RWANDA, IS IT A SUCCESS STORY OR EXAGGERATED? DEVELOPMENT HISTORY

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Abstract
This study is a multi-level development history analysis of Rwanda, wherein “development” is defined in accordance with Amartya Sen’s holistic approach. It takes into account social, physical and economic variables, and considers how they impact individuals’ capacity to live freely. The objectives of the paper are: 1) to investigate how global, regional, national and local events have interplayed to shape the development process over time in Rwanda, 2) to discover Rwanda’s unique contribution to present day development discussions, and 3) to see how development should best proceed in Rwanda today. The study was quantitative in nature. Through a brief historical survey, six key turning points have been identified as critical to Rwanda’s development history: 1) the adoption of identity cards in 1926, 2) the Hutu Revolution of 1959, 3) independence from Belgium in 1962, 4) the coffee crisis of 1987-1989 and resultant SAPs, 5) the 1994 genocide, and 6) the new constitution in 2003. These turning points have helped us to understand Rwanda’s development in six areas more clearly. These areas are: economic considerations, agriculture and land scarcity, gender, education, good governance and the reconciliation process. We have chosen these areas over others due to their prominence in literature surrounding Rwandan development. Despite being portrayed as a success story, the developmental situation in Rwanda is falling short in some areas. The profound structural transformation, which needs to occur in both economic and societal terms, makes future development success uncertain.

Keywords: Development, Genocide, Rwanda, structural transformation

Introduction
Rwanda has had a complex, and often troubled, history. Sadly, it is most famous—not for its beautiful rolling hills—but for the state-sponsored genocide that killed close to 1,000,000 Tutsis in 1994. Since then, many analyses from various disciplines (law, ethics, social sciences, etc.) have shed-light on the causes of the genocide and its’ repercussions.
In their own disciplines, development scholars and practitioners alike have focused on the role of the development process in the years prior to and after the genocide. Some have gone so far as to argue that, over time, ill-conceived development and social strategies contributed to an environment more conducive to the occurrence of genocide (Uvin, 1998). Unfortunately, many of these studies are one-dimensional or bi-dimensional in nature; they only consider one or two spheres of influence in making their overall analysis. For example, some studies may adequately address regional and national issues but fail to consider international and local dynamics. For any development history analysis to be holistic, it must take into account all four levels, not to mention the horizontal and vertical linkages between each level.

What follows is a multi-level development history analysis of Rwanda in four sections. Part I introduces the primary objective of this paper, our working definition of development, and the methodological and analytical framework that will be employed. Part II is a brief socio-political history of Rwanda interspersed with closer examinations of critical turning points in its history. Part III addresses development efforts in Rwanda, from the time of independence to the present. This section—based on a holistic understanding of development—is centered around six “key focus areas”: 1) economics, 2) agriculture/new technology, 3) gender and equality, 4) education, 5) good governance, and 6) reconciliation processes. They were chosen based on their prominence in both the historical survey and in the general literature on Rwandan development. Finally, part IV will consist of conclusions and recommendations for Rwanda’s future development.

Material and Methods

Objective

The overall objective is to produce a multi-level, time-series analysis of development in Rwanda—particularly since the genocide—in order to: a) investigate how global, regional, national and local events have interplayed to shape the development process over time in Rwanda, b) discover Rwanda’s unique contribution to present-day development discussions, c) see how development should best proceed today in Rwanda based on the results obtained from our findings.

Definition of Development

Note that, for the purposes of this analysis, the term “development” will most closely resemble Amartya Sen’s holistic definition where expanding “capabilities” and “functionings” are the central precepts. It is necessary to state at the outset which definition is being used, as there are many competing definitions of development, and some are concerned solely
with economic measures of success and advancement. According to traditional, neo-classical models of development, a society can be “developing” economically (as seen in GDP/per capita growth and increased investments or savings), while the rich amass more wealth and the poor become increasingly destitute. This is a phenomenon often called, ‘growth without development.’ Since such a narrow definition of development is inadequate, but correct in suggesting that GDP growth is essential to development, Sen’s definition of development will be followed, wherein freedoms to make one’s own decisions are largely—but not solely—determined by income. He suggests that several other factors are also critical for development (Sen, 1999, p. 3):

*Growth of GNP or of individual incomes can, of course, be very important as a means of expanding the freedoms enjoyed by the members of the society. But freedoms depend also on other determinants, such as social and economic arrangements (for example, facilities for education and health care) as well as political and civil rights (for example, the liberty to participate in public discussion and scrutiny).*

Therefore, proper education, adequate health care, job opportunities, democracy, lack of discrimination, etc. are all essential to foster holistic development.

**Methodological and Analytical Framework**

The underlying assumption in pursuing a multi-level study is that such an analysis ‘leaves no stone unturned.’ The diagrammatic framework that will be used for this study depicts the complex levels, linkages and factors that have impacted Rwanda’s development over time (see Figure 1). This model was influenced by Abrahamsson and Nilsson’s own visual framework, which underpinned their analysis of Mozambique’s development history. They too included considerations at the global, regional, national and local levels over time, and argued that to do any less would render any developmental analysis incomplete (Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995, pp. 12-13). Such diagrams are often necessary to help readers understand the various linkages between and within levels, as they pertain to critical periods in a country’s history.

The reader should refer back to this diagram often throughout the following pages, in order to understand how one event can potentially have implications at all levels (global, regional, national, local). Nothing happens in isolation. For example, there were many events at the global, regional, national and local levels that created an atmosphere conducive to genocide in Rwanda. Any good development analysis must consider how the interplay, overlap and linkages between events and levels have impacted the
development process over time, whether positively, negatively or a combination of both.

Since the investigators will be using a certain framework and approach to this assignment (i.e., gathering data in order to find patterns and critical turning points in Rwanda’s development history from which recommendations can be made), the strategy employed is more inductive and abductive in nature, as opposed to deductive. This is generally the case with development history case studies. Furthermore, since only secondary data will be used, a qualitative method for data gathering will be applied. One major drawback of the inductive thought operation is that the internal limitation of induction “can never be either analytically or empirically certain” (Danermark, 1997, p. 81). This mode of interference is “restricted to conclusions at the empirical level.” (ibid)

Even though induction does not imply the necessity to use a theory per se, a number of concepts and theories within the field of peace and development studies have influenced this study. The concepts of structural violence and positive/negative peace deriving from Johan Galtung (the founding father to the Scandinavian school of Peace and Development Studies), will be used in order to understand the Rwandan societal constraints. Ted Gurr’s concept of relative deprivation will also figure prominently in this study.

Finally, in this multi-level analysis, Todaro and Smith’s (2010, p. 22) three-fold development objectives—that build-on Amartya Sen’s holistic definition of development—will serve as a guideline to evaluate Rwanda’s development history. They posit that true, holistic development works:

1. To increase the availability and widen the distribution of basic life-sustaining goods such as food, shelter, health and protection.

2. To raise levels of living, including, in addition to higher incomes, the provision of more jobs, better education, and greater attention to cultural and human values, all of which will serve not only to enhance material well-being but also to generate greater individual and national self-esteem.

3. To expand the range of economic and social choices available to individuals and nations by freeing them from servitude and dependence not only in relation to other people and nation-states but also to the forces of ignorance and human misery.

In a different vein, note that the conductors of this analysis assume a general level of “development knowledge” on the part of the reader (i.e., assuming the reader is a development practitioner or scholar). Therefore, certain terms, expressions and strategies unique to development history and theory will not be explained.
Results

Colonial Rwanda (1918-1962)

Although Rwanda had been part of the German colony of Rwanda-Burundi since 1884, in 1918 it became a United Nations protectorate to be governed by Belgium as declared by the Treaty of Versailles (Mamdani, 2001).

In 1926 the Belgians introduced a system of ethnic identity cards differentiating Hutus from Tutsis. Mamdani refers to this as the origin of the racialization of the Hutu and Tutsi (Mamdani, 2001). Newbury (1995) emphasizes that this colonial policy served mostly to intensify animosity between Tutsis and Hutus. Sometimes the process of identification was arbitrary and not based on ethnicity at all; if you had ten or more cattle, you were ‘Tutsi,’ and if you had fewer cattle, you were ‘Hutu’ (Mamdani, 2001). The polarization between the two groups escalated, and in 1957, the
PARMEHUTU (Party for the Emancipation of the Hutus) was formed while Rwanda was still under Belgian rule. The PARMEHUTU, founded on a sectarian ethnic ideology, had the desire to reclaim Rwanda for the Hutu people.

In 1959, the “wind of destruction” occurred, wherein the PARMEHUTU rebelled against the Tutsi elites through massacring many Tutsi. As a result, up to 150,000 Tutsis fled to Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and DRC. Newbury (1995) points out that this was a time of discrimination for both Tutsis inside Rwanda and in exile. In 1960, Hutus won the municipal elections that were organized by the Belgians, and after a 1961 coup in Gitarama, they declared Rwanda a republic and abolished the monarchy. PARMEHUTU leader, Gregoire Kayibanda, became the first President of Rwanda in 1962, when official independence was granted and national elections held. Unfortunately, oppression and violence against Tutsis continued, and the refugee crisis worsened.

From our survey of Rwandan history, development efforts since 1962 revealed six crucial aspects impacting Rwanda’s development have been identified. They are: 1) changing economic conditions, 2) the importance of agriculture and new technology, 3) gender issues, 4) education, 5) good governance and 6) the post-genocide reconciliation process. In addition to the historical survey shaping our choices of “key focus areas,” Amartya Sen’s holistic definition of development has prompted us to choose categories outside the traditional economic sphere. Each of these will be discussed in detail. Note that we have chosen to start this discussion at independence, as very little had happened development-wise prior to the 1960s.

**Pre-Genocide Rwanda (1962-1994)**

By the time of independence in 1962, land was a significant and volatile issue for several reasons: a) there was such a scarcity of livable, farmable land due to Rwanda’s topography (many hills in the west, swamp land in the east) and increasing soil infertility due to over-farming, b) over 90% of Rwandans were subsistence farmers and so relied on land for their livelihood, and c) Rwanda’s population density was the highest in Africa, so this made competition for existing land even more fierce (Verpoorten and Berlage, 2004). In Rwanda particularly, land was equated with power and status, so its importance cannot be ignored in the development discussion. Before and after independence, many Tutsis began fleeing their land to go to bordering nations (Prunier, 1995).

With Hutus running the country, there was in-fighting between politicians from the stronger regions in the south (where Kayibanda was from) and the north. A 1973 coup brought a northerner to power, General
Juvenal Habyarimana, and his policies favored northern interests over southern ones (Britannica, 2010).

On the economic front, although Rwanda had fared well during the first oil crisis in the mid 70s, the second crisis of 1979 caused interest rates to skyrocket, and Rwanda struggled to both pay off old loans and get new ones approved. With the world coffee crisis of 1987, coffee prices plummeted, and Rwanda’s export revenue dwindled. Habyarimana was forced to adopt Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) from the IMF and WB. The drastic economic measures of the SAPs (such as devaluing the currency) brought Rwanda close to societal collapse. Such economic hardships for the people—particularly the poor—caused increased competition for scarce resources among the Hutu and Tutsi.

In 1990, some of the outside Rwandan refugees, who had by this time organized themselves into an official group known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), invaded from Uganda. The guerilla fighting continued until a cease-fire in 1991 (Prunier, 1995). On the heels of the cease-fire, and due to increasing international pressure, negotiations were called. From 1992-1993, a series of talks were held with the result of a peace-agreement signed in 1993 in Arusha, Tanzania (known as the “Arusha Peace Accord”). One stipulation of the agreement was that the RPF would soon have a voice in government proceedings. Of course, many Hutu were unhappy with this agenda (Britannica, 2010), and some observers on the ground believed that these “peace talks” were smokescreen to hide the real state intention of genocide (Dallaire, 2003). Many Hutu extremists had no intention of sharing power with the Tutsis. Indeed, since 1993, a very influential state-controlled radio network called Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) had been increasingly used by the state as a means to spread ‘Hutu Power’ propaganda about Tutsi plans to overthrow the government and the Hutu responsibility to ‘protect the homeland.’ Since most Rwanda’s had a transistor radio these hate messages spread quickly (Kellow and Steeves, 1998).

At the regional level, not much help was offered to Rwanda during this growing tension. Central and East Africa had very little regional organization (until the mid 1990s) and each country was trying to find its own way after decolonization. The interaction that did occur usually involved coping with conflict “spillovers” from one state to the next. In essence, there was no ‘regional security complex’ to speak of (Buzan and Waever, 2003). At the international level also, very little help was forthcoming (albeit France tried to support the Hutu government during the war, but with little success). Rwanda was a tiny, obscure country with no strategic position (in terms of Cold War advantage), and had little in the way
of natural resources. Perhaps this was the true reason for the lack of international involvement.

**Post-Genocide Rwanda (1994-2003)**

The cease-fire ended on April 6, 1994, the date that President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down). He was instantly killed along with the President of Burundi. The radio station, RTLM, immediately cast Tutsi blame and gave the order to begin the slaughter (the code words, “cut down the tall trees,” served as the signal to begin the killing) (Kellow and Steeves, 1998). Tutsis again began fleeing to the border but only very few escaped the killings. In the span of just three months, it is estimated that between 800,000 – 1,000,000 Tutsis were slain (Britannica, 2010). Neighbors killed neighbors. Churchgoers killed their fellow congregants. Even some Hutu priests and nuns actively engaged in the killing (Longman, 2010). Sadly, the international response was indifferent and the aid that did come was ‘too little, too late.’ By July of 1994, the better-organized RPF had gained control of the country. It is estimated that about two million Hutu refugees had fled Rwanda. This in itself caused a massive refugee crisis in the Great Lakes Region and was one of the causes of the First Congo War (Britannica, 2010).

While the RPF tried to establish a transitional government in Rwanda, they also had to face the growing refugee crisis. To make matters worse, some Hutus in Zaire were organizing into militant and political cells (particularly in the North and South Kivu provinces), desiring to come back to Rwanda to gain control and “finish the job.” Soon, cross-border raids by Hutu militia began occurring, and Rwanda became increasingly frustrated that Zaire was doing little to control these insurgents. By 1995, Rwanda and Uganda had begun plotting with eastern Zairian-oppressed groups about how to overthrow Mobutu’s government, and gave their support to rebel leader Laurent-Desire Kabila. However, once Kabila toppled the government in 1997, he also failed to address the Hutu militia problem. This was the impetus for the Second Congo War, which began in 1998 (Britannica, 2010).

Aside from this regional conflict, Rwanda was faring quite well on the national front during this period. By all outward measures (political, social, economic), Rwanda was quickly recovering from the genocide, and the international community took note. Under the surface, however, Rwanda continued to struggle with social cohesion, reconciliation processes and a rural population that, by and large, was not benefiting from Rwanda’s economic growth as expected.
Figure II holds a set of interdependent societal and developmental factors, which have contributed (directly and indirectly) to the genocide. The figure is organized in two sections. The top box is treating events and historical happenings while the second box is outlining various factors that have played an influencing role over time.


Since the genocide, the RPF has held a transitional government in Rwanda. A new constitution was introduced in 2003—after a national referendum with the formation of political parties. Some human rights groups claim, however, that the government discourages opposition parties from forming and has suppressed dissidents in the lead-up to elections. Some of them argue also that the multi-party system is in place mostly to satisfy international observers (HRW, 2010); the views denied by the Government.
of Rwanda. The government argues that national unity should not be compromised on the pretext of political pluralism, particularly when the parties in question are militant and racist in nature (i.e., such as the Hutu militia, FDLR—Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) (Beswick, 2010). Despite all the claims to the contrary, a 2010 Transparency International report has declared Rwanda to be a fairly “corrupt-free” state, particularly in comparison with numerous other African nations (Transparency International, 2008). Also in its’ favor is the fact that Rwanda has a female-majority parliament, unique in the world (Beswick, 2010).

The period since the genocide has been a relatively stable and economically strong one for Rwanda—despite having a large debt burden. The economic growth is evidenced by increasing GDP/capita rates, advances in tourism and infrastructure development (BBC, 2010). On the regional and international levels, in 2007, Rwanda joined the East Africa Community, and in 2009, the Commonwealth (Britannica, 2010). Many of Rwanda’s political, social and economic actions since 2000 have been reflective of its development policies as outlined in two important government documents: *Rwanda 2020 Vision* and the *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* (PRSP—first created in 2002). Although these development documents were created just prior to 2003, they both shaped the development of the new constitution and were influenced by it. In this way, Vision 2020, the PRSP and the new constitution were mutually reinforcing, and the new constitution helped to “fast track” the implementation of the reports’ development objectives.

**Figure III. Summary of the reports’ development objectives.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turning points</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Impacts</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1926-1933</td>
<td>Belgians created identity cards which initiated the societal division between Hutu and Tutsi</td>
<td>National and local level societal impacts: identity cards increased the societal division and introduced discrimination of the Hutu population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Hutu Revolution. Hutu mobilize and initiate a power struggle to take over power from Tutsi.</td>
<td>The massacres lead to a large amount of refugees fleeing to neighboring states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Rwandan Independence: First Republic was created under President Gregoire Kayibanda</td>
<td>After independence, an institutionalized discrimination policy against Tutsis began.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-1991</td>
<td>International Coffee Agreement (ICA) fell apart; Rwanda became indebted and fell into financial crisis.</td>
<td>Coffee crisis at the end of the 1980s impacted negatively on the world economy. In Rwanda, the public sector was hit hard, and a Structural Adjustment Program was introduced in 1990-1991.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Genocide: around 1 million people were killed in the state-sponsored massacres. Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—the Tutsi led diaspora party took over power in July.</td>
<td>Multilevel societal collapse in Rwanda (See impacts in graphs in appendix 1). Hutu government legitimized killing of Tutsi population. The genocide led to a horrendous trauma for the Rwandan civil society. Tutsi refugees fled to neighboring states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>New constitution was created. The first multiparty elections took place. Rwandan process of democracy started.</td>
<td>The first PRSP was implemented in 2002. Donor community thus impacted on the policy making through the PRSP.</td>
</tr>
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Part III: Interpretation of results

Economic Considerations

According to Gerard Prunier, economic growth in Rwanda during the 1960s was barely present. During this time, international aid was minimal yet still contributed much to the economy. In the early 1960s, Christian Democrats in Germany and Belgium—two of Rwanda’s donor countries—had a strategy to generate third world aid through party donations. This strategy was, to some extent, a resistance against communism (the “Hallstein doctrine”), which had been spreading in Africa.

In the 1970s, the Rwandan economy had made some advances as a result of good fiscal policies, low inflation, a large influx of aid and high export earnings (due to good coffee prices). In addition to coffee exports, Prunier notes that Rwanda’s entrance into the francophone ECGLC (Economic Community of the Great Lake Countries) in 1976 and KRBO (Kagera River Basin Organisation) one year later, greatly facilitated its development during the 70s. Rwanda benefited from these communities in two different ways: 1) by entering the ECGLC, Rwanda received improved transport links which increased trade, and 2) through support from the KRBO, Rwanda expanded its hydroelectric development (Prunier, 1995). After the second oil shock of 1979 though, Rwanda’s growth slowed to 3% a year until the mid 1980s and became stagnant until 1990 (World Bank, 2010).

By the 1980s, there had been advances on numerous fronts (in comparison to the 1960s): the mortality rate was down, education had improved and so had the economy. Still, the country was struggling after the second oil shock. It was during this time that Rwanda began to receive foreign aid (in response to the debt crisis, decreasing coffee prices and greater petroleum costs). To understand this increase in foreign aid, one must realize that a major shift in economic policy came around the time of the 1987. As mentioned in the turning point about the coffee crisis, Rwanda became indebted after coffee prices plunged on the world market. Habyarimana was forced to negotiate with the World Bank and IMF to implement the first SAPs. As a result of having the IMF’s ‘stamp of approval,’ Rwanda received both increasing amounts of international aid and private bank loans. Unfortunately, the global economic climate and the SAP implementation measures brought Rwanda to the brink of societal collapse and created an atmosphere conducive to genocide. Foreign loans during this time were also contingent on Habyarimana pursuing ‘western-oriented’ development objectives (i.e., industrialization and urbanization), at the expense of rural areas. Therefore, rural discontent and feelings of relative deprivation grew. Instead of acknowledging the government’s role is this (so
to its favoring of Kigali and northern areas over the rural south), it blamed the Tutsis for the country’s social and economic woes (Kamola, 2007).

The genocide of 1994 stopped the country’s development entirely and severely damaged its’ economy. In that year, the GDP fell significantly to match 1969 levels. In other words, Rwanda regressed 25 years! It was not until 2000 that the country recovered its production to match 1992 levels and much progress has been made in other spheres since the implementation of new developmental strategies in 2003. The main strategy of the government has been the expansionary fiscal policy oriented toward education and infrastructure improvement (CIA, 2010).

International aid has also played an important part in the opening-up of Rwanda. The net official development assistance and official aid received reached 104.3 million dollars in 1994, and in 2008 it was 930.6 million. This constituted a little more than 20% of Rwanda’s GDP. Indeed, there is a strong positive correlation between the adoption of further SAPs after the genocide and the liberal amounts of foreign aid received from western donors. Because of so many internal and external crises, Rwanda really needed the assistance of the international community to rebuild its’ economy. One must ask, however, if such economic dependence, and reliance on the goodwill and actions of donor countries, is wise or sustainable. For instance, Abrahamsson and Nilsson argue that such aid will eventually decrease significantly as donors experience “aid fatigue.” They further argue that, “aid dependency of great magnitudes reduces the country’s sovereignty and ability to take independent political decisions” (Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995, p.144).

Today the strategy of Rwanda focuses on expansionary fiscal policies, and on the integration of the economy into the international market. It is evident that these actions have led to good economic performance in the last 15 years, but we have to consider the long-term feasibility of these policies. It is true that the country, in the long run, “has to diversify into new export products if it is ever to get to stage where the current account is to be sustained without massive aid” (Bigsten and Lundström, 2004, p. 15).

As a country’s economic situation is often an indicator of development, it does not tell the whole story. To understand how a nation is really doing, in terms of holistic development, one must examine the HDI (Human Development Index). In addition to GDP/capita (PPP), it considers health and education factors.
This figure shows that the HDI has increased slowly year-by-year, except in the 90s. HDI was drastically low at the end of the 80s (due to impacts from the coffee crisis), and even more through the mid 90s (due to the societal collapse of 1992 and the genocide of 1994). Since the end of the genocide, however, it has increased by more than 220 points, from 0.214 to more than 0.434 in 2012. This means that the aggregate life expectancy, the real GDP per capita (adjusted by PPP), and overall knowledge (measured by weighting adult literacy by 2/3 and number of years of schooling by 1/3) have improved. Today, Rwanda is catalogued by the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) as a country with low human development, and its’ place on the HDI country scale is 167 of 182 (UNDP, 2013) but with it vision 2020, it is expecting to be a middle income country in 6 years to come.

**Agriculture, New Technology, Land Scarcity**

In recent years, Rwanda has been striving to transform itself from a country highly dependent on agricultural production to a modern society in which industrialization and knowledge acquisition lead to prosperous development. Though PRSP (2002) states that there should be less reliance on subsistence forms of agriculture and a movement toward mechanized agriculture, yet in practice, only 3% of the state budget was used to make investments in the sector in 2006 (UNDP, 2007, p11). Still, there have been some small improvements, particularly the distribution of higher yielding seeds.

In the 1960s, the agricultural sector contributed 80% of the country’s GDP, but today it is less than 40%. Although the importance of agriculture has declined somewhat today in terms of GDP generation, it still employs more or less than 90% of the total labour population (Ministry of Finance, 1998). The minimal government contribution toward the agricultural sector is particularly disturbing since the vast majority of Rwanda’s population are
still rural, subsistence farmers. Since the headcount ratio of those living under the $2 poverty line has actually increased since the late 80s (to over 90% of the population living under $2/day as of 2000) (World Bank, 2010), it is even more vital that development efforts shift toward the agricultural sector immediately. The gulf between the urban “haves” and the rural “have nots” widens yearly, and the total poverty gap likewise increases.

If one considers the structural-change models of economic development (particularly Lewis’ ‘two sector’ model), this shows that gradually, people are moving to the cities (namely Kigali) to find employment. This is particularly true for youth under the age of 25, the majority of whom are unemployed (MINECOFIN, 2003). Typically, the mechanism by which underdeveloped economies transform their structures is to switch from a largely traditional, agrarian, subsistence economy to a modern, urbanized and industrialized one. This happens primarily though the expansion of the modern urban sector through capital accumulation, investment and the transfer of surplus rural workers to the cities (Todaro and Smith, 2009, p. 115).

Gender Relations and Women’s Rights

Gender relations vary over time and are dependent on a society’s specific context and history. In the Rwandan context, the war and genocide have had immense impacts on gender relations. The following section will pinpoint different aspects which have been, and continue to be, important for Rwanda’s development in this sphere.

Male Identity Crisis as a Contributory Aspect to the Genocide

Because development is so much more than economic advancement, and must include increasing capacities to make life choices (Sen, 1999), one critical issue in pre-genocide Rwanda was a “male identity crisis” that made young Hutu men more susceptible to genocidal propaganda. Jones (2002, p. 5) argues that the Hutu-dominated government saw an opportunity to solve the male identity crisis by using rhetorical tools to address groups of young Hutu men. The goal was to show the benefits they could gain from killing the Tutsi population:

...the task of genocide was ‘sold ’ to the young man who would be its main implementors by referring to it as ‘work’— harkening back to ‘the communal work parties of the 1970’s and ‘80s,’ which had perhaps fortified the self-esteem of the men involved even if it did little to line their pockets. The word ‘interahamwe’ [the genocidal militia] itself was previously used for communal work parties; ‘clearing the brush’ originally referred to clearing land for cultivation and
has subsequently been used for killing Tutsi. One is not surprised to learn that the genocidal killers of April-June, 1994, according to Human Rights Watch, ‘included many young men who hung out on the streets of Kigali or smaller commercial centers, with little prospect of obtaining either the land or the jobs needed to marry and raise families.’

Further, the fragile internal legitimacy experienced by the Rwandan government, due to poor governance and economic decline, could be improved by diverting young Hutu men’s attention toward the ‘Tutsi problem’ and away from the government’s corruption, in-fighting and inefficiency. Although Adam Jones offers intriguing insights in this regard, he fails to offer explanations as to why women were also ‘genocidaires’ (a fact that he himself highlighted). As an example, Jones mentions one of the most active politicians during the genocide, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko (former Minister of Women and Family Affairs) had pinpointed Tutsi-refugee camps around Rwanda for massacres (2002). The existing literature is scant on the reasons for women participating in the killings, and so this issue warrants more investigation.

Effects of Women During, and in the Aftermath of, Genocide

During the actual genocide, Tutsi women ran a substantially high risk of being on the receiving end of violence—regardless of their social status—just as their male counterparts. However, violence against women was often sexual, and rape was strategically used. The social stigma placed on victims of sexual violence created a great deal of shame amongst victims, and they were further traumatized by not being able to speak of the violation, due to fears of social shaming (Baldwin and Newbury, 2000). As aforementioned, some women were not victims but killers, and this poses a profound challenge to the popular notion that women are the upholders of peace and stability in a nation, no matter what the circumstances.

One of the consequences of the genocide was the large number of orphans. This has led to a pattern of family building called ‘extended families.’ It involves providing for those without parents, and the responsibility usually falls on women’s shoulders (in addition to providing for big families without a husband). Indeed, a large number of women became widowers after the genocide. Since a majority of the Rwandan population live in rural areas, this has been a big problem for women, as there are few opportunities for education and/or microenterprise activities (Baldwin and Newbury, 2000).

The post-genocide era involved, not only women combining their traditional nurturing roles, but taking on traditional male roles. As an immediate consequence of the genocide, 70% of Rwanda’s population was
female. This drastically influenced gender relations and created a male ‘vacuum’ that females had to fill (i.e., in political and economic spheres) (Devlin and Elgie, 2008). This trend, combined with the aforementioned “male identity crisis,” has evoked much thought on gender relations in post-genocide Rwanda. On a psychological level, women claiming positions that men had once held served to bolster both individual and collective self-esteem, further emboldening women’s groups.

Post-genocide changes were also taking place in the social sphere. Even though a movement working for women’s rights was present prior to the genocide, local women’s organisations after the genocide made a great impact on caring for the survivors and during the reconciliation process. Regarding the latter, women’s groups were particularly strong in convincing refugees to return to Rwanda in order to rebuild the society. Burnet (2008) states that the women’s movement was the most active sector in civil society between 1994-2003.

**Gender Equality—A Top Down Approach: The Implementation of Gender Quotas**

In light of the new constitution adopted in 2003, the government decided to implement gender quotas in the parliament. This was a drastic and visible change, and led to Rwanda having the highest number of female parliamentarians in the world. The government also highlighted gender related issues as an important step for development. How come gender-related matters have become so important for the Rwandan government? Is gender equality visible in society as a whole, or is it mostly superficial, a “show” for the international community demonstrating Rwanda’s recovery and advancement? These are difficult questions. One may be tempted to draw a connection between the outcome of the genocide and the subsequent goal of gender equality. As aforementioned, 70% of the inhabitants in Rwanda after the genocide were female, so it makes sense that a government would consider more carefully the plight of over 2/3 of the population. However, there is scant evidence of such links between the genocide and gender awareness in Rwandan society. Indeed, one has to carefully consider the reasons for the implementation of gender quotas, and ask whether the striving for gender equality may have been more reflective of the government’s desire to attract foreign aid, than a real desire for social change.

**Education**

Education promotes, among others, progress in overall health, nutrition and life expectancy (factors that are important for economic development). After the genocide, the educational system changed rapidly,
as it had served as an instrument in fuelling ethnic divisions. In the new curriculum, any kind of discrimination was strictly prohibited, and the most important objective was to create national unity (as stated in the constitution). As schools had been venues for genocidal acts (often carried out by teachers and students) (Hodgkin, 2006), a new “confidence” needed to be instilled in the school system (Obura, 2003). How is the educational sector now functioning in post-genocide Rwanda, in comparison to its’ dark past?

In addition to banning all discrimination, several other changes have been made to the education system. As a first step in increasing education among the Rwandan people, the government has made primary education free and compulsory. Rwanda has made remarkable progress with respect to the MDGs when looking at primary education. However, the gender disparities in secondary schooling are still high (UNDP, 2008). In addition to the implementation of free and compulsory education, the government has had—as of late—a vast interest in promoting science and technology in education (MINEDUC 2006). As stated in the Education Sector Strategic Plan, the emphasis—in accordance with Rwanda Vision 2020—is on transforming Rwanda to a knowledge-based society since the country’s biggest assets are its people, due to a lack of natural resources, this emphasis is reasonable (MINEDUC, 2006).

**International Influences**

The international donor community has a profound impact on the shape of Rwandan education. Michele Schweisfurth (2006) has identified three components of international influence on the Rwandan education system: 1) the global and bilateral pressures relating foreign aid to education, 2) the effects of migration arising from national and regional conflict, and 3) the conceptualisation of genocide as a global tragedy. The first two components are the most notable and will be discussed below.

First, Rwandan education has undergone structural reform as a prerequisite to securing international aid. Rwanda has changed their bilateral partners from France and Belgium to the UK (among others). All of these countries have their own, more or less complicated, historical relationship with Rwanda. Similarly, each partner has brought their own views on education to bear on the Rwandan situation. Today, the focus of donors is on Rwanda structuring its’ education system so that it conforms to the objectives of education as outlined in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The target *Basic Education for All* is particularly emphasised by donors and the international community. Overall, Rwanda’s educational system has come a long way, but much needs to be done to address the
specific educational and historical circumstances that led to genocide in the first place.

Part IV Conclusions, reflections and summary of recommendations

Upon the completion of our multi-level development history analysis of Rwanda, one thing can be concluded: despite being portrayed as a success story, the developmental situation in Rwanda is falling short in some areas. The profound structural transformation, which is needed in both economic and societal terms, may jeopardize future progress (UNDP, 2007).

The analysis demonstrated that global, regional, national and local elements all intertwined to shape the development process in Rwanda, and that these processes both contributed to—and were shaped by—the genocide. In several areas, such as education, economics, gender issues and governance, post-genocide policies were significantly different than their pre-genocide counterparts. For example, the economy switched to a neoclassical orientation, the education sector underwent vast reforms to ‘weed out’ discriminatory elements, and the role of women in the development process changed drastically (particularly in the governmental sphere). In this way, Rwanda offers a unique contribution to development discussions wherein a crisis leads the development process in a new direction (or several new directions). The following is a summary of recommendations on how development in Rwanda should best proceed today.

Economics

Since 1994, stability and security have been increasingly restored in Rwanda. This reality—largely due to international aid—has led to continuous growth in both GDP and GDP per capita. Unfortunately, the gini-coefficient shows that inequalities have also risen dramatically, and the total head count is higher today than in the late 1980s. As Bigsten and Lundström state (2004, p. 22), “this increase in income inequality may reflect a relative neglect of the rural area in the post-conflict reconstruction process.” Indeed, much effort has been placed on (re) constructing cities like Kigali. Such urban bias has harmed rural areas and increased feelings of relative deprivation. Overall, on the economic front, Rwanda needs to: a) increase the amount of the state budget devoted to rural and agricultural development, b) expand and diversify its’ exports to bring in more revenue, c) adopt a “market friendly” neoclassical approach wherein fragile domestic markets are protected through government regulations, d) rely less on international aid (partly by expanding the export sector and trading more within the EAC). The problem, of course, is generating enough capital without aid in order to diversify and expand the export sector. At the same time, as Rwanda is still industrializing, many imports are needed to form the base materials for the
industrialization effort and to expand the export industry. Rwanda needs to urgently consider ways it can continue to grow without remaining in this aid dependency trap where the balance of payment situation is continually bleak.

**Agriculture/Land Scarcity**

Regarding agriculture, we cannot forget that Rwanda is still a poor rural country with almost 87% of the population working in subsistence agriculture and living on $2 per day. With growing inequalities between the urban and rural divide, agricultural development needs to become much more than a ‘plan on paper.’ To date, very little has been done in this sector, and what little that has been accomplished has involved the distribution of high-yielding seeds. If Rwanda is to move forward in the agricultural sector, here are some considerations. First of all, the government has to invest much more heavily in agriculture (farming technology, improved seeds, fertilizers, etc.). Good soil, fertilizer and improved seeds are particularly important to maximize crop yields on small plots. For farmers to obtain these products, the government needs to offer subsidies. The above is suggestive of a green revolution. Such a strategy, combined with land reform policies, may significantly reduce rural poverty. Improved infrastructure in rural areas is also important to facilitate the transportation of agriculture products to the market centers. Environmental awareness programs need to be designed and implemented to protect existing land. Similarly, reforestation projects and maintenance of swampy areas will help avert future desertification. It is important that children are educated too so that they have future options (i.e., regarding whether to farm or find other skilled employment). This helps to reduce pressure on land and dependency on agriculture. Concurrently, alternative sources of employment have to be developed in rural areas so that people can choose to stay in the region, even if farming is not a possibility. Finally, the refugee situation must be addressed in surrounding countries if Rwandans are going to overcome their risk aversion and engage in more extensive and commercially productive farming practices. While they fear that refugees will come back and either reclaim the land or demand a share of it, farmers are not likely to risk costly ventures.

**Reconciliation**

The ongoing reconciliation process in Rwanda is a crucial aspect for future development. As demonstrated, the current process is faulty on many levels. The three court systems involved with genocide trials differ immensely in terms of legal representation, the severity of sentences handed-out and public opinion. Since many victims feel that the various court systems are inadequate, they find reconciliation difficult without true justice. In light of the regional security complex, the reconciliation process has to
include a broader awareness of—and coming to grips with—war crimes committed in the region as a whole in relation to the genocide. Furthermore, the problems faced by a large group of Rwandan women stigmatized due to sexual violence during the genocide has to be acknowledged in the reconciliation process. If their grievances are recognised and addressed in the reconciliation process, a dismantling of the social stigma associated with sexual violence can begin.

**Education**

With respect to education, an un-biased history teaching is crucial while trying to build a strong democratic base. Therefore, history has to be impartial in order for students to be open-minded and to develop critical thinking skills. Students need an unbiased perspective particularly regarding ethnic tensions in Rwanda’s history as causality of the genocide.

As noted earlier, Rwanda has been successful in creating a compulsory and free primary education, although 61% of students drop out after primary school (Sutherland-Addy, 2008). One recommendation therefore, in addition to adopting an appropriate history curriculum, is to increase the number of students entering and completing high school through various incentives. Finally, in line with Rwanda Vision 2020, efforts have been made to emphasize teaching in science and technology (at all levels). However, one may question if the focus on science and technology is valid in a society where the vast majority of the population are the rural poor. Certainly, if this emerging “knowledge-based” society works to improve agricultural sciences and technology, thereby benefit the rural population, it would be money well spent. One fear is that, as students become increasingly educated, they will leave Rwanda to obtain jobs in more prosperous countries. This brain drain is a real threat and should be treated as such. The government needs to devise incentives that would entice graduates to live and work in Rwanda.

**Gender**

As stated, gender equality has been addressed as an important development issue by the government, and there have been efforts on mainstreaming aspects of gender equality, especially in the educational sector and within the field of politics. While some may criticize the Rwandan government for “putting on a show” where women in politics is concerned, it is important not to underestimate the power of women in changing their situation and making their voices heard.
Democracy

Rwanda has started its democratic process, but there is still much improvement to be made. Democratic elections being held in 2003, combined with the introduction of a new constitution, were big steps for Rwanda.

After examining these brief recommendations, it is clear that the road to developmental success will be a long one for Rwanda. Still, considering its dark past, Rwanda is tackling its’ challenges in a brave manner. The room for manoeuvre for this small, war-torn country seems to increase as time passes. Rwanda certainly has a role to play in the region and is poised to increase its’ role in the international arena.

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