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Generativity is a Core Value of the ESJ: A Decade of Growth

Erik Erikson (1902-1994) was one of the great psychologists of the 20th century¹. He explored the nature of personal human identity. Originally named Erik Homberger after his adoptive father, Dr. Theodore Homberger, he re-imagined his identity and re-named himself Erik Erikson (literally Erik son of Erik). Ironically, he rejected his adoptive father's wish to become a physician, never obtained a college degree, pursued independent studies under Anna Freud, and then taught at Harvard Medical School after emigrating from Germany to the United States. Erickson visualized human psychosocial development as eight successive life-cycle challenges. Each challenge was framed as a struggle between two outcomes, one desirable and one undesirable. The first two early development challenges were 'trust' versus 'mistrust' followed by 'autonomy' versus 'shame.' Importantly, he held that we face the challenge of **generativity** versus **stagnation in middle life**. This challenge concerns the desire to give back to society and leave a mark on the world. It is about the transition from acquiring and accumulating to providing and mentoring.

Founded in 2010, the European Scientific Journal is just reaching young adulthood. Nonetheless, **generativity** is one of our core values. As a Journal, we reject stagnation and continue to evolve to meet the needs of our contributors, our reviewers, and the academic community. We seek to innovate to meet the challenges of open-access academic publishing. For us,

¹ Hopkins, J. R. (1995). Erik Homburger Erikson (1902–1994). *American Psychologist*, 50(9), 796-797. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.50.9.796>

generativity has a special meaning. We acknowledge an obligation to give back to the academic community, which has supported us over the past decade and made our initial growth possible. As part of our commitment to generativity, we are re-doubling our efforts in several key areas. First, we are committed to keeping our article processing fees as low as possible to make the ESJ affordable to scholars from all countries. Second, we remain committed to fair and agile peer review and are making further changes to shorten the time between submission and publication of worthy contributions. Third, we are looking actively at ways to eliminate the article processing charges for scholars coming from low GDP countries through a system of subsidies. Fourth, we are examining ways to create and strengthen partnerships with various academic institutions that will mutually benefit those institutions and the ESJ. Finally, through our commitment to publishing excellence, we reaffirm our membership in an open-access academic publishing community that actively contributes to the vitality of scholarship worldwide.

Sincerely,

Daniel B. Hier, MD

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Italian Society and Gender Role Stereotypes. How Stereotypical Beliefs Concerning Males and Females are Still Present in Italian People at the Beginning of the Third Millennium

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Abstract

There are many forms of discrimination in our society. Why is more attention being paid to discrimination against women with awareness-raising debates, public demonstrations, and more? Women's discrimination against men is discrimination, too! To cope with this growing phenomenon, it is necessary to understand the roots from which it originates and is fed. Gender role stereotypes may be responsible for this (Ostuni, 2017). In this work, thanks to a survey carried out by ISTAT in 2019 (referred to 2018) on the male and female Italian population aged between 18 and 74 years old, it will be explained if and how our society is "trapped" in stereotypical beliefs. The results obtained show that Italy is divided into two parts and that in the north-central regions stereotypes are less rooted than in the southern ones. The phenomenon is less widespread, for both sexes, both as they grow in age and when they have a higher educational degree. In this context, as far as family society, and the economy is concerned, the role of women is subordinate to men, especially in the South. As stereotypes are responsible for different forms

of discrimination against women, a possible way to establish fair gender equality can be obtained by eliminating them and bringing down the prevailing patriarchal culture.

Keywords: Italy, society, discrimination, gender role stereotypes

Introduction

An essential link could exist between the discrimination against women and the cultural context in which this behavior originates. It is difficult to admit, but this form of male discrimination perpetrated against women could be determined by a deeply patriarchal culture that is still dominant in our society due to the hierarchy between the status of men and women, that is female subordination and male dominance.

This can be seen through stereotypes, namely "social constructions" that do not reflect reality and that we, unfortunately, accept daily. They have become part of our consciousness, last over time, are mainly transmitted from generation to generation, and produce inequalities in contemporary societies (access to the labor market, different wage levels, etc.).

Perhaps, the persistence of some dynamics in the relations between the genders originated from having ignored the many cultural and social transformations carried out by women.

Masculine and feminine are perceived as opposites and presented as complementary. In fact, the two sides coexist in each individual, regardless of gender. Keeping them in balance is the essential condition for establishing healthy and functional relationships with each other (Ostuni, 2017).

In this paper an attempt will be made to find out whether Italian society is sex-typed, that is if the reality we live in is the result of immutable models that lead to a tightening of the same reality. It will be done through the analysis of the activities that the gender role stereotype attributes to one gender or another, namely, those that the common thought considers "for males" or "for females" and that, once created, are resistant to change.

Methodology and data

In this paper only stereotypes regarding traditional gender roles will be analyzed, thus differing further and subsequent analyses about them.

In November 2019, on the occasion of the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women and within a collaboration agreement with the Department for Equal Opportunities at the Presidency of the Council, Istat has published data concerning its survey about gender role stereotypes.¹

¹ Istat: "Gender role stereotypes and the social image of sexual violence". The sample of the survey "Gender role stereotypes and the social image of sexual violence" is defined as a sub-

The survey, which concerned individuals aged 18 to 74 years, for the first time, in addition to the detection of stereotypes on traditional gender roles, took into account opinions on the acceptability of violence, its spread and its causes, and stereotypes of sexual violence.

The questions asked to the respondents concerned the family, work, and society roles and there was a total of five, namely:

- 1) *Under conditions of labor shortage, should employers give priority to men over women?*
- 2) *Is it above all men who must provide for the economic needs of the family?*
- 3) *Is it the man who must make the most important decisions concerning the family?*
- 4) *Are men less suited to housework?*
- 5) *For men, rather than women, is it very important to succeed at work?*

The possibilities of answers were "*complete agreement*", "*quite in agreement*", "*little agreement*", "*complete disagreement*", "*does not respond*". In this regard, to avoid adding up three modes of responses (complete agreement, quite in agreement, and little agreement) that certainly denote a favorable opinion of the stereotype but not a convinced one, we preferred to focus attention on the answer "*complete disagreement*" which highlights the strong opposition to the implementation of the gender role in question. Finally, the answer "*does not respond*" was not taken into account because of the very low percentage found.

For each question, attention will be paid to the difference between the sexes. As for age and educational qualification the whole country has been considered, while, at the regional level, through the relationship of masculinity, an attempt will be made to divide regions according to the greater or lesser extent of the stereotype perceived by men as compared with women.

Subsequently, always according to the indicator "*complete disagreement*", the cluster analysis technique will be applied with the aim of creating groups of regions, homogeneous within them and heterogeneous between them. All that will be done to identify, first separately, for men and for women, in which regions the stereotype is more diffused. Afterward, the cited technique of the cluster analysis will be applied, with the same objective, to both sexes together.

To understand if our society is gender-typed, as mentioned above, the data produced by Istat in 2019, which relate to 2018, and the result from the

sample of the people's sample answering the Labor Force Survey in the period June - November 2018.

survey "Gender role stereotypes and the social image of sexual violence"², were used. The methodology used is as follows:

- 1) taking men as a reference, the ratio of masculinity has been calculated to assess the greater or lesser extent of disagreement on the basis of the question under consideration, as compared to women:

$$R_m = \frac{P_m}{P_w} \cdot 100$$

where P_m represents the population of men, while P_w represents the population of women. This indicator assumes values above 100 when there is a greater disagreement between men and women and vice versa.

- 2) the cluster analysis technique has been applied to search for groups of regions homogeneous within them and heterogeneous between them according to the chosen indicator.³

The results obtained

Under conditions of labor shortage, should employers give priority to men over women?

In 2022 and in any evolved society, talking about male privileges over female ones in the world of work, even under conditions of labor shortage, should no longer be a stereotype.

The classic reason that has always disadvantaged women in the world of work is parenting. As women have always had the task of taking care of their children in case of illness or emergency, they have often asked for work permits, reduction of working hours, or the passage from full to part-time. All that has led women to an important gap, compared to men, in terms of availability of time, energy and constancy and has often obliged them to take a step back in the sphere of work.

This has always happened in Italian society because of the rooted stereotype according to which women must have the duty and the task of raising children. All that at the expense of their career.

In order to promote equality and equal opportunities, the male-female dichotomy ought to disappear within the working world, where women should no longer be discriminated against for their own role as a parent. Moreover, the parenting "privilege" should involve both sexes to the same extent and women should be given more career opportunities.

² Istat: <http://dati-violenzadonne.istat.it/>

³ The method used to measure the distances between cases (regions) is that of the quadratic Euclidean distance. For the formation of clusters, the hierarchical criterion with agglomerative grouping was adopted, with Ward's algorithm (1963). For the related methodological insights see e.g., Delvecchio (2010), Lis and Sambin (1977).

For both sexes, as many as 70% of respondents disagreed with this privilege. This means that about 30% believe that the male sex should be privileged in the world of work.

It is remarkable, however, that the phenomenon begins to lose conviction, because the percentages of disagreement over this hypothetical stereotype decrease with age for both sexes (Table 1).

In fact, it is in the youth age groups (18-29 years) that the highest percentages of disagreement are found (77.3% for boys and 76.4% for girls), while it still remains rooted in the most adult generations, within which the percentages decrease (62.8% for men and 65.2% for women).

By analogy with what has been seen on the phenomenon trend by age groups, there is also feedback when the educational level of the respondents is taken into account. In fact, the stereotype is more widespread among the less educated (41.3% for men and 53.4% for women with or without a primary school degree). The low diffusion of the stereotype reaches very high percentages (84%) among the very young, for both sexes (Table 2).

Table 1 – Age groups

Age groups	Men	Women
	Complete disagreement	Complete disagreement
18-29	77.3	76.4
30-44	70.7	71.6
45-59	71.7	70.7
60-74	62.8	65.2
<i>Total</i>	<i>70.4</i>	<i>70.5</i>

Source: Istat

Table 2 – Educational level

Educational degree	Men	Women
	Complete disagreement	Complete disagreement
Elementary/no degree	41.3	53.4
Junior High School	65.8	61.8
High School diploma	73.8	76.2
University degree or diploma	84.3	84.6
<i>Total</i>	<i>70.4</i>	<i>70.5</i>

Source: Istat

Widening the issue to Italian regions and placing the masculinity ratio in descending order, in a group of eight regions the masculinity ratio is greater than 100. This means that men are less convinced than women of the stereotype (Table 3).

A remaining group of regions (eleven) have a masculinity ratio of less than 100. This ratio, on the other hand, denotes that the stereotype is more widespread among men and less rooted in women.

The balance between men and women is reached only in the Piemonte region where, like the national value, there is a masculinity ratio of 99.9%. Two opposite trends show that 77% of men in the Marche region are more inclined to have women in the labor market, while 43.8% of men in the Basilicata region are in favor of the precedence of male versus female work.

Table 3 – Stereotype spread among men and women

Regions	Men	Women	Masculinity Ratio	Stereotype spread	
	Complete disagreement	Complete disagreement			
Marche	77.0	69.5	110.8	Spread among women	
Campania	59.6	54.5	109.4		
Lazio	74.2	68.8	107.8		
Molise	61.3	56.9	107.7		
Abruzzo	64.6	60.5	106.8		
Calabria	61.1	57.7	105.9		
Liguria	75.6	72.7	104.0		
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	77.1	74.6	103.4		
Piemonte	76.1	76.2	99.9		Situation of balance
Italy	70.4	70.5	99.9		
Veneto	77.2	78.3	98.6	Spread among men	
Sicilia	61.3	62.4	98.2		
Umbria	69.7	71.0	98.2		
Lombardia	77.9	79.7	97.7		
Trentino-Alto Adige	70.7	72.6	97.4		
Valle d'Aosta	72.3	75.6	95.6		
Puglia	55.7	58.7	94.9		
Toscana	75.4	79.6	94.7		
Sardegna	73.0	77.6	94.1		
Emilia-Romagna	70.5	77.7	90.7		
Basilicata	56.2	62.1	90.5		

Source: Personal data processing based on Istat data

Is it above all man who must provide for the economic needs of the family?

This question, inserted in the Istat survey, emphasizes the role of man seen as an irreplaceable source of income, that is, he who must provide for the economic needs of the family, namely, earning and covering all the fundamental needs of the family.

As far as past history is concerned, the roles of men and women were usually well defined. In the family the widespread prerogative of men was to provide for economic needs and to impart discipline to the members of the

family, while the only task of women was to ensure the well-being of their hearth and home.

In the nuclear family, on the other hand, the roles of men and women, because of work, should be equal. The rights and obligations within the couple should be equally divided, thus creating an economic and social equality of the sexes.

Unfortunately, by analyzing the answers of the Istat sample surveyed, this hypothetical stereotype reaches quite high percentages all over Italy: 50.9% of men and 57.1% of women disagree. This result shows that 49.1% of men and 42.9% of women support the central role of family men in providing for economic needs.

Considering the phenomenon by age, the percentage of new generations (age group 18-29) stands at 57% for both sexes, while a high percentage of women in the age group 45-59 (61.6%) can be inferred from a careful reading of the data. It is evident that this stereotype is less widespread in the female age group 45-59 than in the age group 18-29 (Table 4).

On the other hand, analyzing the educational degree held by the respondents in relation to the stereotype submitted, a progressive percentage increase can be noted for both sexes from the lowest educational level to the highest. The stereotype is very ingrained in the respondents with a low level of education (elementary/no degree). In fact, for men it does not reach 25%, while for women it settles on about 37%. On the contrary, the stereotype is much less widespread among those who have a higher educational level: for people having a University or High School degree it reaches about 67% for men and 72.4% for women (Table 5).

Table 4 – Age groups

Age groups	Men	Women
	Complete disagreement	Complete disagreement
18-29	57.5	57.2
30-44	48.5	56.4
45-59	53.5	61.6
60-74	45.2	51.6
Total	50.9	57.1

Source: Istat

Table 5 – Educational degree

Educational degree	Men	Women
	Complete disagreement	Complete disagreement
Elementary/no degree	24.8	36.7
Junior High School	43.0	49.7
High School diploma	55.7	62.3
University degree or diploma	67.3	72.4
Total	50.9	57.1

Source: Istat

By ordering the masculinity ratio in descending order, it is evident that only in the Marche region the ratio is greater than 100. This means that only in this region men disagree with the proposed stereotype, while in the remaining regions the spread of the stereotype is more rooted among men. Women therefore reject, albeit with very low percentages in many regions, the role of man as the main actor for the economic livelihood of the family. In this regard, we note that 11 regions have a masculinity ratio lower than the Italian average (89.1%) (Table 6).

Table 6 – Stereotype spread among men and women

Regions	Men		Masculinity ratio	Stereotype spread
	Complete disagreement	Complete disagreement		
Marche	58.3	53.4	109.2	Spread Among women
Campania	41.7	41.8	99.8	
Lazio	56.9	58.4	97.4	
Lombardia	59.5	63.3	94.0	
Valle d'Aosta	56.6	60.7	93.2	
Trentino-Alto Adige	55.2	59.5	92.8	
Veneto	58.0	62.6	92.7	
Sardegna	59.8	66.1	90.5	
Basilicata	46.0	51.5	89.3	
Italy	50.9	57.1	89.1	
Piemonte	55.6	62.9	88.4	Spread among men
Sicilia	40.7	46.5	87.5	
Toscana	57.1	66.9	85.4	
Emilia-Romagna	50.5	60.1	84.0	
Calabria	41.1	51.0	80.6	
Umbria	49.3	63.8	77.3	
Puglia	38.2	50.6	75.5	
Molise	38.4	51.2	75.0	
Abruzzo	30.5	40.9	74.6	
Liguria	47.8	64.7	73.9	
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	46.9	64.5	72.7	

Source: Personal data processing based on Istat data

Is it man who must make the most important decisions concerning the family?

This stereotype, in a sense, is linked to the previous one, with the only difference that the previous stereotype focused on the possible or desired

economic inequality within the couple, while in this stereotype the man assumes the role of a true leadership recognized by all members of the family, that is, the one who must coordinate the actions, solve any problems and will be responsible for the decision-making consequences within the family.

Essentially, the relationship of the spouses is influenced by the one holding power in the couple on economic management, sexuality, relations with the world outside the family, etc.

In past times, in Italian society, there was a widespread belief that men had to hold the decision-making part in the family, but today the opposition to this stereotype reaches quite high percentages. In the country as a whole, men express their opposition with 75.4% and women with a remarkable 82.9%. Looking at the age groups, the highest percentage for both men (78.6%) and women (85.6%) is reached in the age group (45-59 years) but women, in all age groups, have higher percentages than men, which is therefore the sign of a clear opposition to the stereotype by the female sex (Table 7).

Table 7 – Age groups

Age groups	Men	Women
	Complete disagreement	Complete disagreement
18-29	74.2	81.5
30-44	73.4	83.4
45-59	78.6	85.6
60-74	74.0	79.8
<i>Total</i>	<i>75.4</i>	<i>82.9</i>

Source: Istat

Table 8 – Educational level

Educational degree	Men	Women
	Complete disagreement	Complete disagreement
Elementary/no degree	53.7	68.6
Junior High School	73.8	78.5
High School diploma	76.6	86.9
University degree or diploma	85.2	91.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>75.4</i>	<i>82.9</i>

Source: Istat

A similar trend can be found in the educational degree of the respondents. The disagreement percentages for both sexes raise as their level of education increases. Significantly, women's opposition to this stereotype is always greater than men's one. Therefore, it is not superfluous to point out that the disagreement with the stereotype registered in women with the highest level of education (University degree or diploma) reaches almost 92% even if the 85.2% registered among men is not negligible (Table 8).

As already pointed out in the analysis of the age groups and educational degree of the interviewees, the lesser diffusion of the stereotype among women is also found in the masculinity ratio, placed in descending order and constructed for all regions (Table 9).

This ratio is below 100 in all regions, which justifies the increased spread of stereotypes among the male population. The Italian value of the masculinity ratio is 91%, higher than 12 regions.

Table 9 – Stereotype spread among men and women

Regions	Men	Women	Masculinity ratio	Stereotype spread
	Complete disagreement	Complete Disagreement		
Abruzzo	71.7	73.3	97.8	
Sicilia	71.9	74.2	96.9	
Campania	64.7	67.7	95.6	
Lombardia	81.7	87.2	93.7	
Valle d'Aosta	80.3	85.9	93.5	
Trentino-Alto Adige	77.0	82.6	93.2	
Veneto	84.2	90.5	93.0	
Toscana	79.5	86.5	91.9	
Italy	75.4	82.9	91.0	
Lazio	76.4	84.1	90.8	
Marche	74.8	82.8	90.3	<i>Spread among men</i>
Emilia-Romagna	76.2	85.0	89.6	
Molise	67.9	77.0	88.2	
Umbria	74.7	84.8	88.1	
Sardegna	82.7	94.0	88.0	
Piemonte	77.0	88.6	86.9	
Calabria	69.1	80.7	85.6	
Basilicata	64.9	76.2	85.2	
Liguria	73.2	86.5	84.6	
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	74.8	89.3	83.8	
Puglia	64.9	80.6	80.5	

Source: Personal data processing based on Istat data

Are men less suited to housework?

It is useful to understand whether it is right that in Italy women sacrifice part of their free time or the commitments that work requires to devote themselves to the daily care of the family or, maybe, if the biggest problem of Italian males is that they are ashamed to say they have become househusbands. Are men good at housework a valuable help for women or have to be considered guilty of committing an invasion in a female field?

Unfortunately, in the twenty-first century, perhaps for a mere matter of tradition and mentality, in a society where it is customary to define women as

"emancipated", most of the household chores "belong" to women. Tradition and mentality play a predominant role in the men who lived their youth in a period when the interchangeability of roles, between parents, was not the norm.

In fact, the percentage of disagreement on the submitted question, for both sexes, is in balance: 47.0% for men and 47.3% for women. The low rate of response recorded in women (47.3%) denotes the male tendency to repeat over time behaviours and ways of thinking learned in the family of origin.

In a couple, the common goal must be the well-being of the family. In the daily housekeeping there must be no defined male or female chores and an alternation or interchangeability of roles should prevail. All that for the sake of the family but, of course, without altering their personality.

All this seems to have been understood by young generations (18-29 years), who seem to be moving towards the overcoming of this stereotype with response rates above 50%: 51.6% for boys and 52.4% for girls. Response rates decrease as age increases for both sexes. Therefore, the stereotype is more entrenched among adult age groups (Table 10).

On the other hand, the response rate for the educational degree increases as the level of education increases. As for the lack of adaptability of men to do household chores, the level of disagreement does not reach 30.0% for men and women belonging to the elementary/no degree educational level, while for those who have a university degree or diploma, equally for both sexes, this level does not exceed 60.0% (Table 11).

Table 10 – Age groups

Age groups	Men	Women
	Complete disagreement	Complete disagreement
18-29	51.6	52.4
30-44	48.7	49.4
45-59	48.5	49.1
60-74	39.1	39.2
<i>Total</i>	<i>47.0</i>	<i>47.3</i>

Source: Istat

Table 11 – Educational level

Educational degree	Men	Women
	Complete disagreement	Complete disagreement
Elementary/no degree	28.7	27.8
Junior High School	44.3	42.2
High School diploma	48.5	52.5
University degree or diploma	56.7	57.8
<i>Total</i>	<i>47.0</i>	<i>47.3</i>

Source: Istat

Analyzing the masculinity ratio in Italian regions, ordered in a decreasing way, it is evident that the answers about this stereotype have divided our country into two groups. In the first group (9 regions) there are the regions that have a masculinity ratio value greater than 100 and where the disagreement to the submitted question is more widespread among men than women with a marked difference in the Campania region (128.0%), while in the second group (11 regions) women's greater dissent prevails (Table 12).

Table 12 - Stereotype spread among men and women

Regions	Men	Women	Masculinity ratio	Stereotype spread
	Complete disagreement	Complete disagreement		
Campania	43.4	33.9	128.0	Spread among women
Molise	39.1	34.3	114.0	
Basilicata	36.9	33.9	108.8	
Calabria	43.7	40.4	108.2	
Sicilia	39.4	36.6	107.7	
Abruzzo	45.0	42.0	107.1	
Lombardia	53.5	51.4	104.1	
Lazio	46.8	46.5	100.6	
Umbria	47.6	47.3	100.6	
Toscana	48.8	49.1	99.4	Spread among men
Italy	47.0	47.3	99.4	
Puglia	42.1	42.4	99.3	
Trentino-Alto Adige	53.0	54.4	97.4	
Veneto	51.3	54.2	94.6	
Emilia-Romagna	48.5	52.9	91.7	
Piemonte	45.9	52.1	88.1	
Valle d'Aosta	46.6	53.0	87.9	
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	49.2	57.1	86.2	
Liguria	45.3	54.0	83.9	
Marche	41.6	52.4	79.4	
Sardegna	47.6	62.4	76.3	

Source: Personal data processing based on Istat data

For men, rather than women, is it very important to succeed at work?

Wrongly, in Italian society, work for men and women is evaluated in a different way. It is considered as a pillar of their identity and social role for men, and as a need for subsistence for women. Sometimes, however, a specific motivation takes over: men "must" be successful at work not to lose their women's appreciation or even because the loss of prestige could compromise the relationship with them.

The submitted question aims at finding out whether the opinion expressed by the respondents leads to a rooting of the stereotype and whether succeeding at work is considered as an important value by men. Moreover, it helps understand women’s level of disagreement and whether the female interviewees think that men having a leading role in the world of work is a right thing.

As far as the whole country is concerned, the disagreement is predominant among men (51.4%) by about 3 percentage points compared to that of women (48.6%). This male majority is also felt in the age groups, with the exception of the very young people age group (18-29 years), where the belief in the stereotype is more widespread among girls (51.8%) with a difference of 1 percentage point.

Among the age groups of men, the greatest disagreement is found in the adult age groups (45-59 years), where the response rate reaches about 55.0% (Table 13).

As already seen for the other questions, the trend in response rates, for both men and women, follows the increasing trend, starting from the lower to the higher educational level, but in this case, there is a peculiarity concerning women: the response rate given by those having a university degree or diploma decreases (50.2%) compared to that of women with a High School diploma (52.1%) (Table 14).

Table 13 – Age groups

Age groups	Men	Women
	Complete disagreement	Complete disagreement
18-29	50.8	51.8
30-44	49.3	45.0
45-59	54.9	50.4
60-74	49.2	48.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>51.4</i>	<i>48.6</i>

Source: Istat

Table 14 – Educational level

Educational degree	Men	Women
	Complete disagreement	Complete disagreement
Elementary/no degree	31.6	39.3
Junior High School	50.8	47.0
High School diploma	53.6	52.1
University degree or diploma	55.2	50.2
<i>Total</i>	<i>51.4</i>	<i>48.6</i>

Source: Istat

The series of the masculinity ratio of the Italian regions in descending order shows that in 14 regions this ratio is greater than 100 (Table 15).

Table 15 – Stereotype spread among men and women

Regions	Men	Woman	Masculinity ratio	Stereotype spread
	Complete disagreement	Complete disagreement		
Abruzzo	56,6	45,0	125,8	
Piemonte	56,5	46,1	122,6	
Lombardia	51,6	46,7	110,5	
Valle d'Aosta	63,0	57,1	110,3	
Lazio	50,8	46,4	109,5	
Emilia-Romagna	55,8	51,7	107,9	
Marche	60,5	56,5	107,1	
Sardegna	59,1	55,3	106,9	Spread among men
Sicilia	46,0	43,1	106,7	
Veneto	55,4	52,1	106,3	
Italy	51,4	48,6	105,8	
Umbria	53,2	51,1	104,1	
Trentino-Alto Adige	53,6	51,8	103,5	
Friuli-Venezia Giulia	51,8	50,9	101,8	
Puglia	50,0	49,5	101,0	
Toscana	54,2	56,8	95,4	Spread among women
Liguria	48,0	50,4	95,2	
Campania	40,8	43,2	94,4	
Calabria	48,9	52,3	93,5	
Basilicata	44,6	52,6	84,8	
Molise	43,7	52,9	82,6	

Source: Personal data processing based on Istat data

The gap is very marked in Abruzzo (125.8%) and Piemonte (122.6%), where the masculinity ratio exceeds 120.0%.

In the other 6 regions, however, this belief is more widespread among women than men and the ratio of masculinity is less than 100. Again, there is a marked gap in Basilicata (84.8%) and Molise (82.6%).

The regions where stereotypes are more deeply rooted among men

In this regard, to have a homogeneous classification of the regions under observation, referring to men only and through cluster analysis, regions were grouped according to the indicator "complete disagreement" concerning the five questions included in the Istat survey, thus obtaining five clusters (Table 16).

From the analysis of the clusters, as far as men are concerned, the regions where stereotypes are less widespread belong to cluster 3 – (Lombardia, Veneto, Piemonte, Toscana and Lazio), where average values higher than the other groups and the Italian one are found in the following

questions: “Under conditions of labor shortage, should employers give priority to men over women?” (76.2%), “Is it man who must make the most important decisions concerning the family?” (79.8%) and “Are men less suited to housework?” (49.3%) and cluster 2 – (Valle d'Aosta, Sardegna and Marche) with answers to the following two questions: “Is it above all man who must provide for the economic needs of the family?” (58.2%) and “For men, rather than for women, is it very important to be successful at work?” (60.9%). It is not superfluous to point out that the rejection of the stereotypes under consideration comes from men concentrated in the North-Central regions of our country with the sole exception of Sardegna.

On the other hand, there are regions where stereotypes about the role of both sexes are more concentrated among men. As many as four questions have been answered with an average value level lower both to the other groups and to the national one by the members of the regions inserted in the cluster 4 (Campania, Basilicata, Molise, Sicilia, Calabria and Puglia), that is “Under conditions of labor shortage, should employers - give priority to men over women?” (59.2%), “Is it man who must make the most important decisions concerning the family?” (67.2%), “Are men less suited to housework?” (40.8%) and “For men, rather than for women, is it very important to be successful at work?” (45.7%). On the contrary, in the region inserted in cluster 5 (Abruzzo) men are less convinced that “Is it above all man who must provide for the economic needs of the family?”, as the percentage is very low (30.5%).

Table 16 – Average values per cluster – Men

Stereotype	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4	Cluster 5	Italy
1) Under conditions of labor shortage, should employers give priority to men over women?	72.7	74.1	76.2	59.2	64.6	70.4
2) Is it above all man who must provide for the economic needs of the family?	49.9	58.2	57.4	41.0	30.5	50.9
3) Is it man who must make the most important decisions concerning the family?	75.2	79.3	79.8	67.2	71.7	75.4
4) Are men less suited to housework?	48.7	45.3	49.3	40.8	45.0	47.0
5) For men, rather than for women, is it very important to be successful at work?	52.5	60.9	53.7	45.7	56.6	51.4
Regions' total	5	3	5	6	1	20

Considering this aspect, it is easy to verify that the acceptance of the stereotypes under consideration comes from men concentrated all in the South of Italy.

The regions where stereotypes are more deeply rooted among women

Referring only to women, the cluster analysis identifies four groups of regions that are homogeneous within them and based on the "complete disagreement" indicator concerning the five questions included in the Istat survey (Table 17).

Examining the groups, the regions where stereotypes are less widespread belong to cluster 4 - Piemonte, Lombardia, Friuli Venezia-Giulia, Liguria, Veneto, Toscana and Sardegna, where average values, higher than in the other groups and in the Italian one, are found in the following questions: *"Under conditions of labor shortage, should employers give priority to men over women?"* (77.0%), *"Is it above all man who must provide for the economic needs of the family?"* (64.4%), *"Is it man who must make the most important decisions concerning the family?"* (88.9%) and *"Are men are less suited to housework?"* (54.3%) – and cluster 3 - Umbria, Lazio, Trentino-Alto Adige, Emilia-Romagna, Valle d'Aosta and Marche, as for question: *"For men, rather than women, is it very important to be successful at work?"* (52.4%). Also for the female sex, the geographic situation is similar to men's one. The refusal to the stereotypes under consideration comes from women belonging to the Centre-North regions of our country, always with the sole exception of Sardegna.

On the other hand, the regions in which the rooting of stereotypes is most widespread among women are included in cluster 2 (Abruzzo, Sicilia and Campania). Also in this cluster four questions have been answered with a lower average value level than both the other groups and the national one, that is: *"Is it above all man who must provide for the economic needs of the family?"* (43.1%), *"Is it man who has to make the most important decisions concerning the family?"* (71.7%), *"Are men less suited to housework?"* (37.5%) and *"For men, rather than for women, is it very important to be successful at work?"* (43.8%), while in cluster 1 (Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria and Molise) it is widely believed, among women, that *"Under conditions of labor shortage, should employers give priority to men over women?"* (58.9%). The geographical situation does not change: the rooting of stereotypes, even for women, is widespread among those belonging to the South of Italy.

Table 17 – Average values per cluster - Women

<i>Stereotype</i>	<i>Cluster 1</i>	<i>Cluster 2</i>	<i>Cluster 3</i>	<i>Cluster 4</i>	<i>Italy</i>
<i>1) Under conditions of labor shortage, should employers give priority to men over women?</i>	58.9	59.1	72.5	77.0	70.5
<i>2) Is it above all man who must provide for the economic needs of the family?</i>	51.1	43.1	59.3	64.4	57.1
<i>3) Is it man who must make the most important decisions concerning the family?</i>	78.6	71.7	84.2	88.9	82.9
<i>4) Are men less suited to housework?</i>	37.8	37.5	51.1	54.3	47.3
<i>5) For men, rather than for women, is it very important to be successful at work?</i>	51.8	43.8	52.4	51.2	48.6
<i>Regions' total</i>	4	3	6	7	20

The regions where stereotypes are more deeply rooted among both sexes

Every comment seems superfluous. Starting from the classification, with a clear distinction between men and women of the regions in clusters, Italy appears divided into two parts. People of the Central-North regions reject any kind of stereotype in a decisive way, while in the South stereotypes are very rooted. The cluster analysis of both sexes, of course, confirms this orientation.

In Table 18, which shows the average values per cluster, it is evident the increasing progression that these values undergo passing from cluster 1 to cluster 3. This means that in cluster 1 (Puglia, Calabria, Molise, Basilicata, Sicilia, Campania and Abruzzo) there are only southern regions that present a wide spread of stereotypes, while in cluster 3 (Piemonte, Toscana, Lombardia, Veneto and Sardegna) there are regions where the phenomenon is very limited.

Table 18 – Average values per cluster – Men and Women

<i>Stereotype</i>	<i>Cluster 1</i>	<i>Cluster 2</i>	<i>Cluster 3</i>
<i>1) Under conditions of labor shortage, should employers give priority to men over women?</i>	<i>59.4</i>	<i>73.1</i>	<i>77.1</i>
<i>2) Is it above all man who must provide for the economic needs of the family?</i>	<i>43.6</i>	<i>56.7</i>	<i>61.1</i>
<i>3) Is it man who must make the most important decisions concerning the family?</i>	<i>71.8</i>	<i>80.6</i>	<i>85.2</i>
<i>4) Are men less suited to housework?</i>	<i>39.5</i>	<i>49.8</i>	<i>51.7</i>
<i>5) For men, rather than for women, is it very important to be successful at work?</i>	<i>47.8</i>	<i>53.3</i>	<i>53.4</i>
<i>Regions' total</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>5</i>

Conclusion

Stereotypes are beliefs, more or less shared in society, that a group shares with respect to another group, thus creating immutable models that lead to the crystallization of reality. Gender role stereotypes are among the most frequent and approved by a reference society.

What generally emerges from the analysis carried out on the main results of the Istat Survey on traditional gender roles stereotypes is that Italy is practically divided into two. In the Central-North part, according to the answers given to the submitted questions, it is clear that the stereotypes proposed have a very limited effect on the male and female population. On the contrary, the same stereotypes are very rooted in the South.

When the specific questions are analyzed in order to create a ranking of the most rooted stereotypes, and through the average values of the cluster carried out to both sexes (Table 18), what is clear is that: 1) there is a belief that men are less suited than women to housework; 2) for men, rather than women, it is very important to be successful at work; 3) it is above all man who must provide for the economic needs of the family; 4) under conditions of labor shortage, employers should give priority to men over women and finally 5) it is man who must make the most important decisions concerning the family.

As demonstrated here, gender role stereotypes are still present in our society and are also transversal to the two genders. Consequently, also the interventions to be implemented in the labor market must be transversal, aiming at the realization of a humanized vision of work where people and not tasks or roles occupy a central place. A new, inclusive and sustainable sociality is at stake (Sacco G., Sacco P., Zizza A., 2021). The emancipation and economic autonomy of women is, especially in the South, hampered by

cultural factors that persist. Sometimes it is women who want to dedicate themselves only to the family, thus neglecting the possibility of a working career and giving up their free time, so as not to "betray" the behaviours and stereotypes acquired in the family of origin.

Fortunately, as previously shown, younger generations with a higher level of education want a more socially active life and a less widespread adherence to stereotypes. This poor adherence to stereotypes has been possible thanks to gender education. Messages sent to young people especially through schools are starting to hit the mark. This is the reason why stereotypes are less common among young people with a high level of education.

It is a cultural revolution. A civilized and democratic country strives for a more just and balanced society, and as such, it must involve all men and women. Women should work in better conditions. Motherhood should not be considered as an obstacle to work, but compatible to working life. Housework should not be done exclusively by women, but by men as well, thus creating a balanced occupation on equal terms. A more equitable division of domestic work should include better support measures for the family, like the provision of childcare services and the promotion of corporate welfare systems for female workers. The increasing feminization of the labor force requires greater flexibility in the labor market, less uncoordinated working time and social time with care systems that in the future must make up for the change that has already occurred in the family scenario (Sacco G. 1995).

Despite the fact that great progress has been made towards gender equality, in order to give priority to educational and training forms that help bridge the gap, it is therefore essential a change of mentality that abandons the still persistent gender role stereotypes.

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ESJ Humanities

The Violation of Human Rights in Latin America Derived from the Covid-19 Pandemic Administration

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Abstract

There is no doubt at this stage of the solid evolving global relevance of universal human rights in a complex global scenario like everyone faces today. The COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns have produced, and are still causing, an overwhelmingly negative impact on the standard citizens' lives. As drastic as it is, such affirmation is sustained in the serious deterioration in a considerable number of democracies around the world, but especially reflected in Latin America, a region of six hundred (600) million inhabitants (Werthein & Abrantes, 2021). This research aims to assess the scope of the violation of individuals' basic human rights caused by the COVID-19 pandemic administration in Latin American countries. Unreasonably extended lockdowns and other misleading and inappropriate measures implemented by different Latin American administrations have had unsurmountable and dramatic consequences for the region's inhabitants. Many Latin American governments have inadvertently put in place two (2) excluding options for their populations affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. It had to be either healthcare and fight against COVID-19, on the one side, or economic sustainability, on the other, but not the two (2) simultaneously. Losses of thousands of lives, economic devastation, thousands of business shutdowns, millions of job losses, and educational catastrophes have all affected essential freedoms and individuals' basic universal human rights recognized by modern constitutions, including those in Latin America. As discussed, these are the resulting consequences of governments' failure to build up necessary resources, be readily prepared to face catastrophes of this

sort, and act with integrity and transparency in managing public funds. Both quantitative (i.e. numbers and statistics) and qualitative (i.e., secondary data) methodologies have been used to arrive at very relevant conclusions. Sustainable results of this research reflect how mismanagement of the pandemic, including corruption practices by certain Latin American governments, has led to catastrophic consequences in healthcare and the economic field.

Keywords: Human rights, violation, Latin America, pandemic, corruption

Introduction

Since the end of 2019, the world has faced an unexpected and tremendous never-ending nightmare. The eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic has caused a severe and devastating impact on the different countries around the globe. In quite relevant geographic areas, including Latin America, the detrimental consequences of the pandemic, and especially of the unreasonably extended lockdowns and other mismanagement actions, are visibly reflected in a deterioration of democracies, the transformation of democracies into autocracies, as well as violations of basic universal human rights (Beteta, 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic tests societies of the world's most unequal continent, where many depend on informal work for their livelihood. Social distancing measures directly affect their livelihoods and make immediate social assistance imperative. The crisis also challenges political leadership, as some presidents emerge as strong, unifying leaders while others face complex difficulties in a continent where trust in formal political institutions is historically low. Today, it is absolutely clear that the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the lives of millions of people. They were compelled to change their lives, as the interaction between human beings has been disrupted. The state of enormous uncertainty has been dominating people's lives.

The present article will focus on Latin America, where the adverse effects of never-ending lockdowns and other misleading actions have had catastrophic effects on the rule of law, and specifically on the principle of the supremacy of the constitutions, which are considered to be, in this part of the world, the fundamental law of the State. Many democratic governments have taken undue advantage of the pandemic outbreak by purportedly and illegally stepping into infringement and violations of individual rights and guarantees widely recognized by those constitutions. In the case of non-democratic governments (i.e., Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela), human rights violations have even been aggravated. Either because those lockdowns and other restrictive actions have largely overextended in time and have resulted in undue severity (they should be known as non-intelligent lockdowns), or because the different

governments have only taken an insufficient reactive rather than a proactive approach to face the lack of vaccines, hospital and medical infrastructure and materials, the result was an apparent and devastating deterioration of democratic institutions in the Latin American region.

It is essential to review the basic universal human rights recognized by western-style constitutions in Latin American countries. Identifying those rights is crucial to portray the dimension of those infringements and violations by legitimate and non-legitimate governments. That is to say, those political authorities who have been appointed to public office through free elections and those who have not have, for various reasons, a legitimate standing. It is true that under international human rights law, States can limit the exercise of most human rights if it is necessary to protect the rights of others or collective interests. However, it is necessary to thoroughly assess the seriousness and extent of those restrictions and the length of time they have been in place. This is to determine whether or not they have legal and practical sustainability, considering that human rights have a supreme value and priority. A critical response to this dilemma is that government actions should not have disproportionately harmed common citizens' interests, such as recognizing and protecting human rights (Lebret, 2020).

It is true that the institutional and economic performance of democratic governments, especially in Latin America, has been disappointing and frustrating for a very long period of time (Fukuyama, 2015). If someone couples the failure of citizens' expectations with the governments' mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic and the unreasonably extended lockdowns, the rise of protest demonstrations should not be taken as a mere surprise by anyone. This is not, in any way, a justification for such disrupting demonstrations. Still, it is only conscious reasoning to understand why citizens step out and protest in situations when their fundamental universal human rights have been flagrantly infringed or violated. The capacity of the States in Latin America has not followed the necessary pace to meet citizens' demands in a pandemic scenario. Such failure has been obvious, namely, there were not enough hospital and medical supplies and infrastructure and insufficient medical staff to satisfy the overwhelming demands of infected patients, among other very serious gaps and deficiencies. More importantly, healthcare workers heavily exposed to infections have not and are not having adequate and reasonable access to personal protective equipment, safety procedures, and diagnostic protocols necessary for safe working conditions (Delgado, Wyss Quintana, Perez, Sosa Liprandi, Ponte-Negretti, Mendoza & Baranchuk, 2020). In addition, there has been a lack of enough vaccines necessary to reduce the number of infections, and, therefore, the number of casualties has strongly increased. Non-compliance with vaccine programs has

unfairly assigned vaccines to government officials' family members and political parties' active members, constituting flagrant corruption practices.

According to Our World in Data publications, Latin America is losing the fight against COVID-19, and human rights enforcement is in real danger. When measuring the number of casualties as a percentage of the total population, 9 out of 10 countries in the region are at the top of this slot. Vaccination campaigns have appeared to be very slow and chaotic, and therefore, they have not been successful in stopping the virus circulation among the population. Notwithstanding the extended-lasting lockdowns and human rights restrictions imposed by governments in the region, the number of casualties in the region in terms of population is still the highest. Numbers appear to be overwhelming in all sectors, as will now be reflected. A recent United Nations (UN) report has reflected that in 2020, an additional twenty-two (22) million people in the Latin American region will be plunged into poverty. In addition, nearly sixty (60) million people fell out of the middle class. According to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the population of Latin America represents less than nine percent (9%) of the world's population and has suffered over a quarter of the world's casualties due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The post-pandemic era certainly presents a historic opportunity for the region to launch a truly transformative agenda. However, there is still a long road ahead to repair the health and economic damages that the pandemic has caused and is still causing.

Methodology

This research aims to analyze the impact of the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic on human rights in Latin America, which has resulted in serious violations in several areas. It has first been necessary to give an overview of the Latin American context after having suffered the consequences of the pandemic on the political, healthcare, and economic fronts. In addition, the research has been designed to establish a cause-and-effect relationship which, in this case, is reflected in the mismanagement of the pandemic by several Latin American governments and its negative consequences on basic universal human rights, deriving in their violation and restriction.

Qualitative and quantitative data have been used and collected from relevant books, websites, and other publications. In terms of qualitative data, secondary data has been used to support results and conclusions. Such data provides evidence of flagrant violations and restrictions of human rights in Latin America as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. As far as quantitative data is concerned, tables and figures related to the number of casualties, lockdown index, the impact of lockdown index on the gross domestic product (GDP), stringency index, the share of vaccinated population, and violation of

democratic standard index, clearly reflect how human rights in Latin America were violated and restricted. In this sense, it has been considered that there was a need to look at both quantitative and qualitative data to gather evidence on the cause-and-effect relationship that has been established, namely, that the mismanagement in the fight against the pandemic in certain countries in Latin America has caused devastating effects on the economy, healthcare, education levels, and governments' institutions, with infringement and violations of fundamental human rights.


The research design and its aim also had ethical and philosophical considerations. How has this been reflected? Corruption practices and violations of integrity principles and standards have also been taken into account to assess whether or not a violation of ethical conduct by Latin American governments has been common in the mismanagement of the pandemic and has played a key role in the violation of human rights. Even though the World Health Organization made an international and overwhelming call for fair, transparent, and equitable access to vaccines and treatments, in Latin American countries, there has been and still is extreme pressure on governments to secure vaccines for the population. Why? Corruptive practices have threatened and are still threatening massive access to vaccines, as there has been an evident lack of transparency in the development, procurement, supply, and distribution processes, which have had a very negative effect on the different pre-established vaccination programs (i.e., Argentina).

Abstract concepts, such as violation of democratic standards and restriction of rights caused by the governments' mismanagement of the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic and the fear of contracting the virus, cannot be easily measured. Millions have lost their jobs, thousands of businesses were closed, students were restricted from having regular classes (there is a considerable number of Latin American families who cannot afford a laptop or other technological resources), circulation has been limited or banned, and other violations of basic universal human rights have occurred. Latin American governments' mismanagement actions have exacerbated the pandemic's psychological and healthcare negative effects. Those abstract concepts have been turned in this research into measurable observations making good use of operationalization. Operationalization has been used to reduce subjectivity and increase the reliability of the data that has been collected. A good sample of this operationalization is the magnitude of the violation of democratic standards and the extent of the stringencies imposed during the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic in Latin America.

Results

The information included in this section is focused on reflecting comparative data of Latin America and other geographical regions, among other types of data. Results do not respond to any particular questionnaire but constitute random indicators that strongly impact human rights violations/restrictions in different aspects, as shown below.

Table 1. COVID-19 pandemic number of casualties per million inhabitants




Source: Worldometer June 30, 2021 Report

Results: Latin America (South America and Central America)
COVID-19 deaths per million inhabitants: 2263

Despite high ELIs (as defined below) in Latin America, the casualties ratio per million inhabitants shows that Latin America has been hit more than the European Union & UK, South Asia, Countries Non-Members of the European Union, Middle East, Russia & Central Asia, Oceania & Islands in East Asia, North Africa, East Asia, and the Caribbean. Such ratios are worse than all of those in all regions shown in **Table 1** above:


Figure 1



Source: Oxford University, Google, Apple, Wind, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. 2020. The “Effective Lockdown Index (ELI)” provides equal weight to a “virus policy” measure—an adjusted version of the Oxford index—and a “social distancing” measure—a summary of the Google data

Results: The ELI for Latin America is higher than the Global ELI in China and North America and lower than in Western Europe. Despite this, the number of casualties per million inhabitants in Latin America is higher than Western Europe, the UK, and North America.

Figure 2: Impact of ELI on Gross Domestic Product (GDP)




Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research

Results: There is a direct relationship between a high ELI and a high GDP fall. Comparing Figures 1 and 2, the former shows that the ELI in Latin America is higher in a given period of time compared to ELI Global, ELI North America, and China. A high ELI has caused Latin America to have the highest GDP fall compared to other geographical regions such as North America, China, Western Europe, and the Asia Pacific.

Figure 3a: Stringency Index March 15, 2020, published July 29, 2021, showing Latin America Source: Our World in Data

COVID-19: Stringency Index

This is a composite measure based on nine response indicators including school closures, workplace closures, and travel bans, rescaled to a value from 0 to 100 (100 = strictest). If policies vary at the subnational level, the index is shown as the response level of the strictest sub-region.




Source: Hale, Angrist, Goldszmidt, Kira, Petherick, Phillips, Webster, Cameron-Blake, Hallas, Majumdar, and Tatlow (2021). "A global panel database of pandemic policies (Oxford COVID-19 Government ResponseTracker)." *Nature Human Behaviour*. – Last updated 29 July 2021, 09:50 (London time)
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Source: Our World in Data

Figure 3b: Stringency Index March 16, 2021, published on July 29, 2021, showing Latin America

COVID-19: Stringency Index

This is a composite measure based on nine response indicators including school closures, workplace closures, and travel bans, rescaled to a value from 0 to 100 (100 = strictest). If policies vary at the subnational level, the index is shown as the response level of the strictest sub-region.




Source: Hale, Angrist, Goldszmidt, Kira, Petherick, Phillips, Webster, Cameron-Blake, Hallas, Majumdar, and Tatlow (2021). "A global panel database of pandemic policies (Oxford COVID-19 Government ResponseTracker)." *Nature Human Behaviour*. – Last updated 29 July 2021, 09:50 (London time)
OurWorldInData.org/coronavirus • CC BY

Source: Our World in Data

Results: The nine metrics used to calculate the Stringency Index are: school closures; workplace closures; cancellation of public events; restrictions on public gatherings; closures of public transport; stay-at-home requirements; general information campaigns; restrictions on internal movements; and international travel controls. Comparing Figures 3a and 3b shows the Stringency Index on March 15, 2020 (average 30) and March 16, 2021 (average 60) in Latin America, there is a significant deterioration of the fundamental universal human rights and freedoms in this region

Table 2: Transparency Perception Index 2020 (published in 2021) vs. Transparency Perception Index 2018 (published in 2019)




Source: Transparency International

Results: The Transparency/Corruption Perception Index elaborated by Transparency International in 2020 shows that the Americas (including Latin America) is a geographical region where transparency is seen as lower than that in the European Union and Western Union, and the Asia Pacific Region. When comparing Transparency Perception Index 2018 with that of 2020, there is a deterioration in the Americas (44 vs. 43,) and the highlights of such weakening in the index can be attributed to corrupt practices during the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis going through investigations of corrupt contracts, embezzlement, and inflated pricing of medical supplies like face masks and body bags in many Latin American countries.

Figure 4: Share of the Population fully vaccinated against COVID-19

Share of the population fully vaccinated against COVID-19

Share of the total population that have received all doses prescribed by the vaccination protocol. This data is only available for countries which report the breakdown of doses administered by first and second doses.




Source: Official data collated by Our World in Data – Last updated 1 June, 10:30 (London time)

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Source: Our World in Data


Results: Latin America is one of the geographical regions where only 10-15% average population has received all doses of prescribed vaccines. This is a meager percentage compared to North America (40% average), Europe (30% average), and Asia (20% average)

Figure 5a: Pandemic Violations of Democratic Standards Index (June 2021)



Source: V-Dem Institute

Figure 5b: Pandemic Violations of Democratic Standards Index (March to December 2020)



Source: V-Dem Institute

Results: The Pandemic Democratic Violations Index measures the following violations: (i) No time limit on emergency measures; (ii) Discriminatory measures; (iii) Derogations from non-derogable rights; (iv) Restrictions on media freedoms; (v) Disproportionate limitations on the role of the legislature and (vi) Abusive enforcement. When comparing Figures 5a and 5b, the

number, and seriousness of the violations, there has been a solid increase and aggravation of all types of democratic violations after comparing periods of the COVID-19 pandemic ranging from March through December 2020 versus that ending in June 2021.

Discussion

For this research, it is essential to identify the so-called basic universal human rights. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, these are rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status. Human rights include the right to life and liberty, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to work and education (as a considerable number of Latin American families cannot afford a laptop or other technological tools to have access to online education), and the right of circulation, among others. Everyone is entitled to these rights without discrimination, and even tourists, when entering a country, are allowed the right of circulation (Dordyak, 2017). The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which entered into force in 1976, seeks to promote and protect the right to work in fair and favorable conditions; the right to social protection, an adequate standard of living, and the highest attainable standards of physical and mental well-being; the right to education and the enjoyment of benefits of cultural freedom and scientific progress. The use of qualitative and quantitative methodologies in this research has arrived at valuable findings. As a consequence of certain Latin American governments' mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic, regional GDPs plunged, social protection levels as well as citizens' standards of living dramatically deteriorated, and the right to work, educate, and receive education (on-site and online education) were severely affected. The right to work has been associated with the right to have a life, as having a job provides human dignity (Kaya & Yilmazer, 2019). However, millions of jobs were lost, and thousands of businesses suffered shutdowns.

Amnesty International has supported the idea that violations of human rights usually do not contribute to facilitating adequate responses to emergencies in the public health area, undermining their efficiency (Amnesty International, 2020a). The World Health Organization also requested countries to ensure that the measures taken to fight the COVID-19 pandemic should not negatively affect human rights. Most modern constitutions or fundamental national laws, including those in force in Latin American countries, recognize the protection and guarantee of basic human rights. Human rights are characterized as universal entitlements applicable to all individuals. They are solely focused on preserving and defending human

dignity. States must protect, promote and enforce human rights (Sikkink, 2014). Such traditional human rights can be identified as economic, social, and cultural rights, including the right to health, education, fair remuneration, to enjoy cultural leisure, social security benefits, and the right to secure food, shelter, the right to circulate within and outside the countries' geographic boundaries, the right to receive and give education, the right to do lawful business, among other fundamental rights (May 2021). In accordance with international law, the right to life cannot be suspended even in emergency circumstances (Queensland Human Rights Commission, 2019). No doubt that the right to health care guarantees the right to life because it is closely related to human life. States are obliged to take action to prevent threats to public health and to provide medical care to those who need it. Indeed, in Latin America and even in developed economies, the COVID-19 pandemic has reflected strong deficiencies in healthcare systems and health inequities characterized in many cases by shortages of medical materials and equipment (Kalra, 2020). Also, some countries suffered a collapse in the health system and poor quality of medical facilities, which especially affected low-income sectors of the Latin American population (Bambra, Riordan, Ford, Matthews, 2020).

Sanitary, economic, social, and political conflicts are strongly disturbing the life of inhabitants in Latin American geography today. In many cases, these conflicts existed even before the COVID-19 pandemic. Still, nobody can doubt at this stage that the consequences of such a pandemic have exacerbated problems and have turned on a red light for societies that are suffering the emerging negative effects observed today. These are the conclusive findings drawn out from the quantitative and qualitative research methodologies that have been used and clearly support such affirmations. There is a direct relationship between democracies and the respect for human rights, which are even strongly reinforced in such a recognized system of government (Tak, 2019). The context is extremely challenging for both Latin American democracies and autocratic regimes in place today. It is well known that Latin America is the world's most unequal continent, where a relevant portion of the population depends on normal work for their own livelihood (Lacase, 2021).

The COVID-19 pandemic has truly represented a strong challenge to political leadership in Latin America, where institutions are historically weak and do not enjoy the trust of the population (Acacio & Passos, 2020). Some Latin American leaders have increased their political power violating the principle of the division of powers to face the crisis of the pandemic. From Argentina in South America to El Salvador and Nicaragua in Central America, the current administrations in those countries have used the COVID-19 pandemic to incur different types of abuses of power, restricting and/or

deleting key human rights, with the sole intention of having no opposition parties in the political arena (Larrosa, 2020). In addition, in a worldwide rank reported by the World Health Organization, Peru is first with the highest number of casualties (5,915) per million inhabitants, Brazil is ninth with two thousand seven hundred and four (2,704) casualties, and Argentina is eleventh in the ranking with two thousand four hundred and forty-three (2,443) casualties per million inhabitants. Lockdown has been implemented as a way to reduce the spread and the potential contagion. These countries enjoy democratic governments which have emerged from free elections. Moreover, corruption is a serious threat to individuals' lives and established lifestyles, particularly when a health emergency such as the COVID-19 breaks out (Kos, Richard & Wasserstrom, 2020).

It is relevant to realize that transparent government administrations bring higher investments in healthcare and offer strong epidemiological surveillance mechanisms, which are key to fighting a pandemic and preserving human lives as much as possible (Layachi, 2020). Transparency International has referred to the COVID-19 pandemic not only as just a health and economic crisis but also as a corruption crisis, in the sense that those government administrations with higher levels of corruption have been in a highly weaker position to face the pandemic challenges. Undoubtedly, corruption has a severe impact on the Latin American States' ability to cope with their obligations to guarantee compliance with several universal human rights in a pandemic situation.

Unfortunately, this is the context in a great number of Latin American countries. Priority has been given to purchasing testing kits, medicines, patients' protective equipment, ventilators, unique beds, and other relevant medical devices, and that was the right thing to do because there were scarce existing supplies of this kind at the time the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. However, despite the urgency with which those supplies were required, the truth was that the purchasing processes had been characterized, in many cases, by an evident lack of transparency. According to Transparency International, direct purchasing mechanisms were used without complying with standard regular bidding processes, which were reflected in illegal and corrupt practices. In Colombia, such practices became a common standard. Procurement rules were eased, and there was an increase in public servants' discretion in awarding contracts, which generated favoritism, lack of transparency, and corruption. The negative consequences of such discretion have offset any potential benefits in promoting flexibilities in the procurement process for emergency reasons (Gallego, Prem & Vargas, 2021). Criminal and civil charges were brought against a good number of public officials working in procurement areas in Latin American countries (i.e., Argentina) for incurring corruption practices.

In Latin America, the sanitary and economic crises are closely linked. Despite very extended lockdowns, as reflected in quantitative data in the Results section, which have caused large economic devastation, country economies will require several years to recover. There were very high rates of casualties and very poor vaccination campaigns, Chile is an exception to this rule. According to Prensa Internacional magazine, Latin American countries have been very dogmatic when taking steps towards closing their economies. Peru is at the top of the rank, followed by Argentina in second place. In 2020, and just for comparison purposes, while the global gross domestic product (GDP) had a percent (3%) fall, the average GDP decline in the Latin American and Caribbean region was seven percent (7%), with certain countries declining between ten and twelve percent (10-12%). Such is the case with Argentina and Peru. In addition, in 2020, the workforce in Latin America worked 16% fewer hours, almost twice the loss occurred worldwide. After analyzing the key economic indicators in Latin America, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has considered that the recovery of Latin American economies would depend on the path of vaccination and its expansion. Further, in the G-7 meeting, which recently took place in England, the WTO expressed its fears that the steps taken by Latin American governments to provide vaccines to their population were not as fast as they should be. In addition, the WTO desires that developed economies like those of the countries conforming to the G-7 would reach a global agreement to provide developing countries with more extensive access to vaccines. Although countries in the G-7 have initiated the process of a massive donation of vaccines to developing countries, the WTO considered that an extra United States Fifty Billion Dollars (USD 5B) would be needed to accelerate the deployment of vaccine supply. While in Europe, the European Commission took very relevant actions to support short-time work and invested the amount of Euros Thirty-Seven Billion (Euros 37B) in supporting small and medium companies as well as the healthcare sector (Lebret, 2020), this was not clearly the case in Latin America. Subsidies and financial aid from the States were not sufficient for recovery purposes.

Moreover, children of different ages and in every geographic region, especially in Latin America, where school shutdowns have been extended for very long periods of time, have been severely affected by the political, social, and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and, in some cases, by mitigation actions and policies from different government administrations that may advertently or inadvertently have caused, in many instances, more harm than good. Undoubtedly, the negative impact on children will be lifelong, according to the opinion of qualified educational and healthcare experts. It is also apparent at this stage that the harmful effects of the pandemic will not be distributed equally among the world's population. Those severe

consequences are expected to be most damaging for children in the poorest countries, in the most unprotected neighborhoods, and in those children who are already in disadvantaged or more vulnerable situations.

According to reports prepared and submitted by the John Hopkins University, as of 3 December 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had claimed more than one million and four hundred thousand (1,400,000) lives and infected more than sixty-four (64) million people around the world. COVID-19 has strongly impacted people's access to healthcare worldwide. The Save the Children non-governmental organization recently issued a report that surveyed twenty-five thousand (25,000) participants in thirty-seven (37) countries, including several Latin American ones. The conclusion was that ninety percent (90%) of families had severe restrictions to access healthcare services and medicines (Ritz, O'Hare & Burgess, 2020). The pandemic and the inappropriate actions and mismanagement incurred by the governments to fight it have increased structural and societal inequalities. Levels of poverty have increased in Latin America, and traditional educational standards have been set aside. Millions of children ceased to have in-person classes and had no access to electronic and video devices to have online classes. The very negative impact on students' educational standards is evident and will be even more visible in the future.

Faced with an overwhelming crisis, Latin American governments have had, in general, reactive approaches to the pandemic. Except for Chile, which designed and implemented an aggressive vaccine program, there was no other relevant, proactive approach. There is a general belief that extended school shutdowns in Latin America have harmed and are still provoking lasting damage to a full generation. Empty classes are considered a real tragedy with no access to online education due to individuals inability to afford access to technological tools. There were Latin American governments that decided to close schools for an extended period. A common argument sustaining that decision was not focused on students' physical attendance. Namely, parents' circulation and gathering at school entrances and exits could increase COVID-19 circulation. Closures have also impacted working parents' daily routines, as many of them have to work from home to share time with their children. Poverty levels in Latin America have not allowed students to receive online education as they do not have laptops and wi-fi connections available.

On average, thirty-eight percent (38%) of workers in Latin America are employed in the informal economy, many of them without access to health or unemployment insurance. Expecting people living hand-to-mouth to comply with lockdown restrictions is perhaps unrealistic. While government-funded relief helped to alleviate this problem, it was probably insufficient. Implementing a lockdown correctly is critical in reducing its cost, and several

factors may prevent it. Some are particular to individual countries, but a few structural elements common to the region stand out. One is limited government capacity to enforce lockdowns, especially in more remote areas where law enforcement presence is weak. Combined with low trust in government and media, the result was that a certain number of citizens chose to ignore government mandates. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has warned about the need to adopt immediate strategies to face the labor crisis caused by COVID-19, which has led to the loss of at least thirty-four (34) million jobs in Latin America and the Caribbean. The situation could increase inequalities in the region even as early indications of recovery have been observed in recent weeks. Both qualitative and quantitative data in this research have contributed to giving an adequate frame to this Discussion section and supporting the findings outlined in *infra*.

Conclusion

At this stage of the twenty-first (21st) century, there is no doubt that basic universal human rights constitute true, significant, and supreme values in all modern societies. They are required to be fully protected by governments in any case. Findings in the Results section reflect a comparatively high number of casualties, a high Lockdown Index, the negative impact of such Lockdown Index on GDP (they should be known as non-intelligent lockdowns), both unfavorable and negative Transparency Index, an unreasonable strong Stringency Index, a low share of the fully vaccinated population as well as an increasing Pandemic Democratic Violations Index. Such findings reflect that many Latin American administrations have had a reactive versus a proactive and well-planned approach to fight the COVID-19 pandemic. They have incurred severe and serious mismanagement as well as a series of corruptive practices in their intent to fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. Mismanagement and corruption have resulted in an ineffective fight against the pandemic and have led to severe restrictions and violations of basic, essential and universal human rights. As analyzed in this research, those violations have not only negatively impacted citizens' lives (i.e., thousands of casualties, insufficient access to vaccines, no access to education, massive loss of jobs, business shutdowns, lack of medical infrastructure and supplies) but also on democratic institutions, converting some democracies into new real autocracies where lack of transparency and corruption practices have been and currently are common standards.

Undoubtedly, Latin American governments' actions reflect that, in general, they are not prepared, in any case, to face huge challenges brought by a pandemic and any other natural catastrophes. Improvement of all types of infrastructure, including healthcare, care centers personnel training, new

vaccine manufacturing, and distribution facilities, and pharmaceutical and medical device research centers are only a few examples of the actions that should be taken. Benchmarking with world-class practices and process excellence are two of the tools recommended to be considered in the short and long term for improvement purposes. The challenges that Latin American governments face during the post-pandemic era are huge. They should be prepared to reinvent themselves, thinking about planning and designing appropriate and effective policies to protect basic essential human rights and avoid further and more severe economic and social devastation.

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<https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus>
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<https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/corruption/design>
31. https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/#main_table BY PETER
<https://www.wto.org>



ESJ Humanities

A Global Perspective on the Role of Faith and Spirituality in a Post-COVID-19 National and Community Recovery: The Nigeria Case of the Pandemic

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Abstract

This paper focuses on contributing to the ongoing discourse regarding the global perspectives on the role of faith and spirituality in a post-COVID-19 national and community recovery with reference to the pandemic in Nigeria. The year 2020 saw a lot of faith organisations like churches introduce and apply new initiatives of spirituality-based elements in helping people to recover from the pandemic. These elements are embodied in their programs and fellowships to their members and the general society. A vast majority of the members acknowledge a reliance on God for solutions against mental, emotional, physical, material, and financial challenges caused by the pandemic. An analytical methodology through the Integrated Critical Analysis method was used with data collected from available literature as tools of research for this study. The research findings of this study show that the value and benefit of faith includes its efficacy on the behaviours and attitude displayed in the engagement or non-engagement of people. This is to the extent of the people's faith, religious and spiritual beliefs, along with the support that they find in their being members of faith communities. Although people may have at one time or the other had negative experiences in the past, however, studies show that faith and spirituality plays a significant role in preventing further negative effects and risk in the recovery process. The study concludes that the value that spirituality and faith-oriented approaches bring

to the prevention and recovery process is a necessity.

Keywords: Global Perspective, Faith, Religion, Spirituality, Pandemic, COVID-19

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to reflect on the role of faith and spirituality to national and community recovery in a post-COVID-19 Nigerian society. This contribution is offered from a Christian perspective. As many countries in the world are confronted with the surge of the coronavirus disease 2019 [COVID-19] pandemic, Nigeria certainly has its own share amid the global crisis since the first recorded case on the African continent in Egypt on the 14th February 2020 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2020). This Egypt incident is subsequent to the first reported human case of the disease by officials in Wuhan City, China, in December 2019 caused by the novel coronavirus causing COVID-19, later named SARS-CoV-2 (World Health Organisation [WHO], 2020). This is so even though there is uncertainty about the full scope of the pandemic cases and data which are underreported and uncertain, thereby prompting the WHO to warn that Africa could become the next epicentre of the crisis (OECD, 2020). Like all other countries in the world, there are life-saving spiritual and faith initiatives and interventions that need to be applied as essential components of rescue and recovery from the pandemic in Nigeria.

The central argument of this paper is that faith and spirituality is an integral part to solving health, economic, and social needs. While faith and spirituality are often useful at a personal level, the paper explores the research question: Is faith and spirituality capable of playing a significant role in a post-COVID-19 national and community recovery in Nigeria? With this important research question, it is argued that faith and spirituality are a powerful, indispensable, and integral necessary resource for the prevention and recovery from the distress and frustration caused by the pandemic. The paper sought to understand the contributions along with the intricacies and challenges surrounding the involvement of faith and spirituality in the system. It seeks to translate the role played by leaders of Christian communities to what they can assume in the process of national and community recovery in a post-COVID-19 environment.

An overview of the socio-economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic was presented along with the analysis of the contributions of Christian churches in preventing the spread and economic effects of the pandemic and helping in the recovery from it. Moreover, it is necessary to state that although the emergence of the COVID-19 has raised the consciousness of Christians to the importance of faith community and spirituality, the research on how

different Christian communities have responded to COVID-19 in sub-Saharan Africa is still emerging.

Methodology

An analytical method through the Integrative Critical Analysis [ICA] (Gilbert et al., 2018) was used in this study. The ICA focuses mainly on analysing the existing body of literature that is relevant to the study. With this method, existing literature data was collected and utilised from articles, books, websites, twitter, blogs, YouTube videos, and organisational releases, bulletin and reports from churches, government, local and international organisations. Applying the ICA method provided a significant body of secondary data in existing published and unpublished materials or statements by scholars and leading Christian leaders and other relevant materials relating to the state of COVID-19 in Nigeria and churches' response. As Gilbert (2018, p.51) puts it, "An integrative critical analysis of published literature is a process of true discovery; that process is as significant to the total research effort as are the fresh empirical findings and exegetical analysis that typically follow such an analysis of the literature." The ICA method was applied with an Insider-Outsider Perspective in an objective and balanced manner (Nakata, 2015). As a current member of the clergy and a Nigerian who was born and lived in Nigeria until recently, when I moved overseas to research Nigerian Pentecostalism and social engagement, I am well acquainted with the dynamics of social interaction between the church and social life. I am also able to assess the activities of the churches from a distance in view of the emerging global realities occasioned by COVID-19.

Background on the Status of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Nigeria

Nigeria was deeply hit by the spread of the coronavirus and this has resulted in poverty, illnesses, deaths, the decline of economic resources, and lower income for Nigerians (Human Rights Watch, 2021). The cumulative number of confirmed coronavirus cases in Nigeria between 28th February 2020 and 6th April 2021 is about 160,000 (Roser et al., 2020). Thus, the government was faced with the challenging task of managing a health crisis and a weakened economy. The socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria can be seen in the dwindling rate of employment, food insecurity, human development, and other areas of people's livelihoods. Oseni et al. (2020) in the World bank blog reports that "While significant recovery in employment was registered in latest rounds, a high rate of households reported income loss, and many are still moving in and out of work" (para.5). The analysts further state that "economic shocks continue to take a stronghold on Nigerian households as such households reduce food rations in their consumption as a coping mechanism has increased" (para.7).

Before the current COVID-19 crisis, Nigeria scored poorly on response and preventive measures to pandemics by the 2017 WHO's mission report on the Joint External Evaluation of Core Capacities of the International Health Regulations (IHR) on the Federal Republic of Nigeria (WHO, 2017). This underscores the fact that as a country, Nigeria was not prepared for response to the COVID-19 pandemic that rocked the country because of the Nigerian government weak policy response which in itself did not measure up to the huge challenge (Dixit et al., 2020). An example of this lack of preparedness is the Emergency Economic Stimulus Bill 2020 which was passed on the 24th March by the Nigerian House of Representatives (Brooks & Knight, 2020). The bill was passed to support businesses and individual citizens with 50% tax rebates. The bill only focused on relief for the formal business sector as against the informal sector which employs the majority of the workforce in Nigeria. Another example is the announcement of the government in April 2020 on cash transfers of ₦20,000 to vulnerable and poor households registered on the National Social Register. This measure had little or no positive effect as the cash payment only reached a small portion of those registered in the National Social Register. Moreover, other measures like the Central Bank of Nigeria stimulus package of 3 million credit loans to poor families affected by the pandemic did not yield adequate results because the loan is not interest-free and it required collateral which many people are unable to afford (International Monetary Fund, 2021; Dixit et al., 2020). Interestingly, the announcement by the Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs Disaster Management and Social Development to provide food assistance to vulnerable and hungry households in states like Lagos, Ogun, and the Federal Capital Territory did not go far enough. It was marred by corruption, lack of accountability, and transparency which were further made worse by the use of middlemen.

These and many other issues have made it a necessity to look into the role of faith and spirituality as played by faith-based institutions in a COVID-19 national and community recovery in Nigeria. Governments and political leaders in Nigeria do recognize that the federal, state, and local structure and agencies need the collaboration and support of faith organisations in providing adequate logistical resources required in comprehensively and effectively confronting the pandemic in many local communities. Hence, the situation requires the support of faith-based organisations (Hein, 2014; Acker, 2017). Faith-based leaders and organisations are well placed to reach beyond these governmental structures, particularly with their congregations and programs in engaging them and their community in the recovery and restoration process (White et al., 2012). Faith is a personal and social resource that helps people to cope with the struggles of life. Its impact is often made manifest as people congregate and fellowship in their local places of worship and during religious

gatherings. Over time, the involvement of the Nigerian faith-based institutions has complemented the shallow commitments made by the Nigerian government and its agencies.

Faith and Spirituality

The role of faith and spirituality in a society cannot be overemphasized particularly in the context of Nigeria. Faith and spirituality are two vital components that help to bridge the gap between socio-political realities and the economic life of the Nigerian people. Due to inequalities in the economic distribution, most Nigerians have learned to rely on their faith for their daily sustenance.

Faith is defined by the Oxford Living Dictionary as “Strong belief in the doctrines of a religion, based on spiritual conviction rather than proof” (Cross & Livingstone, 2005, p.598). Bishop David Oyedepo states that “faith is an active living force! When it gets into a man, it turns him on, it controls his mentality. Your faith is what determines the events of your life” (Udodiong, 2018, para.2). Oyedepo is one of the leading Christian ministers in Nigeria and the founding Senior Pastor and Presiding Bishop of Living Faith Church, a Pentecostal Megachurch in Nigeria (Cocks, 2021). Bishop Oyedepo adds that “The operation of faith in your life will prove the reality of heaven. Faith is the master key to every man's destiny. It takes faith for anything to work. Therefore, faith is not optional in the Christian race, it is the prerequisite for good reports” (Oyedepo, 2018, para.1). There are two points to note in the above two definitions. Firstly, a person’s faith controls them and determines the events of their life. Secondly, it takes faith for anything to work. These two points reveal the important role that faith plays in motivating and galvanising people amid the COVID-19 debacle in most communities in Nigeria. Most Nigerian Christians share the sentiments expressed by Oyedepo above.

Spirituality is the openness to God or a divine connection to experience inspiration and enlightenment with a sense of meaning and purpose in life. Hodge (2011, p. 22) argues that while spirituality is a “person’s existential relationship with God or the Transcendent... whereas religion is... an expression of the spiritual relationship developed in community”. Transcendent because it goes beyond an ordinary or common experience, belief or thought by that connection into the corporate expression of that connection in the person’s relationship to God and the community through an organized system of faith, religion, beliefs, and practices. Religious beliefs influence the sense of happiness and self-concept of people (Hill & Pargament, 2003; Emmons, 1999).

Global vs Local Faith Communities in Fight against COVID-19

The participation of the faith communities within the global community in the fight against a pandemic is so vital that the World Health Organisation embarked on ensuring an ongoing collaboration and dialogue with religious leaders in response against the COVID-19 outbreak (WHO, 2021). Furthermore, through one of its offices, the World Health Organisation Information Network for Epidemics (EPI-WIN) made available, for online discussions and comments, a draft setting out practical guidelines for members of the faith communities before it was reviewed and finalised in April 2020 (WHO, 2020b). Since then, many organisations, governments, and countries including Nigeria have built upon it by issuing out their own strict public health guidelines and directives via tools like webinars, articles, and other faith-directed resources for religious communities and their leadership. Moreover, faith groups and leaders continue to display unique insights into practical roles to play in this period as people look up to faith teachings to find solace. By so doing, they know that they are consciously and unconsciously building the tenacity to endure the crisis individually and collectively despite their vulnerability.

The role of faith and spirituality has further provided Nigerians with more life changing and lifespan opportunities. The benefits of which the alternative of disregarding its important role can leave society with new sets of ailments like mood disorders, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and other illnesses (Dacher, 2014). More and more experiences in Nigeria show that faith and spirituality in this COVID-19 era is providing the needed healing in people's lives as there is increasing recognition of the importance of spirituality and healing (Orr, 2015). Studies have shown that faith and spirituality have a positive impact on the health and wellbeing of people as they go through their journey of recovery from distressful circumstances, situations, and events that happen in their lives (Koenig, 2012; VanderWeele, 2017; Schoenthaler et al., 2018). In his analysis of religious/spiritual (R/S) beliefs and practices, Koenig (2012) concludes that "people who are more R/S have better mental health and adapt more quickly to health problems compared to those who are less R/S" (p.15). To Koenig, "these possible benefits... impact physical health, affect the risk of disease, and influence response to treatment...a desire to provide high-quality care, and simply common sense, all underscore the need to integrate spirituality into patient care" (p.15). VanderWeele (2017) in his synthesis of religion and health states that "religious participation of various forms is associated with lower rates of depression" (p.4). Furthermore, in one of his summary propositions, VanderWeele declares that "religious participation contributes to physical and mental health, and subjective well-being, through shaping behavior, creating systems of meaning, altering one's outlook on life, building

community and social support, supporting moral beliefs” (p.30). It is therefore not uncommon that people in Nigeria resort to faith, spirituality, and religious beliefs and practices for support.

Many of the faith-based organisations in Nigeria, particularly the megachurches within the Pentecostal strand like the Redeemed Christian Church of God, Daystar Christian Centre, and others had to adapt to the changes that arose from the effect of the virus (Orjinmo, 2020). Daystar Christian Centre (DCC), a Pentecostal church with headquarters based in Lagos, Nigeria is an example of one of the faith-based organisations that have taken the role of contributing and supporting initiatives on responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria despite the unpreparedness of most churches (Osanyintuyi, 2020). For instance, in April 2020 during the pandemic, DCC launched feeding programs and donated critical Personal Protective Equipment as a response to the COVID-19 fallout (Daystarn, 2021). As these charitable networks push on in carrying out their activities, they continue to embark on mobilisation efforts. While also complying with sanitary and social distancing rules, these faith-based organisations and leaders use volunteers along with the provision of financial resources to meet needs in response to the pandemic’s impact. Therefore, the sick, the poor and the vulnerable like the homeless, elderly, disabled, and less privileged people within their sphere of contact in their society were assisted to stay the course of the pandemic.

Leaders of megachurches in Nigeria felt the need to speak out to stir up the faith of not only their members but the Nigerian populace in general. For example, Pastor Enoch Adeboye, the General Overseer of the Redeemed Christian Church of God, predicted that although the disease will not die out completely, the disease will however dissipate, thus encouraging and strengthening the faith of the people to have hope of a brighter future (Ayeni, 2020). Not only that, Adeboye went further to donate 200,000 hand gloves, 8,000 hand sanitisers, and 8,000 surgical masks to the Lagos State government for distribution to affected people in the state (Orjinmo, 2020). This gesture cushioned the devastating effect of the coronavirus pandemic. Furthermore, leaders of Christian communities aided the vulnerable in society who are at higher risk of contracting the disease and being hit with the pandemic’s downturn by helping them to beat hunger through the delivery of groceries. They also put in place certain infrastructure including the provision of online church services and prayer services which were run by many churches including the DCC during the period (Orjinmo, 2020). This step has largely helped to reduce the status quo of in-person gatherings as faith leaders continue to come up with creative and innovative options that stir their faith communities to adapt to the new reality facing them. In carrying out their mission, churches who can afford it have put in place measures to prevent the spread of the coronavirus disease by moving their worship services online.

Thus, they were able to help their members and other members of the society to make sense of the pandemic (Grant et al., 2021).

The COVID-19 pandemic slowed and led to the breakdown of daily activities through lockdowns in Nigeria. This caused hardship and inconvenienced many. The role played by faith and spirituality helped to bridge the gaps that arose from it. This includes steps taken in preventing coronavirus transmission such as tips on how to wash hand with soap and clean water, promotion of sanitation and hygiene practices, etc. These steps were applied by educating and raising awareness through social media and online platforms, television and radio broadcast with jingles, and drama skits in local dialects (WaterAid/Onome Oraka, n.d). Other steps include WHO (2021b) advice to the public such as getting vaccinated, keeping a physical distance of at least one metre from others, avoiding crowds and close contacts, wearing a properly fitted mask, particularly when in poorly ventilated settings and where physical distancing is not possible. After all, Nigeria has had previous experiences of which it had to deal with epidemics like the Ebola pandemic which shook many parts of the African continent more specifically in Nigeria of which an infected airline passenger entered the country on 20th July 2014 (Althaus et al., 2015). Although the said passenger's arrival caused an outbreak, first in the city of Lagos and spreading to the city of Port Harcourt, Nigeria was however later declared Ebola-free on 20th October 2014 after the country reported a total of 20 cases which included 8 deaths (Althaus et al., 2015).

A close look at the history of pandemics, including smallpox, Ebola, HIV/AIDS and others that have rocked the world in the past, show that the intervention of religion, faith, and spirituality factors have been an integral and constant part of the story at every point in time. This is because these factors have played and continue to play important roles in everyday life for the majority of people affected by such crises in Nigeria and the world at large. Applying the lessons and experiences from past pandemics like smallpox, Ebola, SARS, and HIV/AIDS must continue to be the watchword in the role played by religious organisations and spiritual leaders as faith actors in the crisis (Levin, 2020; Mui, 2019; LeDuc & Barry, 2004). For example, as in past outbreaks in which religious engagement was vital, the necessity to enforce and maintain physical distancing becomes a central focus for public health. As a result, the need to adopt and adapt the limiting of religious gatherings becomes obvious for faith and public partnership to work.

Although faith and spirituality are very personal things, particularly with adherents to and in an organised religious group or setting, yet there are those who do not consider themselves religious. Such individuals approach the concept of faith differently and still have a strong sense of spirituality that shapes their lives, the values by which they live and their worldview.

Therefore, faith and spirituality can be very important tools in supporting and helping people with a sense of comfort, community, and belonging in being able to cope with their problems and various issues in times of great distress. In answering the question of how faith and spirituality help with the issues and challenges arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, it must be stated that when dealing with a crisis like this, it is very easy to be afraid, feel alone, and disoriented. However, faith and spirituality can help in easing these feelings by providing individuals with the strong conviction that there is a higher power who will guide them and their wellbeing. It also provides a connection to the community or fellow group of people of faith around them who share similar beliefs as they maintain the hope and reassurance that things will get better and are thus equipped with strength and calmness in expressing themselves. This is important because it is quite beneficial that people are in a position whereby they feel more comfortable in talking with other people who share beliefs of faith and spirituality that are like theirs.

Being able to express and explore one's faith and spirituality is a universal human right of which individuals can express their faith and be part of an organised religious group that may be able to offer help and support in times of crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic. United Nations General Assembly (1949, Article 2) states that: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status". Moreover, the strategic role that religious groups play in helping people find meaning in their lives while also maintaining hope in the face of threats and disruptions from the pandemic becomes more apparently vital. People can seek explanations, get comfort, and have a glimpse of hope from faith and spirituality in the face of their challenges when they are boxed into a position of fear, loneliness, and uncertainty. For instance, Enoch Adeboye, General Overseer of the Redeemed Christian Church of God, in one of his Sunday sermons admonished Christians not to be afraid but rather put their trust in God for His protection during the pandemic because he won't allow calamity on those who trust him (Omoniyi, 2020). He backed this by citing some scriptures including Psalm 91:1 which says: "He that dwells in the secret place of the almighty must abide under the shadow of the almighty" and that dwelling and abiding in God are conditions to enjoying God's blessings in these end times (Omoniyi, 2020).

The successes and failures of the responses of the federal, state, and local governments in Nigeria is largely dependent on the recognition and accommodation of the role that faith and spirituality can play in the shaping of an effective public policy. Ensuring that there is constructive engagement with churches and its leaders in the country will go a long way in mitigating challenges encountered during the COVID-19 pandemic. The role of the faith

and spiritual community is important for many reasons. One reason is that due to their deep knowledge of the local communities and large network of communication, church leaders are helpful and quite influential in the conveying of relevant information in times of crisis like COVID-19. Using their pulpit, voice, organisational structure, media and other tools at their disposal contributes immensely to effectively disseminating public health messages which by necessity are a direct and short way of simply urging people to adhere to government guidelines.

Resources of Faith Communities

Faith and spiritual leaders draw on theological, spiritual, and relatable stories that are interpreted both in context and tradition to convey and educate people in ways that they can comfortably and undoubtedly accept and act upon. Constructive behaviours can be modelled, for example, through respect for quarantine requirements. Furthermore, by facing threats and tension from social isolation, violence, and criminal behaviours amid the pandemic, faith and spiritual leaders can teach and instil in people the inspiration to invoke care and compassion, rather than feeling angry, accusing and condemning others. Studies such as Goodman (2020), Coppola et al. (2020), and Lee et al. (2016) have shown that in times of pandemics, those who are actively involved in a faith community do participate in their faith community as they invest in a prayerful relationship and strong connection with their God. For example, Goodman (2020, para. 1) describes the situation in the following words:

Kay Bajwa, a real estate agent...., spends her time in quarantine praying five times a day and working with members ...to find ways to help the less fortunate during these difficult times. "This whole ordeal is bringing us closer together..." she says. "Spending time praying and being with him is comforting." Bajwa is not alone in turning to her faith to weather life's storms. Religion and belief are now seen by many researchers and clinicians as an important way to cope with trauma and distress thanks to research over the last three decades.

Although the situation described in the above quotation is common to many, it is however arguable that a few may be struggling with their faith during the pandemic (Goodman, 2020). Those who are active, particularly the youth, are less likely to fall prey to continued frustration and distress during the crisis thereby reducing the likelihood of taking excessive alcohol and engaging in other unwarranted negative activities (Lee et al., 2017; Johnson et al., 2016; Johnson et al., 2018). The Pew Research Centre (2021) concludes that "in nearly every country surveyed, those who say religion is very important in their lives are more likely to say both their own faith and that of their compatriots has grown due to the pandemic" (para. 9). It is therefore not

surprising that Moreno and Cardemil (2018) reveal that religious attendance is linked to a lower level of a situation in which depressions, disorders, despondency, and anxieties take hold of such people. This is attributable to the potency of the power of religion on adherents, specifically those who associate with Pentecostal churches in Nigeria.

Challenges Faced by Faith Communities due to COVID-19

It is becoming obvious that while various religious groups in Nigeria are willingly adjusting, others are sometimes grudgingly adjusting to the shocking interruptions that the COVID-19 outbreak brought on almost every facet of normal life. These have caused challenges and obstacles in the way in which churches have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria.

One way to illustrate such a conundrum is the ability of churches to carry out their mission objectives and their social responsibility together with their desire to offer themselves as receptacles of public trust. Even though amongst other things, those who can afford it are streaming their services online as already discussed, however in many cases, these churches became less successful against their wish of executing their social responsibility. This is because many of the arms of these churches including their para-church ministries and institutions were no longer functioning at full capacity or were completely closed to the public as part of the restrictions and lockdown arising from coronavirus diseases (Grant et al., 2021).

Maintaining spiritual and social connections during COVID-19 is another difficulty that faced communities of faith in Nigeria. This lack of connection has affected their religious rites and life, their ability to do charitable work, and their pastoral care and congregation. While on the one hand, these factors can cause pain when religion is left out, on the other hand, they however allow for the generosity and creativity of religious leaders and their members to adapt to the change in circumstances. As people adapt, they are finding new ways to practice their faith and serve members of their communities during such restrictions. One of such ways is dealing with the challenge of the vulnerable groups in society like the bottom poor and the homeless in the society being marginalised and stigmatised with the belief that they are associated, truly or falsely, with the disease. It is quite possible for the faith and spiritual communities to magnify such prejudice or tensions and, on the other hand, counter them. Religious and faith leaders should step up in teaching, pleading, admonishing, and emphasising the need to dispel such prejudice.

Another issue is that of trust which is vital for public health interventions along with tackling the economic and social disruptions that accompany them. Very few people, communities, and their leaders trust the

system as they do not have confidence that the system and implementation of such interventions will work effectively and efficiently without the usual hiccups that take place in governmental services in Nigeria. It is therefore important that the help of religious leaders is sought to play key roles in tackling misinformation and fear as they are in the category of leaders that are often most trusted in the society, though not all the time.

There is also the issue of some spiritual leaders who take things too far in that some of them can sometimes convey inaccurate and sometimes false information and or reasons why an event is happening. An example is a report by Dr. Sanusi Bala, Chairman of the Nigerian Medical Association, who indicated in an April 2020 channels television interview that Kano religious leaders do not believe in coronavirus spread (Channels Television, 2020; Sahara Reporters, 2020). This kind of assertion from such leaders is very dangerous as the influence that such leaders have on their followers is so firm that their followers are immediately prone to believing them, thereby leading to disobedience of public health policies. Moreover, some of the Muslim adherents have voiced out that the whole issue of the pandemic is a conspiracy to prevent Muslims from praying and that there is no such thing as COVID-19 or coronavirus. Other religious leaders have even escalated the distrust and fears of people during the pandemic, particularly by well-known faith leaders. For instance, Pastor Chris Oyakhilome of Christ Embassy caused a major controversy when he alleged that the coronavirus is linked to the 5G technology network which is part of a conspiracy to create a new world order, but was quickly debunked by scientists (Orjinmo, 2020). Oyakhilome's theory was also swiftly quashed by other Nigerian Pentecostal leaders like Sam Adeyemi and Matthew Ashimolowo, Senior Pastors of Daystar Christian Centre and Kingsway International Christian Centre respectively, whose pressure later led to backtracking by Oyakhilome (Adesina, 2020; Egbunike, 2020).

Amid a surging pandemic, other prominent church leaders have agitated for the churches to be fully reopened. One of them is David Oyedepo, the Bishop and Founder of the Living Faith Church, a leading Pentecostal megachurch in Nigeria. He described the shutdown as an attempt at crippling Christianity (DW, 2020). However, in the same vein, others like Pastor Tunde Bakare of the General Overseer of The Citadel Global Community Church, formerly known as Latter Rain Assembly, have chided religious leaders, particularly those that run mega facilities, who have called for prayer houses and places of worship to be reopened. He advocates that such leaders should support and collaborate with governments instead of embarking on criticisms and he went a step further to say that they provide their facilities for use as response centres for dealing with the coronavirus (Bakare, 2020; Olowoyo, 2020; Dw, 2020). While it is understandable that there is frustration amongst

pastors, and various faith leaders who find it difficult to operate during this pandemic, still they have to show an example in displaying patience. Some of the issues these leaders face are the difficulty they have in giving physical in-person spiritual support and guidance to the sick, especially to those who are isolated in their homes or quarantined in hospital facilities as a result of the sickness. Besides, families and community members are unable to have the physical presence of such spiritual leaders when their loved ones die as they are faced with restrictions on rites of mourning their loved ones.

Findings from the Literature

The relevant literature and analysis reveal that faith organisations such as churches in Nigeria are relevant to the COVID-19 period in Nigeria. It can therefore be said that they would be relevant in a post-COVID-19 era. The literature suggests strongly that churches and other faith organisations were actively involved in the life of the nation and, therefore, have a role to play in the national and community recovery. Their role is vitally indispensable to the post-COVID national recovery for the following reasons.

First, churches see themselves as being relevant to the national recovery because they are essential community hubs that are providing a key base for members of the society to get access to refuge and comfort in times of crisis, in this case, the COVID-19 Pandemic. Moreover, they have an even bigger role to play now with the increased need for further resources and support to maximise what can be offered to people and communities at this critical time of recovery in the country.

Secondly, the existing networks provided by these faith-based organisations are vital in helping to restore both communal and individual wellbeing while also helping to build the necessary resilience needed both now and in the future. The problems that individuals and communities experienced when places of worship were closed during the COVID-19 pandemic became apparent as they were denied access to sacred places where they can find respite, feel safe, seek peace and solitude to mourn, pray and deal with their issues. This shows that such places of worship are symbols of long-term survival, for people in their communities, as they are local centres giving care, practical support, and companionship. These places of worship have the potential for providing continuous support, not just a one-off, for people of all faiths as the Nigerian nation engages in the post-COVID national recovery process for not only their members but also non-church members who have been affected by the closure. As hallowed grounds, they must remain open as they are increasingly essential to the community and the activities resulting in the prevention of the negative impacts of increased isolation and needs in a period of difficulty and suffering cutting across all groups of people, socially, economically, and otherwise.

Thirdly, politicians and governmental leaders have expectations as there is increasing recognition by the local, state, and national governments of the immense value and role such faith-based institutions play in being community partners, making available their places of worship, and making contribution to the well-being of the people. The level of the network they provide in helping to reach across a wide range of communities is also a recognisable factor. “No single government, or level of government, can meet the demands of crisis management alone. The COVID-19 crisis, given its scope and magnitude, is challenging all levels of government to reinforce their partnerships...in the short, medium, and long term” (Allain-Dupre et al., 2020, p.75).

Fourthly, prayer being the most prominent response from the church to these sorts of challenges is another finding which shows that churches rightfully think that they are relevant actors in the recovery process. Additionally, during the post-COVID pandemic recovery, churches will continue to be well-positioned in giving people the spiritual support they need and the encouragement to have faith through consistent prayer that things will turn around for good for those who have been greatly impacted by the pandemic financially, economically, and otherwise.

The fifth finding is the fact that there are some damaging effects resulting from the closure of places of worship and restrictions on movement as can be seen from the findings already discussed above. It is essential for every effort to be made in keeping places of worship, including the facilities that go with them, open to support such pandemic emergencies to ensure physical, emotional, mental, social, and spiritual care and wellbeing along with other communal benefits. This will in the immediate and long-term help to deal with the grief and loss of those whose issues could not be supported and resolved in the tick of the pandemic challenges which may take years to heal and return to normality.

Besides all of the above, it is clear that despite the regulations put in place by the government to deal with the COVID-19, churches still managed to look out for opportunities to make their presence felt. This they did through their engagement with people online to provide continuous spiritual support; reducing and, where possible, eliminating the dire consequences of social isolation and loneliness; giving people access to quiet reflection from the comfort of their homes; and various other assistance like contacting the isolated folks. Other ways in which they made their presence felt include providing practical help such as partnering with the government as hubs for vaccination and testing; making available food and other needed supplies like medicine, water, and so on.

Recommendations

Based on the analysis and findings from above, this study hereby recommends the following.

First, churches must not only continue to exercise restraint but must also work to ensure they are trustworthy as they beef up efforts that include not holding meetings and not having gatherings where necessary, as this can contribute to further spread of the virus which has the potential of resurfacing. On the issue of trust, since Christian faith leaders are supposed to be trusted by members of their communities, they are well placed in the position to encourage the people on positive behavioural changes on issues like adjusting to habitual mask-wearing, maintaining physical or social distancing, and so on. Therefore, the “Government can leverage the trust, reach and practical support of religious leaders to deliver effective public-health responses” (Tony Blaire Institute for Global Change, 2020). Nevertheless, to effectively do so, government officials, public leaders, and public health authorities need to earn the trust of the religious community leaders and vice versa. This is necessary considering that public health officials have to work with religious leaders in conjunction with the World Health of Organisation to overcome obstacles of mistrust arising from pandemics on issues of the day that affects people in the local communities. For instance, there was public mistrust as was evident during the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa on issues like how people can bury their loved ones without getting exposed to the virus (Dockins, 2014).

Second, churches need to beef up their capacity to enable them to provide spiritual and social support and care for the sick, the bereaved, and the dying in more appropriate ways. This should include supporting their own pastors and ministers to be better positioned in providing the needed assistance as key workers in the local communities in which they are located. In addition, those who have the resources should increase their investment and efforts in clinics, hospital, and COVID-19 recovery centres including making available ministers who can provide chaplaincy duties to care for both patients, volunteers, and staff in such designated places.

Third, the teachings of churches and faith leaders should focus on encouraging people to obey government guidelines and public health order to help slow down the virus. Example include following 1.5 meter social distancing rule, wearing masks, etcetera. Any dissidents amongst them should be called out and be reminded of the biblical injunction made by Jesus, “Give back to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s” (Mark 12:17, ESV - English Standard Version). Despite the unworthy actions of conspiracy theories and so on, faith leaders have the special duty of helping to dispel such claims and correct them along with various other rumours, conspiracy theories, scapegoating, misunderstandings, misinformation, or deliberate false information that are linked to religious beliefs that are peddled by people.

These corrective measures are a necessity for religious faith institutions who ultimately have the capacity to communicate their messages in positive ways as these do play a very critical role in determining how the coronavirus disease is perceived and understood by the public in Nigeria.

Fourth, in the same vein as above, churches must ensure that they do not preach messages that undermine COVID-19 protocols but should respect the right of others such as members and non-members of their congregation who want to do so without being judgemental of them.

Fifth, not only should all churches work to ensure that they are applying the necessary rules and providing support, they should work with a common goal and attitude. For example, a situation whereby some churches are more open to opening their places of worship for use by the general public, while some others are not that willing to do so should not be allowed. The more there are in the number of faiths organisations and leaders that get involved in a collaboratively coordinated effort, the better it will be for an increased rallying of spiritual and social solidarity that supports many people through this pandemic which in turn may result in stronger networks of relationships on communal, organizational, and personal levels. Not only that, there may also be the possibility whereby the groundwork through this pandemic is laid now for the future for closer public-private partnerships amongst the various levels of governments and the various faith communities in Nigeria. Having said this, it should be equally stated that faith-based organizations must not be expected to bear the major brunt in handling most of the burden that comes with this responsibility even though they see themselves as having the duty of care to do these things. They should rather be seen as important and necessary partners in the drive to reach and care for the needy and vulnerable in society. It should be borne in mind that the congregations in many of these organisations are small, particularly in the smaller ones which are mostly made up of volunteers in their staffing structure. Such small faith organisations will therefore need the necessary support financially and otherwise because as Proverbs 27:17 (ESV) puts it, “Iron sharpens iron, and one sharpens another.”

The programs of these faith organisations and their leadership should be supported through spending and sponsorships from other public institutions like the government, privately-owned companies, and international organisations since such publicly supported social initiatives and interventions of such faith organisations can be beneficial to all (Hein, 2014). Besides, like any other organisation, faith-based organisations and their arms or institutions should have and do have the right to apply for grants from governments and international organisations. Nevertheless, such grants must be used for the social responsibility purpose for which they were released – which in this instance has to do with responding adequately to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Apart from mobilisation of additional funding, the collaborative efforts between the faith organisations and government or international organisations should also be such that it increases the efficiency of responses to the coronavirus pandemic. An example is ensuring that there are regular and consistent health programs like vaccinations that must remain well funded with providing enough tools and logistic support like transport, accommodation, and so on for volunteers that faith organisations have readily made available. The importance of volunteering and helping others cannot be overemphasised because response and recovery programs that are run with volunteers, like those advanced in and/or through congregations of faith-based organisations, have an inherent ability for success. This can be seen in the fact that such steps are efforts that are linked with outcomes that lead to positive health for all (Yeung et al., 2017).

Sixth, the ongoing consultations, communication, and advice on the latest scientific information must continue with churches and practitioners in the grassroots to ensure that places of worship remain open safely. This will also enable them to maximise their contribution to people's wellbeing and recovery and, more so, in the event that there is a surge in the transmission of the COVID-19. While it is a fact that having a more coordinated and broader role by and with the faith community in areas that are focused on addressing COVID-19 response and prevention can be significantly powerful, it is nevertheless necessary to emphasise the urgency for such coordination to be quickly applied. This is more so that the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are likely to remain with us for some years to come, thereby necessitating more considerations on how the social service programs of faith communities can be delivered effectively and safely. Initiating coordinated efforts that are creative and innovative is required to ensure the continuation of laudable programs that serve the needy in society, particularly in a country like Nigeria where the needs and demands are increasingly being felt by the low-income citizens. Coordinated programs should not just be a collaboration between the local, state, or federal government and the faith organisations and their leaders, it should go beyond that. The prominent and well-established faith-based organisations, their arms or institutions and leaders should not work in isolation or by themselves as this will be selfish and will not be helpful in meeting the high demands and needs during this pandemic in a large populated country like Nigeria. They should rather collaborate with smaller faith organisations to achieve this goal as this action will extend the reach and network that is needed to accommodate such objectives. This brings to mind the biblical injunction in Ecclesiastes 4:9-12 that:

Two are better than one because they have a good reward for their toil.
For if they fall, one will lift up his fellow. But woe to him who is alone
when he falls and has not another to lift him up! Again, if two lie

together, they keep warm, but how can one keep warm alone? And though a man might prevail against one who is alone, two will withstand him—a threefold cord is not quickly broken.” (ESV - English Standard Version)

The above is summed up succinctly in two other scriptures which are Ecclesiastes 4:9 (ESV) which says, “Two are better than one because they have a good reward for their toil.” Also, Hebrews 10:24-25 (ESV) that says, “And let us consider how to stir up one another to love and good works, not neglecting to meet together, as is the habit of some, but encouraging one another, and all the more as you see the day drawing near.”

Seventh, although churches are showing support, they should, however, do a lot more in collaborating with their counterparts and the federal, state, and local governments to improve efforts towards the enhancement of effective and efficient distributive mechanisms to reach people, households, and communities that are worst-hit by the pandemic.

Conclusion

This study has shown that faith and spirituality including religious beliefs and practices are a necessity in responding to recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria as they play their part in consideration of their role within the global perspective on the response. In giving support and comfort to not only those in need, but the various levels of government, the faith and spiritual communities provide valuable and tangible resources and support that assist in preventing and addressing the fallout of the coronavirus disease that has plagued the country. Despite all the initial pushbacks at the first half of 2020 by religious leaders, people began to accept these restrictions which continued for the rest of 2020 into the first quarter of 2021. When considering the role of religion in the recovery and prevention process of this crisis, it is impossible not to reflect on the provocative correlation between the challenges and responses. The COVID-19 response and recovery interventions will not be enough with only the governments having to act. Intervention measures will be much more successful with the participation and roles played by religious faith-based organisations in helping to address the various issues that medical and scientific interventions are unable to address. These include helping people to heal faster mentally, emotionally, and otherwise as they find recourse to trusted interventions through faith and spirituality of which faith organisations, their arms, institutions, and congregations are very effective in mobilising and providing a timely and appropriate response in times of crisis and needs.

Finally, it has also been shown that those who are spiritually active do participate in their faith community as they invest in a prayerful relationship

and strong connection with their God. The implications of COVID-19 are quite significant. As the pandemic grows, there will be greater pressure on the drivers of faith and spirituality to respond appropriately and safely to help all types of people and communities within their reach. There is urgency on the need for more integrative and collaborative efforts for effective response and recovery during the period of the impact that comes with this pandemic. It will be a mistake if faith leaders, members of the faith communities, and their partners do not act now as they will run the risk of mistakenly taking for granted the continued positive and negative impact the COVID-19 pandemic can have on Nigeria both now and in the future. The COVID-19 pandemic is a wake-up call to Nigeria and the world at large, particularly with policy and structural issues required in a post-COVID-19 world. A more integrated and collaborative response is needed in all sectors of the society including faith organisations to provide the needed support of spiritual, health, finance, and other interventions.

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Challenges of the 21st Century in European Continent: Terrorism and Migration

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Abstract

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Europe faced new challenges. These new challenges communicated in this study address two issues, terrorism, and migration. Firstly, this study seeks to answer the question, if is there a direct link between migration and terrorism using the research methodology of data collection and analysis, also, what are the secondary links between terrorism outside Europe and migration to Europe. Secondly, based upon the qualitative methodology of research, this study is analyzing European terrorism and migration to European countries with respect to how these two phenomena have affected migration policies, and governments' counter-terrorism actions. Finally, this paper tries to find an answer to the dilemma of a stricter, more restrictive migration policy versus effective fight against terrorism. This paper shows that while it is true that one root cause of migration is the threat of terror, nevertheless terror itself is not an inexplicable phenomenon or "final cause", but a consequence of numerous roots causes.

Keywords: Terrorism, migration wave, European Union, populism, right-wing extremism

Introduction

Some people think that the word “migrant” should never be uttered in the same breath as “crime” or “terrorism.” Immigrants, however, are routinely blamed for increasing crime in many societies, after the al Qaeda serial terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which targeted American symbols in the United States, such as the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. As a result, migration began to increasingly link to international terrorism in the press, policy community, and public imagination. The association of migration to crime and terrorism is often overblown for political purpose, especially by extreme far-right political parties, like the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, and the FIDESZ in Hungary. For most right-wing populist parties in Europe put the immigration issue on the top of their agenda exploiting anxieties over cultural disintegration and rising crime.

In 2014, 2015 and 2016, the member states of the European Union faced two challenges caused by political crises. Firstly, in afore-mentioned years millions of refugees crossed the border of EU. Only in 2015, more than 1 million migrants and refugees entered Europe, in that year Germany received more than 1.1 million asylum seekers – by far the highest number in the EU. Since 2015 to 2019 1.7 million people applied for asylum in Germany making it the country with the fifth highest population of refugees in the world. (See Figure 1.)

As argued in this paper, the “external shock”, such as the “refugee crisis”, posed major political and administrative challenges for governments in many European countries. After 9/11, especially in relation of the rise of Islamic State, Western nations have adopted various policies barring migrants and refugees based on fear of terrorism and other security threats.¹ Furthermore, the President United States, Donald Trump in 2017 banned the travel from Muslim-majority countries to US.²

In fact, most European countries in 2015, were neither politically nor administratively “equipped” to handle the increased arrival of refugees and migrants.. Difficulties in managing refugee issues provoked extensive media attention and sparked heated political controversies. For example, one has only to look at the number of articles on immigration that has grown exponentially after 2015. Many argue that not accidentally, the recent rise of right-wing populism led to the fact that right-wing populist parties proved most successful

¹ Ilya Somin: Does the Threat of Terrorism Justify Migration Restrictions? 30/03/2022 Downloaded from <https://verfassungsblog.de/os5-migration-restrictions/>

² Marc Helbling and Daniel Meierrieks: Terrorism and Migration: An Overview British Journal of Political Science (2022), 52, 977–996 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/2D92D099D870D7D8E606C39E683D3E89/S0007123420000587a.pdf/terrorism_and_migration_an_overview.pdf

in certain countries – e.g., in Poland and in Hungary – with comparably few immigrants and no refugee crisis to speak of.

In 2015, before the Hungarian government had the barrier built, more hundred migrants entered to Hungary, but they soon left to the developed Western countries where they could find democratic environment and high-level social allowances. After building the barrier on the Schengen border in Hungary, the Hungarian government can stop the migrants at the border by using law enforcement, we can only suppose that the migrants' destination is not Hungary, but the wealthy countries in the European Union.

Despite the fact that Hungarian authorities provided food, medical care, most asylum seekers decided to continue on their way to Western Europe within a few days.³

Political background of migration in the European Union

The above explanation, however, does not imply that migration is a necessary precondition for the rise of right-wing populism. Rising populism has of course many drivers and migration is just one of them – though an important one.

Moreover, migration does not necessarily affect media and political discourse, however migration can be divisive by the populist politics' rhetoric. The most striking example in this respect can be found in Central and Eastern European countries. The salience of immigration in these countries, rose sharply after 2015, despite the extremely low refugee numbers compared to Western European countries. It is because political entrepreneurs, e.g., Viktor Orbán managed to raise the salience of immigration, and frame discussion of the issue in negative terms, too, by turning it into a matter of national sovereignty and thus mobilizing larger portions of the electorate.

In Hungary, from the Western countries' perspective, the Orbán regime caused major confusion. It is because on one hand the Orbán regime is obviously autocratic, but on the other hand it is still alike democracy having mocked democratic institutions, but this fact is still ignored by the large part of the Hungarian people. This Janus-faced nature of Orbán regime could make its populist ideology on immigration issues dominant.

So, we should recognize that the Orbán regime is successfully using elements of extreme nationalist-populist communication. Herman Goering, the Nazi leader, one of the founders of the populist ideology, said: "Naturally the common people don't want war. . . but after all it is the leaders of a country who determine policy, and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along. The people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders...tell

³ European Commission EMN Country Factsheet: COUNTRY FACTSHEET: Hungary 2015 EUROPEAN MIGRATION NETWORK. 1 page

them they are being attacked and denounce the peacemakers for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger."⁴ According to the populist ideology, immigrants should be considered one of the most dangerous enemies of the 12th century.

The Orbán regime's control over the public discourse, based on its media dominance and massive campaigns on hate-inciting rhetoric, conspiracy theories (e.g., about the existence of a so-called "Soros-plan"⁵) and disinformation.

Even do, after seizing on the coronavirus pandemic as a handy pretext, Viktor Orbán's government continued to extend its hegemony over the Hungarian media landscape and inspired other European countries such as Slovenia and Poland. Its coronavirus legislation, which gave the government almost unlimited powers to handle the crisis, threatened journalists with prosecution on charges of disseminating fake news and "blocking the government's anti-pandemic efforts," and imposed additional curbs on their already limited access to state-held information. It gave impetus to the Orbán regime to pave an even stronger government propaganda on immigration issues, as well. In countries like Poland, the mere prospect of EU-imposed refugee quotas became the subject of critical media coverage and emotionally charged political debates.

⁴ Gustave Gilbert: Interview in Hermann Goering's jail cell, April 18, 1946. "Nuremberg Diary". Published by Hachette Books New York, NY, United States, ISBN 0306806614.

⁵ George Soros, Hungarian-American billionaire is accused by the Hungarian government's propaganda to intervene in the matters of European countries by organizing more million immigrants to enter to the field of the European Union. This is widely believed among the Hungarian people; however, it was never proved by the Orbán regime.




Figure 1: Number of asylum applications received in Germany 2010-2018⁶

Among the forces, driving people to make the dangerous journey are the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The vast majority – more than 80% - of those who reached Europe by boat in 2015 came from those three countries. (See Figure 2.)

Poverty, desertification, human rights abuses and deteriorating security are prompting people to set out from countries such as Eritrea, Libya, countries in Sahel, Pakistan, Morocco, Iran, and Somalia, also in Afghanistan in the hope of a new life in somewhere in the developed Western European countries, like Germany, Sweden, or the UK. In parallel with the immigrants' waves, the number of terrorist attacks increased. Only the year 2015, terrorist who belonged to an operative network of Islamic State (also refers to ISIS),⁷ caused 163 victims and 350 injuries related to terror attacks. 211 terror plots

⁶ Philip Oltermann: How Angela Merkel's great migrant gamble paid off, The Guardian, 30 August 2020. Downloaded from the website <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/30/angela-merkel-great-migrant-gamble-paid-off>

⁷ The formation of IS officially happened in on 29 June 2014. On that day the worldwide caliphate's creation has been announced by the leader of Sunni terrorist organisation named ISIL, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi alias Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, who started to use the name of "Caliph Ibrahim".

were failed, foiled, or completed and 1,077 individuals were arrested on terrorism-related offenses.⁸




Figure 2: Top five countries of origin 2010-2019⁹

Therefore, Europe has faced two major crises, immigration, and terrorism, that have threatened the continent and tested its political and social landscape. Some populist government of the European Union, including Hungary, argued for their anti-immigrant policy in the way of using the statement “immigrants are the main cause of the peak of terrorist attacks”.¹⁰

The Hungarian prime minister stated, too, that there is an “overwhelming logical” connection between terrorism and the movement of Muslims into Europe”.¹¹

This paper shows that it is unquestionably veridical that *both of phenomena happened at same time, however there is no evidence that there would be any correlation between them.*

⁸ EUROPOL: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report TESAT 2016, 20 July 2016. p.10. Downloaded from <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2016>

⁹ Samer Serawan: Refugees in Germany Deutsche Welle, 26/08/2020. Downloaded from the website <https://www.dw.com/en/merkel-germany-refugees/a-54769229>

¹⁰ PABLO GORONDI: Hungary’s Orban says EU didn’t learn from terror attacks, <https://apnews.com/article/268b8594525b47828e083e950e2d4ff4>

¹¹ MATTHEW KAMINSKI: All the terrorists are migrants. Politico, November 23, 2015. Downloaded from <https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-interview-terrorists-migrants-eu-russia-putin-borders-schengen/>

In 2018, a coordinated online campaign by far-right activists of the social media pressured mainstream European parties to drop support for a U.N. migration pact that was years in the making.

Moreover, the Belgium government collapsed under pressure of debate over immigration policy.¹² Since 2015 the issue of migration has become highly politicized in Hungary by the Orbán government that mounted a billboard campaign to tell that migrant should respect Hungary's laws, also, stoked fears that foreigners could snatch the jobs of Hungarians. Out of the 10 million people that reside in Hungary, only 5,000 are Muslim – that is one per every 2,000 inhabitants.

Unlike in France, United Kingdom, or Belgium there are no sizeable immigrant groups. Budapest, a city of more than two million, has only one mosque and merely a handful of prayer rooms. Furthermore, the Hungarian government violated the Dublin Regulation¹³, when hindered migrants to apply for asylum when did not let them in the territory of Hungary.

The last minaret was built almost 500 years ago by the occupying Ottoman Turks. Yet, in recent years, Hungary's formerly Muslim-friendly public discourse has become increasingly fearful of Islam. According to a recent Pew Research Centre survey, 72% of Hungarians, the highest proportion of any European country, see Islam in a negative light. (See Figure 3) What could be the reason for this drastic shift in Hungarians' perception? The answer is obviously the populist politics of the governing party in Hungary.

It should be highlighted that public opinion largely overestimates the real percentage of Muslim population living in the given country. Because of populist politicians' propaganda, the bigger visibility of Muslim population (race, clothing) perceptions can easily run ahead of reality.

¹² Laurens Cerulus, Sarah Wheaton: Belgium sets up minority government after migration dispute breaks coalition. Politico, 9 December 2018. Downloaded from the website <https://www.politico.eu/article/belgium-sets-up-minority-government-after-migration-dispute-breaks-coalition/>

¹³

Views of Muslims more negative in eastern and southern Europe

Unfavorable view of Muslims in our country



Note: In Poland, question was asked of a subsample of 686 respondents.

Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey, Q36c.

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Figure 3: View on Muslims in Europe¹⁴

European publics wildly overestimate the proportion of their populations that is Muslim: an Ipsos-Mori poll in 2020 found that on average French respondents thought 31% of their compatriots were Muslim. The actual figure is closer to 8%, and the relatively biggest difference experienced in Hungary, 70 times more than reality. (See Figure 4)

However, it is worth analysing, what is the linkage, if there is any, between the peak of terrorist attacks and the immigrations.

¹⁴ Eyes on Europe: Explaining the main drivers of anti-immigration attitudes in Europe, 30 November 2020. Downloaded from the website <https://www.eyes-on-europe.eu/explaining-the-main-drivers-of-anti-immigration-attitudes-in-europe/>




Figure 4: Overestimating the real percentage of Muslim population in some EU members

The above-mentioned political crises overlapped in time that resulted in a presumed linkage that this paper will try to clarify. As argued here, while it is true that one root cause of migration is the threat of terror, nevertheless terror itself is not an inexplicable phenomenon or "fundamental and final cause", but a consequence of numerous roots causes, like insecurity, poverty, etc., in the conflict countries.

Definition of terrorism

There is no universal definition of terrorism in the international literature. The main difficulty in defining terrorism is the lack of agreement how to determine the cases when use of violence should be considered legitimate; therefore, the modern definition of terrorism is inherently controversial. The use of force for the achievement of political goals has been legitimate in the case of state organizations, such as military or law

enforcement. Non-state actors' right to implement violence does not have any definition either in the domestic law, or in the international law, due to the illegitimate character of them in the state system.

The UN member states still do not have agreed-upon definition of terrorism. This fact was and still is a major obstacle to introduce effective international measures against terrorism. In 1998, Arab countries elaborated a document titled "The Arab convention for the suppression of terrorism", which gives largely different definition on terrorism than the UN resolutions. De facto it is a legal platform for condemning Israel acting against Palestinian terrorists.¹⁵

Terminology consensus, however, would be necessary for a single comprehensive convention on terrorism. However, the Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) on "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts",¹⁶ gives a quasi-definition on terrorism. "Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature;"

The European Union defined the meaning of "terrorist act" under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, in the Article 1(3).¹⁷ In this document "terrorist acts" mean intentional acts which, given their nature or context, could seriously damage a country or international organisation and which are defined as an offence under national law. These include:

- attacks upon a person's life which may cause death.
- attacks upon the physical integrity of a person.
- kidnapping or hostage taking.

¹⁵ League of Arab States: The Arab convention for the suppression of terrorism adapted by Council of Arab Ministers of Interior and Justice, Cairo April 1998, downloaded from the website https://www.unodc.org/images/tldb-f/conv_arab_terrorism.en.pdf

¹⁶ UN Security Council resolution 1566, 8 October 2004, downloaded from the website <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/n0454282.pdf>

¹⁷ **Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism.** (2001/931/CFSP). Downloaded from the website <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32001E0931>

- causing extensive destruction to a government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility.
- seizure of aircraft, ships, or other means of public or goods transport.
- manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives, or of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons,
- participating in the activities of a terrorist group, including by supplying information or material resources, or by funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the group.

If these acts aim to constitute terrorist acts, they must be carried out with the aim of seriously intimidating the population, or unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

The International Military Staff of NATO has agreed on the term of terrorism in 2016. In accordance with the NATO definition of the terrorism: *“The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve a political, religious, or ideological objective.”*¹⁸ For the research purposes of current paper, NATO definition is accepted.

Global trends of terrorism

To understand the current situation of terrorism in Europe, the key trends, and the patterns of terrorism during the last 10 years, we should consider it on global level. Period of terrorism of the last decade, corresponds with the rise and fall of the Islamic State (ISIS). Determining trend is, because of the counterterrorism effort, terrorist attacks and lethality have declined significantly in global scale already six consecutive years. While this is a certainly good news – particularly in the 20th year of the so-called global war on terror – terrorism remains a pervasive threat. It is worth to note, that different organizations analysing terrorism use different databases and methodologies for determining the number of terrorist attacks and related lethality.¹⁹ (See Figure 5)

¹⁸ NATO Military Committee MC 0472/1, 06 January 2016

¹⁹ For example, the Statista (German company specializing in market and consumer data), or the American the Global Terrorism Database (Managed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism /START/), and the Global Terrorism Index produced by the Institute Economics and Peace (international non-partisan, non-profit organisation), could provide different numbers of attacks and deaths. It is because of different counting methodology. The terrorist attack on 13 November 2015 in Paris was a serial terrorist




Figure 5: Global trend in terrorism²⁰

After the military defeat of ISIS in 2019, the fragmentation of the Islamic State's core in Syria and Iraq continued. It is because decline of ISIS's hard core has been coupled with the transformation into a guerrilla-type organisation, which is still active in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries.

Second global trend is the rise of the far-right terrorism²¹ in the Western countries that is galvanized by the immigration to Europe, United States, and Oceania.²² This kind of terrorism is motivated by racial hate. In European countries, such as Germany, Austria, United States and France, radical Islamists attacked synagogues. In New Zealand, local people attacked mosques.

attack having eight episodes, which mathematically could be counted as 1 attack or 8 attacks. There are same problems for deaths from terrorism, some could count in the killed terrorist, meanwhile others not.

²⁰ The diagram produced by the author, the terrorist attacks and deaths from terrorism data are taken from the yearly Global Terrorism Index reports published by Institute Economics and Peace.

²¹ For the paper purposes, the far-right terrorism also referred to the racially and ethnically motivated terrorism, including anti-Semitism terrorism, too.

²² Even such country as New Zealand, which had no terrorist attack ever, become a terrorism-infected country. On 15 March 2019, there were 2 attacks against mosques in Christchurch city, resulted 51 deaths.

In recent years, analysts and security institutions alike have pointed out that right-wing extremists are increasingly networking across borders and even continents.^{23, 24}

Jihadist terrorism, on a global level, can successfully increase terrorism in certain parts of the world. In the Middle East, South Asia, and throughout Africa, al Qaeda, the Taliban, the fractions of Islamic State (ISIS) and their affiliates could make a renewed push to capture new territory and destabilize countries, because the American government decided to withdraw its military forces from these regions. Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, Mali, and Nigeria are home to jihadist groups.

Despite of nearly two decades of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries, there are nearly four times Islamic militants today as there were on September 11, 2001. Moreover, there were 67 Salafi-jihadist groups in 2018 in these regions, which is the highest level since 1980. This reflected a 180 percent increase in the number of groups from 2001 to 2018.²⁵ (See Figure 6)

Salafi-jihadist groups are based on two criteria: firstly, they emphasize importance of returning to a “pure” Islam, i.e., the “Salaf” (the first three generations of Muslims, beginning with the Prophet Muhammad and his companions), and secondly, these groups believe that violent jihad is a religious duty.

The current number of the active Salafi-jihadist groups is at the highest level over the past 40 years, as presented in Figure 6. This finding is significant since 1980, when the era was marked with foreign fighters like Abdullah Azzam (Palestinian mentor of Bin Laden), Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri who went to Pakistan, later to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets and support the Afghan mujahedeen.

²³Yassin Musharbash: The Globalization of Far-Right Extremism: An Investigative Report, July/August 2021, Volume 14, Issue 6. Published by Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Downloaded from the website <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-globalization-of-far-right-extremism-an-investigative-report/>

²⁴ The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate: CTED Alert 2020, Member States Concerned by the Growing and Increasingly Transnational threat of Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism, April 2020, page 3. Downloaded from the website https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/files/documents/2021/Jan/cted_trends_alert_extreme_right-wing_terrorism.pdf

²⁵ Seth G. Jones: The evolution of the Salafi-Jihadist threat. Current and Future Challenges from the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and Other Groups. A report of the CSIS Transnational Threats Project November 20, 2020, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, USA.




Figure 6: Number of Salafi-jihadist and Allied Groups, 1980–2018²⁶

It should be noted that Salafi-jihadists terrorists are still killing large numbers of people, though mainly in “near enemy” countries in the Middle East and North Africa, rather than in the West. Consequently, terrorist groups inspired by global Jihad have killed much more Muslims than non-Muslims. By far the vast majority (around 75%) of victims of the terrorist attacks over the past 15 years has been Muslims killed by Muslims.²⁷ During the last two decades, the United States built a counterterrorism enterprise through its intelligence, law enforcement and military bodies that has been remarkably successful from a tactical perspective, that is, foiling attacks²⁸

²⁶ The graphic designed by the author, the used data are taken from Seth G. Jones Charles Vallee Danika Newlee Nicholas Harrington Clayton Sharb Hannah Byrne: *The Evolution of the Salafi-Jihadist Threat Current and Future Challenges from the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and Other Groups*, Center for International Studies, November 2018. pp 6-9. Downloaded from the website https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181221_EvolvingTerroristThreat.pdf

²⁷ Masood Farivar: *Most Terrorism Victims Are in Muslim Majority Countries*. Voice of America News, August 24, 2016. Downloaded from the website <https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/most-terrorism-victims-are-muslim-majority-countries>

²⁸ New York Daily News: *Here’s a list of terror attacks and foiled plots in New York City since 2010*. 11. December 2017. Downloaded from the website

and disrupting terrorist networks.²⁹ But it has been less successful from a strategic vantage point, because in recent times more people are radicalized to violent extremism than in 2001 as a result of a more diversified and globally dispersed terrorist threat. Two decades after 9/11, in the American government's database of known or suspected terrorists, their number has grown with more than twenty times.³⁰ Another trend will probably continue during the 2020s in which *violent non-state actors' and terrorist groups will increasingly use emerging technologies*. Hamas, Hezbollah, fractions of Islamic State, Houthi rebels in Yemen, and the Taliban have demonstrated alacrity and capability to deploy unmanned aerial systems for combat and reconnaissance purposes.³¹

Terrorism in the European Union

Terrorism is a highly complex and constantly changing phenomenon, which day by day makes headlines, and stands at the forefront of national and international agendas. It has many forms and is associated with a wide variety of groups. Its range varies from nationalist-separatist organisations, through extreme right-wing groups to political religious networks, and individuals, all of them commit terrorist acts based on certain motivations or ideologies.

As argued before, even Europe itself is not immune from the terrorism, even though the terrorist attacks happened largely not in the European continent, but in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Europe. Several EU members (such as France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom) have a long history of fighting domestic terrorist groups like the Organisation Armée Secrète (French,

<https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/list-terror-attacks-foiled-plots-nyc-article-1.3692532>

²⁹ Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing David S. Cohen Remarks to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy as Prepared for Delivery, 4 July 2010. Downloaded from the website <https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg632.aspx>

³⁰ Russel Travers: Counterterrorism in an era of Competing Priorities: Ten Key Considerations, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 12 November 2019. Downloaded from the website https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/counterterrorism-era-competing-priorities-ten-key-considerations#utm_term=has%20grown%20by%20a%20factor%20of%20nearly%2020&utm_campaign=9%2F11%20and%20the%20Unwinnable%20War%20%28Levitt%20%7C%20NBC%20News%29&utm_content=email&utm_source=Act-On+Software&utm_medium=email&utm_mmc=Act-On%20Software-_-email-_-9%2F11%20and%20the%20Unwinnable%20War%20%28Levitt%20%7C%20NBC%20News%29-_-has%20grown%20by%20a%20factor%20of%20nearly%2020

³¹ Colin P. Clarke: Trends in Terrorism: What is on the Horizon in 2021? The Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 5, 2021. Downloaded from the website <https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/01/trends-in-terrorism-whats-on-the-horizon-in-2021/>

OAS)³², the Basque Homeland and Liberty (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, ETA), Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion, RAF), the Red Brigades (Italian, Brigade Rosse), Irish Republican Army (IRA), etc.

Traditionally, Europe, during the last decades has been confronted with the following four types of terrorism:

- Ethno-nationalists and separatists, such as the IRA and ETA;
- Left-wing terrorists (the RAF and the Red Brigades are the most well-known examples) and anarchist terrorism /such Revolutionary Struggle (EA), Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei (SPF), and Sect of Revolutionaries (SE) in Greece/;
- Extreme far-right terrorism /such National Socialist Underground (NSU) attacks in Germany/
- Religious inspired (jihadist)

EUROPOL (European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports) in its yearly reports also added a fifth group of terrorism, the so-called single-issue terrorism. It uses this term for the form of terrorism related to environmental protection and animal right issues. Activists of single-issue terrorist groups oppose, among others, the construction of large infrastructure projects, animal testing, animal exploitation, nuclear energy, or oil drilling. Moreover, EUROPOL, for statistical purposes, uses an extra group of terrorist attacks, too, the so-called “not-specified group”, which means that the member states report attacks with non-specified nature of the terrorist attack. There is no detailed information to be able to determine attacks in the latter cases, which group they belong to.

The primary concern, however, to Europe is the “violent Islamist” terrorism. Such attacks, classified by EUROPOL as “religious” or “jihadist” in motivation, have been much more lethal than other types of terrorism. The number of jihadist terrorism-related attacks increased since 2011 but have been decreasing during the last four years in Europe. (See Figure 7).

³² Note from the author: The Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS) was a far-right French dissident paramilitary organisation during the Algerian War. The OAS carried out terrorist attacks, bombings and assassinations, (including the assassination attempt against president de Gaulle in 1962). The OAS was responsible around 2000 in early 60s.




Figure 7: Number of terrorist attacks in Europe 2011-2020³³

Most jihadist attacks in Europe since 2011 have been linked to or motivated by the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), the Al Qaeda and its affiliate, the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

In the countries of the European Union, as well as in other European states, the ideologies behind terrorism vary widely, but can be roughly divided into two identifiable main drivers. Motivation includes religiously inspired terrorism and nationalist/separatist sentiments terrorism. The nationalism/separatism inspired terrorism is the leading type of terrorism in Europe already more the ten years. (See Figure 8)

It is well known that the terrorism related to Northern Ireland has officially ended in 1994, with the Provisional IRA, dissident Irish Republican terrorist groups, and the main Loyalist groups ceasing their terrorist campaigns and engaging in the peace process. The peace process ended by signing the comprehensive peace agreement, so-called “Good Friday Agreement” in 1998. Unfortunately, after 1998, some of the fraction of former IRA remained active.

For example, in 2014, the Real IRA executed 11 attacks. In details: in February 2014 the Real IRA (or 'New IRA') sent 7 letter bombs to British

³³ The graphic is designed by the author, the used data taken from the Congressional Research Service: Terrorism in Europe, February 10, 2021, and the EUROPOL TE-SAT Reports 2012-2020. Note: Data include statistics from the United Kingdom (UK), until the year 2020, when UK withdrew from the EU in January 2020.

Army recruitment offices in South-East England; the first-time republican militants attacked inside Great Britain since 2001.³⁴ The following month, a police land rover was hit by an explosively formed penetrator in Belfast.

A civilian car was also hit by debris, but there were no injuries. It was the first successful attack of its kind in more than ten years³⁵. Also in November, a police-armoured jeep was hit by an another explosively formed penetrator in London Derry in that November, blowing off a door and damaging a passing car but without any fatal injuries.^{Victoria McMahon}: IRA warns public to stay away from PSNI targets as it launches fresh bid to kill.³⁶ Two weeks later, on 17 November, a police land rover was attacked with a homemade rocket propelled grenade launcher on Crumlin Road, Belfast. The warhead pierced the land rover's outer shell.³⁷

DR groups (DR means, different fractions of former IRA, like Continuity Irish Republican Army, Cumann na mBan i.e.: The Irishwomen's Council, Fianna Éireann i.e.: Deer Ireland, Irish Republican Liberation Army, Irish Republican Movement, Real Irish Republican Army) deployed a variety of types of attack in 2015, including postal IEDs, command-wire IEDs (CWIEDs), under-vehicle IEDs (UVIEDs), radio-controlled IEDs (RCIEDs), shooting attacks, incendiary attacks, and a grenade attack.

In 2015, 16 attacks took place in the UK, in Northern Ireland. All Dissident Republican groups retain the intent and capability to conduct further attacks. Police in Northern Ireland remained the principal target for those terrorist groups and members of the armed forces and prison officers were targeted, too. Just for giving an example, in November 2015, a PSNI vehicle was riddled with automatic gunfire in Belfast, with dissident republicans suspected of being responsible.

In 2014 and 2015, there were no injuries or fatalities caused by Irish separatist terrorist attacks, although in some cases these were very narrowly avoided.

³⁴ Henry McDonald: New IRA sent bombs to army recruitment centres. The Guardian, 17 February 2014). https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/feb/17/new-ira-sent-bombs-army-recruitment-centres-britain?CMP=tw_t_gu

³⁵ Vincent Kearney: Dissident 'IRA' claims west Belfast mortar attack, BBC News, 18 March 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-26636763>

³⁶ Victoria McMahon: IRA warns public to stay away from PSNI targets as it launches fresh bid to kill. 6 November 2014, <https://www.irishmirror.ie/news/irish-news/crime/ira-warns-public-stay-away-4577276>

³⁷ Rebecca Black: „Fears dissidents are upping ante as grenade launcher used in latest bid to murder police”, Belfast Telegraph, 18 November 2014.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20150713025310/http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/fears-dissidents-are-upping-ante-as-grenade-launcher-used-in-latest-bid-to-murder-police-30752670.html>

From the media visibility point of view, the terrorist attacks without large number of injured or killed victims, are not big sensation. This is the reason why, the European wide or world wide media is not giving a big attention to such events. Thus, they are nor really well known for the public.




Figure 8: Different types of terrorist attacks in EU between 2011 and 2020³⁸

With regard the jihadist terrorism trends in Europe, the statistic shows that, after the peak of 2015-2016, the number of jihadist terrorist attacks and killed person are decreasing already 4 consecutive years. (See Figure 9) This decreasing of terrorist attacks in the EU coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic. Restrictions on freedom of movement, travel and the immediate threat to personal health may explain some of the fall.³⁹ According to the Global terrorism Index 2022, the political terrorism has now overtaken religious terrorism in the West, with religiously motivated attacks declining 82 per cent in 2021.

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Attacks number	0	6	1	4	17	13	33	24	21	14
Deaths*	0	8	1	5	150	135	62	13	10	12

³⁸ The graphic is designed by the author, the used data taken the EUROPOL TE-SAT Reports 2012-2020. Note: Data include statistics from the United Kingdom (UK), until the year 2020, when UK withdrew from the EU.

³⁹ The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP): Global Terrorism Index 2022 Measuring the impact of terrorism, Sydney, March 2022. page 4.

Figure 9: Number and deaths of jihadist terrorist attacks 2011-2020⁴⁰ (*The attackers are not included)

By analysing the data in the table above, it can be noticed that the year 2018 was a turning point when jihadist attacks become ineffective, i.e., more attacks then killed person. From 2018 the number of terrorist attacks recorded in the EU appears to have largely remained stable. (See Figure 10)

The family background or place of birth of perpetrators vary significantly. Half of the completed jihadist attacks were carried out by EU citizens (second or third generation of immigrant parents). The other half of the perpetrators had entered the EU as asylum seekers or irregular migrants several years ago before carrying out their attack. Only one perpetrator, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, entered the EU from Tunisia via Italy approximately a month prior to his attack.⁴¹ A few numbers of asylum seekers staying in European soil for 4-5 years, should be counted as perpetrators, among them even fewer percentage of perpetrators originated from asylum seekers, mathematically is neglectable (8 perpetrators from 472700 asylum seekers, it is means $\sim 0,00001$). Moreover, *this small number will be much smaller if we take the number of migrants as a basis which is represent 1,5 million⁴² in 2020.* There are some academics are stating that the migrant inflows per se actually lead to a lower level of terrorist attacks.⁴³ Moreover, other academics argued that from 1990 to 2014 the increased undocumented immigration is not associated with terrorist attacks, radicalization, or terrorism prosecutions.⁴⁴ Some European countries strengthened the bilateral cooperation on migration, counter-terrorism and security. For example, in February 2022, Austria and

⁴⁰ The table designed by the author. The data base taken from the EUROPOL EE Terrorism and Situation yearly Reports 2012-2021. The reports downloaded from the website <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report#fndtn-tabs-0-bottom-2>

⁴¹ The Tunisian Brahim Aoussaoui arrived in Lampedusa (Italy) 4 weeks before the attack. His background checks did not revert any criminal record; however, his asylum application had been rejected, as Tunisian citizens are generally considered to come from a safe country of origin. It is not yet clear how Brahim Aoussaoui got from Italy to France, where he committed the 3 murders.

⁴² European Commission: Overall figures of immigrants in European society 2020. Downloaded from the website https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en

⁴³ Vincenzo Bove and Tobias Böhmelt: How migration policies moderate the diffusion of terrorism? European Journal of Political Research. Number 2 February 2020. pages 160-181

⁴⁴ Michael T.Light and Julia T.Thomas: Undocumented immigration and terrorism: Is there a connection? Social Science Research, Volume 94, February 2021, pages 20-31 Downloaded from <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0049089X20301101>

Switzerland agreed on the reinforced cooperation in the field of migration management and counterterrorism.⁴⁵

In accordance with the data of the EUROPOL: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2021, “Europe continued to suffer the effects of effects of jihadist radicalisation and recruitment in prisons and the threat from released prisoners.”⁴⁶




Figure 10: Trend of jihadist terrorist attacks in Europe 2011-2020⁴⁷

Considering perpetrators of jihadist terrorist attacks, it is worth analysing, who were the attackers. For example, in case of the 2015 serial terrorist attacks in Paris, most of the attackers were French and Belgian citizens who crossed borders without difficulty, albeit registered as terrorism

⁴⁵ Swissinfo Foreign Affairs: Switzerland and Austria want to strengthen cooperation on migration and security, they said on Tuesday. February 01, 2022, Downloaded from <https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/bern-and-vienna-vow-to-boost-cooperation-on-migrants-and-terrorism/47311948>

⁴⁶ EUROPOL: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2021, page 8 Downloaded from https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/tesat_2021_0.pdf

⁴⁷ The graphic designed by the author. The data base taken from the EUROPOL EE Terrorism and Situation yearly Reports 2012-2021. The reports downloaded from the website <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report#fndtn-tabs-0-bottom-2>

suspects. Two other attackers were Iraqi, travelling with fake documents, and having false name in their passport.⁴⁸

Abdelhamid Abaaoud (the Paris attacks “mastermind”) who participated in the Syrian civil war on the Islamic State’s (ISIS) side (posted on social media), was able to return to Belgium unnoticed. (See Figure 11) Of course, the fact, that a terrorist entering to the European Union space is undetected, is a warning signal which raises the problem of the European border control, and intel information exchange between the EU member states.⁴⁹



Figure11: Abdelhamid Abaaoud, alias Abou Omar Al-Baljiki in Syria

⁴⁸ The Paris prosecutor's office said that the fingerprints from Ahmad al-Mohammad, the dead suicide bomber, the man was the first of three to blow himself up at Stade de France stadium, matched those of a person who came to Europe with migrants via the Greek island of Leros. The man may have been posing as a Syrian refugee. Paris attacks: Who were the attackers? - BBC News, 27 April 2016. Downloaded from the website <https://www.bbc.news/world-europe-34832512>

⁴⁹ Jon Henley: Paris attacks: EU in emergency talks on border crackdown, The Guardian, 20 November 2015. Downloaded from the website <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/20/paris-attacks-france-launches-un-push-for-unified-declaration-of-war-on-isis>

Migration

Migration itself always has been a major factor in the history of humankind. It is likely that the humanity born in Africa then spread on the planet within and outside of Africa around 2.5 million years ago. In historical times, Africa has been the source of the largest forced migrations in the history. The history of humankind experienced already some big migrations. For example, great migrations include the Indo-European migrations to Europe, the Middle East and South Asia during the Bronze Age, the Bantu migrations across sub-Saharan Africa, Barbarian invasions during the Roman Empire, the Great Migration from England of the 1630s, and the California Gold Rush from 1848–1850, etc.

It is worth to mention that the largest migration in history was the so-called Great Atlantic Migration from Europe to North America, the first major wave of which began in the 1840s with mass movements from Ireland and Germany. The Hungarians also arrived in Europe with the one of the latest waves of Migration Period in the 9th century.

The trans-Atlantic slave trade was the largest long-distance forced migration of people, even though it happened over a shorter period than the trans-Saharan and Indian Ocean slave trades. From 1800s, the migrants from the black continent have been unfolding projects of self-development by traveling to places where they hoped to find better opportunities.

Yet contemporary trafficking and displacements caused by wars, intolerance, and natural catastrophes or climate change attest to the continuing relevance of violence as a key aspect of the experience of migrants from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

The long-term and growing body of evidence on migration and mobility shows that migration is in large part related to the broader global economic, social, political, and technological transformations that are affecting a wide range of high-priority policy issues. As argued here, the scale of international migration increases in line with recent trends.

This growth of migrant's ratio cannot be explained by the rise of world population, globalization, or higher mobility of the humankind. In fact, up until the beginning of the industrial revolution, global population grew very slowly. Then from the beginning of 1800s, the growth rate accelerated to a peak of 2.2% in 1963. (See Figure 12).




Figure 12: The world population growth with the estimation to 2100

The UN Population Division report of 2019 projects world population to continue growing, although at a steadily decreasing rate, and to reach 10.9 billion in 2100 with a growth rate at that time of close to zero.⁵⁰

The report confirms that the world's population continues to grow, albeit at a slowing rate. From 1968, due to the world-wide collapse of the total fertility rate,⁵¹ it has declined to 1.1% today (2020). (See Figure 13)

⁵⁰ The graphic designed by the author. The used data taken from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division: World Population Prospect 2019 Highlights. ST/ESA/SER.A/423. ISBN: 978-92-1-148316-1 page 12.

⁵¹ In 1967, nearly 13 million women in the world were using the birth control pills, and by 1984 that number reached 80 million. Reference: Planned Parenthood Federation of America: Birth Control – History of the Pill, page 4. Downloaded from the website https://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/1514/3518/7100/Pill_History_FactSheet.pdf




Figure 13: Annual world population growth rate 1950-2100⁵²

It is a reality that there have been major migration and displacement events during the last ten years; events that have caused great hardship and trauma as well as loss of life. Foremost *displacements of millions of people have been due to conflict (such as within and from the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, the Central African Republic, South Sudan), extreme violence (such as inflicted upon Rohingya forced to seek safety in Bangladesh) and recent Taliban takeover of power in Afghanistan, or severe economic and political instability.*

To face the challenge if migration internationally happens in a coordinated way, the UN constructed a new agreement on the migration. All 193 members, except the United States, agreed the pact in July 2018.

This agreement emphasises that all migrants are entitled to universal human rights and aspires to eliminate all forms of discrimination, including racism, xenophobia and intolerance against migrants and their families. Even the text of compact agreement quite clearly states that all member states have sovereign right to determine their national migration policy. The Trump-lead United State voted against it.

Currently, as estimated around 281 million people, approximately 3.6% of the world's population, currently live outside of their country of origin, globally, with nearly two-thirds being labour migrants.⁵³ From the

⁵² United Nation Population Division: World population growth Downloaded from the website <https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth>

⁵³ The graphic is designed by the author, the data base taken from the UN Migration, International Organization for Migration: World Migration Report 2020, Switzerland, ISSN 1561-5502. p.20.

1970s, the ratio of immigrants to the total population of the world, during the last 50 years (1970-2020), has increased from 2.2 % to 3.6%. (See Figure 14)




Figure 14: Ratio of immigrants to the total population of the world

If we are taking into account, the net migration rate, which indicates the contribution of migration to the overall level of population change, the overall picture of migration will be clearer in global scale. The net migration rate does not distinguish between economic migrants, refugees, and other types of migrants, nor between lawful and unlawful migrants. In this matter, there are also different counts and lists of countries. The UN, World Bank and the CIA have different catalogues, but for the research purposes of this paper, the UN list has been utilized.

For example, it has been clear that in Europe Lithuania and Latvia are losing their population already four continuous years. Latvia, since it became EU member in 2004, has lost one-fifth of its population, because around 40000 Latvian left to work to wealthy EU countries: U.K., Ireland, and Germany. This small Baltic republic has comparatively low birth rate and high mortality rate are also contributing factors. Almost the same problem appears in Lithuania with a 17.5 percent of decrease. Post-Communist countries in Central-East Europe must face with similar challenges. In the global scale, Venezuela, Syria, South-Sudan, and Eritrea have the biggest decline in population.

The world champion of receiving migrants is Canada, meanwhile Germany and Norway, as well.

Annual Net Migration Rate 2015–2020




Figure 15: Annual Net Migration Rate 2015-2020⁵⁴

Definition of migrants

Depending on the goal and reason for relocation, persons who migrate can be divided into three categories: migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Each category is defined broadly, because mixed circumstances might occur, and motivate individuals to change their location.

From practical perspective, the migration can be identified as the movement of people from one place to another to live. Emigrants leave their country, while immigrants enter a foreign country. Migration impacts on both the place left behind, and on the place where migrants settle down. People have many reasons why they might want to move from one place to another. These reasons may be economic, social, political, or environmental. There are usually push factors and pull factors at work, why migration takes place. Push factors are the reasons that make someone decide to move. Peoples' own experience of life in one place gives them good reasons to leave it. Push factors are often negative things, such as unemployment, crop failure, droughts, flooding, war, poor education opportunities, or poor public services.

Pull factors, on the other hand, are the expectations which attract people to new places. They are usually positive things, such as job

⁵⁴ REUERHC (“Reinforce EU economies, reinforcing human capital”): Guide for Integration. Action n. 2018-1-IT01-KA202-006739) – in the framework of the European programme “Erasmus Plus KA2 Strategic Partnerships for VET”. 2018. page 5

opportunities, a better standard of living, better education, or better healthcare. Many people in the developing countries choose to migrate. These are *voluntary migrants*. They are called as *economic migrants*.

Other voluntary migrants include older dependants who want to live somewhere warm and sunny in their retirement. However, many other people have no choice, and are forced to leave their homes. These are involuntary migrants. Their lives may be in danger due to wars or a natural disaster. These people are also called as *refugees*.

Migration is a complex process covering population movement across societal boundaries, either within or between nation states, affecting gaining and losing for the countries by the temporary and permanent movement which provides asylum-seekers and economic migrants, as well as illegal migrants. The terms asylum seeker and refugee are often confused.

What is the difference? A refugee, by definition: *“A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”*⁵⁵ UN Convention of 1967 Protocol.

A *displaced person* who has crossed national boundaries and who cannot or is unwilling to return home due to well-founded fear of persecution. Such a person may be called an asylum seeker until he or she receives refugee status by the domestic state organizations, or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), provided he or she formally makes a claim for asylum.

For the research purpose of this paper, migrant is an individual, who left his or her country of origin, and formally applied for asylum in another country, but whose application has not yet been concluded. They are the asylum seekers. After their application for asylum had been decided, they can be legal or illegal migrants, depending on getting the right for asylum, or not.

Migration to Europe

For the sake of a better understanding of the European migration crisis since 2015, the global picture of the migration should be analysed first.

⁵⁵ The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, downloaded from <https://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/4ec262df9/1951-convention-relating-status-refugees-its-1967-protocol.html>

Because of terrorism, migration and COVID-19, some EU countries applied extremely strong border control even within the Schengen area.⁵⁶

According to the UN International Organisation for Migration's World Migration Report of 2020, the number of international migrants was estimated to be almost 272 million globally, with 51 million more than in 2010. Nearly two thirds were labour migrants. International migrants comprised 3.5 percent of the global population in 2019.⁵⁷ This number in accordance with the World Report 2022 became 3.6 percent.⁵⁸

According to UNHCR report, at the end of 2020 around 82.4 million people were forcibly displaced across the world. Of these, 26.4 million were refugees, whilst 48 million were internally displaced within their country of origin. 86% of the world's refugees are living in countries neighbouring their country of origin, often in developing countries. Over 6.7 million people have fled due to the conflict in Syria, and many more are displaced inside the country. Turkey is the biggest refugee hosting country in the world. At the end of 2020 Turkey provided safety to 3.6 million Syrian refugees. According to the UNHCR, there are 3.6 million Syrians under temporary protection and over 330,000 refugees and asylum seekers under international protection.⁵⁹

In 2020, more than two thirds of the refugees across the world came from five countries: Syria (6.7 million), Venezuela (4.0 million), Afghanistan (2.6 million), South Sudan (2.2 million) and Myanmar (1.1 million).⁶⁰ It is obvious that terror violence has a positive and significant effect on asylum migration flows relative to the number of IDP.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Elspeth Guild: Schengen Borders and Multiple National States of Emergency: From Refugees to Terrorism to COVID-19. European Journal of Migration and Law, 21 December 2021 pages 385-404. Downloaded from file:///C:/Users/jtomo/Downloads/[15718166%20-%20European%20Journal%20of%20Migration%20and%20Law]%20Schengen%20Borders%20and%20Multiple%20National%20States%20of%20Emergency_%20From%20Refugees%20to%20Terrorism%20to%20COVID-19.pdf

⁵⁷ IOM Migration Report 2020. Downloaded from the website https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf

⁵⁸ International Organization for Migration UN Migration: World Migration Report 2022 page 19

⁵⁹ UNHCR Turkey - Fact Sheet September 2021. Downloaded from https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/unhcr-turkey-fact-sheet-september-2021-entr?gclid=Cj0KCQjw3v6SBhCsARIsACyrRAk5mHJkDQ7hsYZ11IjVksX99gnPT3PnUwB-3oPhGHnTvuMwarRByu8aAvFvEALw_wcB

⁶⁰ UNHCR Global Trends forced displacement person, 2020. p.3 downloaded from the website <https://www.unhcr.org/uk/statistics/unhcrstats/60b638e37/global-trends-forced-displacement-2020.html>

⁶¹ Federico Carril-Caccia, Jordi Paniagua and Francisco Requena: Asylum Migration, Borders, and Terrorism in a Structural Gravity Model. 2021, Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183-2463) Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 146-158

In the early 1980s roughly 28 million people changed their country of residence. Flows peaked between 1995 and 2000, when 43 million people moved to another country. More recently, between 2010 and 2015, about 36 million migrants changed their country of residence. This corresponds to 0.5% of the global population, and an average of 7 million international migrants moving per year.⁶²

In 2020 5,1% of EU population were non-EU citizen. At the end of 2019, 10% of all the world's refugees and only a fraction of internally displaced persons was living in the EU.




Figure 16: Number of immigrants 2008-2020⁶³

In the 1990s, the large proportion of immigrants in Western European states have come from the European post-Communist countries. The most targeted countries were Spain, Greece, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.

In 2014-2016, the blood-spattered conflict in Syria was far the biggest driver of migration peak to Europe. However, it is worth mentioning that the violence in Afghanistan and Iraq, abuses in Eritrea, as well as poverty in Kosovo, are also forced people to look for new lives elsewhere. It is means

⁶² European Commission: European Political Strategy Center, 10 trends shaping migration. Downloaded from the website https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/10_trends_shaping_migration.pdf

⁶³ The graphic designed by the author, the used database is the Eurostat immigration database, downloaded from the website <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>

that that terrorism indeed increases intentions to migrate both within and across Syria and Iraq.⁶⁴

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that more than 1,011,700 migrants arrived by sea in 2015, and almost 34,900 by land.

In 2014, this number was around 280,000. Of course, these figures do not include those who got in undetected.⁶⁵

The EU's external border force, Frontex, monitors the different routes migrants use and numbers arriving at Europe's borders and put the figure crossing into Europe in 2015 at more than 1,800,000. Between 2014 and 2016, the countries in the Balkans like Kosovo and Albania and Eastern Europe Eastern European countries like Ukraine, also contributed to the overall flow of asylum seekers into the EU, and non-EU countries as Norway or Switzerland. After the aggression of Russia against Ukraine in February 2022, the refugees from Ukraine increased sharply, over 5 million left from home country mainly to EU countries.⁶⁶

According to the statistic, approximately half of refugees in 2015 trace their origins to just three countries: Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. (See the Figure 17)


⁶⁴ Killian Foubert and Ils Ruysen UNU-CRIS Working paper Series nr 7 September 2021 page 25 Downloaded from <https://cris.unu.edu/sites/cris.unu.edu/files/WP21.07%20-%20Foubert%20and%20Ruysen.pdf>

⁶⁵ Lauren Turner: Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts BBC NEWS 4 March 2016 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911>

⁶⁶The EU countries bordering Ukraine have allowed entry to all Ukrainian refugees, and the EU has invoked the Temporary Protection Directive, which grants Ukrainians the right to stay, work and study in any European Union member state. Refugees fleeing Ukraine (since 24 February 2022)". UNHCR. 2022. Downloaded from <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine> .

Top 10 origins of people applying for asylum in the EU

First-time applications in 2015, in thousands



Source: Eurostat

Figure 17: Top ten countries by number of immigrants between 2008-2020 to EU⁶⁷

It is clear, that migration itself is related not exclusively with the immigrants arriving from other continent but also there is a migration from the non-EU countries to EU countries. This trend is related to the price's differences of the related countries in European continent, and it is happening between EU countries. So, another migration trend has been the Northern Europeans' moving toward Southern Europe. Citizens from the European Union make up a growing proportion of immigrants in Spain, coming chiefly from the United Kingdom, Germany, but also from Italy, France, Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium, etc.

British authorities estimate that the population of British citizens living in Spain is much larger than Spanish official figures suggest, establishing them at about 1,000,000, with 800,000 being permanent residents.

As the next map is demonstrating, the immigrants to EU are originated from the conflict's countries located in Middle East and in Africa (Sudan, South Sudan, and Nigeria). (See Figure 18)

⁶⁷ Lauren Turner: Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts BBC NEWS 4 March 2016 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911>




Figure 18: origin of immigrants to Europe in 2015

Conclusion

As has been argued in this paper, complex reasons, such as personal, group, community, socio-political, and ideological factors continue to breed radicalization and mobilization of people to violence. There are approximately four times more radicalized individuals today than there were on 11 September, when al Qaida executed a serial terrorist attack against American symbols (WTC, Pentagon).

According to the Global Terrorism Database of the number of known or suspected terrorists has grown, as well. As radicalized populations grow, ability of Western Countries to identify, capture, and kill terrorists will necessarily decline. Furthermore, migration from Africa, due to the global warming, has been engendering far-right extremism against refugees and asylum seekers in Europe. The flourishing of the radicalized communities requires robust terrorism prevention efforts.

In sum, the stylized facts about transnational terrorism since 1995 tell us that:

- It concerns many parts of the world, particularly countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, where migration to Western countries originates,
- Jihadist groups having global vision, are likely to be the largest, most persistent transnational threat in the Western world, but these jihadist groups have spread in large areas of ungoverned or poorly governed territories, notably in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.

- Activity of terrorist organisations concentrated in the Middle East, Central Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. These regions recorded more terrorism deaths since 2018 than before. In 2019 and 2020 the largest increase of terrorism was in sub-Saharan Africa.

As argued in this paper, there is extremely little evidence (almost equal zero) that more migration would unconditionally lead to more terrorist activity in European countries.

While the overall risk of transnational terrorism (as expressed by its frequency and lethality) tends to be rather marginal, notwithstanding the ‘outlier’ of the 9/11 attacks.

This paper has found a real concern on the failures of immigrants’ integration in Western society (second and third generation of immigrants) that have led to the so-called homegrown terrorism.

Although jihadist terrorist incidents have graver consequences in terms of fatalities, most terrorist incidents in Europe – two of three attacks – were carried out by separatist groups during the last decades.

The weak immigration management, and the lack of efficient policies in this field, also the populist tendencies have triggered the growth of the extreme far-right terrorism in the Western World.

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Developing EFL Learners' Pragmatic Competence through a Blended Learning Model: A Quasi-Experimental Study

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Abstract

In the era of globalization, EFL (English as a Foreign Language) teachers have nominated to weld EFL instruction and aspects of intercultural competence together. Howbeit, the literature on the topic promulgates that procuring pragmatic competence remains a high-priority quest for EFL learners worldwide. This paper delineates the use of a blended learning model to teach pragmatic competence in an EFL context. This quasi-experimental study sought to probe into the potential of a blended learning model on participants' levels of pragmatic competence. 62 students from a junior high school participated in the study. 32 participants belonged to the control group and 30 participants belonged to the experimental group. The main findings demonstrated that the three-week blended learning model resulted in a statistically significant impact on participants' levels of pragmatic competence; that is, the experimental group participants ($M=16.40$; $SD=2.54$) remarkably outperformed the control group participants ($M=11.87$; $SD=3.49$) on the posttest. This implies that foreign language teachers are highly encouraged to attach much importance to amalgamating classroom teaching and the use of interactive websites (blended learning) as a way to develop the pragmatic competence of language learners.

Keywords: Blended learning, ICT, Foreign Language Teaching, Pragmatics, Pragmatic Competence

Introduction

Over the past few decades, the field of language teaching and learning has undergone a paradigm shift at the level of teaching methods and approaches as well as beliefs about what constitutes language competence. This has taken place to align with the world changes brought about by globalization. Besides, recent sophisticated technology has invaded the educational arena, evincing a great potential to upgrade the quality of the teaching and learning of languages. Being able to communicate successfully and effectively in different cultural contexts is deemed to be the ultimate goal for language learners, language course designers, and teachers alike. To this end, researchers have long been investigating the constituents of the competence that allows language learners to attain this objective. After the development of the famous model of communicative competence by Canale and Swain (1980) and Canale (1983), many other advocates for a communicative view of language (Savignon, 1983; Widdowson, 1983) proposed their model accounting for the necessary components of which this competence is grounded. Among these theoreticians is Bachman (1990) who conceives of pragmatic competence as a crucial construct of communicative competence.

In the literature, pragmatic competence can be defined as “the ability to communicate your intended message with all its nuances in any socio-cultural context and to interpret the message of your interlocutor as it was intended” (Fraser, 2010, p. 15). However, teaching this aspect of language in the traditional classroom usually fails because the time allotted to classroom activities is not sufficient for the effective development of pragmatic competence (Jeon & Kaya, 2006). As an alternative solution to the inadequacy of classroom allotted time to thoroughly cover and lead pragmatic activities, ICT tools offer new and powerful platforms for this purpose.

Modern technology has positively influenced various fields. A plethora of theoretical studies have been conducted to investigate the potential benefits it may accrue to its users, and language learners are no exception (Taylor & Todd, 1995; Venkatesh & Davis, 2000; Rogers, 2003). ICT tools have pushed the teaching and learning of foreign languages to the next level. One instance wherein it proves to be powerful is online exchanges, of which educators and practitioners made a virtue of developing intercultural pragmatic competence of learners by raising their cultural awareness (Kramsch and Thorne, 2002; Abrams, 2002).

In his seminal work, Cohen (2016) suggests that using internet tools to teach pragmatics would be very fruitful because today’s advancement in terms

of online platforms and multimedia computer programs enables users to interact with the computer through, for example, interactive software applications or websites. This way of language learning finds an echo in studies on ICT in an area referred to as ‘Computer-Assisted Language Learning (CALL) as opposed to Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC) in which communication occurs between two or more users through the use of electronic devices (Thomas, Reinders, & Warschauer, 2013). In this regard, interactive websites represent an interesting tool whose usefulness in the area of pragmatics is promisingly high.

With that in mind, the rationale of this study was to investigate the feasibility of a blended learning model as an alternative method to teach pragmatics, thus informing a new way for learners to develop their pragmatic competence. Thereof, the choice of blended learning (classroom teaching followed by the use of an interactive website) as a tool to develop learner’s pragmatic competence is justified based on, first, the fact that the nature of pragmatics entails interaction as a necessary condition for learning to take place, and second, there are no time-related restrictions on learners when using ICT tools (interactive website).

2. Review of the Literature

2.1. Defining Pragmatic competence

Teachers and educators, in the field of foreign language teaching and learning, have shifted their focus towards developing learners’ communicative competence, of which pragmatic competence is a very crucial component (Kasper & Rose, 2002; Kasper & Roever, 2005). The latter consists of two terms which are pragmatics and competence”.

The origin of the term ‘pragmatics’ dates back to 1938 (Morris, 1938). As an emerging discipline, it was referred to as “the study of the relationship between signs and their interpreters” (Verschueren, 2009, p. 2). Set up as an interdisciplinary branch in linguistics, scholars attempted to attribute definitions to it to make clear its concerns; and the most common definition of pragmatics in the literature is that it is the study of “meaning in use or meaning in context” (Jenney, 1995, p. 1). Hence, meanings and contexts wherein they take place are the central interest of pragmaticists (people who study pragmatics) (Grundy, 2000). Speakers frequently mean much more than their words say. For example, I might say: “It’s hot in here!”, but what I mean is: “Please, open the window!” (Jenney, 1995).

The second word ‘competence’ has its roots in the early 1960s when Chomsky alluded “linguistic competence” (Tienson, 1983). In his book *Aspect of the Theory of Syntax* (1965), Chomsky made a distinction between linguistic competence and linguistic performance. The former indicates the unconscious knowledge of rules governing the language whereas the latter

denotes the manifestation of this knowledge in the actual speech production. The term competence was further elaborated by other scholars, like Crystal (2008), who defined it as speakers' knowledge of their language, the system of rules which they have mastered so that they can produce and understand an indefinite number of sentences, and to recognize grammatical mistakes and ambiguities (p.92). From the definition given by Chomsky and the one provided by Crystal, it is fairly obvious that competence refers to the ability of the speaker to produce and grasp sentences and utterances, even those that he/she has never heard before. This also involves the speaker's capacity to judge language production (sentences and utterances) based on its grammatical correctness.

Succinctly, pragmatic competence is a significant facet of effective second-language interactions (Bachman, 1990; Canale & Swain, 1980; Hymes, 1972; Savignon, 1997). Being pragmatically competent means being able to interact successfully with the native speakers of the target language in any socio-cultural context. However, in a context where the target language is used as a second or foreign language, the instruction of pragmatics usually occurs in formal settings such as classrooms employing authentic materials or imitating real-life situations, which equips the learner with the "ability to analyze language in a conscious manner." (as cited in Holmes & Brown, 2007, p 524).

2.2. The Teaching and Learning of Second-Language Pragmatics

The bulk of studies in the past three decades showed that the instruction of the pragmatic aspect of the second language is more powerful than mere exposure to the target language (Bouton 1994a, 1994b; Kasper, 1997, 2001; Bardovi-Harlig, 2001; Rose, 2005; Félix-Brasdefer, 2006; Jeon & Kaya, 2006; AlcónSoler, 2008; Ishihara & Cohen, 2010). However, "given the complexities of pragmatics that involves the connections among forms, functions, and contexts, one would naturally wonder whether pragmatic competence is indeed teachable" (Taguchi, 2013).

Earlier studies focused on the nature of learning, that is, whether pragmatic learning is a cognitive or a socio-cognitive process (Zsuzsanna Ittzes, 2014). Some pragmaticists perceived pragmatic learning as a cognitive and individual activity focusing on the impact of raising learners' consciousness, noticing, and output. (Jeon & Kaya, 2006). Other pragmaticists (Ohta, 2005; Atkinson, Churchill, Nishino, & Okada, 2007; Alcon Soler, 2008; LoCastro, 2011) viewed pragmatic learning as a socio-cognitive activity. Within this framework, learning takes place when learners interact with each other or with other things like ICT tools. Developing analytic skills as part of pragmatic learning has also received wide attention and interest on the part of researchers and educators viewing these skills as

necessary for learners to “analyze language and strategies for learning and using speech act” (Zsuzsanna Ittzes, 2014, p. 57). In the same line of thought, Cohen (2005) maintains that because native speakers carry out different speech acts (e.g., requesting) on varying occasions even for the same pragmatic goal, developing analytic skills would be much better than learning formulaic and one-size-fits-all utterances.

Interestingly, scholars went further and put forward theories and models accounting for the acquisition of pragmatic competence. Noticing hypothesis by Schmidt (1993, 1995, 2010) asserting that if learning to take place, instruction must make the pragmatic features noticeable to students. With the same purpose as the previous model, Sharwood-Smith (1993), in his Consciousness Raising Model (later renamed Input enhancement), reasons that input converts to intake when the former becomes salient to the learner. In his cognitively-motivated assumption, Output hypothesis, Swain (1985, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2005) posits that the learner’s output is considered as both the ultimate goal and aiding device to acquisition. In her cognitively oriented model, the Two-Dimensional Model of second-language proficiency development, Bialystok (1993) argues that the learning of L1 pragmatic competence by children is distinct from adults learning a second language. Children are usually involved in the process of analysis as their main task of acquiring pragmatic competence, whereas adults are meant to get involved in the process of developing the “control strategies to attend to the intended interpretations in contexts and to select the forms from the range of possibilities that satisfy the social and contextual needs of the communicative situation” (Norouzian & Esmali, 2016 (p. 54).

2.3. The Role of ICT in the Teaching and Learning of Pragmatics in EFL Context

Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has changed the face of education worldwide. Because of the fact that today’s students are oftentimes labeled as “digital natives”, people born and brought up during the era of digital technology, who are heavy ICT tools users in all their walks of life, technological advancement has taken place faster and revolutionary than could have been imagined a few decades ago (facer et al. 2003). The enormous number of studies that have been conducted and the books that have been published in this regard show critical appraisal of the merits of using the internet as a tool for instructional offerings in the area of language learning based on fostering student autonomy (Cohen and Ishihara, 2005). Such innovative technologies offer solutions, especially to many of the challenges regarding second-language pragmatic learning (Taguchi & Sykes, 2013).

Technology has become the perfect complement to the teaching and learning of languages and paved the way for teachers to facilitate meaningful

learning, i.e., enabling learners to build deep and interlinked knowledge that is applicable in the real world (Ertmer, 2010; Lai, 2008; Law, 2008; Thomas & Knezek, 2008). For so doing, especially in the area of pragmatics, researchers attempted to develop new ways in the digital environment to assist teachers in the instruction of the pragmatic aspect of language and also aid language learners in successfully improving their pragmatic competence. One such way is to “employ web-based strategy instruction: to enhance learners' development and use of language learner strategies, to provide guidance in complex pragmatic language use that is difficult to "pick up," and to facilitate learning through web-based materials” (Cohen, 2016). According to Jeon & Kaya (2006), the teaching of pragmatics in the classroom usually does not reach its ultimate goal because the time allotted to pragmatics-related activities is most of the time not sufficient to develop students' pragmatic competence. “One of the best qualities of web-based learning is that technology allows learners to work independently with their initiative and proceed at their own pace using as much or as little electronic resources as they need” (Cohen and Ishihara, 2005).

Given the fact that pragmatics learning, by its very nature, necessitates interaction between interlocutors in an organized context, “contemporary multimedia technologies are becoming more interactive and responsive to learners” (Thomas, Reinders, and Warschauer, 2013). In effect, the websites of today are so sophisticated that they enable users to interact with the machine through digitally designed interactive activities, hence interactive websites. In addition, in such an environment, the teacher can diversify pragmatic activities according to the learning styles of the students. Students usually come to the classroom with varying learning styles which represents a challenge to the teacher, especially when the class is highly heterogeneous in this regard. At best, the teacher can cater only to specific students' learning styles to the exclusion of others because of time constraints as well as the number of students (Larsen-Freeman, 2000). As a viable alternative, the instructor can resort to the use of technology either as a complementary tool to the usual classroom teaching or as a superseding tool that the learners can use on their own to foster their autonomy (Gonzalez & Louis, 2008).

2.4. Blended Learning

In the literature, the term blended learning originated in the business world in connection with corporate training (Sharma and Barrett, 2007). After a while, it was employed in higher education (MacDonald, 2006) and afterward it emerged in language teaching and learning. The term became a buzzword in ELT coinciding with the publication of Sharma and Barrett's book *Blended Learning* in 2007. With reference to ELT blends, Sharma (2007) suggests that “for blended learning to be effective the two-component parts

should be integrated with the technology complementing and not replacing the efforts of the teacher”.

To achieve a ‘principled approach to blended learning Sharma and Barrett (2007, p. 13 –14) suggest four guiding principles. Firstly, they advise you to ‘separate the role of the teacher and the role of technology as the roles are not interchangeable, but they are complementary. Secondly, ‘teach in a principled way’ using means that best suit the learners’ needs, i.e., pedagogically driven. Thirdly, ‘use technology to complement and enhance F2F teaching’ means that the two modes should complement each other, which seems to suggest that face-to-face is exclusively the lead mode. Lastly, ‘It’s not so much the program, more what you do with it’ (Jones, 1986). To illustrate this final statement three examples of how to use a CD-ROM are given, from an individual using it alone at home, to follow up practice in self-study or at home after a class, to actually using it in class as part of a presentation.

In turn, Dudeney and Hockly (2007, p. 138–139) refer to a blended learning course where 75 percent is delivered online and 25 percent face-to-face in their list of three possible course designs for online learning in language learning environments. A 100 percent online language learning course, where the course is not unlike a coursebook online. A blended language learning course, where 75 percent is delivered online and 25 percent face-to-face. A face-to-face language learning course with additional online materials, where online tools are used to support and extend face-to-face lessons.

2.5. The Theoretical Framework

To gain in-depth insights into the research problem being investigated, two theories serve as the theoretical framework of this study. First, Speech act theory was adopted since it is regarded as the backbone of pragmatics, like Searle, Kiefer, and Bierwisch (1980) assert, “Speech act theory, together with the study of indexical expressions, make up most, or perhaps all, of the domain of pragmatics”. This conclusion was drawn by the aforementioned scholars as a reaction to Stalnaker’s (1972) assumption that there is an inextricable connection between speech acts and pragmatics: “Pragmatics is the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are performed”. Hence, relying on speech acts as the key measure for pragmatic competence of language learners is highly endorsed in the literature. Second, politeness theory, developed by Brown and Levinson (1987), was embraced in the study for the reason that there is a logical link between requesting and politeness. By the same token, Leech (1983) confirms that the directive group into which the speech act of requesting falls is pre-eminently associated with ‘negative politenesses’. Within the same theory, Brown and Levinson (1987) propose three facets of interpersonal interactions that are universally linked to

politeness:1) the social distance between the interlocutors, 2) the degree of imposition of the act to be carried out, 3) the power relationship between the interlocutors. Thereof, this quasi-experimental study purported to investigate whether the blended learning model was undertaken can develop the pragmatic competence of EFL language learners.

3. Methodology

3.1. Research Hypotheses

Following an extensive survey of the literature on ICT and pragmatic competence, as well as each construct in isolation (Snow & Goldfield, 1983; Elley, 1989; Strickland & Taylor, 1989; Dickinson & Smith, 1994; Klesius & Griffith, 1996; Lawless & Pellegrino, 2007; Lai, 2008; Law, 2008; Thomas & Knezek, 2008; Ertmer, 2010; Thomas, Reinders, and Warschauer, 2013; Cohen, 2016, to mention but a few). The researchers hypothesized that blended learning can play the same powerful and effective role in the field of language teaching and learning if applied in the right way. Therefore, two research hypotheses stem from the relevant literature:

- 1) Blended learning (face-to-face and interactive websites) does help EFL learners develop their pragmatic competence.
- 2) Students improve their production, perception, and comprehension of speech act with varying degrees of competence (via the Blended Learning).

3.2. Research Questions

This study sought to address the following questions:

- 1) Does the use of blended learning (face-to-face and an interactive website) help EFL learners develop their pragmatic competence?
- 2) Are the students able to perceive, comprehend, and carry out the speech act under study appropriately after subsequent to the use of the blended learning model?

3.3. Population and Sampling

This study opted for a quasi-experimental design. The participants of the experiment belonged to a junior high school in Ifrane Directorate, Morocco. The participants were third-year students. They were beginners, and their first language was Moroccan Arabic and the English language as their second foreign language. The study utilized non-random assignments to recruit two in-tact classes of the same level. The first sample or class (the experimental group) contained 30 students and the second sample or class encompassed 32 students. Thus, both samples had approximately the same characteristics as far as language proficiency, gender, race, and socioeconomic situation are concerned. Hence, a comparison between these two samples was

conducted. The researchers designated these students to constitute the population of the study for the reason that the students were not previously introduced to the speech act ‘making the request’ under study.

3.4. Data Collection Procedures

The researcher embarked upon collecting data immediately after the website was fully designed and the pragmatics contents were befittingly included drawing upon relevant literature on the speech act of request and refined by virtue of a native speaker’s guidance. As far as the treatment for this study is concerned, it was the teaching of the speech act of requests in the classroom followed by students’ exposure to interactive website contents at home (the website contained pragmatological and sociopragmatic activities needed for making requests in varying contexts).

Concerning the pretest for the experimental group, it was administered to 30 students according to the number of students in the class. The time allotted to the test was one hour, which is an adequate amount of time. As for the pretest for the control group, it was given out to 32 students. The test was allotted the same amount of time as that of the experimental group. Before choosing the two classes from among six classes in middle school, the researchers made sure that the language level of the students do not vary to a great degree, which means that the classes chosen were almost homogeneous.

After having the pretest sheets of paper collected, the researchers gave the experimental group students the treatment. Whereas the experimental group was taught the speech act of request through both classroom teaching and exposure to the interactive website contents, the control group was taught the same lesson but only in the classroom. After three weeks, the experimental group and control group sat for the posttest within a time frame of one hour, similar to the pretest.

3.5. Research Instruments and Scoring Criteria

This study used multiple-choice (MC) and discourse completion tests (DCT) as the main data collection methods. The former was adopted to elicit the students’ perception and comprehension of different forms of requests in varying contexts, while the latter was utilized to trigger their responses (written output) in form of requests vis-à-vis brief situational descriptions together with a short dialogue with an empty slot.

Once the pretest-posttest sheets of paper were collected from the experimental and control groups, the correction on the part of the researcher had to take place. As mentioned earlier, the test consists of three parts, each occupying an entire page: 1) perception, 2) comprehension, and 3) production. In order that all the pieces of paper to be corrected in a standardized way, the researcher established the criteria for each part of the test. It is important to

note that the production part of the pretest-posttest was corrected in accordance with what was judged to be correct and appropriate in the literature, and, equally important, through the guidance of a native speaker of English. The first pragmatic dimension that the test starts with is perception. This latter is measured by providing the subjects with five sets of multiple choices and asking them to identify the most polite request strategy. Since all the five sets of multiple choices are gauging the extent to which the subjects can identify the most polite request strategy, each correct answer in each set is scored 1. In the aggregate, all answers being correct means the subject will receive 5/20 for this part of the test. See table 2.1 for more details.

Table 3.1. Perception scoring.

Questions	Question type	Question name	Score out of 20	Total
Q1	MC	Politeness	1/20	5/20
Q2	MC	Politeness	1/20	
Q3	MC	Politeness	1/20	
Q4	MC	Politeness	1/20	
Q5	MC	Politeness	1/20	

MC = multiple choice

The second dimension being measured is comprehension. This part is organized in such a way that the subjects are given five multiple-choice situations along with their description and asked to identify the appropriate request strategy for each. 1 score is assigned to each correct answer out of a total of 20, that is, the whole part takes 5 scores out of 20. To assess the subject's grasp of the use of various request strategies in different socio-cultural contexts, situations including the variables discussed earlier have been included. See figure table 2.2 for more information.

Table 2.3. Comprehension scoring.

Situations	Question type	Question name	Score out of 20	Total
S1	MC	PR	1/20	5/20
S2	MC	SD	1/20	
S3	MC	DI	1/20	
S4	MC	CIR	1/20	
S5	MC	NCIR	1/20	

PR = power relationship, SD = social distance, DI = degree of imposition, CIR = conventionally indirect requests, NCIR = non-conventionally indirect requests.

Last but not least, the production ability is assessed as the last dimension. Because of the fact that it adopts a different data collection method, which is discourse completion entailing the capacity to fill in blanks with proper request strategies, it is deemed to be the most difficult aspect of pragmatic competence on the part of the test-takers, and, hence, given the

largest score in the whole test. Each question is scored 2 out of 20, and the entire part accounts for 10 out of 20 in total. It is worth mentioning that the first and the second situation measure the production ability of the same strategy, which is CIR, because of its wide use in everyday conversations. See figure 2.3 to know the ins and outs of this part of the test. Lastly, the subjects, of course, are not given which strategy to employ in what context since it is part of the examination.

Table 3.4. Production scoring.

Situations	Question type	Question name	Score out of 20	Total
S1	DC	CIR	2/20	10/20
S2	DC	CIR	2/20	
S3	DC	PR	2/20	
S4	DC	DI	2/20	
S5	DC	SD	2/20	

3.8. Findings

3.8.1. The Results of the Control Group's Pre- and Posttests Data Analysis

As has been mentioned earlier, the pretest, which measures three sub-competencies (perception, comprehension, and production), was administered to the students of the control group 21 days before they sat for the posttest. Again, perception and comprehension are scored out of 5, whereas the production is scored out of 10 which gives a total score of 20 out of 20. The control group comprised 32 students with approximately the same characteristics. To gain a comprehensive and clear picture of the students' performance before and after being taught the speech act of request in the classroom, see table 3.2.

Outcome	Pretest (n=32)		Posttest (n=32)		95% CI for Mean Difference	Sig. (2- tailed)	t	df
	M	SD	M	SD				
Perception	2.28	1.44	3.18	1.17	0.30, 1.50	0.004	3.06	31
Comprehension	2.03	1.33	3.37	0.75	0.80, 1.88	0.001	5.08	31
Production	1.68	2.38	5.31	3.07	2.33, 4.91	0.001	5.74	31
Total score	6.00	3.86	11.87	3.49	4.25, 7.49	0.001	7.38	31

* p < .05

Table 3.2. Control Group’s Descriptive Statistics and Paired Samples T-Test Results for Perception, Comprehension, Production, and Total Score

A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare the control group’s pre-and post-test total scores. There was a significant difference in the total scores for pretest (M=6.00, SD=3.86) and posttest (M=11.87, SD=3.49); $t(31)=7.38$, $p = 0.001$. These results indicated that the students’ level of pragmatics increased after being taught (the speech act of request) through the blended learning model. Regarding the posttest, there is an improvement in their pragmatic level (see figure 3.2). However, it is clear from the mean of both pre-and posttest that their improvement was not so high, that is, the given mean is not what is expected from the students to allow them to carry out the speech act of request effectively appropriately. Besides, the standard deviation shows that the scores are dispersed and not all of them revolve nearly around the mean




Figure 3.2. Control Group's Mean Score before and after the Intervention

Going a little deeper, the components that constitute the pre-and post-tests were also analyzed separately through a paired-samples t-test. For perception, there was a significant difference in the scores for pretest ($M=2.28$, $SD=1.44$) and posttest ($M=3.18$, $SD=1.17$); $t(31)=3.06$, $p = 0.004$. These results suggest that the student's level of perception of politeness in requesting does increase after being taught (the speech act of request) in the classroom. Specifically, the student's competence in perceiving politeness in requests increases when taught in the classroom. Concerning comprehension, there was a significant difference in the scores for pretest ($M=2.03$, $SD=1.33$) and posttest ($M=3.37$, $SD=0.75$); $t(31)=5.08$, $p = 0.001$. These results suggest that the student's level of comprehension of different strategies in requesting does increase after being taught (the speech act of request) through the traditional classroom. Regarding production, there was a significant difference in the scores for pretest ($M=1.68$, $SD=2.38$) and posttest ($M=5.31$, $SD=3.07$); $t(31)=5.74$, $p = 0.001$. To sum it all up, it is obvious that the student's level in the three sub-competencies does increase, however, such level does not live up to the expectation i.e. excelling in pragmatics. (figure 3.3 shows the degree of improvement in the three sub-competencies in pre-and post-test).




Figure 3.3. Control Group's Mean Score for the Three Sub-Competencies before and after the intervention

3.8.2. The Results of the Experimental Group's Pre- and Posttests Data Analysis

Perception and comprehension are scored out of 5, while the production is scored out of 10. This gives a total score of 20 out of 20. The control group comprises 30 students with approximately the same characteristics. To have a complete idea about the students' performance before and after being taught the speech act of request through the blended learning model, see table 3.3.

Outcome	Pretest (n=32)		Posttest (n=32)		95% CI for Mean Difference	Sig. (2- tailed)	t	df
	M	SD	M	SD				
Perception	2.26	1.22	4.13	0.50	0.42, 1.31	0.001	3.97	29
Comprehension	2.66	1.02	4.73	0.44	1.63, 2.49	0.001	9.90	29
Production	1.33	2.05	7.53	2.44	5.23, 7.16	0.001	13.10	29
Total score	7.26	2.99	16.40	2.54	8.10, 10.16	0.001	18.10	29

* p < .05

Table 3.3. Experimental Group’s Descriptive Statistics and Paired Samples T-Test Results for Perception, Comprehension, Production, and Total Score

There was a significant difference in the total scores of the pretest (M=7.26, SD=2.99) and posttest (M=16.40, SD=2.54); $t(29) = 18.10, p = 0.001$. These results suggested that the students’ level in pragmatics did greatly increase after being taught (the speech act of request) through blended learning. Specifically, the results indicated that when students were taught pragmatics through interactive websites, their pragmatic competence remarkably developed. To say it in other words, the post-test demonstrates a very higher improvement in their pragmatic level (see figure 3.4). From this, one can say that teaching the speech act of request through the interactive website can increase the students’ level tremendously. The standard deviation shows that the scores do not differ a lot from the mean value for the group, that is, the scores are close to the mean. Simply put, the majority of students get higher scores in the posttest which revolves around 16. This, in turn, signifies that students are better able to produce the speech act of request appropriately and effectively.




Figure 3.4. Experimental Group's Mean Score before and after the Intervention

Perception, comprehension, and production were all analyzed separately utilizing a paired-samples t-test. As for perception, there was a significant difference in the scores for pretest ($M=3.26$, $SD=1.22$) and posttest ($M=4.13$, $SD=0.50$); $t(29)=3.97$, $p = 0.001$. The results suggested that the students' level of perception of politeness in requesting did increase after being taught (the speech act of request) through the interactive website. Specifically, the student's competence in perceiving politeness in requests greatly increased when taught online. Concerning comprehension, there was a significant difference in the scores for pretest ($M=2.26$, $SD=1.02$) and posttest ($M=4.73$, $SD=0.44$); $t(29)=9.90$, $p = 0.001$. The results demonstrated that the student's level of comprehension of different strategies in requesting greatly increases after being taught (the speech act of request) through the interactive website. Regarding production, there was a significant difference in the scores for pretest ($M=1.33$, $SD=2.05$) and posttest ($M=7.53$, $SD=2.44$); $t(29)=13.10$, $p = 0.001$. All in all, the student's level in the three sub-competencies did highly increase, which means the blended learning program had the potential of developing students' pragmatic competence (Figure 3.5 demonstrates the degree of improvement in the three sub-competencies in pre-and post-test).




Figure 3.5. Experimental Group’s Mean Score for the Three Sub-Competencies before and after the Intervention

3.8.3. The Results of the Control Group versus the Experimental Group’s Posttests Data Analysis

To compare the control and experimental group on the outcome of the post-test, which is crucial to answering the second research question, an independent samples t-test was utilized. Figure 3.6. serves as a piece of evidence.




Figure 3.6. Control Group versus Experimental Group on the Mean Total Score Results

Otherwise stated, the independent samples t-test, which was conducted to show which group scored higher in the posttest including perception, comprehension, and production (see figure 3.6), indicated that students who belonged to the experimental group got greater scores than the control group. This implies that teaching pragmatics, namely the speech act of request, through blended learning led to attaining a higher level in pragmatics compared to the teaching of the same content in only face-to-face instruction. Thereof, the blended learning model adopted, face-to-face instruction, and an interactive website, are viable educational tools that can develop EFL learners' pragmatic competence remarkably.




Figure 3.7. Control group versus experimental group on the mean score results of the three sub-competencies

From figure 3.7, it is clear that, at all levels, the students in the experimental group are shown to outperform the students in the control group. Thus, interactive websites together with classroom teaching, indeed, have great potential in improving EFL learners' pragmatic competence.

Discussion

In this section, the researchers attempted to confirm or refute the hypotheses generated and provide answers to the two research questions:

- 1) Does the use of the blended learning model help EFL learners develop their pragmatic competence?
- 2) Are the students able to perceive, comprehend, and carry out the speech act under study appropriately after utilizing the blended learning model?

Trying to answer these questions, links, and connections will also be established with the previous studies as far as pragmatic competence and ICT are concerned. As noted earlier, the control group embraces 32 and the experimental group includes 30 students. To answer the above research question and gain deeper insights, it is of crucial significance to mention the mean scores (obtained in the posttests) for each group including each sub-competence separately. The first component to compare is perception. The control group's mean score of 3.18 with a standard deviation of 1.17 and the experimental group's mean score of 4.13 with a standard deviation of 0.50 indicates that students in the experimental group outperformed students in the control group. From the p-value, which is 0.001, the difference between the mean scores of both groups is significant.

The second constituent to compare is comprehension. The control group's mean score of 3.37 with a standard deviation of 0.75 and the experimental group's mean score of 4.73 with a standard deviation of 0.44 indicates that students in the experimental group outperformed students in the control group. From the p-value, which is 0.001, the difference between the mean scores of both groups is significant.

The third element to compare is production. The control group's mean score of 5.31 with a standard deviation of 3.07 and the experimental group's mean score of 7.53 with a standard deviation of 2.44 indicates that students in the experimental group outperformed students in the control group. From the p-value, 0.003 is lower than 0.05, the difference between the mean scores of both groups is significant.

Last but not least, the mean total score is decisive in telling. The control group's mean total score of 11.87 with a standard deviation of 3.49 and the experimental group's mean score of 16.40 with a standard deviation of 2.54 indicates that the students in the experimental group outperformed the students in the control group. Based on the p-value, which is 0.001, the difference between the mean scores of both groups is significant. Thereof, the findings of the study are aligned with Dewar and Whittington (2004).

One key finding the recent study put forward is that the blended learning approach for teaching pragmatics is more beneficial to the learners in contrast to a fully online approach or a traditional form of instruction. With regard to previous studies (Osguthorpe & Graham, 2003; Walker, 2005), one major importance is participants' attitudes towards the blended versus online approach, as seen above. In the context of foreign education, Dziuban et al. (2004, p. 5) found that their blended learning courses had "the potential to increase student learning outcomes while lowering attrition rates in comparison with equivalent fully online courses" and that blended learning results in "in success and attrition rates [were] comparable to the face-to-face modality for all ethnicities." A study conducted by Harker and Koutsantoni

(2005, p. 197) also found that “the blended learning model was much more effective in student retention” than the distance learning mode.

Furthermore, developing a blend is an iterative process according to Beetham and Sharpe (2007, p. 8) who believe that “effective designs will evolve only through cycles of practice, evaluation, and reflection”. Rossett et al. (2003) stress that “there’s no cookbook for blends” and state, with reference to the business world, that “the topic cries out for empirical research”. In relation to ELT, Neumeier (2005, p. 176) supports this statement and emphasizes that “further research is needed in order to enhance the quality of blended learning environments”. Westbrook (2008, p. 14) concurs, as to his mind most of the research on blended learning has been carried out in the tertiary sector and therefore there is a “huge deficit in terms of research on using blended learning by individuals or small language schools”.

Implications

There are four implications of the current quasi-experimental study for foreign language program designers and teachers. First, similar to the results of previous research, the findings of the current study provided further evidence for the promising potential of the teaching of pragmatic competence via blended learning models (face-to-face instruction coupled with an online interactive website). The quasi-experimental intervention in the current study manifested a statistically significant improvement in EFL learners’ pragmatic competence. Second, online EFL content designers and teachers need to pay close attention to the changes in students’ learning styles, interests, and motivation in EFL instruction seeing they are heavy users of digital technology. The use of ICT tools along with face-to-face forms of instruction in the teaching pragmatics, as shown, should be part and parcel of day-in-day-out EFL instruction. Third, indeed, the integration of technology in the teaching of different competencies in the language requires training on the part of the teacher. Fourth, given the fact that the world now has become a small village in which people from different cultural backgrounds come into contact, it is incumbent upon school qualified personnel in general and teachers, in particular, to capitalize on blended learning models so that students can effectively employ such devices in learning more about cross-cultural communication as a way to develop their intercultural communicative competence. In a nutshell, the current study advocating the potential of blended learning models stressed that interactive websites along with face-to-face teaching should be adopted as a new way to develop students pragmatic competence. It must be synergized into the language learning instruction with the support of surrounding educational systems.

Limitations

This study had some limitations that were beyond the researchers' control and the scope of the agency. The limitations concern the flaws in the quasi-experimental research design, the sampling method, and the testing effects. The sample in the current study required in-tact classes. Thus, random sampling is not feasible at all (foreign language education & social sciences). Convenience sampling is used in this study for two main reasons. First, it is not feasible to randomly assign students to control and experimental groups within the same classroom, because it would be unethical and impractical to ask the experimental group not to attend the class during the period of the treatment. There is likely to be a degree of self-selection bias. This can either lead to the sample not being representative of the population being studied or exaggerating some particular findings from the study. Second, experts in research methodology and statistics unanimously agree on the fact that quasi-experiment is more powerful in some cases in social sciences, as opposed to true experiment which is more practical in exact sciences. There may be influenced by their previous responses to the same questions (Fraenkel & Wallen, 1993). The current study utilized the pre-post, quasi-experimental design to test the participants twice on the same sets of instruments; thus the testing effects might be unavoidable.

Recommendations for Future Research

With reference to the limitations discussed previously, three suggestions are put forward for future research on pragmatic competence teaching via blended learning models. First, future-oriented research might address the research inherent design flaws of the current study (Quasi-Designs) by opting for a different design. Second, future researchers are invited to investigate the effects of blended learning models on novel speech acts (different functions), of blended learning models on the teaching of various language functions and speech acts. Finally, regarding the negative impact of self-administered surveys (discussed in the literature), on the data quality, it is recommended for future researchers to consider other forms.

Conclusion

This study aimed to investigate the potential of a blended learning model to enhance learners' pragmatic competence. This study adds to the existing pool of knowledge in the use of ICT in education in general and language teaching in particular (Snow & Goldfield, 1983; Elley, 1989; Strickland & Taylor, 1989; Dickinson & Smith, 1994; Klesius & Griffith, 1996; Lawless & Pellegrino, 2007; Lai, 2008; Law, 2008; Thomas & Knezek, 2008; Ertmer, 2010; Thomas, Reinders, and Warschauer, 2013; Cohen, 2016). The study was conducted through a quasi-experimental design using a pre-test

and a post-test, starting from the more obvious and general knowledge to be acquired to the more specific and detailed information. The data gathered from the tests were compared and analyzed by certain statistical procedures to test the hypotheses and answer the two research questions. Hypothesis testing was done by an assorted set of statistical tools, providing clear evidence and establishing reliable proof for supporting the hypotheses which assumed that teaching EFL learners' pragmatic competence via a blended learning model (face to face instruction coupled with an online interactive) would increase their pragmatic competence. The current study informs a new way of teaching pragmatics to EFL learners. EFL teachers are highly encouraged to amalgamate face-to-face learning with online interactive activities e.g., websites or software, as shown in the findings. The more interaction and communication the learners have, the better their pragmatic competence, on the grounds that pragmatics is primarily interactive in nature.

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Modern and Contemporary Architecture Between Western and Arab Countries: A Review of Derivative Synonyms

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Abstract

The most common approaches to contemporary architecture are described as 'modern', yet the terms 'modern' and 'contemporary' possess different contextual weights, resulting in a difference in terminological synonymy. This research examines the phenomenon that emerged in the late twentieth century, processes its conflicts, and describes several interrelated implications for understanding modernity and contemporariness. This research discusses the confusion between contemporary and modernist architectural representation by analyzing Western and Arab visions. Furthermore, it explores the study with inductive logic that takes an analytical turn to analyze, compare, and explore the real causes of the problem. The research also aims to analyze the impact of modernism, the semantic evolution of 'modernity', and our arrival to the contemporary, considering neoliberalism and globalism. The research concluded that separating the idiomatic language from the architectural language is necessary. Furthermore, it found that contemporary ended as an architectural style and continued as a cultural movement.

Keywords: Derivative Synonymy; Modernism; Contemporary Architecture; Synonymy; Semantic Field; Lexical Field

1. Introduction

The twentieth century mimicked a large laboratory that reformulated a new world order that produced many architectural and artistic schools. Modernism, fore and foremost, granted this century new and modern characteristics and idiomatic concepts driven by an architectural trend that adopted everything new and modern and denied the past's historical depth as will be discussed in this research. As modernity was proactive in adopting multiple philosophies (intellectual, cultural, social, economic, and political), it continued to converse and then interacted with all subsequent schools. When contemporary architecture emerged as an architectural school in the eighties of the twentieth century, it was attributed to modernism because it resembles a derivation and a significance. Despite the end of modernism, since the forties of the twentieth century, the term has remained in effect until now.

2. Research Importance

The importance of the research lies in the fact that it addresses the problem of confusion, the term contemporary, and its architectural implications. As the research analyzes with many readings and approaches on modernity, contemporary, and their architectural and artistic features, they address the origin of this confusion. The importance of the research is that it discusses the opinions of contemporary thinkers and architects who approached the emergence of modernity with critical logic, and they reached scientific results. Its essence lies in the fact that it tries to find a clear vision to determine the differences between modernity and contemporary from theoretical, scientific, and visual approaches that will form a base from which researchers can precisely record the aging of the architecture of the end of the twentieth century.

3. Objectives

The research explores current paths from political, economic, and social events of the first twentieth century. This era established a creative path that violated the extremist architecture of modernity with its imperatives and constants and turned into a more creative and innovative modern architecture. The research aims to determine the ambiguous relationship between modernity and contemporary terms and approaches from the opinions of thinkers and architects who discussed the two periods with different research tools. The research investigates why contemporary has overcome modernity and has folded its page as an ideology and architectural approach? (consider the emergence of postmodernism between both movements). It also seeks to reinterpret the contemporary evolutionary nature of architecture from a modern building to a complex and then an iconographic deconstructivism with technological - commercial dimensions.

4. Problematic and Research Questions

The idiomatic synonym between modernity and contemporary contributed to ambiguous interpretations. What led to the approach of both terms with similar meanings? The problem lies in accurately defining features and classifying both paradigms based on cognitive, intellectual, and technical data. The problem lies in the time difference between the birth of modernity and its development, since modernity ended in Europe in the 1940s and then began in the East in the 1960s, which made the process of cognitive separation complex and interrelated; this is the source of the synonymic and problematic issue. What poses the correct classification of periodization?

Furthermore, did the contemporary come as a continuity of the previous, or is it independent from it? Is modernity contemporary? Where is the flaw in the definition of the term? How can the experiences of architects and the opinions of thinkers constitute a landmark in this field and reliable evidence? How did the misunderstanding of the term confuse the effects of modernity on heritage with the contemporary world? Moreover, how does the linguistic synonymy lead to confusion in defining terms and thus in architectural manifestations?

5. Methodology

This study was based on the descriptive-analytical approach and the comparative approach according to inductive reasoning within Qualitative Research. The study used the qualitative method to collect information needed to analyze, compare, and explore the real causes of the problem. Discussing Thomas Kuhn and van Eyck's theories linking concepts with theoretical frameworks. By understanding the phenomenon and trying to explain it through the semantic field and the lexical field, and by realizing the problem of language synonymy; the study examined the effects of idiomatic synonyms on the architectural language over a century from modernity until the emergence of contemporary and its development in Arab countries and the interaction of Arab thinkers with Western thought from which modernity and contemporarily started. The study set time limits from the mid-twentieth century till the end, and spatial boundaries between Europe and the Arab region as a cross-cultural laboratory, through which the researchers sought to explain the phenomenon of history and its impact on architecture.

6. Literature Review

There are many opinions about the relationship between modernity and contemporariness as many thinkers have put forward different viewpoints on similarities and differences. At the same time, the words *modern* and *contemporary* are often used interchangeably. "Talk of modernity is plagued with paradox" (Reddy, 2017). The term synonym is included in the

interpretation of "*modernity* (mə'dərnəʃi)" "of the present or recent times, or having all the newest methods, equipment, designs, etc." (Bull & Phillips, 2006. 468) and "*contemporary* (kən'temp(ə)r(ə)r(i))", "belonging to the same time as *sb/sth* else, or, of the present time, SYN. Modern" (Bull & Phillips, 2006. 159) and the synonym in the language is a synonym of pronunciation' (Amer, 2008): an identical or similar in meaning.

The French poet Charles Baudelaire was the first to coin the term (Modern) in a study entitled (*Painter of Modern Life*) concerning the painter Constantin Gui. "Jean-François Lyotard, called the father of this movement, explains that (*modernity*), perceived as the epoch of progress, assumed a constant supply of new technical solutions" (Tobolczyk, 2021. 2). In this context "*Moderne* : (France) *adj.* "Celui de l'époque actuelle" (Lagane, 1997. 420) which signifies present day. "*Modernism*: from the Latin *modo*, the critical literature frequently reminds us, "just now, the present, this moment" (Bradshaw and Dettmar, 2006. 1). "*Modernity* comes from the initiation or beginning of something" (Iben Manzour), although "*Contemporary* is a movement of a modern influence" (Khalousi. 26). "*Contemporain* : (France) *adj.* "ils vivaient à la même époque" (Lagane, 1997. 141) which signifies living at the same time. "On the other hand, *contemporary* is "living the present with conscience, behavior, and benefit from all its scientific and intellectual achievements and using it to serve humanity and its progress" (Iskandar, 1971). Some intellectuals have attributed the term (*modern*) to all that is innovative in all eras. In the derivative sense, contemporary is derived from modernity, as stated in many Arabic, English, and French dictionaries. Despite the divergence of the period between both epochs (nearly half a century), we find that the comparison between them has some objectivity, especially since both came after a period of architectural clamor. Modernity was preceded by the end of the nineteenth century with its technical & industrial developments, whereas contemporary is preceded by the sixties and seventies era with its extreme architecture.

It became popular in the late 1990s to distinguish between modern architecture and contemporary architecture as shown in (Table 1), particularly after the blurring of postmodernism and the requirement for a recharged modern movement. Synonymous terms have emerged, preferring one to the other and referring to the concept of continuity rather than the concept of change. In other words, there is no discontinuity between modernism and contemporary because the latter emerged from the uterus of modernity, unlike 'modernism that was broken with what preceded it' (Koudeih, 2014) (Tobolczyk, 2021. 13). This approach led Sean Latham and Gayle Rogers to describe it as (Problem) "Instead modernism insists on a kind of ahistorical, even paradoxical presentism" (Latham and Rogers, 2015. 2). At the same time, Aldo Van Eyck went rhetorically "to create an issue from the new

contemporary architecture” (Haddad & Rifkind, 2016). Inspiration came from celebrities of the modern era, for example, Picasso, Mondrian, and Le Corbusier, who described their works as 'contemporary'. Van Eyck's approach will be discussed in detail to investigate why he criticized modernism and how contemporary originated.

Table 1: shows the similarities and differences in the general aspects between modern and contemporary architecture

An analytical comparison between the characteristics of modern and contemporary architecture	
Contemporary	Modernism
Curved lines	Straight line
Rounded forms	Simple forms
Asymmetric	Asymmetric
Unconventional volumes	Proportional volume
Free-form shapes	Free-form shapes
Open floor plans	Open-floor plans
Larges, abundant windows	Largest and abundant windows
Green roofs, living walls	No Green roofs, living walls
Integration into the surrounding landscape	Integration into the surrounding landscape
High-tech architecture	Using concrete
Integrated smart home technology (Konbr, 2016)	No smart home technology

7. Approaches to Modernity and Contemporary

7.1. Western Approaches

The terms modernism and contemporary approach began early when Elie G. Haddad and David Rifkind discussed the theories of Van Eyck’s book *A Critical History of Contemporary Architecture 1960-2010* regarding contemporary architecture and its paths. "To reject the term modernist architecture, it was necessary to invent a new term and a contemporary architecture concept." Van Eyck expanded his critical writings *Mechanistic Conception of Progress* and suggested looking beyond the positivity of the 1920s and 1930s and arguing that architects and urban planners should have abandoned their Euclidean Grooves. By comparison with knowledge, modernist architecture and urban planning faced failures because architects were out of reality and time, deviating from modern creativity. He even “recommended that architects follow the example of such non-Euclidean artists and scientists as Picasso, Mondrian, Joyce, Le Corbusier, Schoenberg, Bergson, and Einstein. Whose work he described, not as modern but contemporary” (Haddad & Rifkind, 2016. 13). Whereas “Louis Sullivan proposed that contemporary artists needed their own Einstein” (Bradshaw and Dettmar, 2006. 39) because he was a contemporary scientist. Van Eyck gave an example of the antithesis of modernity to the contemporary world: When architects “discover anew” implies discovering something new. Translate this into architecture. You will get new architecture – contemporary architecture”

(Strauven, 2016. 2). Elie Haddad also concluded that "the state of absolute modernism lacked the element of complementarity and continuity (Haddad & Rifkind, 2016. 13).

Returning to Western approaches and using the term coined by Thomas Kuhn in 1959, the semantic shift from modernism to contemporary like "a shifting paradigm" (Bishel. 5). and a shift in thinking that, according to Thomas Kuhn, did not require the absolute rejection of the previous paradigm (modernism); this confirms the state of Continuity with modernity, not disconnection. "In the end, the increase in failures led to crises that increased in architectural culture until the beginning of the year 1950 and grew twice as many as in the year 1956, producing intellectual crises.

According to Thomas Kuhn, competition between those who sought to preserve fundamentalist beliefs and others who wished to highlight shortcomings in the prevailing theory and engage in new, unusual research explains the state of diversity, transit trails, and cultural phenomena pre-contemporary era starting in the 1950s and decades. "Examining the record of past research from the vantage of contemporary historiography, the historian of science may be tempted to exclaim that when paradigms change, the world itself changes with them. Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in unfamiliar places. Even more important, during revolutions, scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before" (Kuhn, 1970. 111).

Nevertheless, the changes to challenge the paradigm may be more related to evolutionism than to revolutionism, as Kuhn articulated in *the structure of scientific revolutions 1962* (Haddad & Rifkind, 2016(. This brings us back to the assertion of the continuity that produced contemporary architecture in advanced logic. (Figure 1).




Figure SEQ Figure * ARABIC 1: The cycle of paradigm change according to Kuhn, before science, then deviation, then crisis, then revolution, then paradigm change. (Thwink, 2020)

7.2. Arab Approaches

Afif Bahnassi also approached architectural modernity with critical logic, starting from its interlacement with the human dimension. He considered it to be separated from the language of architecture; this is the historical language that expressed the person for whom architecture was created. Moreover, the modernist architecture remained without language and identity “Quoted by the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (language is the expression of identity; it is the existence)”. Furthermore, we cannot adopt an identityless building that does not harmonize with its historical and social environment. The architecture expressed a national concept, and then it became arbitrary and lost character. Bahnassi’s view meets with Van Eyck’s approach, considering that modernity has failed to return to reality. Bahnassi’s point of view stemmed from an obsession with the Westernization of the Arab identity in the eyes of Arab intellectuals. “It is a problem that has existed since the sixties of the twentieth century.” It is important to consider that Arab thought combined modernism and the contemporary with common criticism approaches through language because Arab modernity initiated in the 1960s of the twentieth century, simultaneously with the launch of the contemporary in the West.

Consequently, Arab intellectuals did not differentiate between them (not ignorant of the terms’ interpretations), but instead, they intersected at a close time. Udo Kultermann indicated this in his book *Contemporary Architecture in the Arab States* “Contemporary architecture in the Arab states has never been investigated in its entirety, its significance, therefore, remains unknown” (Kultermann, 1999. 1), which deepens the research problem.

This brings us back to the conventional synonym that we have enriched. For instance, Ali Thowaini stated: “Modernism or Contemporary is a concept contrary to heritage, and we tend to it toward renewal and change and an invitation to modernization” (Thowaini, 2009, 26). What explains the previous idea must be the research hypothesis that determined the time difference for the emergence of the contemporary between the West and the Arab region. However, Hatem Ibrahim distinguished between them, saying that “contemporary architecture is difficult to identify because it could not be recognized as a clear style in the whole country and the small neighborhood”. He compared the features of modernist and contemporary architecture, which are the first known features, through their simple and clear lines and their emphasis on functionality. Stated, “contemporary architecture becomes an example of internationalism. Internationalism means eliminating the local tradition to global masses, which had no identity or reflected any traditions” (Ibrahim, 2013. 95).

Moreover, in a research paper published by Ibrahim (2013), he explored the effects of contemporary architecture on Qatar and his reference

to the term internationalism, which will be discussed in the second part starting by explaining globalization and monitoring its mechanisms (Technology) and how it produced an Iconic Architecture rather than contemporary. In the same context, Walid al-Sayed considered that the intellectual subordination of the West prompted the development of another kind of architecture in the Arab world during the twentieth century and examined that “this factor is the engine for the emergence of contemporary Arab architecture” (Al-Sayed, 2017). “As time has moved on – as modernism has ceased to be the “just now,” if ever it had been – so to modernism has grown to be many different things” (Bradshaw and Dettmar, 2006. 4), including contemporary.

8. Contemporary Architecture Between Theory and Reality

8.1. Contemporary Concept

Many writers and Architects call the architecture of the present the term contemporary architecture. Many believe that contemporary means the “present or actual – contemporary” (Amara, 1997. 4). Ashley Friedman gave an opinion and classification in an article on the specialized Huncker website that said: “Contemporary architecture, on the other hand, is not an architectural movement. It is an overarching ideology concerned with architecture that reflects the opinions and values of the present and aims to break away from the past” (Friedman, 2019). This implies that contemporary architects have, as their core value, the desire to create architecture that breaks with past principles. Rather than anything worthwhile, contemporary architecture is about innovation.

This means that the adherents of this school have a guiding principle: the desire to create an architecture that contradicts history and is linked to innovation and individuality. This approach is correct. However, like many writers, Friedman fell into generalization when she considered that contemporary architecture is not a movement that reflects a certain historical moment and that “the term includes anything that reflects the present” (Lardinois, 2015). Here lies the ambiguity problem, the term linked to the research is problematic because contemporary interacted with many artistic movements and interfered with them. We have to separate between ‘contemporary’ as a movement that has continued and evolved through sustainability and the neoliberalism economy and between ‘contemporary architecture’ as a school that originated in the 1980s and ended in the 1990s after the banners of ‘globalization’ and ‘branding’. “Regional conditions are exchanged for transnational forms and styles. However, a range of architectural practices have developed another strategy that relies on a new engagement with ordinary local conditions, with the commonplace, and offers an alternative perspective for contemporary architecture” (Haddad & Rifkind, 2016. 189).

8.2. Contemporary Architecture

The term contemporary architecture was first used in the 1980s. Nevertheless, its foundations started in the year 1965, when Robert Venturi published an article critique entitled *The Justifications for Architecture of Pop*, during which he presented a new vision of architecture as opposed to the rigid concepts adopted by modernity. Moreover, he meant *contemporary architecture*. This method continued until the birth of the concept of neoliberalism and globalization and the spread of iconic architecture. Within this framework, Douglas Spencer did not separate between contemporary and neoliberalism. Therefore, he considered that “contemporary architecture is inseparable from the principles of neoliberalism and is the form of our existence or its spatial complement” (Spencer, 2016). Christine Hohenadel has classified Some notable contemporary 21st-century architects include “Frank Gehry, Jean Nouvel, Tadao Ando, Shigeru Ban, Santiago Calatrava, and the late Zaha Hadid, who died at 65 in 2016 but whose oeuvre is still being built by the company she left behind. These contemporary architects are known for show-stoppingly expressive buildings rendered in unconventional, sometimes gravity-defying shapes that alter the landscape in places around the world” (Hohenadel, 2020). “Their emphasis on the aesthetic value of abstract form and stylistic change stopped short in their efforts to address the contemporary architectural debate” (Wagner, 1988. 24).

Patina Lee argued that “The contemporary always seems to be shifting forward, thus writing about the present in a historical context seems tricky” (Lee, 2016). When we examine how architects approach to design at present, we will perceive that they have a variety of visions. Some of them are neo-modern, postmodernism, deconstructivism, or parametricism, as a possible new type of universal language, or something else, that has not been named yet. This explains the dynamics of the contemporary. However, “what is common in all of the above is the technological improvements produced by computer programs related to the construction processes that made everything possible” (Lee, 2016). Lee's viewpoint is more specific to the concept, so whatever comes of this era is considered an ‘echo of our generation.’ Here, we see that contemporary architecture as a style ended in the late nineties of the twentieth century, after which the stage of globalist architecture driven by superior technology begins in the light of Glass Skyscrapers and Iconic Architecture.

8.3. Technology as a tool of Contemporary

The most prominent characteristic of contemporary architecture in the 1980s was the spread of computer technology. “The course Architecture, Urban Mapping and the Digital Technologies deals with contemporary issues concerning the influence of digital technologies in contemporary architectural

and urban design” (Graafland, 2012. 3). “In addition, it depends on the virtualization in the new dimensions of modern, sustainable, and smart planning” (Konbr 2019). Avi Friedman stated, “Contemporary advancements in technology have provided more efficient mechanisms to design, construct, and better communicate with clients” (Friedman, 2021. 3). In their book, *A History of Interior Design*, John Pile and Judith Gara discussed the impact of technology on the development of the contemporary movement. They considered that “The world’s fastest-growing industry has given birth to the universal language of computer-speak, with a new vocabulary, new tools, and ever-proliferating applications” (Pile & Gara. 444). Its effect on design could not be more significant; not only do sophisticated programs enable the design of buildings and interior configurations that would be impossible to render by hand, but their construction is facilitated by translating computer-generated models into accurate three-dimensional ones through fast prototyping. This software was used to construct extremely tall buildings, curved or with unconventional edges, and assess their resistance to computers.




Figure SEQ Figure * ARABIC 2: From the right is a diagram drawn on a computer program showing the intricate shape of the bird Nest stadium, with executive details of the structural ribs (Civilax, 2014).

From the left is a cross-section of the interior space as it appears with its many intersections and a staircase ascending to the upper floors (Pile & Gara, 444).

“Another tool. Building Information Modeling (BIM), provides a virtual-reality walk-through of a project that enables designers and clients to adjust before construction begins” (Pile & Gara. 444). These developments made feasible extremist and nontraditional structures, such as the National Stadium in Beijing (The Bird’s Nest), which was designed by Herzog & de Meuron in 2008, as contemporary construction techniques with very complex designs were used to interconnect metal parts that gave a stunning appearance from the outside. A unique look inside. (Figure 6). Research by Wei *et al.* (2021) analyzed China's reliance on contemporary technologies in buildings in order to increase the efficiency of the material. On the other hand, “Other factors affecting the creation of a style are local and traditional building

materials, contemporary ‘technostatic’ influences (the technology arising from the materials), the need for protection and durability as conditioned by climate, and finally cultural aspirations” (Wagner, 1988.14). And this is what Lu *et al.* (2021) suggested stated that “Today, intelligent urban paradigm and smart cities need to be managed in intelligent techniques to increase comfortable civilization”.

9. Results

Based on the previous, the extent of the controversy surrounding contemporary paths becomes clear. Which went through intellectual, cultural, and social crises, and opinions approached the topic in several ways: Van Eyck perceived it as the envoy of creativity, who lost modernity. In addition, Afif Bahnasi did not separate contemporary and modernism, and he saw that it had split from its humanity. Ali Thowaini equated it with modernism. Hatem Ibrahim and Walid Al-Sayed saw it as a negative identity, and Thomas Kuhn approached it in the paradigm shift. These samples of approaches explain an essential aspect in the concept of contemporary: the dynamism that started from the 1950s and resulted in a new philosophy that overshadowed modernism and beyond, and the identity of places at times, and sometimes interacted with them. The research found that contemporary is driven by six factors: contemporary as a movement, technology as an evolutionary tool, architecture and interior as an artistic style, consumption as a lifestyle, neoliberalism as an economic doctrine, and sustainability as an environmental approach.

10. Discussion

Despite the criticism that affected it, it is impossible to describe contemporary architecture as creative futility. It was a major driver of artistic creativity and architectural innovation that developed important architectural schools such as deconstructivism and iconography. Consequently, we discussed the contemporary movement and analyzed its artistic, architectural, and literary dimensions to arrive at a clear definition that corrects the ambiguities and common mistakes around it and the reasons for their recurrence. Accordingly, we will clarify the confusion that arose across the interpretation of the architectural language between modernity and contemporary by discussing the similarities and differences between their architectural aspects (Table 2).

“The rejection of the academic tradition of formal aesthetics and spatial hierarchies in favor of innovative creativity based on simplicity and abstraction.” (Tobolczyk, 2021. 13). This principle led the modern architecture to Famous slogans: Form follows function, Unity of spatial, A clear design system, Avoidance of symmetry in composition, Free plan,

Purism, and simplicity (Wagner, 1988). Additionally, modern architecture colors “have an earthier hue and feature shades like rust, turquoise, brown and olive greens.” (Bowman, 2020). It was to break open the inner space, clean up its lines, clear it of clutter, and let in light and air. (Spurr, 2012 .58). Furthermore it “finds connect with nature” (Chauhan, 2018), as shown in (Figures 2-4).


While Contemporary architecture “often sticks to a palate of black, white and grey. If color is added, the color is often a pure, saturated tone like true red, indigo, or orange. (Bowman, 2020). Trendy, large and open floor, innovative and advanced (Chauhan, 2018), advancements in technology (Friedman, 2021), environmental aspects in sustainable landscaping (Maged *et al.* 2022), and shifting forward (Lee, 2006). Elsewhere, contemporary architects “wanted to be original. They looked back to find different reasons to do things a different way, mostly creating personal, unique paths to reference” (Rubio-Landaluce, 2018). David Spurr stated that contemporary architecture bears a relation to history similar to that which modern bears to nature: historical forms are there to be cited and transformed, at worst into consumerized kitsch, at best into something rich and strange (Spurr, 2012 .49), as shown in (Figures 3-5).

This research indicates that there is an association between the perception of both differences and similarities, and between the derivative synonyms. This is the knowledge gap that the research addressed. Also, an important finding has been investigated: One thing that can be derived from the language of modern and contemporary architecture is that each one offer 'modern' appearance, but they are different from one another. Nevertheless, modern architecture indicates a specific time period, and contemporary means the now trend (Chauhan, 2018). Furthermore, we realize that this approach becomes more sophisticated when addressing the problem from a different perspective of the architectural language between the West and the Arab regions. “These trends reflected a state of confusion in a culture that is both dogmatic and undefinable, neither traditional in the authentic sense, nor contemporary in the modern sense; a mutated hybrid.” (Dahabreh 2020.1660). as shown in (Figures 7-8).

Table 2: shows the similarities and differences in the general aspects between modernist and contemporary architecture

An analytical comparison between the language of modern and contemporary architecture	
Modern Architecture	Contemporary Architecture
	
<p>Figure SEQ Figure * ARABIC 3: Lovell Beach House, Modern Architecture. USA California. Architect Rudolph Schindler, (Boca do lobo, 2019)</p>	<p>Figure SEQ Figure * ARABIC 4: Adam Winter's Park House, Contemporary architecture, re-envisioning of Wright's early-20th- century style blends seamlessly with the surrounding older homes. (Gwinn, 2020)</p>
<p>Figures (2) and (3) Portrait similarities in the architectural language in the two facades between the modern (Left) and contemporary (Right).</p>	
	
<p>Figure SEQ Figure * ARABIC 5: Schroder house. Modern Architecture. (Sveiven, 2010)</p>	<p>Figure SEQ Figure * ARABIC 6: The Jubilee Church building design by Richard Meier & Partners Architects (USA). Contemporary Architecture. (McManus, 2021)</p>

Figures (4) and (5) Portrait differences in the architectural language in the two facades between the modern (Left) and contemporary (Right).



Figures (7) and (8) Portrait differences in the architectural language in two Arabic facades, but both are contemporary.

Conclusion

This study addressed the problem of the synonymy of terms in architectural and intellectual movements between modernism and contemporary, and its impact on the understanding of architectural style and the prevalence of contradictory interpretations of the two concepts, overlapping in meaning and significance. Moreover, it concluded that the process of defining the term needs to be interpreted through the semantic field and the cognitive dimension.

Therefore, the disputants against this issue often fall into the synonymy problem, hence the lack of an accurate definition of architectural style. The research summarized that modernism ended in the 1940s because its philosophers/thinkers adhered to its Euclidian grooves and ultimate imperatives, consequently following the outbreak of the Second World War. Thus, radical architectural currents fueled by post-war culture set the stage for a new philosophy based on modern principles in a new, more disengaged, and more dynamic style called ‘contemporary.’ This result came after studying the philosophical and economic dimensions of the contemporary as a movement born from the womb of neoliberalism, which needed a modern and simple style to form an absorption of its mass industrial production to globalize culture, economy, and architecture.

Based on Kuhn's theory of *the evolution of the structure of scientific revolutions*, we believe that the contemporary was an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary state through its reliance on digital technology and applied science. However, the term contemporary architecture ended in the 1990s in light of the rise of globalization (Van Eyck). However, as contemporary (as a

concept) continued and has not changed since it was based on the previous, we recommend:

In the first place, separating the architectural language of the contemporary from the derivation to accurately identify it and distinguish it from modernism. The research showed significant differences between them. In addition, an evolutionary study of architectural models, which will be a suitable platform for correct approaches and not fall into synonymy and similarity, to form a clear vision of the architecture future in the light of sustainability and preservation of the natural and built environments. Moreover, approaching modernism and contemporary with comprehensive visions, not only locally or regionally, to know the foundations of contemporary philosophy and its temporal and spatial perspectives and thus determine what it is, how it is, and its future goals.

These conclusive statements emphasize and confirm the achievement of the research objectives, highlight its importance in clarifying the semantic meaning of terms and their development, and point to addressing the problematic answer to the questions of the study. Moreover, manage them through the added value that included discussion of opinions, analysis of patterns, and cognitive interpretation. Such strategies will form an indispensable platform for future research focused on the Covid 19 pandemic, define its architecture aspects through the semantic field, and know how to address its problems based on rationalization and its correct semantic characterization of it? Based on the separation between the semantic and the architectural language.

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