Controversies of Multi/Ethnic Democracy: The Case of Republic of Macedonia

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Abstract
This paper aims to demystify the multi-ethnic model of the democratic form of government, which has been strongly promoted in the international political discourse toward Third World countries. In political science, this concept is actually so controversial and paradoxical, that its (pseudo) scientific use can be interpreted only as an instrument of geopolitical strategies. The author renames it "multi/ethnic democracy" to reveal that its ethnocratic and destabilizing potential overpowers its cooperative intentions. Recent empirical studies have proven the unreliability of this model, but the case study of the Republic of Macedonia has not been included yet.

The combined qualitative and quantitative research in this paper shows that in the last 17 years (2001-2018) this inconsistent cross between ethnocracy and democracy in the Republic of Macedonia resulted in a series of conflicting social, political, religious, and cultural circumstances. Instead of improving the civil (trans-ethnical) concept of the state, the ethnic concept grew stronger. In a short time and with hasty constitutional revisions, the former stable national and civil structure was transformed into an entropic structure full of divisions and tensions on ethnic grounds and of fragmentations and isolations on territorial, institutional, linguistic, and cultural grounds, while the existence of the Macedonian ethnos, nation, and state was brought into question.

Keywords: Multi-ethnic democracy, multiculturalism, ethnocracy (tyranny of the minority), ethnocide, Republic of Macedonia.

1 This paper is a revised version of an earlier paper, which was written in Macedonian and presented at a scientific meeting “ASNOM and the Macedonian state”, organized by the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts – MASA and the Macedonian National History Institute on November 28, 2014. That version was published in a subsequent 2017 MASA reader in Macedonian (pp.165-190): Kambovski, V., I. Katardzhiev et al (Eds.). (2017). ASNOM and the Macedonian state: proceedings of the scientific meeting on the occasion the 70th anniversary of the first assembly of ASNOM held on 28 November 2014. Skopje: MASA. Available at http://manu.edu.mk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ASNOM.pdf.
Introduction

The research problem in this study is the controversial effect of the recently introduced "multi-ethnic democratic" political system and the controversial nature of its theoretical concept.

The main hypothesis is the following: in contradiction to its propagated purpose of elevating institutional democratic rights in Third World countries, the introduction of the so-called "multi-ethnic democracy" deepens ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic societies, undermines existing institutional democratic instruments and catalyzes institutional and state disintegration.

The researcher aims to deconstruct the fatal inner paradoxicality of the multi-ethnic model of democracy (thereby renaming it "multi/ethnic" in the title) by focusing especially on the case study of the Republic of Macedonia. This model of democracy is widely praised in contemporary international politics and international relations rhetoric, but contemporary political theory proves to be very suspicious toward its premises and effects, as the case study of the Republic of Macedonia also proves. There has been an increasing number of recent international civil conflict empirical studies linking this concept to the increased probability of conflict and dismantling of democracy (Stewart, 2008b; 2009; Bormann et al., 2014; Houle 2015), but the Republic of Macedonia has not been included so far.

A triangulation of primary and secondary research methods of data collection was used in this study, as well as a unique combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. On the one hand, secondary methods of data collection, like archival data and textual analyses, were used and analyzed with a positive, empirical and deductive approach (with reference to external literature with quantifiable methods). On the other hand, qualitative primary methods for data collection were also used and analyzed with an interpretative approach. The main qualitative method used is the single country case study of the Republic of Macedonia. The main technique of data analyses in the paper is the Analytic Induction Strategy. The preferred method of interpretation in the discussion sections is the hermeneutic interpretation of text (determining the aporetic and the oxymoronic in the meaning, discourse and practice of the political theory in regard to the research problem). The reason behind the combined overall methodological approach is, partly, the nature of the problem itself and the author being a subject of the population affected by this problem in the case study, but mostly, because both approaches mutually complement each other in supporting the hypothesis. The author hopes that researching the problem by all available approaches will raise awareness for the immediate need for more quantitative and qualitative research on this subject, due to the systematic dangers that it is suspected to cause.
Controversies of the multi/ethnic democracy

Democracy, as a benefit of the Antique philosophies, époques, and empires refers to the demos or citizen as the central figure of state ruling and governing. It is a parabola of the civil configuration of people, so it mustn't be identified with ethnocracy, that is, with the ethnos in a strict cultural, racial, religious, and linguistic sense. The concept of democracy does not mean that the citizens are ruling in the literal meaning of the word, even less so that the ethnic groups are ruling, but it means that no one can decide without the consent, control, and legitimacy given by the citizens. Democracy is a model of governing that is opposite to the monarchic one where there is a sovereignty or "tyranny" of a single person – of the ruler, the monarch, or the emperor. Democracy is also the opposite of the aristocratic model of ruling by a group of individuals, and it is also different from anarchy, which in the absence of a sovereign ruler, promotes extreme liberalism (Compte-Sponville, 2013: 255). Democracy determines the freedom limitations of both citizens and communities, so the state is a restrictive construction based on a constitution, law, order, and institutions of law and order. Neither all democracies are liberal, nor is the multi-ethnic one more liberal than the unitary one. But "ethnic democracy", which is opposed to the civil democracy by definition, ignores the common interest of the citizens in the state (including the legitimacy of the ruling structures of the other ethnic community), and accordingly, it can become a source of anarchy and of social and individual injustice.

The classification of democracy is an open process because experiences with the democratic regimes are changing across the world, as well as the number and the map of sovereign states in the world. According to Harvard University political scientist Samuel Huntington, in 1973 there were only 30 states with a democratic organization out of the total of 122 UN member-states, while in 1990 there were 59 out of 130 independent states (1991: 26). In 2018, the UN lists 193 member-states (UN, 2018). And according to the latest edition of the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, out of 167 countries of the world (excluding only some microstates), 19 have been rated as full democracies, 57 as flawed democracies, 39 as hybrid regimes and 52 as authoritarian regimes (EIU, 2018: 2).

However, in a historical perspective contemporary political science suggests four models of democracy: (1) liberal democracy; (2) consociational democracy; (3) Herrenvolk democracy; and (4) ethnic democracy.

The first model is also called the majoritarian Westminster democracy model, its archetype is Great Britain and it is the predominant political system in the West (and in the world throughout the 20th century). This model is a form of representative democracy with a free and fair form of elections procedure and a competitive political process. It is a form of government in
which representative democracy operates under the principles of liberalism, i.e. protecting the rights of the individual (Lijphart, 2012).

The second model is in opposition to the first one. Instead of supporting the will of the majority, it is grounded on concessions and compromises between the elites from different social groups, and on high sensitivity for the interests and rights of ethnical minorities. Its closest representatives are Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Lebanon, Sweden, Iraq, and Belgium. This model was defined by the Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart, based on the experience of the Netherlands (though it is said to have been practiced before). According to Lijphart, the model is characterized by a grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy (2012).

The third model is characterized by the rule of a superior nation/people over other people, nations, and especially races. Aside from the Nazi model of ruling, this model is also recognized in the American way of ruling over the Black race and in the Eurocentric colonization and world domination. South African theorist Pierre van Den Berghe writes about the American type of "Herrenvolk democracy – the equal superiority of all who belong to the Herrenvolk (master race) over those who do not" (2011). Charles W. Mills, the Jamaican-American political and social philosopher, investigates into the Herrenvolk epistemological ideology behind the European conquests and global domination of the last 5 centuries (1998).

The fourth model is a political system that combines a structured ethnic dominance with democratic, political and civil rights for all. Its practicing dates mostly from the last decades of the 20th century and is related to the states that do not belong to the "West". University of Haifa sociology professor Sammy Smooha explains that this model was introduced in Northern Ireland in the period from 1921 to 1972, then in Israel, Estonia and Latvia (1997). It is also considered to be practiced in Canada (since its independence in 1867 until the quiet revolution in 1960), in Poland (between 1918 and 1935), in Slovakia and in Malaysia (in the inter-war period). According to Smooha, the ethnic democracy archetype is Israel (1997, 2009). However, there are explicit criticisms of the ethnic democracy model, which in the contemporary socio-political circumstances necessarily leads to the multi-ethnic option. Thus, for example, while Sammy Smooha defends the model of ethnic democracy pointing out both the experiences of Israel and some historical experiences, Adam Danel from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem criticizes this concept as an inconsistent and experimental construct intended for the countries with inter-ethnic conflicts (2009). According to Danel, ethnic democracy is torn apart between two contradictory principles: the inclusive and egalitarian democracy on the one hand, and the priority of the majority ethnic group on the other. Ethnic democracy does not fall into the category of Western
democracies, but there are elements of ethnic democracy in certain Western states. To him, Israel is not an example of the ideal type of ethnic democracy.

The most recent model of *multi-ethnic democracy* is merged with ethnic democracy but is intended exceptionally for "non-Western" states (that is: developing states, states in transition, and states with existing conflict, like in the Balkans, Africa, Asia, and ex-Soviet republics). According to the leading consociational theoretician and promoter Arend Lijphart (1995), multi-ethnic democracy is a form of consociational democracy and it involves intensive and complex practicing of *"power sharing"*: - through representative organs for all ethnic groups; - by autonomy in the internal ethnic issues (which usually leads to federalization); - by a proportional system, and finally – by the minority veto (in the Macedonian case allegorically/sophisticatedly called "Badinter majority"). He claims that there are four ways of controlling the ethnic tensions in multi-ethnic societies: the first three are through the majority (cross-cutting cleavages, vote pooling, and majority control) and the fourth is the consensus model (consociational democracy). He defines the consociational model as a "model of power sharing". But, the numerous critics of joint "power-sharing" in ethnic democracies point out the following aspects: it does not always function; it may lead to a deadlock (complete stoppage or blockade of the democratic processes); in its desire to prevent assimilation, in fact, it strengthens ethnic differences and affects the likelihood of ethnic conflict; and, ethnic democracy is not even a democracy because agreements are made behind closed doors, only by selected ethnic elites (Barry, 1975; Bormann, 2010; Bormann et al., 2014).

Furthermore, the contemporary multi-ethnic societies are also strongly marked by the multi-confessional concept. The traditional concept of the *ethnos* in fact also actualized religious identity, as well as religious conversion projects. Paradoxically, post-secularism has re-affirmed the partnership between the religious and the state institutions. Today the tendency of breaking away from the secular concept of the state is strengthened and it is followed by a greater influence of the religious institutions on the state. It is unbelievable, but it is so obvious that at the beginning of the 21st century the religious view of the world and the religious logos have become dominant strategies. And this new religious expansionism is more efficient in regions where it is combined with ethnocentrism. States constituted on strict religious canons appear on the historical stage today, the caliphate regime of state governance (Islamic state) has been restored and intolerance toward the religious, ethnic and cultural differences is escalating. Yet, the media, as well as science, ignore the fact that states in which religious identification of citizens is not a (social and state) priority are characterized by a high degree of stability. States that neither prescribe nor impose religion experience rapid development (for instance, the modern Chinese state is considered to be a
paradigm of a secular state). In these states the coexistence between the different religious communities is more relaxed, citizens are not obsessively attached to conservative values, and the society is free of religious frustrations and conflicts.

Professor Tanja Karakamisheva-Jovanovska, professor of constitutional law and political systems at the University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Skopje, claims that: "even the strongest theoreticians who favor the consociational democracy believe that this model is a model used to repair post-conflict situations in countries that just left the conflict behind them and say that this model cannot be used as a permanent democratic solution" (2014: 14). In her essay "Macedonian Constitutional Identity: Lost in Translation or Lost in Transition?", after describing the controversies of the constitutional changes, she defines the specific multi-ethnic democratic model of the Republic of Macedonia in the following way:

One must know that the consociational democracy, in the Macedonian reality of Macedonian majority versus minorities (non-majority communities) is a concept that is not known as a functioning model in the theory, nor it exists in any other country in the world. The Macedonian model of consociational democracy, unique by its nature, must be understood as a temporary solution, one which the country must overcome and must aim towards development of stable democratic system and stable model of democracy in which the protection of the minority rights will certainly have a key place in accordance with the already established and recognized international practices. (Karakamisheva-Jovanovska, 2014: 14)

Political theory already differentiates between the so-called liberal and non-liberal democracies, between consociational and consensus democracies, and also between ethnic and multi-ethnic ones, so the models of democracy are multiplying. But the multiplication of democratic models leads to their relativization and to a relativization of the very concept of democracy. In the past, consociational democracy was characteristic for the states having deep ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences and divisions, while today consensus democracy is recommended for every state, since state development is defocused from the traditional, trans-ethnic, and national interest and is turned toward the fragmentary, ethnic interest (Lijphart, 2012).

University of Cambridge professor of philosophy and academic Ross Harrison argues that the traditional values of democracy are freedom and equality, but in practice, the opposite may occur (2005: 169). The traditional Western majoritarian democracy, which is characteristic for the contemporary developed Western democracies, shows that the voice of the majority should be respected regarding basic state constitutional and developmental values. It is a "discursive/deliberative democracy" (it does not include only the act of
voting, but also a process of discussions and participation in decision making). In the 1859 essay *On Liberty*, British philosopher and political economist J. S. Mill calls it “tyranny of the majority” (Harrison, 2005: 167).

Yet, although the opposite concept of "tyranny of the minority" is traditionally related to monarchies, dictatorships, and totalitarian regimes, since the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century it is also typical of the so-called multi-ethnic democracies. An opinion has been created that it is ironical *de jure* to aspire to a democratic regime and *de facto* to undertake non-democratic measures. For instance, in the Macedonian case of multi-ethnic democracy (from 2001 onwards), some specific mechanisms of "tyranny of the minority" have gained legitimacy (like a legalized right of veto and obstruction of the original democratic mechanisms). Such is the so-called "Badinter majority". This is a mechanism of deciding in the name of protecting the cultural and educational rights of minorities, which in fact contributes to systematically degrade the cultural and social values of the majority and to thwart the mutual social and developmental interests of all citizens of the state regardless of their ethnic affiliation.

Scientific research shows that multi-ethnic societies are characterized by so-called "horizontal inequalities" (HIs). After completing a major CRISE research in multi-ethnic societies all over the world, its director, professor Frances Stewart, explained that the "horizontal inequalities" are manifested between the different ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic groups/communities of the state. The Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) is based at the University of Oxford and funded by the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) in collaboration with partners in Latin America (Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru), Southeast Asia (Indonesia and Malaysia) and West Africa (Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria). Stewart writes about the "horizontal inequalities" or "inequalities among culturally defined groups" in his CRISE reports (Stewart, 2008a) and in the book *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in Multi-ethnic Societies* (Stewart, 2008b). In a 2009 Social Sciences lecture at the University of Bradford, in which he reviews the main findings and conclusions of his CRISE research, he underlines his previous statement that "when cultural differences coincide with economic and political differences between groups, this can cause deep resentment that may lead to violent struggles" (Stewart, 2009: 2). In the introduction he notes that this research reaches all across the world: "from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia to the Basque region of Spain and Northern Ireland, from Rwanda to Sudan, from Fiji to Indonesia, numerous bitter, deadly conflicts have been fought along ethnic or religious lines" (Stewart, 2009: 1). When assessing the lack of international policies for correcting "horizontal inequalities", he explains that:
At a more political level, many Western governments give priority to promoting multiparty democracy, while generally ignoring political HIs which can result from such a system. The need for power-sharing is more often acknowledged in post-conflict societies, as in Bosnia Herzegovina, Lebanon, and Iraq. But wider acknowledgement of the need to rethink the design of democratic systems in multiethnic settings is rare (Stewart, 2009: 23).

Three approaches are identified by Stewart and his colleagues to manage HIs: direct approaches, which target groups directly; indirect approaches, which are general policies for reducing group disparities; and integrationist approaches, which aim to reduce the salience of group boundaries (2009: 25-6). Many researchers have expanded on Stewart's work since, especially Christian Houle (2015), whose cross-national research has received worldwide comparative politics prizes and acclaim for substantiating how inequality destabilizes democracies when the within-ethnic-group inequality (WGI) is low.

By triggering political, interethnic, inter-religious, and other conflicts, the "horizontal inequalities" are warning about a negative effect, especially because state stability means recognizing mutual interests and similarities, not permanent and radical emphasizing of the differences. In that sense, mono-ethnic political parties should not be allowed to register in multi-ethnic or "plural" societies (Solomos and Bulmer, 2001). The political parties should be multi-ethnic in order to be able to express the civil interest, not the exclusive ethnic interest. Apparently, the obsessive affiliation to the multi-ethnic concept has a negative effect on the state unitariness and stability, and it is far from being an ideal model of democracy. In fact, the multi-ethnic concept generates ethnocentric world-views and mechanisms for their realization. Ethnocentrism is a reflection of the ethnic prejudices and stereotypes that burden social life with an excess of interethnic tensions and conflicts, with conservative interpretations of the history, and even worse, of the present and the future, while making the functioning of the state massive, expensive, and defocused from essential problems (Compte-Sponville, 2013: 368).

To summarize, multi-ethnic democracy seems to be a traumatic introduction to destabilization of the state through its ethnicization (multiplication of ethnocentrism, confessionalism, multilingualism) and through its transformation into a structure of small ethnic, religious, and linguistic communities, a structure without a dominant ethnos that would demand more rights than the other ethnic minorities. Side by side with the marginalization of the majority ethnos, the hidden logic of the multi-ethnic model is to thwart the process of creating a nation - an interethnic and intercultural formation with a recognized common language for mutual understanding, common interest, and common developmental strategy. This
kind of approach thwarts the concept of national state and allows total fragmentation of the state on ethnic, cultural, and linguistic grounds. Multi-ethnic democracy is a platform for creating a "state within a state" that would make an inversion of the ruling factor at the first given opportunity.

One can't help drawing a more general conclusion that contemporary society seems to be founded on camouflages and mystifications, and it seems to have wrapped its developing priorities in the sweet-sounding rhetorical waffles of several cult categories whose demystification is almost a "mission impossible". These categories are shown as the ultimate values of contemporary civilization: democracy, globalization, and integration. Today there are many arguments at our disposal to prove that these cult categories are not a value by themselves and can be subjected to critical analysis and revision, although this is very difficult in an institutional framework (including the official scientific institutions). More and more democracy becomes technocracy, bureaucracy, and a cloak for the conditionless rule of the organized structures of power. It points toward "bankism" and "corporativism" as the foundation of a new imperialism and colonialism (Saul, 1995), toward entropic fragmentation and disintegration of states, reduction of state sovereignty, and the establishment of global supranational hierarchies. According to Russian logician and sociologist Alexander Zinoviev (1922-2006), the ideology of globalization is an ideology of hegemony, domination, and global imperialism, so instead of post-colonialism, we are left with neocolonialism and neo-imperialism (2015). Yet, democracy, human rights, and humanity are still rhetorically paraded. Under the veil of the beautiful human values of the modern civilization, ugly and inhuman conditions are being established. The postmodern civilization is becoming ironic, it speaks of one thing while doing the complete opposite.

The concept of multiculturalism

The category of multi-ethnic democracy is complementary to the category of multiculturalism, but it seems that multiculturalism is more explicitly represented in the encyclopedia literature and in worldwide cultural studies. In the index of concepts of relevant chrestomathies, like Norton's Anthology in Theory and Criticism (2010) for example, there is not even one index example for "multi-ethnic democracy", and there are only three references to the concept of "multiculturalism" in the context of the latest cultural studies (focused on cultural identity policies and racial differences theories). In Martha C. Nussbaum's essay in this anthology, it is underlined that radical multi-culturalism violates the principles of human and cultural diversity, and it becomes an introduction to new anti-humanism (2010: 2326). By glorifying the cultural difference in a non-critical way and by denying or ignoring the possibility for a common interest and a common understanding
multiculturalism leads to self-isolation of the different ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic, and other communities. The world is made of differences, which in this situation become indifferent toward the similarities. In identity policies, there is a different version of multiculturalism, but both of them go in a package with the different conceptions of democracy. All of these policies agree on the need to recognize, locate, and place "the common interest" (a common goal) as a priority of the different racial, religious, and ethnic identities.

In that context, British historian Paul Gilroy (2004) believes that the exclusively restrictive definition of the concept of culture in cultural studies (according to which culture is the substance of racial and ethnic policies) is related to the former discourse on racial and ethnic differences. Debates over multiculturalism and cultural pluralism are often treated as an indication of "political correctness" and refer to the European racial and ethnic particularities. Multiculturalism and globalism are in a state of permanent tension, sometimes they are mutual correctors, sometimes incoherent, but they always show that in conditions of radical multiculturalism it is necessary to recognize the common integrative factor. This uniting factor should be legitimized and it should function without any obstacles, regardless whether recognized in the common official language (lingua franca), in the common national symbols or in the common national developmental, economic, and security priorities.

Canadian university professor of law and philosophy Arthur Ripstein (2005: 715) points out that, in order to avoid unjust policies, multiculturalism turns to the culture of the individual and re-examines the questions of the democratic theory (regarding equality and freedom of the citizens as a normative ideal). In contrast to the democratic theory, which is focused on political institutions and procedures, the theory of citizenship is focused on the attributes of the individual participants in these processes. "The democratic institutions will experience collapse if the majority of citizens become apathetic", says another Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka (2005: 126), which means that democracy assumes active presence/participation of the citizens in the democratic process, as well as high ethical standards; otherwise it becomes a farce and it is self-abolished. The increasing cultural and social pluralism of contemporary societies is increasingly disagreeing with the civil principle.

In the Philosophy Dictionary by the contemporary French philosopher André Compte-Sponville, the term of multiculturalism is defined as a benefit from the ancient antique (Roman) empire that is actualized in the contemporary world in the (quite different) context of mondialization and globalization (2013: 667-8). Multiculturalism is opposed to the republican
universalism and it "defends the rights of the different minorities, especially the ethnic and religious ones" (2013: 667). This concept is important, especially since it reactively initiates the issue of the "common culture", the shared cultural substance. Namely, in conditions when a common cultural interest and a common communication space is missing, the questions posed, especially before the radical democrats, are the following: how will the citizens and communities with different cultural background and identity understand each other, how will they connect, and how will the national core - without which the state integrity would be endangered - be created? The three theories, the multicultural theory of minorities' rights, the theory of civil equality, and the theory of individual freedom are important for contemporary Europe in the context of the worrying tendencies for the radicalization of communitarianism, populism, and globalization/universalism.

Multiculturalism does not strengthen state integrity. On the contrary, multiculturalism defends the rights of the different ethnic and religious minorities first of all, and it opposes the traditional republican universalism and individualism. In France, for example, there is an indisputable multicultural demographic and social structure, but the state has predicted severe legal instruments for recognizing and respecting the common national, trans-ethnic, and trans-religious interest, nowadays increasingly referred to as inter-culturalism. Multiculturalism does not necessarily lead to multi-ethnic democracy and to multi-ethnic political regime of the state. This dictionary also doesn't mention "multi-ethnic democracy" at all. Human rights, civil rights, and citizens' freedoms should be very important in multicultural societies, yet an opposite process occurs, which has negative repercussions on the cohesion of the state. The rights of the minorities are satisfied through the civil and individual human rights, which are also the same for the citizens from the ethnic majority, that is, they are fundamental for the entire nation.

Multi/ethnic democracy in the Republic of Macedonia

The Republic of Macedonia is one of few European and Balkan states that suffer from post-socialist traumatic syndrome and have difficulties to overcome the separation from the "family", as well as the temptations of sovereignty. It is in a long-lasting state of "transition" from the, allegedly, non-democratic and non-human "Yugoslav" socialism into the, allegedly, civilized and human, democratic civic capitalism. What is all this about? On the one hand, the transition lasts too long and creates a sense of instability (neither socialism nor capitalism), and on the other hand, the new post-socialist reality does not succeed to show its bright, virtuous perspective and its human side. Changes happen in this questionable inter-space, a perpetuum mobile for which no one can say if it leads anywhere. Due to this, the demonizing of the
socialist past and tradition is experienced as an empty phrase, which leads to increased reminiscences of the positive benefits from the socialist past.

The states of the so-called Western Balkans (especially Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also Montenegro and Serbia) are faced with the inconsistency of the new social constellations, which is a consequence of the inconsistency in the concepts of the scientific paradigms from the field of social and humanistic discourses. The Republic of Macedonia is an illustrative example of the possibility to establish a state political system (a form of governance) based on preliminary geopolitical strategies and paradigms. The country that in the political rhetoric today is recognized as "post-Ohrid Macedonia" is marked by a multitude of constitutional contradictions and inconsistencies (Karakamisheva-Jovanova, 2014: 6-11). It is also faced with numerous temptations and a series of provocations regarding the inherited fundamental values of cultural identity and regarding the legitimacy of the Macedonian nation.

The case of the independent Republic of Macedonia shows that multi-ethnic democracy, through the instruments for protection of ethnic minorities, in fact introduced measures for the rule of minorities over the majority and other measures which cause confusion and imbalance in the field of human rights and citizens' equality: right to veto, principle of positive discrimination, so-called just representation of the minorities in all institutions, ethnic budget, ignoring the need for conducting a population census (the last one was in 2002, there was an unsuccessful one in 2011, and ethnic parameters are even said to be excluded from the planned census in 2020), political conformism to the detriment of the state/national interests, discrepancy in the developmental strategies on ethnic grounds... With the speed of light, a whole series of concepts appeared from the generic ideologeme of the "multi-ethnic democracy" (that subversive interpretation of democracy), which contributed to the substitution of the genuine democracy. The organization of the democratic political system on the principle of multi-ethnicity in the fragile, Balkanized states polarizes the political discourse and produces its own promotional, scientific discourse in which unverified concepts and quasi-scientific theories are easily used to manipulate the broad masses. The scientific voices which analyzed and criticized the Ohrid Framework Agreement remained unheard, like professor Biljana Vankovska of the Institute for Security, Defence and Peace Studies at the University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Skopje (2006).

So, from 2001 onwards the impossible has happened in the Republic of Macedonia: - in the name of democracy a suspicious ethnocratic hybrid was created; - in the name of multiculturalism a state was created that was divided on ethnocultural and linguistic principle; - in the name of cultural diversity ethnocultural enclaves were created; - in the name of civil freedoms citizens
that are enslaved in the claws of technocracy were created; - in the name of prosperity and private ownership an unseen social division of the citizens was created, as well as an irrepressible emigration of highly educated and skilled population. The irony is a constitutive part of the history of the contemporary world!

The multi-ethnic strategy in the Republic of Macedonia projected itself spectrally on top of the entire social diversity and multiplicity of the society. This multi-ethnic diversity was partly inherited, but also partly constructed and emphasized by the humanitarian crisis (Kosovo, 1998) and by the military conflict (2001) – both fabricated immediately prior to the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OSCE – Skopje, August 13, 2001) as an excuse for reconstructing the Constitution (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2018) and the political system of the Republic of Macedonia. In this way, a dangerous inversion occurred: everyone began speaking about a "multi-ethnic state" instead of a "multi-ethnic society". By the inertia from this basic inversion, the ethnically marked social ambiance (now multiplied and radicalized) pushed out the concept of democracy, which used to be the space for fulfilling citizens' rights/duties and for unifying the citizens around ideological, political, economic, social, and cultural interests (Kulavkova, 2012). In only a few years numerous surrogates of democracy were created: multi-ethnic state, Framework Macedonia (ethnic municipalities, regions, and enclaves, a silent federalization of the Republic of Macedonia), the Badinter majority, positive discrimination, mono-ethnic political parties, territorial reorganization, "just" representation, translation and marginalization of the ancient Macedonian toponyms, "authentic interpretation" of the Law on Amnesty (amnesty of the perpetrators of crimes against the human race, committed in 2001), extension of Albanian language use in the new Laws on the Use of Languages in 2008 (in official use if spoken by at least 20 percent of the local population) and 2018 (second official language)...

During the last seventeen years, the obvious contradictio in adjecto of the so-called multi-ethnic democracy was projected into all the pores of the Macedonian reality. Of course, without valid emotional and temporal distance, it is hard to notice the contradictions of multi-ethnic democracy, even more so since the ethnocentric optics means emphasized subjectivity and emotions (both at the individual and the collective level). At the very moment when the Republic of Macedonia legalized the formation of political parties on ethnic principle, and in that way divided the electorate in numerous, ethnic communities, it drifted apart from the democratic pattern, largely deprived

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itself of its sovereignty, and endangered the adopted, stable, and traditional values of the (civil) democracy and culture.

The contradictions of the multi-ethnic democracy have generated fragmentation of the state entity, a Macedonian way of "Balkanization", with a series of disintegrative tendencies in the ideological, political, legal, educational, financial, and institutional regime of the Republic of Macedonia. The conceptual confusion produced a confused political situation, overdetermined by ethnic priorities and rhetoric. The process of constructing the (trans-ethnic) Macedonian nation was obstructed. The multi-ethnic strategy became a ritual of the Macedonian daily politics and even a cult developmental strategy that blinded and silenced the minds, especially the established and conformist minds. The spiritual sluggishness and blindness brought the Macedonian state into a pre-collapse situation. But in fact, the multi-ethnic paradigm became an introduction to a bi-ethnic state. The multi-ethnic strategy did not resolve the open question, it just kept them open and ready to provoke new ethnic ultimatums. The radical multi-ethnic strategy is in a collision with the civil, trans-ethnic paradigm.

In the Macedonian model from 2001 federalization and secessionism are paradoxically hinted as more benign forms of destabilization of the state than the policy of ethnocide over the Macedonian people, which meant: - internal displacement of the Macedonian population within the Republic of Macedonia, - irretrievable migration of the young population abroad (rapid increase of the Diaspora), - alienation of the territory by reorganization and its transfer into the hands of the local self-government, - "total sale prior to liquidation" of the territory, - urban and ethnic disbalance, - marginalization of the Macedonian linguistic and cultural factor, - impoverishment of the masses focused on their survival, - renewal of the anti-Macedonian propaganda (division of the Macedonians as Bulgarophiles, Serbophiles, Grecophiles), - confusion in the identity matrix of the Macedonians, - alienation of the Macedonian Muslims. The strategies for revision of both ancient and more recent history, the discourse about autochthonous ethnicities, the delegitimation of the collective memory of the Macedonian people, the historical confusions "served" in the textbooks for the elementary and secondary education, the division of power based on the principle of "ethno-financial" zones of interest – all of these are in favor of the adoption strategies for the Republic of Macedonia, whether through minimization of the Macedonian population or through new invasive, mega-ethnic integrations in the region.

As an illustration, the researcher will cite here a statement from the novel *Pale Shadows, Distant Voices* by Dimitrie Duracovski, a leading Macedonian narrator from the city Struga:
And you know our major concern, especially you, the journalists: this thing that was done with the division of Struga. The inhabitants of Struga are not so much worried about the beatings they got, they will forget the nightsticks, tear gases, and rubber bullets, but they are worried about the suit tailored for them. The town with 80 percent Macedonian inhabitants got stuck in a municipality with 65 percent Albanians. And when we say that it is not normal, they immediately scream at us – the inhabitants of Struga are xenophobes, they are intolerant, and allegedly, they do not want to live with the Albanians. But, who are we living with, if not with them …? (2014: 204).

The same can be also said for the city Kichevo, and for the capital Skopje. The 2003 Law on Territorial Organization reorganized the local government on ethnic criteria and in favor of the ethnic minority.

Here one should also take into consideration the nativeness (indigenous character) of a particular culture and language and its inherent right for adequate national and state institutions. The Macedonian culture today is being deprived of its legitimate right to be domiciled in the Republic of Macedonia and to enjoy unreserved support by the state institutions, like it is the case with all the recognized cultural and linguistic identities in all the other neighboring countries on the Balkans and even in Europe. The overseeing if one culture is more equal than the other and the frustration that one particular language has the status of a second language causes other frustrations and conflicting retorts. Such a mechanically measured "justice" in the protection of the cultural, linguistic and educational interest of the already protected cultures is, in essence, unjust.

The combination of the proclaimed multi-ethnic character of the state with the bi-ethnic and federal policies, as well as the increasingly obvious ethnocide policies over the Macedonian people, all line up to be the largest existential and conceptual temptations in the history of Macedonia so far. Let us not forget the difference between ethnocide - the destruction of a culture, and genocide - the destruction of a people or a race (Compte-Sponville, 2013: 368). The Macedonian example serves as proof that the policies of ethnocide are not dangerous only for the minority communities, but also for the majority ones, especially in the conditions of quasi-democracies of the multi-ethnic type.

Revision of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia in 2001

The 2001 constitutional amendments were derived from the political agreement that was signed by the wide coalition of the leading Macedonian political parties in Ohrid on August 13, 2011. Even though that agreement was a consequence of external political factors at the moment when the Macedonian political subjects adopted it, it became an internal political
reference (the "Ohrid Framework Agreement") in political discourse even superior to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, which is the biggest absurdity in the history of the independent and autonomous Macedonian state. One "framework" agreement of political subjects outgrew into a higher, supra-constitutional (the researcher would say: anti-constitutional) category whose range is not predictable, because the threshold of its realization is constantly shifting in practice. In November 2001 it was presumed that all politics devised upon ethnic principle were exceeded with those amendments, but despite that, a new Law on Territorial Organization of the Local Self-Government in the Republic of Macedonia was promulgated in 2003. And again it was argued that finally all demands upon ethnical principle are exhausted, yet the dismantling (démontage) of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia continues to this day through a series of political consensuses and compromises, as well as a series of legislative changes. And again, it is not only that a critical perception of this dismantling of Macedonian sovereignty and of the principles of the Anti-fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia (hereinafter referred to as ASNOM) is lacking, but it is instantly characterized as politically improper speech. With such a priori filibusters the freedom of scientific thought in the Republic of Macedonia is systematically called into question, thereby the attempts of finding correctives are thwarted by the para-constitutional discourse that dominates in the post-Ohrid period of Republic of Macedonia's existence.

The turn that the Republic of Macedonia made in 2001 is so radical that it might be interpreted as a violation of the previous acts and as an annulment of the adopted axioms and ideals of the Macedonian people for their national state. Every day the scientific-political confusion reduces the national sovereignty and moves away from the national strategies that were axiomatically and in a testamentary way formulated in the acts of ASNOM from August 2, 1944, and of the Macedonian Scientific and Literary Society in St. Petersburg from 1902 and 1903. It could be argued that the Macedonian state has alienated itself more dramatically from the interests of the Macedonian nation in the new, independent Republic of Macedonia than in the Republic of Macedonia within the ex-Yugoslavian federation. Therefore, now, 74 years since ASNOM, it would be suitable to ask about the motives for this intrusion on the inherited system of constitutional, governmental, national, and civic values. Who is interested in such a revision?

Instead of improving the civil concept of society and state, in the Republic of Macedonia, the ethnic (and thereby multi-ethnic) concept of the state grows stronger. In all this period since 2001, an initial consciousness existed that the ethnic multi-centrism is a problematic option, but there were no scientific contributions on the consequences of the multi-ethnic regime to support it argumentatively.
It ought to be said that the national concept is not contradictory to the civil concept. On the contrary, the national concept is trans-ethnic and integrative, so in conditions of proclaimed democratic establishment, its orientation is toward civil and human rights. In environments with mixed ethnic composition, the coexistence grows stronger if there is a civil consensus over the state/national priorities and interests, and if the common language of understanding is respected, both concretely and symbolically. In multi-ethnic environments, it is necessary that the relations are regulated based on an intercultural principle, not on the radical multicultural principle. Homogenous cultures, let's say like the South Slavic ones, allow a higher dose of multicultural diversity, while heterogeneous cultures, such as the Macedonian, Albanian, and Turkish one, entail a higher dose of inter-culturalism.

The national principle, judging by the European experience from the 19th century, is closely connected to the trans-ethnic option of demographic structure, that is, to the civil principle and to the ultimate principle of human rights and freedoms. Since 2001 the fate of Macedonia is the fate of a multi-ethnic state in which the demotic and democratic principle is systematically ignored, but the ethnic and multi-ethnic principle is worshiped and glorified. As a consequence of this, people are no longer confronted with the problem of individual citizen's human rights as much as with the ethnic rights of "ethnic communities", which are collective by definition.

At the same time it is forgotten that the (controversial) multi-ethnic democratic model is introduced, mainly, in states with an impending radical restructuring, federalization, disidentification, or delegitimation, in states that are subjected to some negation, division, and/or exploitation, in states that are a zone of someone's (imperialistic) interest. Multi-ethnic democracy in Macedonia is a tool in the process for disidentification of the Macedonian state. Just like the admission in the United Nations on April 8, 1993, under a temporary (non-constitutional) reference/acronym, is a signal for a partial international legitimacy of the state, which maintains the debate for its identity and destabilizes its international position (and the reference "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" was used in the memorandum of the Greek government from 1993, even before the admission of the Republic of Macedonia in the UN).

To summarize, the conceptual and pseudo-scientific contradictions turned the former ASNOM's stable national/civil state, which had a high potential for civil/human freedoms and for human and socially balanced development of the society, into a loose entropic structure in which even the open anti-state discourses are calmly accepted (a process of so-called "Libanization"/"Lebanonization"). Science shares the responsibility with the political and legislative system in this venture of re-organization of the independent Macedonian state, therefore science is obliged to deconstruct and
demystify the contradictory paradigms of post-socialism and post-communism, especially through the prism of Balkan and Macedonian experiences.

**Disassociation from ASNOM Principles**

The conceptual contradictions in the re-organization of independent Macedonia turned the former ASNOM creation that had a civil indication into a multi-centric composition in which the common interest is absent. Today in Macedonia there are only empty phrases for the common interest, phrases full of utopian fallacies that the entrance in the Euro-Atlantic structures will integrate what was self-disintegrated. The integration in NATO and EU appears to be the only common interest of all ethnic communities in the Republic of Macedonia today, but it is more of a "shadow theater" than a reality. ASNOM's Macedonia had free "European" borders because its citizens had passports that opened the doors of the European states and the freedom of movement was inviolable. Due to the numerous additional requirements related to its identity and economic power, Macedonia today is confined both from the inside and from the outside.

Today the Republic of Macedonia has institutions whose indifference toward anti-state discourses becomes proverbial. Since there is an absence of institutional regulators and an absence of integrative, shared interests and factors (pluralization of the state symbols and official languages with a tendency to devalue the role of the Macedonian language as a constitutional language on the territory of the entire state), the result is a disintegration of the state and a threat that parts of the Republic of Macedonia will secede and merge with other, neighboring states, which are based on a more homogenous cultural and linguistic principle.

To illustrate the devaluation of the role of the Macedonian language, here is the Decision of ASNOM from January 15, 1944, which publishes the Decision of AVNOJ (the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia) from November 29-30, 1943, according to which:

In the spirit of the federative principle of expression of Yugoslavia based on the right to self-determination and within the national equality guaranteed to the peoples of Yugoslavia [...] all decisions and proclamations [...] shall be published [...] in the Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian languages. All of these languages are equal in the entire territory of Yugoslavia. (ASNOM, 1964b)

According to the 1927 book *Macedonia, Landscape and Culture of Living* by the German scientist and geographer Leonhard Schultze Jena (1872-1955), although it is the youngest administrative Slavic language, Macedonian is the oldest Slavic language (2013). Then, here is the initial Article 7 from the 1991 *Constitution* of the independent Republic of Macedonia:

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The Macedonian language, written using its Cyrillic alphabet, is the official language in the Republic of Macedonia. In the units of local self-government where the majority of the inhabitants belong to a nationality, in addition to the Macedonian language and Cyrillic alphabet, their language and alphabet are also in official use, in a manner determined by law. In the units of local self-government where there is a considerable number of inhabitants belonging to a nationality, their language and alphabet are also in official use, in addition to the Macedonian language and Cyrillic alphabet, under conditions and in a manner determined by law. (Assembly of RM, 2018: 2)

In 2008 the above article was replaced with Amendment V, which regulates that "any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population is also an official language, written using its alphabet, as specified below" (Assembly of RM, 2018: 23). And today, in 2018, new Laws on the Use of Languages propose elevating the status of the Albanian language to a second official language. The situation with the state symbols is very similar and deeply antagonized (Sharlamanov and Stojanovski, 2012).

When the framework revisions of the Macedonian Constitution were prepared, the authorized political and legislative instances forgot ASNOM's Manifesto ideological postulate: "In these few months the destiny of the Macedonian people is decided upon. The destiny of Macedonia is a destiny of the Macedonian people" (ASNOM, 1964a: 21). If we want to check whether the constitutional acts of the independent Republic of Macedonia confirm the benefits from ASNOM, or whether they disassociate from them by stimulating the paradigm of "multi-ethnic democracy", we should check the actual Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. If we try to provide the integral text of the Constitution with all adopted constitutional amendments, we will find the original text from November 17, 1991, with the amendments from 1992, 2001, 2005, and others, added as annexes at the end of the text. This applies to the printed version of the 2007 Constitution, as well as to the electronic version of the Constitution published on the Internet page of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia (Assembly of RM, 2018). That open overview of the genesis and evolution of constitutional revisions, which presents the new amendments and Preamble along with the previous text of the Constitution, is useful for identifying the main story of the Republic of Macedonia and its fundamental, constitutional, and categorial system. It is also useful in the attempt to compare the latest constitutional solutions with the previous ones since the history of the contemporary Macedonian state and the evolution of its autonomy and sovereignty are written in it.

The amendments of November 2001 are a dazzling testimony to the manner in which the revision of ASNOM's Macedonia escalated from it being
a sovereign and unitary state into a disintegrated and decentralized multi-ethnic "Framework Macedonia". What does that revised and so amended text of the *Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia* show?

1. The 2001 revision of the *Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia* resulted with a reduction and marginalization of the role of the Macedonian people in constituting the state, whereby the constitutional, state-forming character of the Macedonian people in the founding of the Republic of Macedonia was minimized. In fact, a systemic degradation of the status of the Macedonian people was made with the tendency to replace the category "nation" with the category "ethnic community". The historical truth about the role and the immanent right of the Macedonian people to constitute their own independent state, to build a Macedonian nation and to strengthen its sovereignty and its identity on an international level was revised, more precisely, falsified. Neither the ASNOM term "nationalities" is in use anymore, nor the internationally accepted term "national minorities", but new, unique, unprecedented formulations like "parts of people" and "members who belong to communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia" are introduced instead. And there is no difference in the relation between "the Macedonian people" and "nationalities"/"national minorities" in the Republic of Macedonia, regardless whether they represent 1 or 20 percent of the total population. And according to Karakamisheva-Jovanova:

   The Republic of Macedonia thus became an "experimental country" in which the members of the ethnic communities win the majority of their rights not by being citizens, but by being numbers, i.e. percentage of a certain ethnic community (at least 20 percent of the total population), which made Macedonia the only country in the constitutional practice where the collective rights are realized based on a mathematical, and not on civil grounds" (2014, p.7).

   Thereupon, the Constitution is not conceptually coherent in its texture. There is a semantic and lexical gap between the terminological paradigm in the "Preamble" and in the amendments to the Constitution. The preamble retains the distinctive term "Macedonian people" like a palimpsest memory trace from the previous text, which is sufficient to feel the tension that arises from revising fundamental constitutional elements. The difference in value between the category "people" and "parts of people" is almost insignificant. There is an absolute lack of seeing the Macedonian nation as the supra-ethnic category that would unify all "ethnic communities" in one consistent civil structure. This kind of semantic and categorial pluralism later disavows the mentioning of the Macedonian people in the daily political and legislative rhetoric, while at the same time, it thwarts the creation of the Macedonian nation and it puts the strategy of a democratic political system behind on the historical stage. The multi-ethnic concept of constituting the Macedonian state
appears at the stage, induced by the new Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. There is no word about the deviations from ASNOM, from the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, and from the Constitution of the independent Republic of Macedonia.

Here the following questions arise: Why did the Republic of Macedonia withdraw from the obtained sovereignty with a rapid parliamentarian intrusion on its constitutional system without demanding legitimacy from its citizens? Why did the Macedonian legislative institutions mortgage the Macedonian civil state in conditions of military and international pressure, even though it was known that the 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia had completely applied the international standards regarding the rights of the minority nations and communities? Science owes answers to these questions.

2. The 2001 constitutional changes also revise the codified main story of the Republic of Macedonia from November 17, 1991. If the main story from the preamble is a projection of the ideology and conception of the state, then it will be reflected not only in the structure of the state at the actual moment, but it will also generate new developmental and re-structuring processes, followed and supported by new legal acts, although with reactive processes in the very functioning of state and society. Macedonia is an obvious example of this, and it becomes increasingly clear that it is one of the few experimental examples that show how the systematic practicing of paradoxes and the legitimation of exemptions may lead to a developmental situation that common sense would never anticipate or desire. The revision of the "Preamble" of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia resulted in a revision not only of the fundamental concept of the state and its political system but also of the story about the Macedonian people and its role in the creation of the Macedonian republic in 1944. This kind of intervention in the mega-story of the creation of the Republic of Macedonia revises the historical memory and the historical truth in order to obtain a substantial, moral, political, and constitutional excuse for a radical revision of the Macedonian state and its identity (which means that it does not concern only the identity of the Macedonian people, but also the identity of the Macedonian state).

3. The actual Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia delegitimizes the state as a subject that will ethically and culturally look after the rights of the Macedonian minority in neighboring states and all over the world, and as a state that has the right to claim the symbols inherited from the past and from the entire Macedonian cultural and spiritual inheritance (which by the way, is borderless).

4. The amendments of November 2001 relativize even the inviolability of the borders of the Republic of Macedonia. Namely, Amendment I passed on January 6, 1992, revises Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of
Macedonia from November 17, 1991, so now it states: "The borders of the Republic of Macedonia can only be changed in accordance with the Constitution and on the principle of free will, as well as in accordance with generally accepted international norms" (Assembly of RM, 2018: 22). In that way, a possibility to change the borders of the Republic of Macedonia is anticipated based on the principle of "free will", a category that maximally relativizes the previous category of "self-determination to secession", which referred to the federal units within the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. For instance, by a special act of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, an exchange of territories with Kosovo was made in October 2009: Macedonia gave up some 130 hectares of land on the pretext of technical demarcation of the border.

Seen from a historical distance, it seems that the developing constitutional changes of the status of the Macedonian people in the Republic of Macedonia are going in a negative direction, with regard to the historical events such as the independence of the Republic of Macedonia in 1991, ASNOM in 1944, the status of the Republic of Macedonia within the Yugoslav Federation, as well as with regard to the programmatic acts of the Macedonian Scientific and Literary Society (1902-1917, established by Dimitrija Čuposki in St. Petersburg, regarded as the predecessor of the Macedonian Academy for Sciences and Arts) and the Slavic-Macedonian National Educational Association "Ss. Cyril and Methodius" (1912-1913). The Macedonian nation is (systematically) marginalized within the independent Republic of Macedonia from 2001 onwards. How should one qualify the intrusion that the representative organs of the Macedonian multi-ethnic democracy made on the historical and memory codex of the Macedonian people? How should one qualify the taking away of the legitimately acquired rights to establish, organize, and develop a state following the model of other European and Balkan national states with a civil and democratic indication?

Therefore, it can be stated that, 73 years after its establishment and 28 years after its disintegration, the SFR Yugoslavia was a good pattern for a federal bond of the homogeneous cultural matrixes, of the linguistically, traditionally, and religiously coherent peoples, and of the federal republics, which was the reason why there were pre-requisites for intercultural integration and interaction. In such a Yugoslav Federation, Macedonia and the Macedonian people experienced their golden age of national renaissance, the age of having a recognized, active, and sovereign linguistic and cultural identity. Regardless how much certain restrictiveness of the political pluralism could be ascribed to the political regime of the SFY, it is indisputable that in the Yugoslav federation: - the Macedonian language was not only sovereign state (national) language in the Republic of Macedonia, but it was also an internationally recognized language (one of the three languages for
international communication of the Yugoslav federation); - the degree of emigration of the Macedonians was not more than usual; - the Macedonian territory was inviolable ownership of the Macedonian citizens; - crime rate was at the lowest possible level, as well as drug addiction; - freedom of movement was unlimited; - social disintegration was bearable compared to the present one; - the rights of the ethnic or national minorities were in accordance with all international conventions. Paradoxically, precisely that kind of Macedonian state was anathematized because it was both an object of division, negation, and destruction. Violence should have some excuse, shouldn't it?

Without a doubt, the manifesto national platform of ASNOM assumes a cult character in independent Macedonia. Even according to some isolated opinions, the ASNOM strategies were dismantled in the Yugoslav Federation (1945-1990). If that is true, then it can be said that it is precisely in the independent Republic of Macedonia that a radicalization of the dismantling of the national codex of ASNOM takes place. Where does this escalation of anti-Macedonian strategies come from? Why doesn't the independent Republic of Macedonia return to the principles of ASNOM? Why did the highest representatives of the Macedonian state revise the main story of the role of the Macedonian people in 2001 by changing the constitutional preamble and by adopting the amendments imposed by the Ohrid Framework Agreement without the legitimacy of all the people?

There is no doubt that if the anti-Macedonian policies were executed by other external subjects, the Macedonian subject would have a legitimate right to reject them and in given circumstances to revise them. But if the anti-Macedonian policies are executed by the state officials of the Republic of Macedonia, couldn't one say that anti-Macedonianism is legitimated as a long-term development strategy and that it becomes a constitutional, legal, and systemic category? In this kind of situation the guilt is entirely domestic and native, and as such, it is not easy to admit, and it is even less easy to remove the consequences from the national and institutional hubris. This kind of guilt is an introduction to a collective tragedy. This kind of guilt generates systematic, methodically destructive social/political processes and legal measures. This kind of guilt endangers the inherited benefits of the Macedonian people and it makes it fully supported by the legitimate institutions in the legal, judicial, and executive authority. From the viewpoint of the program of the Macedonian Scientific and Literary Society in St. Petersburg (1902) and of ASNOM (1944), it could be said that, unfortunately, with the 2001 Amendments the Macedonian people drifted apart from their national priorities most of all within the independent Republic of Macedonia.
Conclusion

To conclude, the combined deductive and interpretative research and the specific choice of quantitative and qualitative methods of this paper support its initial hypothesis.

It is evident that the multi-ethnic model of democracy does not effectively improve democratization, in spite of its proclaimed intention. The research shows that this model is not regarded viable in many scientific studies and that there is a significant scientific consensus (which is based on both empirical and interpretative analyses) about its controversially high likelihood of deepening inter-ethnic conflicts in multi-ethnic societies, of undermining existing institutional democratic instruments and of catalyzing institutional and state disintegration.

The specific case study of the Republic of Macedonia shows that the systematic constitutional changes induced by this model, followed by the institutional and social crisis, can have radical consequences on the identity and the future of an entire ethnic community - the Macedonians.

Further studies on this topic could show alternative democratic models with better effectiveness and could prevent further worldwide inter-ethnic conflicts. In this study, the author finds that the democratic ambiance is more coherent within the intercultural paradigm than within the paradigm of radical multiculturalism and radical multi-ethnic democracy.

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