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Challenges of the 21st Century in European Continent: Terrorism and Migration

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Abstract

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Europe faced new challenges. These new challenges communicated in this study address two issues, terrorism, and migration. Firstly, this study seeks to answer the question, if is there a direct link between migration and terrorism using the research methodology of data collection and analysis, also, what are the secondary links between terrorism outside Europe and migration to Europe. Secondly, based upon the qualitative methodology of research, this study is analyzing European terrorism and migration to European countries with respect to how these two phenomena have affected migration policies, and governments' counter-terrorism actions. Finally, this paper tries to find an answer to the dilemma of a stricter, more restrictive migration policy versus effective fight against terrorism. This paper shows that while it is true that one root cause of migration is the threat of terror, nevertheless terror itself is not an inexplicable phenomenon or "final cause", but a consequence of numerous roots causes.

Keywords: Terrorism, migration wave, European Union, populism, right-wing extremism

Introduction

Some people think that the word “migrant” should never be uttered in the same breath as “crime” or “terrorism.” Immigrants, however, are routinely blamed for increasing crime in many societies, after the al Qaeda serial terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which targeted American symbols in the United States, such as the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. As a result, migration began to increasingly link to international terrorism in the press, policy community, and public imagination. The association of migration to crime and terrorism is often overblown for political purpose, especially by extreme far-right political parties, like the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, and the FIDESZ in Hungary. For most right-wing populist parties in Europe put the immigration issue on the top of their agenda exploiting anxieties over cultural disintegration and rising crime.

In 2014, 2015 and 2016, the member states of the European Union faced two challenges caused by political crises. Firstly, in afore-mentioned years millions of refugees crossed the border of EU. Only in 2015, more than 1 million migrants and refugees entered Europe, in that year Germany received more than 1.1 million asylum seekers – by far the highest number in the EU. Since 2015 to 2019 1.7 million people applied for asylum in Germany making it the country with the fifth highest population of refugees in the world. (See Figure 1.)

As argued in this paper, the “external shock”, such as the “refugee crisis”, posed major political and administrative challenges for governments in many European countries. After 9/11, especially in relation of the rise of Islamic State, Western nations have adopted various policies barring migrants and refugees based on fear of terrorism and other security threats.¹ Furthermore, the President United States, Donald Trump in 2017 banned the travel from Muslim-majority countries to US.²

In fact, most European countries in 2015, were neither politically nor administratively “equipped” to handle the increased arrival of refugees and migrants.. Difficulties in managing refugee issues provoked extensive media attention and sparked heated political controversies. For example, one has only to look at the number of articles on immigration that has grown exponentially after 2015. Many argue that not accidentally, the recent rise of right-wing populism led to the fact that right-wing populist parties proved most successful

¹ Ilya Somin: Does the Threat of Terrorism Justify Migration Restrictions? 30/03/2022 Downloaded from <https://verfassungsblog.de/os5-migration-restrictions/>

² Marc Helbling and Daniel Meierrieks: Terrorism and Migration: An Overview British Journal of Political Science (2022), 52, 977–996 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/2D92D099D870D7D8E606C39E683D3E89/S0007123420000587a.pdf/terrorism_and_migration_an_overview.pdf

in certain countries – e.g., in Poland and in Hungary – with comparably few immigrants and no refugee crisis to speak of.

In 2015, before the Hungarian government had the barrier built, more hundred migrants entered to Hungary, but they soon left to the developed Western countries where they could find democratic environment and high-level social allowances. After building the barrier on the Schengen border in Hungary, the Hungarian government can stop the migrants at the border by using law enforcement, we can only suppose that the migrants' destination is not Hungary, but the wealthy countries in the European Union.

Despite the fact that Hungarian authorities provided food, medical care, most asylum seekers decided to continue on their way to Western Europe within a few days.³

Political background of migration in the European Union

The above explanation, however, does not imply that migration is a necessary precondition for the rise of right-wing populism. Rising populism has of course many drivers and migration is just one of them – though an important one.

Moreover, migration does not necessarily affect media and political discourse, however migration can be divisive by the populist politics' rhetoric. The most striking example in this respect can be found in Central and Eastern European countries. The salience of immigration in these countries, rose sharply after 2015, despite the extremely low refugee numbers compared to Western European countries. It is because political entrepreneurs, e.g., Viktor Orbán managed to raise the salience of immigration, and frame discussion of the issue in negative terms, too, by turning it into a matter of national sovereignty and thus mobilizing larger portions of the electorate.

In Hungary, from the Western countries' perspective, the Orbán regime caused major confusion. It is because on one hand the Orbán regime is obviously autocratic, but on the other hand it is still alike democracy having mocked democratic institutions, but this fact is still ignored by the large part of the Hungarian people. This Janus-faced nature of Orbán regime could make its populist ideology on immigration issues dominant.

So, we should recognize that the Orbán regime is successfully using elements of extreme nationalist-populist communication. Herman Goering, the Nazi leader, one of the founders of the populist ideology, said: "Naturally the common people don't want war. . . but after all it is the leaders of a country who determine policy, and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along. The people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders...tell

³ European Commission EMN Country Factsheet: COUNTRY FACTSHEET: Hungary 2015 EUROPEAN MIGRATION NETWORK. 1 page

them they are being attacked and denounce the peacemakers for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger."⁴ According to the populist ideology, immigrants should be considered one of the most dangerous enemies of the 12th century.

The Orbán regime's control over the public discourse, based on its media dominance and massive campaigns on hate-inciting rhetoric, conspiracy theories (e.g., about the existence of a so-called "Soros-plan"⁵) and disinformation.

Even do, after seizing on the coronavirus pandemic as a handy pretext, Viktor Orbán's government continued to extend its hegemony over the Hungarian media landscape and inspired other European countries such as Slovenia and Poland. Its coronavirus legislation, which gave the government almost unlimited powers to handle the crisis, threatened journalists with prosecution on charges of disseminating fake news and "blocking the government's anti-pandemic efforts," and imposed additional curbs on their already limited access to state-held information. It gave impetus to the Orbán regime to pave an even stronger government propaganda on immigration issues, as well. In countries like Poland, the mere prospect of EU-imposed refugee quotas became the subject of critical media coverage and emotionally charged political debates.

⁴ Gustave Gilbert: Interview in Hermann Goering's jail cell, April 18, 1946. "Nuremberg Diary". Published by Hachette Books New York, NY, United States, ISBN 0306806614.

⁵ George Soros, Hungarian-American billionaire is accused by the Hungarian government's propaganda to intervene in the matters of European countries by organizing more million immigrants to enter to the field of the European Union. This is widely believed among the Hungarian people; however, it was never proved by the Orbán regime.




Figure 1: Number of asylum applications received in Germany 2010-2018⁶

Among the forces, driving people to make the dangerous journey are the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The vast majority – more than 80% - of those who reached Europe by boat in 2015 came from those three countries. (See Figure 2.)

Poverty, desertification, human rights abuses and deteriorating security are prompting people to set out from countries such as Eritrea, Libya, countries in Sahel, Pakistan, Morocco, Iran, and Somalia, also in Afghanistan in the hope of a new life in somewhere in the developed Western European countries, like Germany, Sweden, or the UK. In parallel with the immigrants' waves, the number of terrorist attacks increased. Only the year 2015, terrorist who belonged to an operative network of Islamic State (also refers to ISIS),⁷ caused 163 victims and 350 injuries related to terror attacks. 211 terror plots

⁶ Philip Oltermann: How Angela Merkel's great migrant gamble paid off, The Guardian, 30 August 2020. Downloaded from the website <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/30/angela-merkel-great-migrant-gamble-paid-off>

⁷ The formation of IS officially happened in on 29 June 2014. On that day the worldwide caliphate's creation has been announced by the leader of Sunni terrorist organisation named ISIL, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi alias Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai, who started to use the name of "Caliph Ibrahim".

were failed, foiled, or completed and 1,077 individuals were arrested on terrorism-related offenses.⁸




Figure 2: Top five countries of origin 2010-2019⁹

Therefore, Europe has faced two major crises, immigration, and terrorism, that have threatened the continent and tested its political and social landscape. Some populist government of the European Union, including Hungary, argued for their anti-immigrant policy in the way of using the statement “immigrants are the main cause of the peak of terrorist attacks”.¹⁰

The Hungarian prime minister stated, too, that there is an “overwhelming logical” connection between terrorism and the movement of Muslims into Europe”.¹¹

This paper shows that it is unquestionably veridical that *both of phenomena happened at same time, however there is no evidence that there would be any correlation between them.*

⁸ EUROPOL: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report TESAT 2016, 20 July 2016. p.10. Downloaded from <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2016>

⁹ Samer Serawan: Refugees in Germany Deutsche Welle, 26/08/2020. Downloaded from the website <https://www.dw.com/en/merkel-germany-refugees/a-54769229>

¹⁰ PABLO GORONDI: Hungary’s Orban says EU didn’t learn from terror attacks, <https://apnews.com/article/268b8594525b47828e083e950e2d4ff4>

¹¹ MATTHEW KAMINSKI: All the terrorists are migrants. Politico, November 23, 2015. Downloaded from <https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-interview-terrorists-migrants-eu-russia-putin-borders-schengen/>

In 2018, a coordinated online campaign by far-right activists of the social media pressured mainstream European parties to drop support for a U.N. migration pact that was years in the making.

Moreover, the Belgium government collapsed under pressure of debate over immigration policy.¹² Since 2015 the issue of migration has become highly politicized in Hungary by the Orbán government that mounted a billboard campaign to tell that migrant should respect Hungary's laws, also, stoked fears that foreigners could snatch the jobs of Hungarians. Out of the 10 million people that reside in Hungary, only 5,000 are Muslim – that is one per every 2,000 inhabitants.

Unlike in France, United Kingdom, or Belgium there are no sizeable immigrant groups. Budapest, a city of more than two million, has only one mosque and merely a handful of prayer rooms. Furthermore, the Hungarian government violated the Dublin Regulation¹³, when hindered migrants to apply for asylum when did not let them in the territory of Hungary.

The last minaret was built almost 500 years ago by the occupying Ottoman Turks. Yet, in recent years, Hungary's formerly Muslim-friendly public discourse has become increasingly fearful of Islam. According to a recent Pew Research Centre survey, 72% of Hungarians, the highest proportion of any European country, see Islam in a negative light. (See Figure 3) What could be the reason for this drastic shift in Hungarians' perception? The answer is obviously the populist politics of the governing party in Hungary.


It should be highlighted that public opinion largely overestimates the real percentage of Muslim population living in the given country. Because of populist politicians' propaganda, the bigger visibility of Muslim population (race, clothing) perceptions can easily run ahead of reality.

¹² Laurens Cerulus, Sarah Wheaton: Belgium sets up minority government after migration dispute breaks coalition. Politico, 9 December 2018. Downloaded from the website <https://www.politico.eu/article/belgium-sets-up-minority-government-after-migration-dispute-breaks-coalition/>

¹³

Views of Muslims more negative in eastern and southern Europe

Unfavorable view of Muslims in our country



Note: In Poland, question was asked of a subsample of 686 respondents.

Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey, Q36c.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Figure 3: View on Muslims in Europe¹⁴

European publics wildly overestimate the proportion of their populations that is Muslim: an Ipsos-Mori poll in 2020 found that on average French respondents thought 31% of their compatriots were Muslim. The actual figure is closer to 8%, and the relatively biggest difference experienced in Hungary, 70 times more than reality. (See Figure 4)

However, it is worth analysing, what is the linkage, if there is any, between the peak of terrorist attacks and the immigrations.

¹⁴ Eyes on Europe: Explaining the main drivers of anti-immigration attitudes in Europe, 30 November 2020. Downloaded from the website <https://www.eyes-on-europe.eu/explaining-the-main-drivers-of-anti-immigration-attitudes-in-europe/>




Figure 4: Overestimating the real percentage of Muslim population in some EU members

The above-mentioned political crises overlapped in time that resulted in a presumed linkage that this paper will try to clarify. As argued here, while it is true that one root cause of migration is the threat of terror, nevertheless terror itself is not an inexplicable phenomenon or "fundamental and final cause", but a consequence of numerous roots causes, like insecurity, poverty, etc., in the conflict countries.

Definition of terrorism

There is no universal definition of terrorism in the international literature. The main difficulty in defining terrorism is the lack of agreement how to determine the cases when use of violence should be considered legitimate; therefore, the modern definition of terrorism is inherently controversial. The use of force for the achievement of political goals has been legitimate in the case of state organizations, such as military or law

enforcement. Non-state actors' right to implement violence does not have any definition either in the domestic law, or in the international law, due to the illegitimate character of them in the state system.

The UN member states still do not have agreed-upon definition of terrorism. This fact was and still is a major obstacle to introduce effective international measures against terrorism. In 1998, Arab countries elaborated a document titled "The Arab convention for the suppression of terrorism", which gives largely different definition on terrorism than the UN resolutions. De facto it is a legal platform for condemning Israel acting against Palestinian terrorists.¹⁵

Terminology consensus, however, would be necessary for a single comprehensive convention on terrorism. However, the Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) on "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts",¹⁶ gives a quasi-definition on terrorism. "Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature;"

The European Union defined the meaning of "terrorist act" under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, in the Article 1(3).¹⁷ In this document "terrorist acts" mean intentional acts which, given their nature or context, could seriously damage a country or international organisation and which are defined as an offence under national law. These include:

- attacks upon a person's life which may cause death.
- attacks upon the physical integrity of a person.
- kidnapping or hostage taking.

¹⁵ League of Arab States: The Arab convention for the suppression of terrorism adapted by Council of Arab Ministers of Interior and Justice, Cairo April 1998, downloaded from the website https://www.unodc.org/images/tldb-f/conv_arab_terrorism.en.pdf

¹⁶ UN Security Council resolution 1566, 8 October 2004, downloaded from the website <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/n0454282.pdf>

¹⁷ **Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism.** (2001/931/CFSP). Downloaded from the website <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32001E0931>

- causing extensive destruction to a government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility.
- seizure of aircraft, ships, or other means of public or goods transport.
- manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives, or of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons,
- participating in the activities of a terrorist group, including by supplying information or material resources, or by funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the group.

If these acts aim to constitute terrorist acts, they must be carried out with the aim of seriously intimidating the population, or unduly compelling a government or an international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

The International Military Staff of NATO has agreed on the term of terrorism in 2016. In accordance with the NATO definition of the terrorism: *“The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve a political, religious, or ideological objective.”*¹⁸ For the research purposes of current paper, NATO definition is accepted.

Global trends of terrorism

To understand the current situation of terrorism in Europe, the key trends, and the patterns of terrorism during the last 10 years, we should consider it on global level. Period of terrorism of the last decade, corresponds with the rise and fall of the Islamic State (ISIS). Determining trend is, because of the counterterrorism effort, terrorist attacks and lethality have declined significantly in global scale already six consecutive years. While this is a certainly good news – particularly in the 20th year of the so-called global war on terror – terrorism remains a pervasive threat. It is worth to note, that different organizations analysing terrorism use different databases and methodologies for determining the number of terrorist attacks and related lethality.¹⁹ (See Figure 5)

¹⁸ NATO Military Committee MC 0472/1, 06 January 2016

¹⁹ For example, the Statista (German company specializing in market and consumer data), or the American the Global Terrorism Database (Managed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism /START/), and the Global Terrorism Index produced by the Institute Economics and Peace (international non-partisan, non-profit organisation), could provide different numbers of attacks and deaths. It is because of different counting methodology. The terrorist attack on 13 November 2015 in Paris was a serial terrorist




Figure 5: Global trend in terrorism²⁰

After the military defeat of ISIS in 2019, the fragmentation of the Islamic State's core in Syria and Iraq continued. It is because decline of ISIS's hard core has been coupled with the transformation into a guerrilla-type organisation, which is still active in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries.

Second global trend is the rise of the far-right terrorism²¹ in the Western countries that is galvanized by the immigration to Europe, United States, and Oceania.²² This kind of terrorism is motivated by racial hate. In European countries, such as Germany, Austria, United States and France, radical Islamists attacked synagogues. In New Zealand, local people attacked mosques.

attack having eight episodes, which mathematically could be counted as 1 attack or 8 attacks. There are same problems for deaths from terrorism, some could count in the killed terrorist, meanwhile others not.

²⁰ The diagram produced by the author, the terrorist attacks and deaths from terrorism data are taken from the yearly Global Terrorism Index reports published by Institute Economics and Peace.

²¹ For the paper purposes, the far-right terrorism also referred to the racially and ethnically motivated terrorism, including anti-Semitism terrorism, too.

²² Even such country as New Zealand, which had no terrorist attack ever, become a terrorism-infected country. On 15 March 2019, there were 2 attacks against mosques in Christchurch city, resulted 51 deaths.

In recent years, analysts and security institutions alike have pointed out that right-wing extremists are increasingly networking across borders and even continents.^{23, 24}

Jihadist terrorism, on a global level, can successfully increase terrorism in certain parts of the world. In the Middle East, South Asia, and throughout Africa, al Qaeda, the Taliban, the fractions of Islamic State (ISIS) and their affiliates could make a renewed push to capture new territory and destabilize countries, because the American government decided to withdraw its military forces from these regions. Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, Mali, and Nigeria are home to jihadist groups.

Despite of nearly two decades of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries, there are nearly four times Islamic militants today as there were on September 11, 2001. Moreover, there were 67 Salafi-jihadist groups in 2018 in these regions, which is the highest level since 1980. This reflected a 180 percent increase in the number of groups from 2001 to 2018.²⁵ (See Figure 6)

Salafi-jihadist groups are based on two criteria: firstly, they emphasize importance of returning to a “pure” Islam, i.e., the “Salaf” (the first three generations of Muslims, beginning with the Prophet Muhammad and his companions), and secondly, these groups believe that violent jihad is a religious duty.

The current number of the active Salafi-jihadist groups is at the highest level over the past 40 years, as presented in Figure 6. This finding is significant since 1980, when the era was marked with foreign fighters like Abdullah Azzam (Palestinian mentor of Bin Laden), Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri who went to Pakistan, later to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets and support the Afghan mujahedeen.

²³Yassin Musharbash: The Globalization of Far-Right Extremism: An Investigative Report, July/August 2021, Volume 14, Issue 6. Published by Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Downloaded from the website <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-globalization-of-far-right-extremism-an-investigative-report/>

²⁴ The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate: CTED Alert 2020, Member States Concerned by the Growing and Increasingly Transnational threat of Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism, April 2020, page 3. Downloaded from the website https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/files/documents/2021/Jan/cted_trends_alert_extreme_right-wing_terrorism.pdf

²⁵ Seth G. Jones: The evolution of the Salafi-Jihadist threat. Current and Future Challenges from the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and Other Groups. A report of the CSIS Transnational Threats Project November 20, 2020, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, USA.




Figure 6: Number of Salafi-jihadist and Allied Groups, 1980–2018²⁶

It should be noted that Salafi-jihadists terrorists are still killing large numbers of people, though mainly in “near enemy” countries in the Middle East and North Africa, rather than in the West. Consequently, terrorist groups inspired by global Jihad have killed much more Muslims than non-Muslims. By far the vast majority (around 75%) of victims of the terrorist attacks over the past 15 years has been Muslims killed by Muslims.²⁷ During the last two decades, the United States built a counterterrorism enterprise through its intelligence, law enforcement and military bodies that has been remarkably successful from a tactical perspective, that is, foiling attacks²⁸

²⁶ The graphic designed by the author, the used data are taken from Seth G. Jones Charles Vallee Danika Newlee Nicholas Harrington Clayton Sharb Hannah Byrne: *The Evolution of the Salafi-Jihadist Threat Current and Future Challenges from the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, and Other Groups*, Center for International Studies, November 2018. pp 6-9. Downloaded from the website https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181221_EvolvingTerroristThreat.pdf

²⁷ Masood Farivar: *Most Terrorism Victims Are in Muslim Majority Countries*. Voice of America News, August 24, 2016. Downloaded from the website <https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/most-terrorism-victims-are-muslim-majority-countries>

²⁸ New York Daily News: *Here’s a list of terror attacks and foiled plots in New York City since 2010*. 11. December 2017. Downloaded from the website

and disrupting terrorist networks.²⁹ But it has been less successful from a strategic vantage point, because in recent times more people are radicalized to violent extremism than in 2001 as a result of a more diversified and globally dispersed terrorist threat. Two decades after 9/11, in the American government's database of known or suspected terrorists, their number has grown with more than twenty times.³⁰ Another trend will probably continue during the 2020s in which *violent non-state actors' and terrorist groups will increasingly use emerging technologies*. Hamas, Hezbollah, fractions of Islamic State, Houthi rebels in Yemen, and the Taliban have demonstrated alacrity and capability to deploy unmanned aerial systems for combat and reconnaissance purposes.³¹

Terrorism in the European Union

Terrorism is a highly complex and constantly changing phenomenon, which day by day makes headlines, and stands at the forefront of national and international agendas. It has many forms and is associated with a wide variety of groups. Its range varies from nationalist-separatist organisations, through extreme right-wing groups to political religious networks, and individuals, all of them commit terrorist acts based on certain motivations or ideologies.

As argued before, even Europe itself is not immune from the terrorism, even though the terrorist attacks happened largely not in the European continent, but in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Europe. Several EU members (such as France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom) have a long history of fighting domestic terrorist groups like the Organisation Armée Secrète (French,

<https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/list-terror-attacks-foiled-plots-nyc-article-1.3692532>

²⁹ Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing David S. Cohen Remarks to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy as Prepared for Delivery, 4 July 2010. Downloaded from the website <https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg632.aspx>

³⁰ Russel Travers: Counterterrorism in an era of Competing Priorities: Ten Key Considerations, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 12 November 2019. Downloaded from the website https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/counterterrorism-era-competing-priorities-ten-key-considerations#utm_term=has%20grown%20by%20a%20factor%20of%20nearly%2020&utm_campaign=9%2F11%20and%20the%20Unwinnable%20War%20%28Levitt%20%7C%20NBC%20News%29&utm_content=email&utm_source=Act-On+Software&utm_medium=email&cm_mmc=Act-On%20Software-_-email-_-9%2F11%20and%20the%20Unwinnable%20War%20%28Levitt%20%7C%20NBC%20News%29-_-has%20grown%20by%20a%20factor%20of%20nearly%2020

³¹ Colin P. Clarke: Trends in Terrorism: What is on the Horizon in 2021? The Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 5, 2021. Downloaded from the website <https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/01/trends-in-terrorism-whats-on-the-horizon-in-2021/>

OAS)³², the Basque Homeland and Liberty (Euskadi ta Askatasuna, ETA), Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion, RAF), the Red Brigades (Italian, Brigade Rosse), Irish Republican Army (IRA), etc.

Traditionally, Europe, during the last decades has been confronted with the following four types of terrorism:

- Ethno-nationalists and separatists, such as the IRA and ETA;
- Left-wing terrorists (the RAF and the Red Brigades are the most well-known examples) and anarchist terrorism /such Revolutionary Struggle (EA), Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei (SPF), and Sect of Revolutionaries (SE) in Greece/;
- Extreme far-right terrorism /such National Socialist Underground (NSU) attacks in Germany/
- Religious inspired (jihadist)

EUROPOL (European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports) in its yearly reports also added a fifth group of terrorism, the so-called single-issue terrorism. It uses this term for the form of terrorism related to environmental protection and animal right issues. Activists of single-issue terrorist groups oppose, among others, the construction of large infrastructure projects, animal testing, animal exploitation, nuclear energy, or oil drilling. Moreover, EUROPOL, for statistical purposes, uses an extra group of terrorist attacks, too, the so-called “not-specified group”, which means that the member states report attacks with non-specified nature of the terrorist attack. There is no detailed information to be able to determine attacks in the latter cases, which group they belong to.

The primary concern, however, to Europe is the “violent Islamist” terrorism. Such attacks, classified by EUROPOL as “religious” or “jihadist” in motivation, have been much more lethal than other types of terrorism. The number of jihadist terrorism-related attacks increased since 2011 but have been decreasing during the last four years in Europe. (See Figure 7).

³² Note from the author: The Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS) was a far-right French dissident paramilitary organisation during the Algerian War. The OAS carried out terrorist attacks, bombings and assassinations, (including the assassination attempt against president de Gaulle in 1962). The OAS was responsible around 2000 in early 60s.




Figure 7: Number of terrorist attacks in Europe 2011-2020³³

Most jihadist attacks in Europe since 2011 have been linked to or motivated by the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), the Al Qaeda and its affiliate, the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

In the countries of the European Union, as well as in other European states, the ideologies behind terrorism vary widely, but can be roughly divided into two identifiable main drivers. Motivation includes religiously inspired terrorism and nationalist/separatist sentiments terrorism. The nationalism/separatism inspired terrorism is the leading type of terrorism in Europe already more the ten years. (See Figure 8)

It is well known that the terrorism related to Northern Ireland has officially ended in 1994, with the Provisional IRA, dissident Irish Republican terrorist groups, and the main Loyalist groups ceasing their terrorist campaigns and engaging in the peace process. The peace process ended by signing the comprehensive peace agreement, so-called “Good Friday Agreement” in 1998. Unfortunately, after 1998, some of the fraction of former IRA remained active.

For example, in 2014, the Real IRA executed 11 attacks. In details: in February 2014 the Real IRA (or 'New IRA') sent 7 letter bombs to British

³³ The graphic is designed by the author, the used data taken from the Congressional Research Service: Terrorism in Europe, February 10, 2021, and the EUROPOL TE-SAT Reports 2012-2020. Note: Data include statistics from the United Kingdom (UK), until the year 2020, when UK withdrew from the EU in January 2020.

Army recruitment offices in South-East England; the first-time republican militants attacked inside Great Britain since 2001.³⁴ The following month, a police land rover was hit by an explosively formed penetrator in Belfast.

A civilian car was also hit by debris, but there were no injuries. It was the first successful attack of its kind in more than ten years³⁵. Also in November, a police-armoured jeep was hit by an another explosively formed penetrator in London Derry in that November, blowing off a door and damaging a passing car but without any fatal injuries.^{Victoria McMahon}: IRA warns public to stay away from PSNI targets as it launches fresh bid to kill.³⁶ Two weeks later, on 17 November, a police land rover was attacked with a homemade rocket propelled grenade launcher on Crumlin Road, Belfast. The warhead pierced the land rover's outer shell.³⁷

DR groups (DR means, different fractions of former IRA, like Continuity Irish Republican Army, Cumann na mBan i.e.: The Irishwomen's Council, Fianna Éireann i.e.: Deer Ireland, Irish Republican Liberation Army, Irish Republican Movement, Real Irish Republican Army) deployed a variety of types of attack in 2015, including postal IEDs, command-wire IEDs (CWIEDs), under-vehicle IEDs (UVIEDs), radio-controlled IEDs (RCIEDs), shooting attacks, incendiary attacks, and a grenade attack.

In 2015, 16 attacks took place in the UK, in Northern Ireland. All Dissident Republican groups retain the intent and capability to conduct further attacks. Police in Northern Ireland remained the principal target for those terrorist groups and members of the armed forces and prison officers were targeted, too. Just for giving an example, in November 2015, a PSNI vehicle was riddled with automatic gunfire in Belfast, with dissident republicans suspected of being responsible.

In 2014 and 2015, there were no injuries or fatalities caused by Irish separatist terrorist attacks, although in some cases these were very narrowly avoided.

³⁴ Henry McDonald: New IRA sent bombs to army recruitment centres. The Guardian, 17 February 2014). https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/feb/17/new-ira-sent-bombs-army-recruitment-centres-britain?CMP=tw_t_gu

³⁵ Vincent Kearney: Dissident 'IRA' claims west Belfast mortar attack, BBC News, 18 March 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-26636763>

³⁶ Victoria McMahon: IRA warns public to stay away from PSNI targets as it launches fresh bid to kill. 6 November 2014, <https://www.irishmirror.ie/news/irish-news/crime/ira-warns-public-stay-away-4577276>

³⁷ Rebecca Black: „Fears dissidents are upping ante as grenade launcher used in latest bid to murder police”, Belfast Telegraph, 18 November 2014.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20150713025310/http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/fears-dissidents-are-upping-ante-as-grenade-launcher-used-in-latest-bid-to-murder-police-30752670.html>

From the media visibility point of view, the terrorist attacks without large number of injured or killed victims, are not big sensation. This is the reason why, the European wide or world wide media is not giving a big attention to such events. Thus, they are nor really well known for the public.




Figure 8: Different types of terrorist attacks in EU between 2011 and 2020³⁸

With regard the jihadist terrorism trends in Europe, the statistic shows that, after the peak of 2015-2016, the number of jihadist terrorist attacks and killed person are decreasing already 4 consecutive years. (See Figure 9) This decreasing of terrorist attacks in the EU coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic. Restrictions on freedom of movement, travel and the immediate threat to personal health may explain some of the fall.³⁹ According to the Global terrorism Index 2022, the political terrorism has now overtaken religious terrorism in the West, with religiously motivated attacks declining 82 per cent in 2021.

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Attacks number	0	6	1	4	17	13	33	24	21	14
Deaths*	0	8	1	5	150	135	62	13	10	12

³⁸ The graphic is designed by the author, the used data taken the EUROPOL TE-SAT Reports 2012-2020. Note: Data include statistics from the United Kingdom (UK), until the year 2020, when UK withdrew from the EU.

³⁹ The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP): Global Terrorism Index 2022 Measuring the impact of terrorism, Sydney, March 2022. page 4.

Figure 9: Number and deaths of jihadist terrorist attacks 2011-2020⁴⁰ (*The attackers are not included)

By analysing the data in the table above, it can be noticed that the year 2018 was a turning point when jihadist attacks become ineffective, i.e., more attacks then killed person. From 2018 the number of terrorist attacks recorded in the EU appears to have largely remained stable. (See Figure 10)

The family background or place of birth of perpetrators vary significantly. Half of the completed jihadist attacks were carried out by EU citizens (second or third generation of immigrant parents). The other half of the perpetrators had entered the EU as asylum seekers or irregular migrants several years ago before carrying out their attack. Only one perpetrator, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, entered the EU from Tunisia via Italy approximately a month prior to his attack.⁴¹ A few numbers of asylum seekers staying in European soil for 4-5 years, should be counted as perpetrators, among them even fewer percentage of perpetrators originated from asylum seekers, mathematically is neglectable (8 perpetrators from 472700 asylum seekers, it is means $\sim 0,00001$). Moreover, *this small number will be much smaller if we take the number of migrants as a basis which is represent 1,5 million⁴² in 2020*. There are some academics are stating that the migrant inflows per se actually lead to a lower level of terrorist attacks.⁴³ Moreover, other academics argued that from 1990 to 2014 the increased undocumented immigration is not associated with terrorist attacks, radicalization, or terrorism prosecutions.⁴⁴ Some European countries strengthened the bilateral cooperation on migration, counter-terrorism and security. For example, in February 2022, Austria and

⁴⁰ The table designed by the author. The data base taken from the EUROPOL EE Terrorism and Situation yearly Reports 2012-2021. The reports downloaded from the website <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report#fndtn-tabs-0-bottom-2>

⁴¹ The Tunisian Brahim Aoussaoui arrived in Lampedusa (Italy) 4 weeks before the attack. His background checks did not revert any criminal record; however, his asylum application had been rejected, as Tunisian citizens are generally considered to come from a safe country of origin. It is not yet clear how Brahim Aoussaoui got from Italy to France, where he committed the 3 murders.

⁴² European Commission: Overall figures of immigrants in European society 2020. Downloaded from the website https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/promoting-our-european-way-life/statistics-migration-europe_en

⁴³ Vincenzo Bove and Tobias Böhmelt: How migration policies moderate the diffusion of terrorism? European Journal of Political Research. Number 2 February 2020. pages 160-181

⁴⁴ Michael T.Light and Julia T.Thomas: Undocumented immigration and terrorism: Is there a connection? Social Science Research, Volume 94, February 2021, pages 20-31 Downloaded from <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0049089X20301101>

Switzerland agreed on the reinforced cooperation in the field of migration management and counterterrorism.⁴⁵

In accordance with the data of the EUROPOL: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2021, “Europe continued to suffer the effects of effects of jihadist radicalisation and recruitment in prisons and the threat from released prisoners.”⁴⁶




Figure 10: Trend of jihadist terrorist attacks in Europe 2011-2020⁴⁷

Considering perpetrators of jihadist terrorist attacks, it is worth analysing, who were the attackers. For example, in case of the 2015 serial terrorist attacks in Paris, most of the attackers were French and Belgian citizens who crossed borders without difficulty, albeit registered as terrorism

⁴⁵ Swissinfo Foreign Affairs: Switzerland and Austria want to strengthen cooperation on migration and security, they said on Tuesday. February 01, 2022, Downloaded from <https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/bern-and-vienna-vow-to-boost-cooperation-on-migrants-and-terrorism/47311948>

⁴⁶ EUROPOL: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2021, page 8 Downloaded from https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/tesat_2021_0.pdf

⁴⁷ The graphic designed by the author. The data base taken from the EUROPOL EE Terrorism and Situation yearly Reports 2012-2021. The reports downloaded from the website <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report#fndtn-tabs-0-bottom-2>

suspects. Two other attackers were Iraqi, travelling with fake documents, and having false name in their passport.⁴⁸

Abdelhamid Abaaoud (the Paris attacks “mastermind”) who participated in the Syrian civil war on the Islamic State’s (ISIS) side (posted on social media), was able to return to Belgium unnoticed. (See Figure 11) Of course, the fact, that a terrorist entering to the European Union space is undetected, is a warning signal which raises the problem of the European border control, and intel information exchange between the EU member states.⁴⁹



Figure11: Abdelhamid Abaaoud, alias Abou Omar Al-Baljiki in Syria

⁴⁸ The Paris prosecutor's office said that the fingerprints from Ahmad al-Mohammad, the dead suicide bomber, the man was the first of three to blow himself up at Stade de France stadium, matched those of a person who came to Europe with migrants via the Greek island of Leros. The man may have been posing as a Syrian refugee. Paris attacks: Who were the attackers? - BBC News, 27 April 2016. Downloaded from the website <https://www.bbc.news/world-europe-34832512>

⁴⁹ Jon Henley: Paris attacks: EU in emergency talks on border crackdown, The Guardian, 20 November 2015. Downloaded from the website <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/20/paris-attacks-france-launches-un-push-for-unified-declaration-of-war-on-isis>

Migration

Migration itself always has been a major factor in the history of humankind. It is likely that the humanity born in Africa then spread on the planet within and outside of Africa around 2.5 million years ago. In historical times, Africa has been the source of the largest forced migrations in the history. The history of humankind experienced already some big migrations. For example, great migrations include the Indo-European migrations to Europe, the Middle East and South Asia during the Bronze Age, the Bantu migrations across sub-Saharan Africa, Barbarian invasions during the Roman Empire, the Great Migration from England of the 1630s, and the California Gold Rush from 1848–1850, etc.

It is worth to mention that the largest migration in history was the so-called Great Atlantic Migration from Europe to North America, the first major wave of which began in the 1840s with mass movements from Ireland and Germany. The Hungarians also arrived in Europe with the one of the latest waves of Migration Period in the 9th century.

The trans-Atlantic slave trade was the largest long-distance forced migration of people, even though it happened over a shorter period than the trans-Saharan and Indian Ocean slave trades. From 1800s, the migrants from the black continent have been unfolding projects of self-development by traveling to places where they hoped to find better opportunities.

Yet contemporary trafficking and displacements caused by wars, intolerance, and natural catastrophes or climate change attest to the continuing relevance of violence as a key aspect of the experience of migrants from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

The long-term and growing body of evidence on migration and mobility shows that migration is in large part related to the broader global economic, social, political, and technological transformations that are affecting a wide range of high-priority policy issues. As argued here, the scale of international migration increases in line with recent trends.

This growth of migrant's ratio cannot be explained by the rise of world population, globalization, or higher mobility of the humankind. In fact, up until the beginning of the industrial revolution, global population grew very slowly. Then from the beginning of 1800s, the growth rate accelerated to a peak of 2.2% in 1963. (See Figure 12).




Figure 12: The world population growth with the estimation to 2100

The UN Population Division report of 2019 projects world population to continue growing, although at a steadily decreasing rate, and to reach 10.9 billion in 2100 with a growth rate at that time of close to zero.⁵⁰

The report confirms that the world's population continues to grow, albeit at a slowing rate. From 1968, due to the world-wide collapse of the total fertility rate,⁵¹ it has declined to 1.1% today (2020). (See Figure 13)

⁵⁰ The graphic designed by the author. The used data taken from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division: World Population Prospect 2019 Highlights. ST/ESA/SER.A/423. ISBN: 978-92-1-148316-1 page 12.

⁵¹ In 1967, nearly 13 million women in the world were using the birth control pills, and by 1984 that number reached 80 million. Reference: Planned Parenthood Federation of America: Birth Control – History of the Pill, page 4. Downloaded from the website https://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/1514/3518/7100/Pill_History_FactSheet.pdf




Figure 13: Annual world population growth rate 1950-2100⁵²

It is a reality that there have been major migration and displacement events during the last ten years; events that have caused great hardship and trauma as well as loss of life. Foremost *displacements of millions of people have been due to conflict (such as within and from the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, the Central African Republic, South Sudan), extreme violence (such as inflicted upon Rohingya forced to seek safety in Bangladesh) and recent Taliban takeover of power in Afghanistan, or severe economic and political instability.*

To face the challenge if migration internationally happens in a coordinated way, the UN constructed a new agreement on the migration. All 193 members, except the United States, agreed the pact in July 2018.

This agreement emphasises that all migrants are entitled to universal human rights and aspires to eliminate all forms of discrimination, including racism, xenophobia and intolerance against migrants and their families. Even the text of compact agreement quite clearly states that all member states have sovereign right to determine their national migration policy. The Trump-lead United State voted against it.

Currently, as estimated around 281 million people, approximately 3.6% of the world's population, currently live outside of their country of origin, globally, with nearly two-thirds being labour migrants.⁵³ From the

⁵² United Nation Population Division: World population growth Downloaded from the website <https://ourworldindata.org/world-population-growth>

⁵³ The graphic is designed by the author, the data base taken from the UN Migration, International Organization for Migration: World Migration Report 2020, Switzerland, ISSN 1561-5502. p.20.

1970s, the ratio of immigrants to the total population of the world, during the last 50 years (1970-2020), has increased from 2.2 % to 3.6%. (See Figure 14)




Figure 14: Ratio of immigrants to the total population of the world

If we are taking into account the net migration rate, which indicates the contribution of migration to the overall level of population change, the overall picture of migration will be clearer in global scale. The net migration rate does not distinguish between economic migrants, refugees, and other types of migrants, nor between lawful and unlawful migrants. In this matter, there are also different counts and lists of countries. The UN, World Bank and the CIA have different catalogues, but for the research purposes of this paper, the UN list has been utilized.

For example, it has been clear that in Europe Lithuania and Latvia are losing their population already four continuous years. Latvia, since it became EU member in 2004, has lost one-fifth of its population, because around 40000 Latvian left to work to wealthy EU countries: U.K., Ireland, and Germany. This small Baltic republic has comparatively low birth rate and high mortality rate are also contributing factors. Almost the same problem appears in Lithuania with a 17.5 percent of decrease. Post-Communist countries in Central-East Europe must face with similar challenges. In the global scale, Venezuela, Syria, South-Sudan, and Eritrea have the biggest decline in population.

The world champion of receiving migrants is Canada, meanwhile Germany and Norway, as well.

Annual Net Migration Rate 2015–2020




Figure 15: Annual Net Migration Rate 2015-2020⁵⁴

Definition of migrants

Depending on the goal and reason for relocation, persons who migrate can be divided into three categories: migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Each category is defined broadly, because mixed circumstances might occur, and motivate individuals to change their location.

From practical perspective, the migration can be identified as the movement of people from one place to another to live. Emigrants leave their country, while immigrants enter a foreign country. Migration impacts on both the place left behind, and on the place where migrants settle down. People have many reasons why they might want to move from one place to another. These reasons may be economic, social, political, or environmental. There are usually push factors and pull factors at work, why migration takes place. Push factors are the reasons that make someone decide to move. Peoples' own experience of life in one place gives them good reasons to leave it. Push factors are often negative things, such as unemployment, crop failure, droughts, flooding, war, poor education opportunities, or poor public services.

Pull factors, on the other hand, are the expectations which attract people to new places. They are usually positive things, such as job

⁵⁴ REUERHC (“Reinforce EU economies, reinforcing human capital”): Guide for Integration. Action n. 2018-1-IT01-KA202-006739) – in the framework of the European programme “Erasmus Plus KA2 Strategic Partnerships for VET”. 2018. page 5

opportunities, a better standard of living, better education, or better healthcare. Many people in the developing countries choose to migrate. These are *voluntary migrants*. They are called as *economic migrants*.

Other voluntary migrants include older dependants who want to live somewhere warm and sunny in their retirement. However, many other people have no choice, and are forced to leave their homes. These are involuntary migrants. Their lives may be in danger due to wars or a natural disaster. These people are also called as *refugees*.

Migration is a complex process covering population movement across societal boundaries, either within or between nation states, affecting gaining and losing for the countries by the temporary and permanent movement which provides asylum-seekers and economic migrants, as well as illegal migrants. The terms asylum seeker and refugee are often confused.

What is the difference? A refugee, by definition: *“A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”*⁵⁵ UN Convention of 1967 Protocol.

A *displaced person* who has crossed national boundaries and who cannot or is unwilling to return home due to well-founded fear of persecution. Such a person may be called an asylum seeker until he or she receives refugee status by the domestic state organizations, or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), provided he or she formally makes a claim for asylum.

For the research purpose of this paper, migrant is an individual, who left his or her country of origin, and formally applied for asylum in another country, but whose application has not yet been concluded. They are the asylum seekers. After their application for asylum had been decided, they can be legal or illegal migrants, depending on getting the right for asylum, or not.

Migration to Europe

For the sake of a better understanding of the European migration crisis since 2015, the global picture of the migration should be analysed first.

⁵⁵ The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, downloaded from <https://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/4ec262df9/1951-convention-relating-status-refugees-its-1967-protocol.html>

Because of terrorism, migration and COVID-19, some EU countries applied extremely strong border control even within the Schengen area.⁵⁶

According to the UN International Organisation for Migration's World Migration Report of 2020, the number of international migrants was estimated to be almost 272 million globally, with 51 million more than in 2010. Nearly two thirds were labour migrants. International migrants comprised 3.5 percent of the global population in 2019.⁵⁷ This number in accordance with the World Report 2022 became 3.6 percent.⁵⁸

According to UNHCR report, at the end of 2020 around 82.4 million people were forcibly displaced across the world. Of these, 26.4 million were refugees, whilst 48 million were internally displaced within their country of origin. 86% of the world's refugees are living in countries neighbouring their country of origin, often in developing countries. Over 6.7 million people have fled due to the conflict in Syria, and many more are displaced inside the country. Turkey is the biggest refugee hosting country in the world. At the end of 2020 Turkey provided safety to 3.6 million Syrian refugees. According to the UNHCR, there are 3.6 million Syrians under temporary protection and over 330,000 refugees and asylum seekers under international protection.⁵⁹

In 2020, more than two thirds of the refugees across the world came from five countries: Syria (6.7 million), Venezuela (4.0 million), Afghanistan (2.6 million), South Sudan (2.2 million) and Myanmar (1.1 million).⁶⁰ It is obvious that terror violence has a positive and significant effect on asylum migration flows relative to the number of IDP.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Elspeth Guild: Schengen Borders and Multiple National States of Emergency: From Refugees to Terrorism to COVID-19. European Journal of Migration and Law, 21 December 2021 pages 385-404. Downloaded from file:///C:/Users/jtomo/Downloads/[15718166%20-%20European%20Journal%20of%20Migration%20and%20Law]%20Schengen%20Borders%20and%20Multiple%20National%20States%20of%20Emergency_%20From%20Refugees%20to%20Terrorism%20to%20COVID-19.pdf

⁵⁷ IOM Migration Report 2020. Downloaded from the website https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf

⁵⁸ International Organization for Migration UN Migration: World Migration Report 2022 page 19

⁵⁹ UNHCR Turkey - Fact Sheet September 2021. Downloaded from https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/unhcr-turkey-fact-sheet-september-2021-entr?gclid=Cj0KCQjw3v6SBhCsARIsACyrRAk5mHJkDQ7hsYZ11IjVksX99gnPT3PnUwB-3oPhGHnTvuMwarRByu8aAvFvEALw_wcB

⁶⁰ UNHCR Global Trends forced displacement person, 2020. p.3 downloaded from the website <https://www.unhcr.org/uk/statistics/unhcrstats/60b638e37/global-trends-forced-displacement-2020.html>

⁶¹ Federico Carril-Caccia, Jordi Paniagua and Francisco Requena: Asylum Migration, Borders, and Terrorism in a Structural Gravity Model. 2021, Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183-2463) Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 146-158

In the early 1980s roughly 28 million people changed their country of residence. Flows peaked between 1995 and 2000, when 43 million people moved to another country. More recently, between 2010 and 2015, about 36 million migrants changed their country of residence. This corresponds to 0.5% of the global population, and an average of 7 million international migrants moving per year.⁶²

In 2020 5,1% of EU population were non-EU citizen. At the end of 2019, 10% of all the world's refugees and only a fraction of internally displaced persons was living in the EU.




Figure 16: Number of immigrants 2008-2020⁶³

In the 1990s, the large proportion of immigrants in Western European states have come from the European post-Communist countries. The most targeted countries were Spain, Greece, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.

In 2014-2016, the blood-spattered conflict in Syria was far the biggest driver of migration peak to Europe. However, it is worth mentioning that the violence in Afghanistan and Iraq, abuses in Eritrea, as well as poverty in Kosovo, are also forced people to look for new lives elsewhere. It is means

⁶² European Commission: European Political Strategy Center, 10 trends shaping migration. Downloaded from the website https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/10_trends_shaping_migration.pdf

⁶³ The graphic designed by the author, the used database is the Eurostat immigration database, downloaded from the website <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database>

that that terrorism indeed increases intentions to migrate both within and across Syria and Iraq.⁶⁴

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that more than 1,011,700 migrants arrived by sea in 2015, and almost 34,900 by land.

In 2014, this number was around 280,000. Of course, these figures do not include those who got in undetected.⁶⁵

The EU's external border force, Frontex, monitors the different routes migrants use and numbers arriving at Europe's borders and put the figure crossing into Europe in 2015 at more than 1,800,000. Between 2014 and 2016, the countries in the Balkans like Kosovo and Albania and Eastern Europe Eastern European countries like Ukraine, also contributed to the overall flow of asylum seekers into the EU, and non-EU countries as Norway or Switzerland. After the aggression of Russia against Ukraine in February 2022, the refugees from Ukraine increased sharply, over 5 million left from home country mainly to EU countries.⁶⁶

According to the statistic, approximately half of refugees in 2015 trace their origins to just three countries: Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. (See the Figure 17)


⁶⁴ Killian Foubert and Ils Ruysen UNU-CRIS Working paper Series nr 7 September 2021 page 25 Downloaded from <https://cris.unu.edu/sites/cris.unu.edu/files/WP21.07%20-%20Foubert%20and%20Ruysen.pdf>

⁶⁵ Lauren Turner: Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts BBC NEWS 4 March 2016 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911>

⁶⁶The EU countries bordering Ukraine have allowed entry to all Ukrainian refugees, and the EU has invoked the Temporary Protection Directive, which grants Ukrainians the right to stay, work and study in any European Union member state. Refugees fleeing Ukraine (since 24 February 2022)". UNHCR. 2022. Downloaded from <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine> .

Top 10 origins of people applying for asylum in the EU

First-time applications in 2015, in thousands



Source: Eurostat

Figure 17: Top ten countries by number of immigrants between 2008-2020 to EU⁶⁷

It is clear, that migration itself is related not exclusively with the immigrants arriving from other continent but also there is a migration from the non-EU countries to EU countries. This trend is related to the price's differences of the related countries in European continent, and it is happening between EU countries. So, another migration trend has been the Northern Europeans' moving toward Southern Europe. Citizens from the European Union make up a growing proportion of immigrants in Spain, coming chiefly from the United Kingdom, Germany, but also from Italy, France, Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium, etc.

British authorities estimate that the population of British citizens living in Spain is much larger than Spanish official figures suggest, establishing them at about 1,000,000, with 800,000 being permanent residents.

As the next map is demonstrating, the immigrants to EU are originated from the conflict's countries located in Middle East and in Africa (Sudan, South Sudan, and Nigeria). (See Figure 18)

⁶⁷ Lauren Turner: Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts BBC NEWS 4 March 2016 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911>




Figure 18: origin of immigrants to Europe in 2015

Conclusion

As has been argued in this paper, complex reasons, such as personal, group, community, socio-political, and ideological factors continue to breed radicalization and mobilization of people to violence. There are approximately four times more radicalized individuals today than there were on 11 September, when al Qaida executed a serial terrorist attack against American symbols (WTC, Pentagon).

According to the Global Terrorism Database of the number of known or suspected terrorists has grown, as well. As radicalized populations grow, ability of Western Countries to identify, capture, and kill terrorists will necessarily decline. Furthermore, migration from Africa, due to the global warming, has been engendering far-right extremism against refugees and asylum seekers in Europe. The flourishing of the radicalized communities requires robust terrorism prevention efforts.

In sum, the stylized facts about transnational terrorism since 1995 tell us that:

- It concerns many parts of the world, particularly countries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, where migration to Western countries originates,
- Jihadist groups having global vision, are likely to be the largest, most persistent transnational threat in the Western world, but these jihadist groups have spread in large areas of ungoverned or poorly governed territories, notably in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.

- Activity of terrorist organisations concentrated in the Middle East, Central Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. These regions recorded more terrorism deaths since 2018 than before. In 2019 and 2020 the largest increase of terrorism was in sub-Saharan Africa.

As argued in this paper, there is extremely little evidence (almost equal zero) that more migration would unconditionally lead to more terrorist activity in European countries.

While the overall risk of transnational terrorism (as expressed by its frequency and lethality) tends to be rather marginal, notwithstanding the ‘outlier’ of the 9/11 attacks.

This paper has found a real concern on the failures of immigrants’ integration in Western society (second and third generation of immigrants) that have led to the so-called homegrown terrorism.

Although jihadist terrorist incidents have graver consequences in terms of fatalities, most terrorist incidents in Europe – two of three attacks – were carried out by separatist groups during the last decades.

The weak immigration management, and the lack of efficient policies in this field, also the populist tendencies have triggered the growth of the extreme far-right terrorism in the Western World.

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