily. German had also a fear that if the Kosovo conflict continued unchecked, refugees will overflow her, given that Germany is the favorite destination for refugees, and asylum seekers in Europe.

The Yugoslav crisis proved that Germany did have an important role as a major regional power. It forced a reappraisal of the diplomatic, economic and military instruments at Germany's disposal and how they could be employed. Most importantly it proved the political context in which a fundamental review of force could be accepted.

One of the enduring legacies of the Yugoslav conflicts therefore is that the ‘normalization’ which the German political elites were calling at the end of 1980s has been achieved finally. 45

The basic elements of Germany’s institutionalist security policy are proved to be very successful. Germany’s new role in the post cold war period as a ‘civilian power’ come to recognize and realize that collective security demands the use of force.

Conclusion

What comes in the post war period in Europe and the situation after the recession of the cold war is that European security and German security is intimately inseparable. The cold war could be seen as the main training ground in rehabilitating and reshaping Germany’s behavior from the unilateralist, militarist negative nationalism of the past. It changed

44 Maull, p.110.
45 Bluth, p.100
Germany successfully as the most credible ally of the west and staunch supporter of a liberal democratic values and norms. Along with changes in its political culture, the historical hostility between France and Germany has adequately resolved through bilateral and multilateral relations especially in security cooperation. Reconciling the two states were tantamount to establishing stability in the continent. Similar kind of cooperation and agreement has been entered with its historic enemy in the east, Poland. It means that Germany is now surrounded by friends and allies which strengthened further deepening and expansion of European integration.

Germany along with its allies want to establish integrated and stable Europe, a Europe that no longer threatened by its assertiveness. As a result the national ‘special path’ has to be avoided at any cost. Security threats are primarily driven from economic, political, social, ethnic, religious, environmental and immigration than military one. Germany no longer wants to militarize itself nor ambition to have destructive weapons including biological and nuclear arsenals. Now as a ‘normal state’ eased from cold war restraint on its sovereignty, multilateralism and institutionalism continued to be the immutable foundations, a remarkable continuity of the post-war legacies. The trauma of an ‘eternal German Question’ for Europe to be the most striking trouble spot forever has been proved to be a myth.

Since it commands substantial amount of power in terms of economic, political as well as military potentials, it need to play a leading role with strict adherence to multilateralism and institutional norms in a positive manner. Despite diverse European security arrangements, the Europeans are not able or often not willing to deal collectively in crisis situation. The CFSP has been never realized because it is very difficult to reconcile the national interests of all members of the community. Hence they are unwilling to invest even in the most available institutional framework like OSCE.

The Political and military turmoil’s of the 1990s shows the fact that a European moving towards political, monetary and economic union need to be supplemented by coordinated functioning military integration, though it may not be an easy task. EU is still far away from posing as a credible alternative to NATO for all eventualities. As long as members do not overcome their present predicaments and start to speak with one voice particularly in crisis situation they will hardly achieve a common ground for ESDI.

No single approach can exactly explain the fact of the post reunification German behavior regarding foreign and security policy. Obviously the realist assumption can not fit properly to the new Germany role. Realists anticipation of a change in the structure of power following the end of cold war would encouraged diplomatic unilateralism, reliance on force
and re-nationalization of FSP (foreign and security policy) is far from reality and not conformed with the new Germany’s role.

It is most probably be best explained by liberal institutionalists that dominated the unified Germany’s FSP discourses. For instance, its enlargement policies, insistence on legitimacy through regional and international institutions for a given action, multilateralism which it calls frequently are some of the manifestations. Many constructivist ideas also influenced the new German Identity. Its involvement in international crisis is now increasingly shaped by norms and firmly held beliefs rather than by material interests. Intervention in Kosovo crisis was the best example. Its institutionalist approach strengthened more after unification. It is used to pursue its national interests with in a supranational framework to avoid any bad memories of the past.

Since state security is interconnected continent wide, state security as a national issue can no longer be obtained for any state acting on its own. Security issues and threats are multidimensional which needs cooperative effort transcending national boundaries. To that effect the state must be willing and committed to the institutions of collective security like OSCE by giving appropriate powers. The united Germany no more wanted to be a military hegemony, if not economic and political.

Its civilian power status coupled with strong economic and liberal democratic values serve as a ‘snowballing’ effect for CEE countries that they saw Germany as their model and tried to imitate her. Germany and Western Europe not only democratically tamed but also institutionally harnessed. Constructivism reflects Germany’s firm commitment to institutionally based solutions and its civilian power status. External variables are more influential in shaping and changing national security culture. The present and future roles of Germany is inextricably linked to its past. The civilian power role for long circumscribed military commitments and seek to avoid the costs of military force.

The transcontinental chain of cooperation is unprecedented and accounted to the Germans role in shaping the continent. It also interested in expanding east-west contact, sustain close ties with in the EU and keeping transatlantic ties that indicates the return of German influence in the continent. The feeling of exercising power with responsibility is recognized. Germany should no longer rule out the possibility of military operations for the common security of the continent. There are clear signs of German adaptation of FSP to a new different environment while maintaining the norms and principles governing that policy. The traditional saying of Germany as an “economic giant but a political dwarf” will no longer explain the unified Germany. Undoubtedly today it is the most powerful actor politically,
economically and militarily in the continent. Even internationally its power is recognized for instance, Germa mostly invited by the five veto powers to discuss issues of international concern is one of its prominences. For effective continental security organization important actors like Russia has to be participated without which security in the volatile region of CEE would be impossible.

Germany’s attitude towards war and conflict suggests that despite being more assertive and influential remains firmly in the west. The foreign policy identity of the new Germany willing to use force only in ‘moral’ circumstances and only as part of an international alliance with legal sanction and in support of international law is indicative of what one would expect from a state with a post sovereign identity. Indeed it follows a Kantian approach to European peace and stability. The new European order was to be built domestically on democratic institutions throughout the continent and regionally a close economic interdependence, prosperity, vibrant international organizations and the rule of law. The stability pact proposed by Germany during the Kosovo war substantiates this idea. In such away the possibilities of military conflict among European democracies become unthinkable. Germany’s integration through widening and deepening derive of the EU and other institutions would further expand the pacific zone. Despite the progressive change of Germany’s behavior regarding the use of force, it will continue to remain contentious as the culture of restraint is deeply entrenched.

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