

European Scientific Journal, *ESJ*

June 2022

European Scientific Institute, ESI

The content is peer reviewed

ESJ Humanities

June 2022 edition vol. 18, No. 20

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ISSN: 1857-7431 (Online)

ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print)

Generativity is a Core Value of the ESJ: A Decade of Growth

Erik Erikson (1902-1994) was one of the great psychologists of the 20th century¹. He explored the nature of personal human identity. Originally named Erik Homberger after his adoptive father, Dr. Theodore Homberger, he re-imagined his identity and re-named himself Erik Erikson (literally Erik son of Erik). Ironically, he rejected his adoptive father's wish to become a physician, never obtained a college degree, pursued independent studies under Anna Freud, and then taught at Harvard Medical School after emigrating from Germany to the United States. Erickson visualized human psychosocial development as eight successive life-cycle challenges. Each challenge was framed as a struggle between two outcomes, one desirable and one undesirable. The first two early development challenges were 'trust' versus 'mistrust' followed by 'autonomy' versus 'shame.' Importantly, he held that we face the challenge of **generativity** versus **stagnation in middle life**. This challenge concerns the desire to give back to society and leave a mark on the world. It is about the transition from acquiring and accumulating to providing and mentoring.

Founded in 2010, the European Scientific Journal is just reaching young adulthood. Nonetheless, **generativity** is one of our core values. As a Journal, we reject stagnation and continue to evolve to meet the needs of our contributors, our reviewers, and the academic community. We seek to innovate to meet the challenges of open-access academic publishing. For us,

¹ Hopkins, J. R. (1995). Erik Homburger Erikson (1902–1994). *American Psychologist*, 50(9), 796-797. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.50.9.796>

generativity has a special meaning. We acknowledge an obligation to give back to the academic community, which has supported us over the past decade and made our initial growth possible. As part of our commitment to generativity, we are re-doubling our efforts in several key areas. First, we are committed to keeping our article processing fees as low as possible to make the ESJ affordable to scholars from all countries. Second, we remain committed to fair and agile peer review and are making further changes to shorten the time between submission and publication of worthy contributions. Third, we are looking actively at ways to eliminate the article processing charges for scholars coming from low GDP countries through a system of subsidies. Fourth, we are examining ways to create and strengthen partnerships with various academic institutions that will mutually benefit those institutions and the ESJ. Finally, through our commitment to publishing excellence, we reaffirm our membership in an open-access academic publishing community that actively contributes to the vitality of scholarship worldwide.

Sincerely,

Daniel B. Hier, MD

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Omur Yanar



Austrian-Hungarian Diplomatic Relations: 2017-2021

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[Doi:10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p1](https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p1)

Submitted: 23 March 2022

Accepted: 09 June 2022

Published: 30 June 2022

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Cite As:

Gyorkos E. (2022). *Austrian-Hungarian Diplomatic Relations: 2017-2021*. European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 18 (20), 1. <https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p1>

Abstract

Since Sebastian Kurz was elected Chancellor in 2017, Austrian internal politics has changed significantly, and there is a visible rapprochement with several countries in the region, including Hungary. There is a consensus between Hungary and Austria on many issues, including the defense of Christian culture, the European way of life, and the protection of society. Both countries are urging the establishment of a common European military force and the strengthening of border guards. Austria is Hungary's second most important trading partner in terms of total trade volume, and Austria is one of the largest investors in Hungary today. Considering these points, it is worth examining how the system of diplomatic relations between the two countries has developed in recent years.

Keywords: Diplomatic relations, Austria and Hungary

1. Introduction

The analysis of diplomatic relations is an extremely interesting field of international relations, as both the historical background and the economic, political, and cultural conditions of the subjects (in this case states) are required, but in my opinion, the researcher's language skills are also important for a full understanding of relations. Without knowing the language of the given state, how could the researcher move „safely”, how could he know and understand the subject of his research? It is important to see that, for historical and cultural reasons, coefficients (can) also play a role in bilateral relations that we may think are natural in everyday life and therefore do not attach

sufficient importance to. However, the most difficult task stems from the diversity of relationships: always staying up to date.

Austro–Hungarian relations have always been special in relations between states. The uniqueness of the relationship can also be expressed in the term „special relationship”¹, which is the most used symbol of the British - American relationship. Throughout the history of the two countries, Austria has enjoyed a prominent role in the direction of Hungarian foreign relations. Of course, this „good neighborliness” had little effect on big politics. Bilateral relations have a long history, for example coexisting for centuries, coexisting as part of the Habsburg Empire, or a common organization under the auspices of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy. It is important to mention here that the Austrians „picked” the Hungarians out of more than ten nationalities, so Hungary was given a leading role in the dualistic state organization. With the end of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy, Austria lost its former influence in the international system of power, but it remained essential for Hungary to maintain unique bilateral relations. Austria's neutrality, which has existed since 1955², played a very important role in the fact that bilateral relations were not severed during the Kádár-era, except in the period following the defeat of the 1956 revolution. During this period the Kádár-regime had an especially good relationship with neutral Austria, not only cultural but also economic and some political relations have intensified. In addition to the already mentioned neutral status, this could also be explained by the person of the Austrian Chancellor, as Bruno Kreisky, being a Social Democrat politician, did not distance himself from the countries of the Eastern Block, including Hungary.³

Following the change of regime, Hungary, like other post-Soviet countries, sought to revive its diplomatic, scientific, and economic relations with Western countries, especially with its neighbor Austria. The development of bilateral relations did not deteriorate after Hungary's accession to NATO, moreover: the Austrians were the main supporters of Hungary's accession to the EU. Austria played a key role in the enlargement of the European Union to the east in 2004 and has since placed considerable emphasis on supporting the accession attempts of post-communist countries.

2. Peculiarities of Austrian domestic policy

In the last days of World War II, Austria, annexed by National Socialist Germany in 1938, was liberated by the Allies (as agreed in Moscow in 1943), and the country was divided into four occupation zones in 1945 (American, British, French, and Soviet) of which the Soviets had control over strategically

¹ BBC (2012)

² Györkös (2017) P.10.

³ Trauttmansdorff (1983) P.246.

important industrial areas. Despite the proclamation of the independence of Austria by the Social Democrat politician Karl Renner (First Chancellor of the First Republic of Austria) on April 27⁴, 1945, the country's true independence could only be achieved as part of a nearly ten-year process. Thanks to the intervention of Karl Renner, the traditional opposition between the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party, which caught the wind from the sails of the already weak Austrian Communists, was eased. Austria's domestic political stability and the huge amount of Marshall Aid have greatly helped the economy to recover. The starting point of the Austrians was that the Republic of Austria was not at war with any country. Consequently, in their view, it was not necessary to conclude a peace treaty, only to restore the country's sovereignty by signing a state treaty. At the 1954 Berlin conciliation, the then Austrian foreign minister, Leopold Figl, raised the possibility of the country's neutrality as a possible condition for a peace treaty.⁵ The main goal of Austrian foreign policy after 1945 was to convince the Western allies that the country was capable of independence with a stable domestic policy and economy. Meanwhile, with the Soviets, they tried to believe that Austria would remain neutral in the struggle between the two blocs led by the great powers. Austria thus sought to secure its own independence through the neutrality provided for in international law. In this sense, the country is internationally committed to remaining neutral in all cases, like Switzerland. This solved the problem of the German question: Article 4 of the Austrian State Treaty prohibited *Anschluß*⁶. The Austrians saw independence as a goal and a precondition for permanent neutrality. The Soviet leadership was interested in preventing Austria from joining NATO (and later the EGK), thus weakening NATO's geo-strategic position⁷. Negotiations have begun in Moscow, combining Austrian sovereignty with neutrality under international law, meaning that it will not join any military alliance and will not tolerate foreign force on its territory. The State Treaty was ratified on 15th May 1955 and entered into force on 27th July of that year. With this, Austria regained its full sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity after 17 years. Perpetual neutrality is a traditional expression of international law. However, the interpretation of Austrian neutrality is characterized by a kind of duality: military and armed neutrality under international law like the Swiss model; while, according to the thesis of active neutrality, a reasonable foreign policy as a policy of peace is the best guarantee for the independence of Austria.

The Austrian party system after 1945 was characterized by the dominance and shift economy of the two major parties, the Austrian People's

⁴ Németh (2012) P.46.

⁵ Györkös (2017) P.9.

⁶ Bundesgesetzblatt (1955), 39. issue, P.727.

⁷ Németh (2012) P.60.

Party (APP) and the Austrian Social Democratic Party (ASDP). These two parties governed a large coalition for several cycles and operated in a kind of special symbiosis: the offices were distributed in proportion to the votes cast for the parties.⁸ However, this system was not only observed in political life, but also in the field of economy and culture, ie everyday life was completely permeated by party politics. In the election, the two major parties generally won 80-90% of the vote. The traditional bipartisan system has been overturned since the 1990s: the two major parties have been steadily weakening and the number of votes „smoothly” above 30% has been unattainable. At the same time, new political parties have emerged on the palette, such as the Liberal Neos, and existing ones, such as the Freedom Party (FP) or the Greens, are gaining strength. The migration crisis has clearly driven water to the Freedom Party’s mill, which was hovering around 30%, while the APP was almost threatened with extinction: just a few months before the 2017 early elections, the party was measured below 20%.⁹

3. Austro – Hungarian relations after 2010¹⁰

The low point of Austro–Hungarian relations was between 2010 and 2017 when the leading political forces of the two countries differed greatly: Austria was led by the Social Democratic ASDP, while in Hungary the Conservative-Christian Orbán government won a two-thirds majority in two parliamentary elections. This period was marked by a number of conflicting situations, disagreements, and loud, sometimes unfriendly media inconveniences, one of the central players of which was the Hungarian-born Viennese journalist Paul Lendvai¹¹, who launched a one-man war against the Hungarian government. It is a fact that the large Austrian financial institutions (Raiffeisen, Erste) were sensitively affected by the introduction of the Hungarian bank tax, but corporate interests were also imbued with a political charge. There was also a serious contradiction between the introduction of the Media Act and the institution of dual citizenship, which is still not allowed in Austria.

The Hungarian action witnessed during the 2015 migration crisis was widely criticized at that time by European Union member states, including Austria. In connection with the huge migratory pressure on Europe, the Austrian and Hungarian governments differed several times, for example, due to the construction of the Hungarian border fence and the fact that Hungary did not register migrants entering Hungary, saying it should have been done in the first Schengen Member State of entry. In this case, they should have

⁸ Grotius P.1.

⁹ Kovács (13.10.2017)

¹⁰ Szalay-Bobrovniczky (2020)

¹¹ Szalay-Bobrovniczky (2020) P.36.

been registered in Greece and lodged their application there. In November 2015, the Austrian Minister of the Interior Cases, Johanna Mikl-Leitner, announced a border protection measure by the Austrian government on the Austrian–Slovenian border, which meant the elimination of a low point in bilateral relations. The Minister of the Interior practically outlined a plan to build a border fence very similar to the Hungarian one.

At the same time, it is important to mention that while political-diplomatic relations have stalled, those based on cultural, social, and economic grounds have persisted. The Austrian historian Roman Sandgruber described this period as follows: „Political relations under the Orbán government are struggling - but not personal ones.”¹² In addition, cooperation appears at almost all levels of high politics and low politics: in addition to discussing strategic decisions, many forms and systems of cross-border cooperation have been launched between the ministries and between the federal provinces and the Hungarian counties. In 2012, the Hungarian government announced a strategic partnership program, which aims to co-operate in certain specific economic areas (for example production, R&D, transportation, etc.). Six companies with an Austrian background are currently participating in the Strategic Partnership.¹³ Over the past decades, more than 40 functioning twinning relationships have developed. In April 2017, for example, the Austrian Government opened an honorary consulate in Pécs. Furthermore, the only university in Budapest that offers full German-language education is the Gyula Andrássy German-Language University, which is outside the German-speaking area and is celebrating its 20th anniversary this year. Among other things, Austria participates in the financing of the university, in addition to Hungary, Germany, and Switzerland.

4. The person of Sebastian Kurz, a new era in Austro–Hungarian relations?

Sebastian Kurz is a Viennese-born Austrian politician who has been the Secretary of State for Integration in the Ministry of the Interior since 2011 and has been Austria's youngest foreign minister since 2013 at the age of just 27. On May 10, 2017, Reinhold Mitterlehner, the president of the APP (and also the vice-chancellor of Austria), resigned after realizing that the party was unable to renew under his leadership. The leadership of the Austrian People's Party (APP) has elected Sebastian Kurz as its president, bringing a complete overhaul of the party's life, starting with a change in its name and logo (Neue Volkspartei, turquoise), which may seem like a small step forward from spring 2017. Kurz – in the eyes of the Austrian public – is a sympathetic politician

¹² Krieglsteiner (2016) „Unter der Regierung Orban sind die politischen Beziehungen belastet – die zwischenstaatlichen aber nicht.”

¹³ Aussenwirtschaftszentrum Ungarn (March, 2021) P.10.

who, despite his young age, is not an extreme, determined, yet tolerant, elegant, and attractive manner, so he fits into the Austrian mentality.¹⁴ With the election of Sebastian Kurz, pollsters measured that support for the APP was around 33-35%, an improvement of more than 10% on his previous position and clearly inseparable from Kurz.¹⁵

In his article published in early 2021, Hans Rauscher explored the similarities and differences between the Austrian and Hungarian political systems. Even the title of the article suggests that some Western politicians and journalists refer to Kurz's policy as „Orbán light”, suggesting that Hungarian and Austrian politics have been in agreement in many respects in recent years. The main point of agreement is the opposition to illegal immigration. Furthermore, the Austrian People's Party has also successfully taken over some of the issues traditionally part of the far-right, thus reducing the far-right lunar court and increasing the conservative polling station. Like the Hungarian ruling party, Kurz maintains good relations with a number of large entrepreneurs, and with their help he became a pro-government owner of two influential Austrian dailies, the Kurier and the Krone Zeitung, enabling the chancellor to have the so-called Message-Control. Influencing the judiciary would have pushed the boundaries of authority, by which time the Greens became a coalition partner and blocked the initiative.¹⁶

5. The first Kurz government (2017-2019)

In the early parliamentary elections in the autumn of 2017, the renewed People's Party, led by Sebastian Kurz, achieved a 31.5% result.¹⁷ The young chancellor candidate has managed to stop the erosion of the APP, and the party has gained unexpected popularity for years.

So, the People's Party had several options with whom to enter into a coalition:

- He chooses a grand coalition with the socialists, which can be said to be almost „classic”, but has been stagnant since the 2000s,
- or he votes in favor of forming a government with the Freedom Party.

According to opinion polls before the parliamentary elections, 40% of Austrians mentioned immigration and security as the main topic of the election, and 29% mentioned social affairs¹⁸, which obviously had a major impact on the candidate for Chancellor. Kurz eventually entered into a coalition with the Freedom Party, which disrupted the „traditional” grand coalition. In 2017, the APP and the Freedom Party took a common position on

¹⁴ Fricz (2019)

¹⁵ Kovács (14.10.2017)

¹⁶ Rauscher (2021)

¹⁷ Bundesministerium für Inneres

¹⁸ Kovács (14.10.2017)

the issue of immigration, one of the main topics in the parliamentary elections, which greatly facilitated Kurz's choice of a coalition partner. The right-wing coalition was made up of a more moderate, traditionally governing force, the Austrian People's Party, and a radically anti-migration party, the Freedom Party, which provided a guarantee to protect borders, curb illegal migration, and abolish mandatory quotas.¹⁹

The critical voices mentioned above have been relegated to the background in recent years, and following the election of Sebastian Kurz in 2017, the former friendly relations between the two countries have been restored. In recent years, there has been a consensus between Hungary and Austria on a number of issues, including Christian culture, the European way of life, and the protection of society. Furthermore, both countries are urging the establishment of a joint European force and the strengthening of border prosecutions. Following the election of Sebastian Kurz as Chancellor in 2017, Austrian domestic and foreign policy has changed significantly, and a clear rapprochement can be observed with the V4s and several countries in the region, including Hungary. However, it is important to note that it was stated by both the Austrian state leaders and the leaders of the V4 that Austria's accession to the Visegrad countries is not part of the long-term plans.²⁰ Austria's self-determination (partly) also stems from its neutrality: it sees itself as a Central European state that forms the basis of its regional policy.

Following the inauguration of the Chancellor in January 2018, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was one of the first to visit the newly elected Austrian Prime Minister. At a press conference after the meeting behind closed doors, the Hungarian Prime Minister highlighted Austria's lucky situation, the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1955. Orbán emphasized the role of the Austrians as an almost „permanent” mediator in history, as a result of which they acted as a kind of bridge between Central and Eastern Europe, with Christian culture, a European way of life, and the protection of society as its main cornerstones. The biggest challenges for the two countries are migration and border protection.

Austro-Hungarian relations are characterized by regular, high-level bilateral meetings, partly due to centuries of coexistence and, on the other hand, strong economic relations and similar views on illegal migration and mass immigration.

¹⁹ Fricz (2019)

²⁰ Alexe (2018)

	Head of State level	Head of government and ministers level	Secretary of State or lower level
2017	16	2	1
2018	7	4	1
2019	7	11	1
2020	2	-	-
2021	1	-	-

High-Level Bilateral Meetings 2017-2021²¹

The border protection of both countries is based on the closure of the Balkan migration route and the protection of the European Union's external borders. Austria has repeatedly sent police and border guards to Hungary's southern border to help control it. Since Sebastian Kurz's chancellorship, cooperation between the two states has deepened. The priorities of the Austrian Presidency of the EU Council in 2018 have also been set along with the motto „Protective Europe”²²:

- Preserving Europe's security and combating illegal migration,
- ensuring prosperity and competitiveness through digitalization,
- Stability in the European Union's neighborhood - the prospect of accession for the countries of the Western Balkans / South-Eastern Europe.²³

The Austrians (like Hungary) see the realization of the above goals in the protection of the external borders of the European Union, which can be achieved by protecting the borders of the countries along the migration route and within the framework of bilateral cooperation and on the other by strengthening Austrian border protection. Austria will continue to be an important security partner for Hungary in the future, as there is an agreement between the two countries on the issue of migration, and the success of the Hungarian border protection is also in the interest of the Austrians.

The common platform generates economic mergers and new business relationships indirectly and involuntarily. In this way, diplomacy strategies will also become stronger and more active, and historical differences will gradually ease.

The economic growth of both countries depends significantly on their export activity. Since 2010, foreign trade between Austria and Hungary has also been developing dynamically. According to the data of the Central Statistical Office, the total trade volume in 2015 was approx. EUR 9.8

²¹ Homepage of the Embassy of Austria in Budapest

²² eu2018.at

²³ sp.

billion²⁴, making Austria Hungary's second most important trading partner, and today it is the fourth largest investor in Hungary (after Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) with an investment volume of over EUR 8 billion. In 2019, with a direct investment of around EUR 6.9 billion (about 10% of total direct investment), it was still the third biggest investor after Germany and the Netherlands.²⁵ Austrian companies are market leaders primarily in the brick and sugar industry, the car trading industry, the paper industry, and construction and real estate development, while the Austrian presence is also dominant in the retail and financial sectors.²⁶ Meanwhile, Hungary is Austria's eighth-largest export market in the world.²⁷ In 2019, Hungary was the most important market for Austrian exports in the Central and Eastern European region, with about EUR 5.6 billion, and the sixth-largest in the world.²⁸ In terms of Austrian imports, it even exceeds that of China, which has traditionally had close trade relations with Hungary. Examining the Austro-Hungarian foreign trade more closely, we see that the structure of goods exchanged between the two countries is quite similar, Austria and Hungary supply similar products. This mirror-like development can be explained by the intertwining of many freight means of transport and on the other hand by the fact that these are trade relations between two highly developed national economies.²⁹

²⁴ bmeia.gv.at/hu

²⁵ Aussenwirtschaftszentrum Ungarn (March, 2021) P.9.

²⁶ bmeia.gv.at/hu

²⁷ Aussenwirtschaftszentrum Ungarn (March, 2021) P.3.

²⁸ Aussenwirtschaftszentrum Ungarn (March, 2021) P.9.

²⁹ bmeia.gv.at/hu

	2019	2020	2021 (First semester)	Percentage change over the same period of the previous year
Austrian exports of goods in millions of euros	5.587,8	4.897,5	2.830,5	+16,8
Imports of goods from Austria expressed in millions of euros	4.296,5	3.853,4	2.303,1	+24,9
Austrian exports of services in millions of euros	1.721	1.431	286 (Q1)	-41,0
Imports of services from Austria expressed in millions of euros	1.694	1.463	344 (Q1)	-11,6
Austrian direct investment	6.959	6.302	No data	No data
Hungarian direct investments in Austria	219	172	No data	No data

Economic relations with Austria³⁰

Of course, there are issues, on which there has been disagreement between the two countries during the first Kurz government, the most important of which is the disagreement over the issue of nuclear energy: Paks II has received a number of criticisms from Austria launching a project. Austria has been voting for renewable energy for years.³¹ In addition, in a statement issued in September 2018, Sebastian Kurz justified the sanctions against Hungary. In his view, there was no compromise on the rule of law, and he, therefore, considered the infringement procedure under Article 7 to be lawful.³² The above harsh statement can be explained by the Austrian Presidency and is very surprising, as there has been no example of this in recent years, and the views on migration are the same.³³ The other controversial issue is the legislation introduced on 1 January 2019, according to which the children of non-Austrian children of EU citizens working in Austria determine the number of family benefits and personal income tax relief on the basis of the local price level, which is negatively affected many commuting Hungarian families living mainly on the border. As a result of the

³⁰ Aussenwirtschaftszentrum Ungarn (March, 2021) P.3.

³¹ Stubnya (2019)

³² Eur-Lex, Article 7

³³ Rettman (2018)

above-mentioned legislation, the European Commission has initiated infringement proceedings against Austria.³⁴ The case is currently before the Court of Justice of the European Union, as Austrian law also conflicts with two EU regulations: Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems states that foreign nationals have the same rights and obligations as to the citizens of that nation. It also states that „cash benefits” (such as family allowances) may not be modified or reduced on the grounds that the person entitled or a member of his family resides in another country (Article 7). Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 on the free movement of workers within the Union also deals with the principle of equal treatment, according to which workers in a given state, regardless of their nationality, are entitled to the same social and tax advantages.³⁵

In May 2019, after less than a year and a half of joint rule, the right-wing People’s Party-Freedom coalition government coalition disintegrated after appearing in a video of Ibiza two years earlier about Austrian Liberal Vice-Chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache accusing the politician of corruption. Strache resigned immediately, but after the outbreak of the scandal, the Freedom Party continued to hold the post of interior minister, which Kurz and the People’s Party did not accept, preferring to resign the entire government and hold early elections. Federal President Alexander Van der Bellen said that citizens’ confidence in public institutions could only be restored through early parliamentary elections.³⁶ During the transition period, the country was governed by an expert government. The People’s Party politicians have assessed the situation well: thanks to the successful campaign of the APP, the popularity of both the party and the chancellor candidate has raised the renewed People’s Party to unprecedented heights for years.

6. The second Kurz government (2020-2021)

The APP won the early elections with a result of 37.5%.³⁷ The election is considered by political experts to be of historical significance, as there has never been such a big difference between the first and second place winners in the history of the second Republic of Austria. Meanwhile, the popularity of the Austrian Socialist Party has fallen to a historic low, and many say a Hungarian „model” is emerging in our western neighbor: the emergence of a dominant, ruling center-right party, without which the formation of a government is almost impossible. The APP has been strengthened under the expert government: about 250,000 people have „voted” for the Freedom Party in the last few days alone. After the election, Kurz said he was willing to sit at

³⁴ hvg.hu

³⁵ Kalas (2020)

³⁶ Magyar Nemzet (2019)

³⁷ Statista.de (2019)

a negotiating table with every party in parliament. However, both the Socialists and the Freedom Party have indicated they are unwilling to enter into a coalition with the People's Party, and the Liberal News did not get enough votes to gain an absolute majority in the legislature together with the People's Party. Kurz's only chance of this remained the swollen Greens for 13.9% popularity. Coalition talks dragged on for a quarter of a year as Conservatives and the Greens took markedly opposite views on the key issues they represented. Finally, the announcement was made on January 1, 2020: the coalition agreements were successfully concluded, so cardinal issues for the APP, the fight against illegal migration, and political Islam were included in the government program, while climate policy was introduced under pressure from the Greens. The Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense came under the control of the APP, and a Ministry of Integration was established, also under the supervision of the Conservatives. Meanwhile, the Greens have come under the influence of the environment, energy, infrastructure, transport, technology, and innovation.

The Hungarian Prime Minister has repeatedly called Austria a „laboratory” and the processes taking place there, such as the cooperation between the People's Party and the Greens, and later the crisis caused by the coronavirus. Sebastian Kurz was also praised in front of members of the press, who managed to stand up to the break-up of the coalition with the AFP and the government crisis and emerged stronger and victorious.

Following the formation of the governing coalition, a small number of diplomatic meetings could take place in 2020, following the outbreak of the coronavirus epidemic in February, with complete closures and epidemiological restrictions across Europe. On 14 July 2020, Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg had an official visit to Budapest in the framework of the „Central Five”³⁸ Foreign Ministers' Meeting. The informal consultation focused on the economic effects of the crisis caused by the coronavirus epidemic. There was also talk of the possibility of future successful cooperation.

After the announcement of the emergency state in Hungary, criticism came from some Austrian parties, including the pro-government Greens, the opposition ASDP, and the Neos. According to the Liberal-Left parties, „democracy was in jeopardy” after the introduction of an extraordinary legal system in Hungary, which allowed only measures to strengthen the government's decision-making power in the event of an epidemic emergency. At the same time, the People's Party and the Chancellor themselves have spoken in an extremely restrained, non-hostile manner.

³⁸ Informal cooperation between Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia

There was also an agreement between the two states in criticizing the distribution of vaccines in the European Union: the heads of government said they were stubborn and unjust. Austria and Hungary have also delivered tens of thousands of vaccines to the Czech Republic, which has received fewer doses of vaccines from the European Union. Therefore, both countries have separate pathways for vaccine procurement: Austria purchased 1 million doses of the Sputnik vaccine and entered into separate agreements with Pfizer / Biontech. Meanwhile, in addition to the Russian vaccine procurement, Hungary also successfully used the Chinese-developed Sinopharm vaccine in the 2021 spring vaccination campaign.

Another point of agreement is the illegal migration that has been mentioned several times during the second Kurz government – so far – in three cases:

- For the first time in November 2020, the issue of illegal immigration and the fight against Islamic terrorism was again on the political agenda in connection with the terrorist attack in Vienna, as all the assassins had a migration background.
- Another debate on asylum policy began this year after two young people with refugee status in Austria raped and murdered a 13-year-old girl in Vienna.³⁹
- Regarding the current situation in Afghanistan, Sebastian Kurz strongly rejected the allocation of refugees on the basis of quotas and increasingly favored local assistance. Austria has provided € 18 million in emergency aid to Afghanistan to help those in need on the ground and to obtain refugee status in one of its immediate neighbors, in order to avoid a migration crisis similar to 2015.⁴⁰

April 18, 2021, marked the 10th anniversary of Sebastian Kurz's entry into the federal government from the presidency of the Austrian People's Party's youth section⁴¹: Kurz took up the position of secretary of state at just 24 years old. The People's Party has changed significantly over the last ten years, mainly due to the „blood refreshment” brought by Kurz, but at the same time significant (geo) political changes have taken place in Austria and throughout Europe. Kurz soon became one of the most popular politicians in Austria, right after the president, and after his appointment as foreign minister in 2013, he became one of the most powerful ministers in the Austrian government. Even as Secretary of State for Integration, he had a strong vision of illegal migration and thanked Hungary several times for closing the Balkan

³⁹ Berliner Morgenpost (2021)

⁴⁰ Bundeskanzleramt (26.08.2021)

⁴¹ Dolna (2021)

route. The curiosity of Kurz's politics lies in the fact that as a conservative he can still remain modern. Interestingly, by 2021, its popularity has dropped significantly – to a depth not seen since 2013 – to around 33%.⁴²

Regarding economic relations, significant changes can be observed in the relationship between the second Kurz government and Hungary, but these cannot be explained by economic policy decisions, but rather by the Covid-19 epidemic. While GDP grew by 4.9% in 2019, Hungary experienced a 5% economic downturn in 2020 due to restrictions due to the coronavirus.⁴³ According to preliminary economic calculations, Hungary may return to the pre-crisis economic indicators in 2021⁴⁴, which can be partly explained by economic protection measures and the growing role of the state - for example, the state acquisition of banks and energy suppliers.⁴⁵ In 2020, Hungary was the eighth most important market for Austrian goods in the world, the sixth most important in the EU, and the third-largest in the Central and Eastern European region.⁴⁶ Austrian exports in 2020 fell by almost 12.4% compared to the previous year. All in all, Hungary is Austria's ninth most important economic partner in the world, with a total trade volume of about 8.75 billion euros.⁴⁷ According to a survey conducted by the Austrian Labor Office in July 2020, more than 98,000 Hungarian citizens worked in Austria, a decrease of only 3.4% compared to the data before the coronavirus.⁴⁸

In addition to the criticism of the emergency situation in Hungary, there has been significant controversy in recent months regarding border protection: the Austrian Minister of the Interior Cases has also questioned the success of Hungarian border protection.⁴⁹ Another pivotal point in Austrian politics, especially since the governing coalition of the Greens, is environmental protection. On August 24, 2021, Greenpeace activists protested in front of the building of the Hungarian Representation in Vienna against the „giga investment” on Lake Neusiedl. In their opinion, the construction endangers the wildlife of the lake on the common border section, and the construction in the Hungarian part may also have a detrimental effect on the Austrian part of the lakeshore. The Austrian government has applied to the Hungarian authorities to make the plans public.⁵⁰

The child protection law passed by the Hungarian parliament in June caused a great storm in Hungary and throughout the EU. Austrian Prime

⁴² sp.

⁴³ Aussenwirtschaftszentrum Ungarn (March, 2021) P.4.

⁴⁴ sp.

⁴⁵ Aussenwirtschaftszentrum Ungarn (March, 2021) P.9.

⁴⁶ sp.

⁴⁷ Sp.

⁴⁸ Finanzen.at (2020)

⁴⁹ Kronen Zeitung (2021)

⁵⁰ Der Standard (2021)

Minister Sebastian Kurz fully supports the decision of the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, to oppose the controversial law of the Orbán government.⁵¹ According to Kurz, the Hungarian procedure has crossed a border. The major Austrian ruling party has received a number of criticisms from the opposition for joining the protest late, but in the end, Austria has also joined some EU member states in protesting against Hungarian law, which they say is contrary to European values and discriminates against certain minorities on the basis of sexual orientation. Karoline Edtstadler, the Austrian EU minister, called the Hungarian law worrying but stressed that the Austrian government should be aware of all the facts before making a final verdict.⁵² Incidentally, the Austrian People's Party has been the subject of numerous domestic criticisms for not being represented at the Pride parade in Vienna.⁵³

7. The impact of the Austrian domestic political crisis of autumn 2021 on bilateral relations

In the autumn of 2021, major changes took place in Austrian domestic politics: the opposition-led parliamentary commission of inquiry into the Ibiza scandal charged Chancellor Sebastian Kurz with corruption charges, and the threads were traced back to 2016. Allegations of corruption included public opinion polls and central manipulation of public opinion. According to political analysts, Kurz and his narrow circle, former members of the APP's youth organization, decided in 2016 to fundamentally change Austrian political life, which had previously been bipolar and based on the transition economy of the two major parties' life is ingrained. Kurz built a movement instead of the old party structures, with the aim of freeing the APP from the shackles of the grand coalition and bringing a new political style into Austrian political life: instead of continuous bifurcation, he wanted to pursue a policy of cooperation. As we have seen in the chapters above, it has gained enormous popularity among voters in a short time. Kurz's system („System Kurz”, as political analysts called it in Austria) was designed to keep the Chancellor and his narrow layer of trust in power.⁵⁴ On October 9, 2021, Sebastian Kurz resigned as chancellor due to corruption investigations against him. Kurz continued to hold the position of party chairman of the APP and the position of a faction leader. On December 2, 2021, he resigned from the above-mentioned positions and also announced his retirement from public life.

⁵¹ Böhmer (2021)

⁵² Vienna.at (2021)

⁵³ Hagen – Schmid (2021)

⁵⁴ KKI podcast

„My country is more important than my person. Stable conditions are needed now. Therefore, in order to resolve the stalemate, I want to make room to prevent chaos and ensure stability.”⁵⁵

It has become a common belief in the APP that the office of chancellor and party chairman should be held by one person. The Austrian domestic political crisis last autumn was finally resolved with the election of Karl Nehammer as interior minister and his appointment as chancellor.⁵⁶ Nehammer is „hard-line” on the refugee issue, so in this and the current situation in Ukraine, he is cooperating with the Hungarian government on the reception of refugees, but due to the Hungarian parliamentary elections on April 3, 2022, there is a general „wait-and-see” from Austria.

Conclusion

As a neighboring countries, relations between Austria and Hungary will continue to be an important cornerstone of the two countries' foreign policy, and their regional cooperation may be one of the keys to their economic and security policy success. For historical and cultural reasons, this relationship will always be unique. However, it is important to see that current political changes can have a serious impact on bilateral relations. The question is what the results of the Hungarian parliamentary elections in 2022 will bring, and what effect this may have on the cooperation that has begun and on the agreement between the two countries on certain issues. Of course, any changes in Austria's domestic politics cannot be left out of the formula, be it the early election following the 2019 Ibiza scandal, the difficulties of post-election coalition negotiations, or the domestic political scandal that erupted in the autumn of 2021. The question is how, in the light of the above, Hungarian - Austrian relations will develop in the future, and how much will the upheaval of Austrian domestic politics affect it. What will be the outcome of the Austrian People's Party in the next parliamentary elections after the loss of the charismatic party chairman? Can the party recover from the political scandals of recent years? Although the APP remains one of the most popular parties among voters, the party's popularity has plummeted in recent months.⁵⁷ According to a December 2021 poll, the Socialists (26%) overtook the People's Party (24%), which has been unprecedented for years.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Bundeskanzleramt.at (09.10.2021): „Mein Land ist mir wichtiger als meine Person. Was es jetzt braucht, sind stabile Verhaeltnisse. Um die Pattsituation aufzulösen, möchte ich daher Platz machen, um Chaos zu verhindern und um Stabilitaet zu gewaehrleisten.”

⁵⁶ Politico (2021)

⁵⁷ derstandard.at (10.12.2021)

⁵⁸ sp.

Another important variable in bilateral diplomatic relations is the European Union and its future, as well as the ongoing geopolitical changes that may pose a series of (security) challenges for the entire continent, including the Central and Eastern European region like the Ukrainian conflict. Another question is how the coronavirus pandemic is evolving and how the governments of individual states and the European Union are adapting to these changes.

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ESJ Humanities

Research Methodologies in Urban Wolof Studies: A Critical Review of the Literature and Suggestion for New Analytical Perspectives

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[Doi:10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p22](https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p22)

Submitted: 01 June 2022

Accepted: 22 June 2022

Published: 30 June 2022

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Cite As:

Dieng A. (2022). *Research Methodologies in Urban Wolof Studies: A Critical Review of the Literature and Suggestion for New Analytical Perspectives*. European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 18 (20), 22. <https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p22>

Abstract

The aim of this review is to offer a reconceptualization of urban Wolof, the language of millions of Senegalese in Senegal and abroad, in the light of the translanguaging theory. Whereas most of the Urban Wolof literature is principally limited to how this languaging form is spoken in Senegal, the present study considers the effects of mobility on urban Wolof by establishing a correlation between transmigration and translanguaging. Going beyond the confines of Senegal, this investigation examines how the Senegalese diasporans engage in their daily translanguaging practices, as they move across borders, in their capacity as mobile multilingual transmigrants. The review offers a more speaker-centred stance, a sort of bottom-up approach to language, the objective being to move away from the a priori assumptions that the urban Wolophone shuttles between languages or codes, and away from the rigidity of code-based theoretical approaches through which scholars have thus far examined urban Wolof. As such, a more decolonised approach in terms of participatory data collection and analysis is now more than ever in order. And this endeavour should be facilitated by the affordances of the ethnographic gaze of an in-group member.

Keywords: Urban Wolof, translanguaging, codeswitching, codemixing, transmigration, linguistic ethnography

Introduction

In the scholarship, Urban Wolof (UW) has, for the most part, up until now, been viewed through the code-based approach of language mixing. In this review, I will endeavour to survey the different methodologies thus far used in UW studies and attempt to bridge the gap between the latter and the “unitary view” of translanguaging (García et al., 2018, p. 8), which could potentially constitute a solid analytical tool to examine UW. There is a considerable body of research on UW, where the Senegalese urbanites’ speech has been the object of scrutiny. The Senegalese city-dwellers have a rather relatively large linguistic repertoire which scholars have called by many names such as “Franlof”, “Francolof”, “Fran-Wolof” (Thiam, 1994, p. 13); “Dakar Wolof” (McLaughlin, 2001) and “urban Wolof” (Swigart, 1992; Calvet, 1994a, 1994b; Juillard et al., 1994; McLaughlin, 2008a, 2008c). What the scholarship is mainly concentrated on is how the Senegalese city-dweller languages in Senegal. What is missing is the aspect of mobility which this review aims to highlight by taking Wolof outside the confines of Senegal and into the many cities of the Global North. As such, the dynamicity of languaging is observed not only at a micro level (language) but also at a macro level, as speakers move across borders freely, the same way they appear to move across languages with ease, making the urban Wolophones’ language repertoires amenable to change, as they adopt novel features to widen their idiolect. Among the Senegalese who have popularised UW are the Mouride. The Mouride are adepts of the Mouridiyya Sufi order, founded in the Senegalese holy city of Touba, by the spiritual guide Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba, who lived from 1853 to 1927 (Ross, 2011, pp. 2930-1).

This is where migration (migrating) meets languaging. In fact, the parallel between languaging and migrating constitutes one of the reasons why UW should be viewed through the lens of translanguaging because it resonates more with the urban Wolophones’ linguistic behaviour. It merits noting that UW should not just be confined to Senegal, as it is the language of millions of emigrants in Africa but also in the Global North. As such, Wolof, including UW, gets inflected with the notion of mobility. To date, and in my findings, there are very few, if any, linguistic studies on UW outside Senegal, with mobility as a variable. In this review, I will explore the multilingualism literature where translanguaging fits in, in relation to other theories, my objective being to demonstrate and make a compelling case that the Senegalese diasporans’ languaging style is more germane to translanguaging than any other theory. This study can indeed be a vast topic but the space at my disposal will allow me only to touch upon the most conspicuous points in the multilingualism literature, especially those relevant to how UW has thus far been studied.

In what follows, I will explore some of the various methodologies employed in UW studies to collect data both in Senegal and abroad. The focus, in the second part, will be on the theoretical approaches underpinning the analysis of UW corpora, most of which were dominated by the theory of codeswitching, code-mixing, the idea that urbanites shuttle between socially constructed linguistic entities which are generally French and Wolof. Even some of the most recent scholars who recognise English as being part of the Senegalese urbanite's multilingual practices (McLaughlin, 2022) still view it (English) seen as an addition to the UW linguistic repertoire, an idea which the translanguaging theory refutes. Refer to García and Li Wei (2014, p. 14) for more on "additive bilingualism".

The UW literature shows the preponderance of the code-based approach, with the focus on languages rather than on the speakers and their creativity. In spite of the paucity of research on novel, speaker-centred approaches in the UW research, I have endeavoured to build on the existing analytical approaches to UW to offer a new theoretical approach to UW research. I will contrast the dual view of language mixing with the unitary view promulgated by the translanguaging experts (García et al., 2018), with the view to demonstrating why UW should be viewed more in the light of translanguaging than through the rigidity of codes. The review concludes with a synthesis of the various theoretical methods gleaned, culminating with an elaboration on the choice of the translanguaging model as the framework for future studies.

Methodological approaches to data collection

Whilst there are many studies on Wolof in general, its grammar and orthography (Torrence, 2013), UW has proven to be a more popular target for scholars, with most of such studies being concentrated in Senegal. Apart from Poplack's (2018), Smith's (2019), and Tramutoli's (2021) works, studies devoted to UW as spoken in the diaspora hardly exist. As a result, one of the central features on which UW scholars concentrate is the Senegalese urbanites' capacity to switch between French and Wolof. As I'll demonstrate later in this review, this aspect alone is far from the only feature that typify what the urban Wolophones are doing linguistically. A closer examination will reveal that languages other than French and Wolof are discernible in the UW corpora, regardless of whether the data was collected in Senegal or abroad.

One of the most popular methodologies of collecting UW communicative speech samples are those ethnographically-informed, involving, principally, observation and interviews. In his research in Saint-Louis, the former capital of Senegal, NGom (2003) set out to examine the situations in which Wolophones included French, Arabic, and English features in their daily conversations. In order to analyse their various motivations for

which they used each of those languages in their translingual practices, he used structured interviews, with a set of questions designed to elicit such specific topics as politics, religion, and culture from a selection of 200 informants, comprising 100 males and 100 females. The group was then divided into 2 sub-groups according to their ages: the over 50s on the one hand, and those aged between 20 and 30 on the other.

Most linguistic ethnographically-informed methodologies use interviews mainly as a way of triangulating observational data from naturally-occurring conversations. In that regard, such data as the one collected by NGom (2003) can be said to lack spontaneity, as far as what Poplack (2018, p. 18) calls “good data” is concerned. According to Poplack’s (2018, pp. 18-21) variationist methodology, good data should not only be representative of the informants but also be varied enough to allow for enough patterns of speech to emerge from the corpus. As such, in collecting her bilingual Wolof-French data, she privileges large corpora of quantitative data whilst employing linguistic ethnographic means (2018, p. 82). NGom’s (2003) approach differs with other ethnographically-informed methodologies in the sense that his data was collected within the framework of pre-established themes he wished to see as emerging from the data. In other words, he was interested in how specific, pre-existing themes were linguistically framed by those UW speakers. This approach runs counter to that employed by proponents of translanguaging, whose modes of analysis tend to be more speaker-centred, therefore more geared towards decolonised methodologies which place the speaker at the centre of the verbal event.

Adepts of translanguaging prioritise the exploration of themes that emerge, spontaneously, from the multilingual corpora, with the speakers and data as a starting point. As such, this stance will inform their data collection procedure. In Casamance, South of Senegal, where Joola, Wolof, and French are among the dominant languages, Goodchild and Weidl (2019) examined the translanguaging practices of multilinguals’ daily practices. The data was comprised of several hours of video-recorded speech samples of naturally-occurring conversations collected between 2014 and 2017. Their principal objective was to look at how the speakers used their varied linguistic repertoires, including multimodal features, in their daily interactions. Therefore, their focus was more on collecting spontaneous speaker samples. Their approach can be seen as novel in the respect that they have moved away from code-based methodologies, which they have found to be too rigid.

It is well to note that most African languages are not predominantly written, although some, like Wolof, have been codified, and have a grammar and an orthography (Republique du Senegal, 2005; Torrence, 2013). It is not surprising, therefore, that most of the source of data is to be found in orality. In addition, because of the epistemic biases and stigma attached to translingual

practices (Swigart, 1994, p. 181, Irvine, 2011, p. 63), the Wolof found in print is generally the monolingual, rural type and, as such, does not reflect the true way that the Senegalese urbanites language. However, more recently, with the advent of social media, the ethnographic research has spread beyond just real-life situations to encompass virtual interactions. The new technologies have helped spread the use of UW beyond the confines of Senegal, as diasporans engage in discussions relating to unemployment and poverty back home. I will concur with Irvine (2011, p. 60) that those topics are one of the most discussed among the Senegalese diasporans.

This deterritorialization of UW, occasioned, in part, by the development of online networks, has triggered the interest of many UW scholars whose main works had so far been limited, in the main, to Wolof in Senegal. In that regard, McLaughlin (2014) examined various ways in which the Senegalese, including the diasporans from Europe and America, use the social media platforms to engage in daily digital practices, using unconventional orthography. Most urbanites, rather than using the codified Wolof orthography in their daily texting, tend to use the French one instead. This is most observable nowadays on social media platforms. Consider, for example, this WhatsApp discussion below, which is part of data collected during my ongoing ethnographic research (Dieng, 2021). The interaction is an ethnic banter between two Senegalese. It is known that West Africans engage in such joking relationships as part of their everyday interactions (Attino, 2021; Dieng, 2021, pp. 127-130). I will not get into the language analysis here but wish to merely point out how urban Wolophones tend to have the predilection for the French orthography even when framing deep African cultural concepts.



Figure 1. WhatsApp banter

The interaction should be spelt thus:

Nga xam gàmmu gii duhut sa gàmmu
[Know that you're not invited in this celebration]
Aziz bàyyil Sereer yi soo béggee lift suba
[Aziz, leave the Sereer alone if you want a lift tomorrow]

With the advent of the Internet, there is a growing body of such digital UW data. The diasporic news platforms and social media constitute a rich source of communicative data (McLaughlin, 2022), for ethnographic study. McLaughlin (2014) contends that her approach for collecting digital UW data is nothing short of ethnographic, basing her argument on Blommaert and Jie's (2010) view that language, being dynamic, is inseparable from the many situations in which it occurs. One of those situations was the comments section of the New York-based Senegalese "Web portal", Seneweb (2014, p. 30). As a digital platform for the diasporic Senegalese, it constitutes a medium for the dissemination of UW abroad, echoing Smith's (2019) "Senegal Abroad". In her latest work, Smith (2019) was interested in the Senegalese transnational identities. Her sojourns in Dakar, Rome, Paris, and New York allowed her to collect ethnographic communicative data from Senegalese informants. She examined how the Senegalese frame notions of identity and blackness in real life multilingual interactions from an UW corpus she had compiled over a period of three months, with observation and interviews as her main methods of data collection.

By and large, UW scholars employ fairly similar methods of collecting data, which, for the most part, are linguistic ethnographically informed. However, in my findings so far, there does not seem to be long-standing immersions with the researched from the researchers' part, in order to allow for patterns of speech to emerge over time. Whilst it may be a valid approach to work with synchronic data, for, say, other analytical purposes, certain theoretical assumptions are best made with diachronic data, collected during a long period of cohabitation with the informants. This is where, according to Poplack (2018), in-group membership is fundamental for the collection of "good data" (2018, p. 18). Irvine (2012, p. 58) notes, to that effect, that a long sojourn with the subjects, "an intensive, long-term ethnography" is key in the data collection process. It is in that regard that being one of them can be highly beneficial.

In-group membership can facilitate understanding of certain practices observationally. It also enables the researcher to grasp intertextual references made by the group during their discussions without having to ask for elucidations. This is particularly important because observational and reported data do not always tally. In other words, what an informant reports to a researcher (especially to an outsider) may not reflect the truth, though truth is relative. In addition, with ethnographic research, there is the risk of exoticizing the research participants (Smith, 2019, p. 15; Perry, 1997, p. 230) by looking at them through the lens of accepted stereotypes. This is not to say that outsiders cannot become in-group members for the duration of the research. For example, some Westerners who are interested in African urban languages do endeavour to look beyond the long, overworked clichés.

In studying the Senegalese immigrants in the United States, Perry's (1997, p. 230) aim was to "transcend media-produced stereotypes of exotic otherness in order to describe how and why Wolof immigrants engage in the cultural production of difference". Smith (2019) also made a conscious effort to immerse herself in Senegalese communities in Senegal, in Europe, and in America, in an effort to better understand how the Senegalese frame certain ideological concepts such as race (and issues of identity) in their everyday language practices. Smith's (2019) and Tramutoli's (2021) works are not only some of the latest on Wolof, but they are also among the most original, in that they look at the Senegalese translingual practices outside Senegal. Both authors collected data in a context of migration, with mobility as one of the variables. Only, they are still, in my view, looking at the collected verbal data as being separate from the speakers, and understandably so because they do not seem to be analysing the data from the (emic) perspective of the speakers.

This is why the aforementioned studies look at UW from a code-based perspective, where languages making up the UW repertoire are seen as separate, reified, entities. In Italy, Tramutoli (2021) views Italian as an added

code to the Senegalese language repertoire, approaching her data from the code-mixing perspective, while still Smith (2019) approaches hers from a codeswitching perspective. In any case, the fact that they both examine UW in the Global North, rather than in Senegal only, like the mainstream research, makes their research innovative in that aspect. The following chapter will treat of the theoretical perspectives through which the UW data have been analysed in the scholarship.

Theoretical perspectives on data analyses

The dual view of codeswitching and code-mixing

On account of most urban languages being a postcolonial phenomenon, the post-independence era saw a flux of interest in the study of urban languages in Africa. One of the most frequently studied urban languages is undoubtedly UW. It was Wioland and Calvet (1968) who, for the first time, spoke of Wolof in terms of it being the main vehicular language of Senegal (Calvet, 1994a, pp. 91-92) but it was Swigart (1992, p. 84), Calvet (1994a, 1994b), and Juillard et al. (1994) who highlighted more thoroughly the urban qualities of the language. They are perhaps the earliest authors to have used the appellation “urban Wolof”. The term was later popularised by subsequent authors such as McLaughlin (2008a, 2008c) who had also spoken of “Dakar Wolof” (2001) previously, following Thiam (1994, p. 20) who called it “le wolof des Dakarais”.

Most of the theoretical perspectives elaborated in the study of UW are principally based on the presupposition of the existence of what is known as codes between which the urban Wolophone is supposed to switch. This is why many UW scholars saw the necessity to view UW through the lenses of codeswitching (Dreyfus & Juillard, 2001; NGom, 2006; Smith, 2019) or code-mixing (Tramatoli, 2021). For the proponents of this theory, the French features in UW are seen as additions to the Wolof language, thereby looking at this mode of languaging as a mixture of two languages, much the same as in the phenomenon García and Li Wei (2014, p. 14) call “additive bilingualism”. Whilst this is a valid point, adopting this view is tantamount to compartmentalising the linguistic repertoire of this speech community into bits of politically charged appellations like Italian, English, or French. On what, for example, do we base the appellation “Spanish” to “name” the speech of people living in Chile or Cuba, for example. This preceding remark, though apparently disconnected from my line of reasoning, affords nonetheless a rough illustration for what I mean by “politically-charged”. In fact, and still in this connection, it is these socially constructed appellations that occasioned the adoption of terms such as Francolof, Franlof or Fran-wolof (Thiam, 1994, p. 13), where the urban Wolophone’s translingual practices are merely seen as a forward and backward movement between two named languages.

Incidentally, the fact that the prefix “Fran” is the first part of the term is not fortuitous. In semiotics, the first part in such annexed terms constitutes generally the ideologically more “dominant” part (Chandler, 2007, pp. 110-114). This is also valid for appellations like *La Françafrique*. Françafrique is supposed to be a “cordial” relationship between France and its African colonies. It is in that regard that the latter are known by “Les amis de la France”, a friendship which could easily be the object of criticism in view of the visible imbalance in this relationship (France vs Francophone Africa). It is this imbalance which is also translated linguistically when translingual speakers are viewed as waltzing between a local vernacular and a more politically dominant one, thereby making the divide even more entrenched. Perhaps, looking at what is termed “Francolof” as one unified linguistic repertoire could offer a new platform from which all languaging forms are seen as equal.

With codeswitching as the most popular theory in the UW scholarship, a few distinctions are often made regarding the way speakers switch codes. In their study of the Wolof spoken in Dakar and Ziguinchor¹, Dreyfus and Juillard (2001, pp. 674-676), make the distinction between three modes of codeswitches: intrasentential, intersentential, and extrasentential, where intrasentential refers to the occurrence of a French feature within a Wolof sentence; intersentential, to the alternation between relatively long stretches of French and those of Wolof in one utterance. Extrasentential switches occur in dialogues, where one speaker makes a monolingual utterance in a given language and the interlocutor replies in another. Prior to this, Poplack (1988) had already elaborated on the distinction between intrasentential codeswitches and borrowings. More recently, she extended the theory and applied it to her study of UW, arguing that borrowing is a more appropriate term to reference the presence, within Wolof, of French lexical items (Poplack, 2018). However, she speaks of codeswitching to reference the alternation between stretches of French and Wolof. The latter would be equivalent to Juillard et al. (2001)’s intersentential switches mentioned above. These theories, applied to the study of language mixing over the intervening years, will reveal that some of these theoretical precepts are flouted by speakers of UW as we will see further below.

The study of UW has gained popularity over the past decades on account of the fact that some scholars have considered it to have a unique status among the African urban languages. It has evolved to become the national language of Senegal, despite the attempt, by the French and the Francophile elite in Senegal, to promote the French language. For example, in other neighbouring African nations like Côte d’Ivoire, a form of Creolised

¹ One of the 14 departmental regions of Senegal.

French popularly known in Senegal as *le français ivoirien* emerged in the post-independence era. In many other Francophone African countries like Gabon, Togo, or Benin, urbanites tend to mainly speak French, whereas the Senegalese somewhat resisted this French domination. Wolof is instead more popular throughout the country. Despite the long-standing relationship between France and Senegal, only around 10% of the Senegalese speak French (Smith, 2019, pp. 7-8). It is instead the “shadow politics of Wolofisation” (O’Brien’s, 1998) that took root and hoisted Wolof to the state of de facto national language. To that effect, much research has been conducted on UW and the Senegalese linguistic landscape.

The popularity of this dual view of codes spans across decades and is, to date, the preferred theoretical approach for many in the UW scholarship. This is observable even in the most recent studies on UW (Smith, 2019; Tramutoli, 2021). One of the most prominent frameworks in codeswitching is the Matrix Language Framework (MLF) theorised by Myers-Scotton (1995). The theory stipulates that the bilingual does not just mix languages randomly, but that in a postcolonial African context of codeswitching, the European language constitutes the embedded language, and the local vernacular represents the matrix language. The embedded language is, as if, housed in the matrix language. Furthermore, the author argues that it is the matrix language which defines the grammatical rules of the translingual utterance. This theory echoes Dumont’s (1983, p. 153) view that the Wolophones’ extensive use of French verbs has not altered the Wolof verbal system because all French verbs are inflected in accordance with Wolof grammatical rules. The MLF model has inspired many proponents of the dual view of codeswitching, including Muysken (1997, 2000, 2013) whose theories have, in turn, inspired Tramutoli’s (2021).

Tramutoli (2021) found that the code switches that the Senegalese migrants in Italy engage in are generally of an intra-sentential nature, that bits of Italian are inserted to the already existing UW repertoire. Looked from that angle, the findings seem to support the MLF notion of embeds within another language. However, despite the existence of rules which characterise codeswitches and code-mixes, including those supported by the MLF model, many of them are violated by UW speakers. To cite an example, scholars like MacSwan (1999, 2005, 2009) have argued that some forms of language mixing do not occur because of some grammatical constraints proper to the codeswitching theory, echoing Myers-Scotton’s (1993a) Blocking Hypothesis which stipulates that some morphemes are incompatible with other morphemes from other languages, or that the use of a given morpheme is inhibited by another to which a codeswitcher attempts to juxtapose it.

The aforementioned precepts are based on the assumption that the so-called hosting language (matrix) dictates the morphosyntactic rules.

Therefore, linguistic elements that do not comply are inhibited or blocked. For example, urban Wolophones can equally say: “*My laax*” (my porridge) or “*Sama porridge*” (my porridge). According to the Blocking principles, the former should not be allowed because the grammatical elements should come from Wolof and not from English. *Sama porridge* would be acceptable according to this principle because *porridge* is a lexical term, and thus can be borrowed (the Blocking Hypothesis prohibits grammatical items from being borrowed). Any urban Wolophone would find those rules to be unfounded.

Several decades later, Myers-Scotton and Jake (2017) refined the MLF model to include a reinforcement of the distinction between grammatical elements (system morphemes) and the lexical elements (content morphemes) in a codeswitching utterance. The authors contend, for example, that definiteness (definite articles, possessives, etc.) are part of the system morphemes (2017, p. 344) and should, according to their codeswitching precepts, come from the matrix language, but our example above (*my laax*) infirms this assumption, where the definiteness or determinacy is framed in English instead. Other authors have been inspired by the MLF model and elaborated many other rules

Regarding precepts and rules of language mixing, Schindler et al. (2008) and Legendre and Schindler (2010), in their analysis of their UW data collected in Thiès, the second largest city in Senegal, found that the speakers flouted many of those precepts of language mixing, including, principally, the ones theorised by MacSwan (1999, 2005, 2009). It is well to note, too, that the dual view of bilingualism can be valid to a certain extent, when the language practices of multilingual language users are viewed from the outside, but I will agree with Otheguy et al. (2015, p. 298) that the researcher must not assume, from the outset, that multilingual speakers are just adding languages together. It is those assumptions which are at the very heart of most, if not all, UW studies. It is the insistence that languages must be viewed as distinct named entities that is also at the very heart of the codeswitching theory and is related to what García et al. (2018, p. 5) call the “dual correspondence view”. Many of the prominent authors of bilingualism such as MacSwan (2017) still support this theory, or, at least, view translingual practices through this theory. However, a relatively more recent view on multilingual languaging, based on the theory that the multilingual speakers possess one unified linguistic repertoire, has emerged. García et al. (2018, p. 8) call it the “unitary view” which is a fundamental aspect of the notion of translanguaging.

The unitary view of translanguaging

In this section, I will examine a different perspective on UW where scholars have questioned the legitimacy of the dual view described in the previous section. Even some of the proponents of codeswitching acknowledge

that the Dakarais' translingual practices exhibit a certain fluidity and ease to the point where early appellations of UW such as "Francolof", "Franlof", or "Fran-Wolof" (Thiam, 1994, p. 13) have now become virtually outdated, so to speak.

UW on its own is a translingual languaging system. In addition, the mere fact of viewing it as a variety of Wolof, i.e., one integrated system under one name, should be a reason to shift to a more unified communicative system. The urban Wolophones' daily translingual practices resemble more what Pennycook & Otsuji (2015, p. 19) call "the dynamic interrelationship between language practices and urban space". Because UW is the language of the city-dwellers, Pennycook & Otsuji (2015)'s metrolingualism is, in my view, a potentially acceptable theoretical approach for studying UW, all the more so because metrolingualism, like translanguaging, is about understanding crystallised or spur-of-the-moment languaging forms in a specific space (Pennycook & Otsuji, 2015, pp. 86-87). I would consider Swigart (1992) to be the closest, of all the UW scholars, to the concept of the unitary view.

Swigart (1992, p. 84) agrees that the urban Wolophone seems to be putting two codes together but, rather than remaining dual, the linguistic system thus obtained is transformed into a *new*, unified entity she calls "third code", thus concluding that UW is "one code" (1992, p. 99). This concept of *third code* is somewhat analogous to (Bhabha, 1990)'s notion of "Third space" where something new is birthed from a combination of elements. In line with this theory, UW can be viewed as a form of languaging creatively improvised in a space of language and culture shock as a response to specific communicative needs. This move is, however, not without social tensions due to the epistemic biases surrounding translingual practices.

This is where, according to Li Wei (2011, p. 1223) translanguagers need spaces where existing rules are apt to be defied, and new concepts creatively coined (see also Li Wei, 2018, p. 15). This "criticality and creativity" (Li Wei, 2011), which is observable in the urban Wolophones' translingual practices, was adumbrated in the previous section. Swigart (1992, p. 84) contends that the fluidity with which the urban Wolophones speak makes this way of languaging "the norm", the unmarked form of speech for the Dakarais, suggesting that the author adopts, in that regard, a more speaker-centred view to be able to see their repertoire as the default way of languaging. She is therefore moving away from the ideas of shuttling between languages. Although some of her statements still sound like duality, her theories on UW are nonetheless consistent with one of the three principles of the translanguaging theory elaborated by Vogel and García (2017, p. 3), that translanguaging "...takes up a perspective on bi- and multilingualism that privileges speakers' own dynamic linguistic and semiotic practices above the named languages of nations and states". Similarly, García and Li Wei (2014,

p. 22) spoke of the linguistic practices of the bilingual language users as being “the norm”. Furthermore, Swigart’s (1992) assumption that UW is “One code” is also not very far off from the theoretical foundations of translanguaging of the “unitary linguistic repertoire” (Vogel & García, 2017, p. 3).

Additionally, what draws Swigart’s (1992) views even closer to the theories of translanguaging, at least as far as UW is concerned, is her insistence that the Dakarois urban Wolophones are not switching between codes, reasoning that their languaging pattern is, in essence, different from patterns observable in code switches (1992, p. 84). These findings attest to the theory that UW, though resultant from different “languages”, if viewed from the inside, constitutes a unitary whole. This theory is in keeping with the one championed by some of the proponents of translanguaging such as García and Li Wei (2014, p. 21) who speak of “new whole” to refer to the bilingual’s linguistic system.

The newness of the whole appears to suggest that something has been added. This is what it looks like from the outside but translanguaging experts insist that the reality within the multilingual speaker’s mind is otherwise (Otheguy et al., 2015), that despite the fact that, from a social perspective, multilingual language users may be said to be using more than one named language, they are still producing speech from a “unitary” linguistic system (García et al., 2018, pp. 8-9). Put another way, what is seen as additions by proponents of the dual correspondence, or of the enumerative approaches to language, is only an enlargement of the one linguistic repertoire. Only, even in describing the unitary nature of the bilingual’s repertoire, the use of certain terms is sometimes inevitable, even if they evoke duality.

The aforementioned translanguaging experts, and perhaps others, do account for that fact. Because of the language planning and policies that have been forced on to us, some of us may have to use terms such as, say, “language features”, rather than what Otheguy et al. (2015) rightly call “idiolectal features”. It is therefore not rare for even scholars who champion the unitary view, like Canagarajah (2011a, p. 401), to use terms which evoke duality such as “shuttling between languages”. But the merit the use of such terms has is that it can concur towards explicating the notion of translanguaging, especially after we have so long been exposed to the theory of the code-based approach.

Before proceeding, let me bring a brief parenthetical clarification, regarding appellations of multilingualism. Makalela and Dhokotera (2021) make the distinction between “monolingual multilingualism” and “multilingual multilingualism”. The former is more in line with enumerative approaches of multilingualism, denoting rigid boundaries with languages. They insist that African multilinguals who engage in multilingual language practices are multilingual multilinguals and not monolingual multilinguals because their translanguaging practices do not consist in an aggregation of separate

named languages, but goes beyond that, in keeping with the theory of translanguaging.

However linguistically diverse a society can be, one can observe a certain fluidity in the way people translanguage. This is especially true in an African context where people are born multilingual only to later acquire, at school, additional languages often viewed, wrongly, as more prestigious. In any case, my point here is that with a plethora of languages, viewing the so-called shuttling between them in terms of switching codes can prove somewhat of a difficult endeavour. Sometimes, the linguistic system may comprise up to five or more named or nameable languages. I would strongly align my view with that of Otheguy et al. (2015, pp. 286-9; see also Li Wei, 2018, pp. 18-19) that, in the mind of the African multilingual speaker, switching between languages or codes is exactly what is not happening. They are simply deploying idiolectal features, housed, as it were, in a large repertoire that knows no boundaries, unfettered by linguistic rules and precepts. It is an expression of linguistic freedom which can appear as a threat, for lack of a better term, to the language policy makers.

This is why more recent scholars regard the unitary view as the most suitable to analyse translingual practices in some African contexts where translanguaging is what many Africans naturally do as multilingual multilinguals. What is noteworthy, additionally, is that in Senegal, many of the 30 or so languaging forms are still not codified. Where, then, would one start, to view those as codes? This is exactly what Goodchild and Weidl (2019, pp. 133-149) stumbled upon in Senegal. Using the translanguaging model, they analysed video-recorded multilingual conversations in Casamance, South-Eastern Senegal. The linguistic ecology of this part of Senegal is one of the most diverse and people from different ethnic backgrounds with highly varied linguistic repertoires engage, fluidly, in daily language practices. They found several local languages such as Joola, French, Mandinka, Wolof, Kriolu, etc. that composed the local linguistic system.

The authors demonstrated how, with a code-based approach, it would have been impractical to analyse this highly multilingual setting. The reason is that specific codes could mean different things for different locutors and there can be confusion in the apprehension of some lexemes. As such, because some of the languaging forms do not yet fully have an official name, one can only obtain a vague idea of what a code could be in those circumstances. They also found that speakers may not always report all the languages that they speak. What is innovative about the study is the inclusion, in the data analysis, of multimodal features as part of the speakers daily translanguaging practices. In fact, there is a growing interest, within the translanguaging scholarship, in multimodality.

More recently, multilingualism has grown to include social semiotics to create larger linguistic systems that would include semiotic repertoires. Some of the most eminent scholars in multilingualism such as Vogel and García (2017, p. 13) agree that multimodality and social semiotics could add to the understanding and furtherance of translanguaging (see also García & Otheguy, 2020, p. 25). In this connection, Adami and Sherris (2019) reason that multimodality is a form of communication that can be said to comprise language and other prosodic features not often accounted for in linguistic analyses. To this end, Perera (2019) examined how translanguaging repertoires have come to include visible corporeal actions such as gestures, gaze, etc. Because gestures can complement the meaning-making process and can direct an interlocutor to a desired meaning (Li Wei, 2018, p. 21; García & Otheguy, 2020, p. 25), sometimes even before words are uttered (Perera, 2019, p. 129), it is well to take them as integral multimodal features of the translanguager's linguistic repertoire.

Whether it is multimodality that is part of language, or the other way around is an object of debate. But what is clear is that proponents of translanguaging adopt such terms as multimodal translanguaging or multimodal languaging (Adami, 2019, pp. 36-38). In the production of a multilingual repertoire, lexical items seem to be playing the same role as do signs in a semiotic repertoire. This is also consistent with Pennycook's (2017, p. 273) observation that, in translanguaging practices, the language features are important, but, of equal importance is also the semiotic repertoire against which the linguistic signs are set. The setting of the author's research was a Bangladeshi-run corner shop in Sydney. In the study of multimodal translanguaging, shops and businesses have proven to be a rather popular setting.

Banda et al. (2019), for example, examined how Chinese signage harmoniously blends with local signs in Zambia to create new meanings. Similarly, Shiohata (2012, pp. 274-283) observed that, in Dakar, shopkeepers designed a rather ingenious way of attracting customers. They inscribe Wolof multimodal signs, using an unconventional orthography (i.e., the French alphabet), on their shop fronts with the name of their revered spiritual leader juxtaposed to the product they are selling to attract other adepts who follow the same marabout (spiritual guide) to visit the shop (2012, pp. 274-283). All the works cited above concur to support the idea that the semiotic space in which the languaging happens is of paramount importance. In fact, one can even argue that there is no space (apart) in which translanguaging occurs because, according to Mazzaferro (2018, p. 3), this notion of space is, in and of itself, part and parcel of the multilingual language users' linguistic resources (see also Otsuji & Pennycook, 2015, p. 85).

The multimodal design can also be bodily. For example, when two Senegalese people meet and shake hands, as they systematically do, if one of them prostrates on the back of the hand of the other, the latter understands the message conveyed, and the ensuing conversation will inevitably be marked by this gesture which is characteristic of the Mouride way of greeting. García and Otheguy (2019, p. 8) posit, in this connection, that our corporeal actions also participate in the “meaning-making” of our communicative process. The same is equally valid for signage involving types of garments but also of signage outside the body, such as special decorations, which marks the communicative system. We know how fundamental the Touba visual culture is in the Senegalese transmigrant identity work (Ross, 2011, p. 2942). The Touba visual culture includes religious objects such as prayer beads, prayer mats, and special clothing proper to Touba, not to mention the photographs of the revered Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba which decorate the many businesses owned by the Senegalese in the West (2011, p. 2942). In such environments of semiotic assemblage, the speaker’s speech and actions become inseparable from the semiosis within which everything happens, and, language, rather than being just a tool, is now part of the setting, as an entity birthed within this semiotic décor (Pennycook, 2017, p. 277).

If we consider the concept of text in the general, semiotic sense of the term, to also include multimodal signage, then hermeneutics, as “the study of human cultural activity as texts with a view towards interpretation to find intended or expressed meanings” (Laverty, 2003, p. 24, citing Kvale, 1996), can be a useful analytical framework when seen as a macro-level philosophical underpinning behind translanguaging as a micro-level analytical tool for scrutinising speech samples. This view, adumbrated earlier, which consists in seeing the speech-speaker-environment as one continuum, affords a fresh perspective on language as being something humans do, echoing the notion which the gerund form *-ing* encapsulates. Note, in passing, that it is from the perspective of *linguaging* that Li Wei (2018, p. 16) initially developed his views on *trans-linguaging*.

Another fundamental aspect of language not fully accounted for, and which can be said to be part of the Wolof prosodic elements, are verbal gestures. In their study of the Wolof language in rural Senegal, Grenoble et al. (2015), inspired by the works of Dialo (1985), examined what they call “verbal gestures”, which they define as “a group of sounds that stand outside of the basic phonemic and lexical inventory of Wolof, but are a core part of the Wolof communicative system” (2015, p. 110). Common Wolof verbal gestures are, for example, “walis”, “piis”, or “ciipetu” (or cipetu). The most common of them all is the *ciipetu*, characterised by a lateral sucking (long or short) of the teeth which produces a fricative sound. Grenoble et al. (2015, p.

115) describe “ciipetu” as a “bilabial-dental click” produced by an “elongated sucking” which carries the illocutionary force of “I don’t like this!”.

To avoid confusion, a precision is in order: the Wolof verbal gestures are not gestures. They are sounds. Contrary to what Li Wei (2018, p. 21) refers to as “manual gestures” in multimodal translanguaging, verbal gestures are sounds that are in the same order as what Gil (2013) terms “paralinguistic clicks”, used in some parts of Senegal, which carry meanings of affirmations or negations, depending on the production of the sound. They also convey disagreement, sadness, despondence, etc. Grenoble et al.’s (2015) work was centred principally on how those verbal gestures are used in RW. As such, in my findings, there does not seem to be any studies which account for verbal gestures as used in translanguaging practices in urban contexts.

Concluding thoughts

The general aim of the above chapter was to highlight some of the theories developed throughout the years in multilingual languaging studies. I have endeavoured to focus on UW studies as it would be beyond the scope of this review to attempt to critique the plethora of works available in the field of multilingualism. From what precedes, it has emerged that UW has mostly been studied through the dual correspondence view of theories such as codeswitching (Smith, 2019; Swigart, 1994, p. 175; Dreyfus & Juillard, 2001; NGom, 2006), codemixing (Tramutoli, 2021) and borrowings (Poplack, 2018), etc. The analysis of UW almost always involved looking at the Senegalese urbanite as switching between pre-existing codes, principally Wolof and French. The code-based theory regarded one language as the recipient and the other as the donor (Poplack, 2018), echoing Myers-Scotton’s (1995) MLF model of matrix and embedded languages.

However, it was observed that the urban Wolophone’s shuttle between the two so-called codes was so smooth that Swigart (1992) considered the resultant of that “new” linguistic mixture to be just “one code”, a “third code” created in a “third” space. Furthermore, new research into the Senegalese linguistic ecology, namely in the South, has revealed that a code-based method of studying multilingualism in this part of Senegal was almost an incongruity on account of the fact that what a code can signify in one language could connote a different thing altogether in another (Goodchild & Weidl, 2019, pp. 133-149). In light of the reasons thus enumerated, I believe it is time to allow for more decolonised, speaker-centred approaches and ways of analysing the UW data.

Realising, after Otheguy et al. (2015), that translanguaging goes beyond the notion of smoothness, and that speakers do not produce languages but their own idiolect, one realises that scholars of the dual correspondence theory not only view multilingual speakers from the outside, but some of their

assumptions on bilingualism can be said to be unfounded if we adopt a more speaker-centred approach. The fact, in addition, that translanguaging is a bottom-up phenomenon, with the speakers occupying a central position (García & Otheguy, 2020, p. 24), makes it more appropriate if scholars are to move towards decolonising the study of languages of Africa. Indeed, rather than assuming, a priori, how urban Wolophones speak, there needs to be novel approaches to UW studies, where researchers adopt a more emic and indigenous stance.

In addition, what makes the translanguaging model more amenable for UW studies is that the multilingual language user's thought process is different to that of the monolingual speaker. Li Wei (2018, p. 18) posits that even when the multilingual decides, momentarily, to be in a "monolingual mode", he or she still does not think along the lines of monolingualism as a social construction. As such, and in accordance with the findings of Goodchild and Weidl (2019) in the south of Senegal, codes do not seem to exist in the imaginary of the Senegalese multilinguals.

Of late, there has been a genesis of multimodality in the study of multilingualism (Adami & Sherris, 2019; Perera, 2019; Adami, 2019; Banda et al., 2019; Li Wei, 2019). It is in that regard that, that translanguaging scholars speak of multimodal translanguaging as being the new area to explore in multilingualism. Multimodality has always been considered ancillary in communication studies, in the same way that Wolof verbal gestures are hardly ever accounted for when referencing the Wolof phonemic repertoire. The study of Wolof verbal gestures will, I believe, play a major part in the understanding of the UW speakers' translanguaging practices, much the same as the understanding of translanguaging will be enhanced by the inclusion of multilingual multimodal analysis. With all these elements in play, it would be malapropos or at least discrepant, in my view, not to consider the urban Wolophone's linguistic repertoire, comprising Wolof, English, French, verbal gestures, and multimodal gestures as constituting one linguistic system, in accordance with the translanguaging theory.

Moreover, even such entities as Wolof, English, French, etc. politically considered to be monolingual languages can be said to carry the vestiges of multilinguality even if we reason in terms of codes. For example, what is officially considered monolingual Wolof has had influences from various other languages such as Arabic (Diop, 2006; NGom, 2006, p. 104) and even Portuguese because the Portuguese had been in Senegal centuries before the French (McLaughlin, 2008b, p. 83). In addition, as early as the 11th century, some parts of the Senegambia area were already Islamised (NGom, 2003). As such, it was inevitable that the indigenous people's languaging practices be

impacted by Arabic. So “established”² are some of the Arabic terms in Wolof that many Senegalese, including my participants, see them as “original” (as in “of origin”) Wolof terms per se. Whilst the linguist can detect the appurtenance of a term, it is less evident for the common Senegalese. Therefore, in a code-based approach, the question of where a code belongs becomes problematic. The same could be said about French, Italian, English, etc.

All the reasons enumerated above concur to solidify the need for the choice of the translanguaging model, which coheres also with the notion of translocality, when studying UW. The central theme of translocality is consonant with the concept of translanguaging in many respects. People from a particular linguistic community in a given *locality* engage in *linguaging* practices that they have in common. The fact, in addition, that they can go beyond the official or political forms of linguaging (*translinguaging*) and carry that across borders (*translocality*) to enlarge their linguaging spaces (and thus linguistic repertoire), lends more weight to the notion of translanguaging as being best suited when analysing the transnational communities’ translingual practices. Translocality, therefore, I will argue, is the (physical) space, dynamic as it is, in which translanguaging (as a theory) occurs. Put another way, transnational processes such as *transmigration* and *translocality* are the macro-level contexts in which the micro-level context of *translinguaging* occurs.

What needs more attention in translanguaging studies is whether speakers follow special patterns in their choice of language features in their daily translanguaging practices. There does not seem to be many studies that focus on patterns of translanguaging. This may be due to the fact that, in translanguaging, the scholarship tends to focus more on the unitary nature of the speakers’ repertoires. Understandably, the unitary view is fundamental in translanguaging but it does not preclude the potential presence of patterns of speech informed by the languagers’ various motivations, spurred, as it were, by the desire to tailor their speech to a specific interlocutor or to comply with some societal or social restrictions which causes them to frequently alter their speech style. I am fortified in this idea by Otheguy et al.’s (2015, p. 297) view that translanguagers do not translanguage in the same fashion every time, that they may be in situations where they do not use their “idiolects” “freely” or fully. In other words, they may have to “monitor” their repertoire with the view to adapting “to the interlocutor and social situation at hand” (2015, p. 297).

² Proponents of codeswitching use the term to denote lexical items from a so-called donor language that are so frequently used that they are now considered part of the so-called recipient language (Poplack, 2018; NGom, 2006).

The above idea echoes Bell's (1984) "Audience design" where speakers appear to design their speech, depending on the circumstances at hand, to a special "audience" or "addressee". For the urban Wolophone in the West, for example, the monitoring of his idiolect can take multiple forms. Sometimes the UW repertoire can be deployed to (or close to) a maximum. Sometimes it is constricted to appear like monolingual Wolof, French or English. At other times, it may appear that they are only selecting a particular language pair. Finally, it may also look as if they are using their whole idiolect but that one of the languages is more salient in a specific moment. As such, and in accordance with the foregoing, more needs to be done to examine how the monitoring is done and in which specific situations certain choices of specific linguistic features occur to the exclusion of others. In short, it would be useful to identify which types of interactions or social situations make certain parts of the speaker's repertoire more, or less, prominent.

At a micro level of languaging, applying the translanguaging model to UW studies will require the scholarship to look at the urban Wolophones' linguistic repertoire as comprising gradient patterns rather than a juxtaposition of socially constructed entities we call French, Wolof, or English. As such, and in accordance with the unitary view, concepts like shuttling or switching between languages become at once discrepant. It is true that, viewed from the outside, the urban Wolophone does appear to switch between codes, but because translanguaging is speaker-centred, the translanguaging model will offer a platform from which the Senegalese urbanites can offer narratives of their own translanguaging practices rather than having them defined for them from the outside. Hence, a departure from traditional Euro-Western theories such as codeswitching, and a move towards more decolonised postulations will greatly supplement the already rich body of UW literature. When analysing UW utterances, what should be born in mind is that the different linguistic features forming the speaker's repertoire are organised in a *heterarchical* system where they are all created equal, so speak. This approach runs counter to code-mixing and codeswitching theories where languages are arranged *hierarchically*. As such, the Dakarois is seen as switching between Wolof and a more prestigious language called French. The translanguaging model would therefore be a powerful tool in dismantling such hegemonic ideologies based on language hierarchies.

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Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and its Impact on Global Geopolitics

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[Doi:10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p48](https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p48)

Submitted: 16 May 2022

Accepted: 02 June 2022

Published: 30 June 2022

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Cite As:

Tampubolon M. (2022). *Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and its Impact on Global Geopolitics*. European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 18 (20), 48. <https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p48>

Abstract

On February 24, 2022, Russia attacked Ukraine. Here as consequence, Russia was subjected to a slew of international sanctions aimed at pressuring it to de-escalate the issue. Even though the economic sanctions issued against Russia were designed to harm this country, all of them had unintended consequences on the economic system of the world, essentially due to global supply chains disruptions. Power, commodities, as well as commerce flow disruptions emerged from the military attacks. Such issue resulted in energy costs got much higher, commodity prices, as well as food prices, all of which contributed to greater inflation on a worldwide scale in several nations. Despite the fact that many attempts of negotiation were created in resolving the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, its political, social, and economic impacts lasted in numerous countries of Europe and other regions around the world.

Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, Invasion, Geopolitics, International relations

Introduction

Russian military forces invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, in violation of international law. The current crisis in Ukraine has far-reaching implications for the country's energy sector. The example of natural energy distribution is arguably the most well-known, and it has given a lot of attention in terms of the media and press. Ukraine has been reliant on domestic gas

supplies for years, yet Russia has regularly cut off supplies, such as throughout the 2009 Russia-Ukrainian gas conflict.

The invasion of Russia has ramifications for the natural power infrastructure in Europe and Ukraine. Historically, the majority of Ukraine's electrical grid was synchronized with the Community of Independent States' (CIS) linked network, including Russia being the biggest nation. Opportunities for integration with Continental European power networks were assessed between 2017 and 2021 due to continued disputes. Tensions between Moldova and Russia, whose grid was also synchronized with the CIS linked networks, were building at the same period (Averre, 2016). As a result, transmission and distribution controllers have been working for years to integrate with the Continental Europe power grid. An emergency synchronization was carried out on the 16th of March, barely 20 days after the invasion. While years of planning had gone into this, the last steps were completed rapidly, and it is still questionable how these synchronizations will affect the Continental European energy system (Hoffmann & Neuenkirch, 2017).

The globe has been following developments in Ukraine with trepidation, dismay, and horror, and the attack has shattered the pillars of our international security and stability system. This has triggered a major humanitarian catastrophe and is causing havoc on the already frail global economy, that were only recently recovering from the pandemic's damage (Bluszcz, & Valente, 2019). The security of individuals immediately touched and a fast restoration to stability and peace are the shared wish and essential commitment. However, because a diplomatic breakthrough or considerable military de-escalation is unlikely in the near future, sanctions are likely to endure - and extend. While the crisis in Ukraine isn't the only security threat the globe is experiencing, it has a significant influence because to its far-reaching implications for global security and economy.

Methods

The research article is attempting to quantify an issue and answer the "what" and "how many" impacts on the geopolitical aspect of Russian invasion on Ukraine. Therefore, quantitative data is employed. It's information that can be tallied or compared numerically. Qualitative data is a sort of data that describes qualities or attributes. It's usually obtained through surveys, interviews, or observation and presented as a tale. It might be challenging to accurately assess and evaluate qualitative data. The data might come in the form of descriptive words that can be examined for trends. Derived data is formed by utilizing mathematical formulae or aggregation to change existing data points, which are often from various data sources, into new data.

This research article utilized all the data set above with the aim of finding out how many types of impacts does the invasion cause on the global

scale. Also, qualitative data is used to determine the degree of impact as well as explain and analyze how such impacts can affect the world in whole.

Several empirical studies have been conducted to evaluate the economic impacts of conflicts. From 1960 to 1989, Koubi (2005) looked examined the effects of interstate warfare on economic growth in a wide range of nations. The study discovered that economic development variations across countries are systematically connected to the incidence and nature of conflict. According to the findings, post-war economic success is linked to the severity and duration of the conflict. However, the benefits of growth-enhancing factors are adversely correlated with a country's degree of economic development. From 1960 to 2002, Kang and Meernik (2005) looked at the consequences of civil conflicts on a variety of economies. They discover that conflicts have a detrimental impact on economic fundamentals and that the international community's response to civil wars has a significant impact on economic growth. Collier (1999) created a methodology to evaluate the economic consequences of all civil conflicts since 1960. According to Collier (1999), the economy rebounds quickly after protracted civil wars, whereas the economy continues to weaken after brief conflicts. According to Nordhaus (2002), wars are extremely expensive, with the cost of the Iraq war to the US ranging from \$100 billion to \$1.9 trillion over the course of a decade. Glick and Taylor (2010) used data dating back to 1870 to investigate the impact of war on bilateral commerce. They utilized the gravity model to evaluate the impact of wars on international commerce while adjusting for other trade factors and probable reverse causality effects. They discover that conflicts have a significant and long-lasting influence on commerce, national revenue, and global economic prosperity. From 1995 to 2017, Bluszcz and Valente (2019) calculated the short-term causal impacts of the Donbass war on Ukraine's GDP. They discovered that between 2013 and 2017, the war reduced Ukraine's per capita GDP by 15.1 percent. According to Ganegodage and Rambaldi (2014), the Sri Lankan civil war had a negative and considerable impact on GDP. They also show that large profits on physical capital investment do not translate into significant positive externalities. Kesternich et al. (2014) look at the long-term impacts of WWII on the socioeconomic level and health of Europe's elderly. They examine data from SHARELIFE, a retrospective survey performed throughout Europe in 2009 as part of SHARE (Heydemann, 2018). For approximately 20,000 people in thirteen European nations, SHARELIFE gives extensive information on their childhood experiences during and after the war. They design many war exposure tactics, including dispossession, persecution, local conflict, and famine intervals. They discover that war exposure, as well as individual-level shocks induced by the conflict, predicts economic and health consequences in later life (Jirušek & Kuchyňková, 2018).

What is Geopolitics?

The study of the influence of geography on power dynamics in international affairs is known as geopolitics. “The word geopolitics was coined by Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén at the turn of the twentieth century, and it spread across Europe in the years between World Wars I & II (from 1918 to 1939), finally becoming extensively used throughout the latter” (Sharples, 2016). In contemporary disputes, geopolitics has been employed as a euphemism for international politics. It includes the practice of analysis, preconditions, estimates, and the use of political power over a region.

Particularly, the idea of geopolitics could be a strategy of remote approach investigation that seeks to get it, clarify, and predict international political behavior in geographic factors. Within the execution of this geopolitics, specifically, the usage arrangement in deciding the goals implies, and how to use these opportunities to realize national objectives by utilizing the topographical star grouping of a nation by utilizing geo-strategy. Every nation, on the off chance that it needs to exist, must be able to use its topographical star grouping ideally to attain its national interface within the setting of achieving national objectives. Hence, the geological star grouping must be utilized as a critical thought for defining national legislative issues and the method of a country within the setting of accomplishing national objectives.

The roots of conflicts between Ukraine and Russia

The catastrophic occurrences in Ukraine between 2013 and 2014 were heavily impacted by actions occurring from outside Ukraine's boundaries. Domestic factors were, obviously, crucial, and political players from all parts of the political range in Ukraine must accept responsibility for what occurred. Nevertheless, Ukraine's ambiguous geopolitical status, combined with the reckless activities of hostile foreign forces pursuing their own self-serving objectives, has pushed the nation's stagnated domestic politics to the brink of civil conflict. Russia, the US, and the European Union were the 3 main protagonists, in roughly decreasing order of importance.

Since 1991, Russia and Ukraine's relations have indeed evolved. Since the two nations broke out in 1991 from the Soviet Union, Moscow has had tense ties with Ukraine. As a result of the Soviet Union's dissolution, Russian's problematic relationship with the rest of the world is a subset of the country's overall problematic connection with the rest of the world. With disastrous repercussions, Ukraine turned into the focal point of two decades of Russian rage and insecurity in 2014.

Both Boris Yeltsin and before that, Mikhail Gorbachev, desired the United States to recognize them as partners in equal position. However, the end of the Soviet Union caused Russia to lose half of its people, one third of

Russian's land, as well as all of its client republics and ideological allies. Throughout the 1990s, Russia had a major identity crisis as a result of its loss of "economic collapse, ideological vacuum, and superpower status" (Casier, 2011). Yeltsin's reliance on Western financing and decisions of NATO to extend the alliance to include former Warsaw Pact members embarrassed him. The bombardment of Yugoslavia by NATO in 1999, in an attempt to curb human rights violations in Kosovo, marked a turning point (Chassang & Miquel, 2009). It highlighted Russia's geopolitical marginalization, with the country unable to protect Serbia, a historically. Vladimir Putin constructed a new Russian identity in the 2000s, based on a booming economy (due to rising international oil prices), capable of standing up to the depredations of the US, the world's sole superpower. Its image of Russia as a significant and ultimate power was popular among Russians, and it had deep roots in Soviet and Russian history (Mankoff, 2011).

Ukraine served as a litmus test for Russia's comeback. With 46 million people, Ukraine was quite far the greatest of the republics that had become independent from Moscow's domination in 1991, and it was strategically located between Russia and the West. "Russia ceased to be a Eurasian empire without Ukraine", Zbigniew Brzezinski famously declared (Brzezinski, 1997). "Even those who spoke Russian and hailed from eastern Ukraine, such as Leonid Kuchma, president from 1994 to 2005, were eager to construct a sovereign, independent country" (Collier, 1999). Ukraine entered the Commonwealth of Independent States, which is an informal organization of 11 former Soviet republics, although it remained wary of Russia's military and political relations. Ukraine has long claimed that Russia has never fully recognized their country as a sovereign entity. Putin is said to have told George W. Bush (the President of USA) in 2008 that Ukraine "isn't even a nation" (Bohm, 2013). The people of Ukraine despised Soviet initiatives aimed at destroying Ukrainian culture, particularly the Holodomor famine of 1932, which followed Stalin's collectivization push. Ukrainians have always been viewed as a "younger brother", with a language and culture rooted in the countryside and only a weak ghost of Russian civilization. Also, Russia took issue with Kiev's attempts to encourage Russia's Russian-speakers, who make up half of the country's population, to embrace the Ukrainian language, as well as its failure to officially guarantee speakers of Russian's rights.

The two nations' commercial ties, on the other hand, remained robust. Russia maintained the position of Ukraine's most significant commercial partnership, accounting for the majority of the country's exports (centered on chemicals and steel) relied on Russian energy supplies (primarily gas) (Balmaceda, 2013). Russia, for its part, was reliant on Ukraine for the passage of 50% of its exports of natural gas to Europe, and the defense sector

of Russia's relied on Ukrainian manufacturing for several critical components (engines for ballistic missiles, for example).

In the period of 1990s, Ukraine and Russia entered into a *modus vivendi*. The US-brokered Budapest Memorandum of 1994 recognized Ukraine's territorial and sovereignty integrity in exchange for Kiev relinquishing every claims to former Soviet nuclear weapons still stationed on Ukrainian soil. In 1997, Kiev leased the Sevastopol naval facility in Crimea, which houses Russia's Black Sea Fleet, to Russia for 20 years. In the mid-1990s, Russian nationalists pushed for the return of Crimea to Russia, which had been given to Ukraine in 1954 to honor the 300th anniversary of Ukraine's union with Russia. However, because Yeltsin declined to back this initiative, it faded away.

Over the following two decades, Russia position itself embroiled in tense horse-trading with Ukrainian politicians. Whether Ukraine's leaders were 'pro-Russian,' like Presidents Kuchma and Yanukovich, or “pro-Western”, like Viktor Yushchenko (the President) and Yulia Tymoshenko (its Prime Minister), the concerns remained the same – most notably, “hard negotiation over the price Ukraine paid for Russian gas”. The precarious balance between Moscow and Kiev was jeopardized by the 2004 Orange Revolution, which saw Viktor Yanukovich, Kuchma's chosen successor and Russia's preferred candidate, lose his election to Viktor Yushchenko of West Ukraine. In “Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005), autocratic presidents were deposed by mass uprisings demanding free and fair elections” (Dreyer et al, 2010). Putin regarded this as a well-coordinated effort by the West to spread democracy – and pro-Western governments – throughout the post-Soviet sphere, and he took dramatic efforts to prevent it from reaching Moscow, tightening opposition restrictions and fostering pro-Kremlin popular movements.

The color revolutions took place against the backdrop of the European Union and NATO's eastern enlargement. Putin grew concerned that the US was pursuing an encirclement and containment strategy against Russia. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which Putin passionately condemned, Russia's ties with the US worsened (Dreyer et al, 2010). He was even more enraged by the West's acknowledgment of Kosovo's independence in February 2008. Everything to a head in August 2008, when Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili launched troops into South Ossetia's separatist province, killing many Russian soldiers in the procedures. Russia replied with a full-scale invasion, compelling Georgian troops to flee and recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia subsequently. In retrospect, Russia's 2008 activities in Georgia might be considered as a foreshadowing of what occurred in Crimea in 2014, in which Moscow used military group to redraw universally established frontiers.

President Barack Obama, in 2009, attempted to rekindle the relationship with Russia's new president, Dmitry Medvedev, by initiating a “reset” of relations with Moscow. The event yielded some beneficial results: in 2010, the US ratified the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and the US began utilizing Russia's Northern Distribution Network to transport soldiers and equipment into Afghanistan. However, after the Arab Spring of 2011, which Russia perceived as additional great instance of aggressive democracy promotion of America, ties worsened once again. Moscow was enraged by Muammar Gaddafi's overthrow in Libya as a result of NATO air attacks, and blocked planned UN intervention to end the civil war of Syrian in 2012. “In September 2013, Russia pulled off a diplomatic coup by persuading Syrian President Bashar Assad to decommission the country's chemical weapons, allowing Obama to back off his threat to attack Syria if the deadly assaults persisted” (Dreger et al, 2016). This demonstrated that Russia and the United States might still work together in sectors of mutual interests.

The Position of the United State

Russia was viewed as a rising democracy, a friend and partner of the United States during the Clinton presidency. Russia decided to join the G7 club of sophisticated industrialized nation state in 1998, and Yeltsin was promised financial assistance to aid in the difficult transformation to a business economic system (which became the G8). However, in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, Washington recognized a security vacuum in Eastern Europe. It appeared rational to bridge the gap by inviting newly democratic Central and East European nations to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a defensive alliance. “The nationalist party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's win in the 1993 State Duma election served as a wake-up signal that Russia may “go bad” and return to its colonial ways” (Högselius & Kaijser, 2019). President Clinton explicitly backed NATO membership expansion as early as 1994 (European Parliament, 2018). In order to join the alliance, candidates must be democracies ready to place their militaries under NATO command (which meant "learning English, buying compatible weapon systems, accepting NATO bases on their territory, and so on"). In exchange, NATO vowed to defend any member state that was attacked under Article V of the alliance charter. In 1999, “Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined NATO, followed by seven more nations in 2004 (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). In 2009, Croatia and Albania joined as well” (European Union, 2011).

Russia objected to NATO expansion, citing the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact alliance. Although Western officials emphasized that this was not the case, it meant that Russia was still considered as a possible adversary with the NATO's expansion. There have been certain initiatives

taken to establish a unique partnership between Russia and NATO. In 1997, a Permanent Joint Council in Brussels was created by the NATO-Russia Founding Act, as well as the NATO-Russia Council was founded during the Rome Summit in 2002. President George W. Bush wants to extend NATO further east as part of his post-9/11 "Freedom" policy (Havlik, 2014). At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, nevertheless, NATO's European members objected to Bush's desire to award Georgia and Ukraine a membership plan of action. (Pages 165-74 in Stent, 2014). They were reassured that future NATO membership was still conceivable, which only increased Russia's resolve to reject such a progression.

“Following the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which resulted in Ukraine's de-nuclearization, US policy toward Ukraine was largely secondary to US policy against Russia. The development of a wealthy oligarch class that restricted competition while conspiring with a severely corrupt political elite plagued Ukraine's transition to democracy and a market economy, just as it did Russia's (Ganegodage & Rambaldi, 2014). After the Orange Revolution in 2004, there was a burst of hope, but it quickly faded as the Yushchenko government succumbed to the same corruption and infighting that plagued its predecessor. With Yanukovich's pro-Russian victory in mostly free elections in 2010, US policy appeared to have struck a stalemate. In effect, Washington subcontracted Western policy toward Ukraine to its Brussels allies.”

The Position of European Union

“The fall of communism in Eastern Europe surprised both the European Union and the rest of the world. Under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which renamed the European Community the European Union” (Gower & Timmins, 2011), the EU was in the process of expanding social and economic union. Border restrictions between participating nations were abolished under the 1995 Schengen accord, and a unified currency, the Euro, was established in 1999. Brussels launched membership negotiations with Central and East European candidate nations in 1998 (Glick & Taylor, 2010). Applicants had to be functional democracies ('Copenhagen criterion') with domestic legislation that was in line with EU law (the *acquis communautaire's* 108,000 papers). Central-East Europeans began joining NATO five to ten years before entering the EU since these conditions were more stringent than those for NATO membership.

The choice to expand the EU was divisive. The former communist nations' living standards were less than half of those in the EU, and enormous investment would be required to bring their infrastructure up to EU standards. Established EU members expected a swarm of cheap labor from the new countries, as well as a shift of all regional development financing to the East. Despite this, there was a political consensus in support of expansion. Germany

pushed for enlargement to help secure its relationship with Poland, which accounted for 40 million people in the new republics. Britain and Denmark favored expansion over 'deepening' EU integration, reasoning that "it would be more difficult to agree on the construction of stronger federal institutions if there were 28 members rather than 15" (Gretsky et al., 2014). Despite the fact that several EU states, particularly Poland, agreed that a plan of action for admittance should be on the table, Ukraine was insufficiently large and politically unpredictable to be a viable contender for EU membership in the foreseeable future.

Russian invasion

"Putin declared a "special military operation" to "demilitarize and denazify" Ukraine on the morning of February 24. Minutes thereafter, missiles and aircraft attacked Ukraine's capital, Kyiv, and were quickly followed by a massive ground invasion from various directions. As a result, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy imposed martial law and ordered the mobilization of all male Ukrainian nationals aged 18 to 60, who were prohibited from leaving the country."

The northern front was launched out of Belarus on February 24th, aiming Kyiv, with a northeastern front targeting Kharkiv; With a southern front (beginning in Crimea) and a distinct probative southeastern front, the southeastern frontline was handled as two independent arrowhead fronts (launched at the cities of Donbas and Luhansk). The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on April 8 that all of its ground forces and groupings in southeastern Ukraine would be consolidated under General Alexander Dvornikov, "who will be in control of combined military operations, which included the reassigned probative fronts, which had been assigned to the northern and north-eastern fronts but were later withdrawn and reassigned to the southeastern front in phase 2" (Welt, 2022). By the 17th of April, residual forces in abandoned industries in Mariupol looked to be impeding progress on the southeastern front. On April 19, Russia started a new invasion front, dubbed the "eastern assault," that stretched 300 miles launching simultaneous missile attacks on Kyiv in the north and Lviv in western Ukraine, from Kharkiv to Luhansk and Donetsk.

Results and Discussion

Overall of the impacts on global geopolitics

Russia is certain that Ukraine should not join NATO when it comes to national positions in the Ukrainian war (Oualaalou, 2020). This is due to Russia's belief that the US and its allies would use Ukraine to set up weaponry and military bases that might be used to strike Russia (Oualaalou, 2020). As a

result, Russia is certain that Ukraine should not be allowed to join NATO in order to protect its sovereignty, peace, and independence (Oualaalou, 2020).

On the other side, the US and its allies, as well as NATO, want Ukraine to join the alliance. They say that because Ukraine is an independent country, it should be allowed to make its own decisions (Oualaalou, 2020). They believe that allowing Ukraine to join NATO is the wisest course of action (Oualaalou, 2020). They think Ukraine is a sovereign country with the authority to pick which organizations it wishes to associate with (Oualaalou, 2020).

Other countries, such as China, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, appear to be on the fence about this. They don't want to officially support Russia, and they don't want to openly support NATO, either, since they have important economic partners on both sides. They do not want to participate in Russian and Ukrainian politics since siding with one authority over the other might have long-term consequences for their economic growth.

First, Russia is one of the largest oil producers (Oualaalou, 2020). Therefore, their invasion of Ukraine forced the United States and its allies to place trade embargoes on Russia. With Russia being unable to trade with most nations globally, it means that they are also unable to sell their oil to other countries (Welt, 2022). Therefore, there seems to be an oil shortage globally caused by the sanctions placed on Russia.

Second, with the rise in oil prices, transportation costs are bound to increase (Welt, 2022). When the price of oil goes up, shipping companies increase their prices because they want to make a profit. Therefore, after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the shipping costs have significantly increased, making it hard for goods and people to move from one place to another (Welt, 2022). In addition, the rise in shipping costs has an overall impact on the prices of other commodities globally (Welt, 2022).

Third, the war increased tensions between NATO, the United States, and Russia (Welt, 2022). Right now, Russia views NATO as an alliance that is meant to weaken its dominance (Oualaalou, 2020). Therefore, Russia, NATO, and the United States do not see eye to eye because they believe they do not share any common ideals, which makes the whole situation tense because one wrong move by either of the players could easily create a global war (Oualaalou, 2020).

Impacts on the oil market

Due to a multitude of factors, notably that of the COVID pandemic, limited energy supplies, and escalating tensions between Ukraine and Russia, energy costs have been increasing prior to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Price of oil were stable in the "US\$80 to US\$95" range before to the invasion. Oil prices reached \$100 per barrel after the invasion. Because Russia is the world's

second-largest producer of oil and sends the bulk of its petroleum to European processors, the attack would render it extremely impossible for European oil merchants and corporations to get Russian energy supplies. Russia is also Europe's largest natural gas supplier, supplying over two-fifths of the region's natural gas (Poitiers, et al, 2022). Owing to Russia's substantial share of exporting oil, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is expected to generate energy supplies disruptions and a long-term surge in prices of energy. This damage might intensify if Russia implements a retaliatory export ban on fuel supplies to Europe as well as the remainder of the world. The retaliatory energy export ban imposed by Russia would result in a significant interruption in global energy supply, raising energy prices. Oil prices might rise over 140 dollars per barrel as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war, decreasing global growth estimates and throwing some European and non-European countries into depression. Price of gas for household use might likely rise as a result of anticipation of a worldwide energy supply disruption. Even though the United States can unleash its energy reserves to alleviate world energy constraints, growing energy demand will take a long time to satisfy due to ongoing energy trade negotiations as global energy prices rise.

The EU's including, implicitly, the UK's dependence on Russian gas supplies has expanded over the last decades. During that period, natural gas utilization in the UK and EU has stayed unchanged, but output has declined by a third. Imports had made up for the shortfall. In 2021, Russian gas will account for 32 percentage of European consumption, up from 25 percent in 2009. Conversely, the construction of new transit routes, including such Nord Stream, that would deliver Russian gas to the UK and the EU, has reduced Ukraine's position as a transit point. "In 2009, Ukraine received more than 60% of Russia's pipeline deliveries to the EU and the UK. By 2021, they had dropped to 25% of the population" (Poitiers et al, 2022).

"Russia can fund its present conflict in Ukraine primarily through earnings from the extraction and sale of oil, coal, and natural gas, as one of the writers pointed out in 2017 (Polak, 2017). The issue is that the EU's restrictive (sanctions) actions against Russia have yet to reach the energy industry. Russia's worldwide petroleum sales were almost \$250 billion last year. According to William Jackson, an economist at Capital Economics, almost two-fifths of that amount came from exports to Europe. More over a third of Europe's gas comes from Russia. According to official figures, Russia's military spending in 2020 will be \$61.7 billion (Poitiers et al, 2022). In other words, the money paid every year for energy commodities by practically all EU nations has allowed Russia, under Vladimir Putin's leadership, to fund the murdering of civilians in locations like Ukraine and Syria."

In addition, once Gazprom ceased supplying the spot market in the fall of 2021, the EU unwittingly contributed to finance Russia's invasion of

Ukraine. Gas prices soared as a result of its tactics. In the third quarter of 2021, the average price for Gazprom's gas in Europe and other countries jumped to \$313.4 per 1000 m³ from \$117.2 a year earlier, and the price rose even more in November 2021. These rises happened because, for the past ten years, Gazprom has connected all long-term contracts to the spot market rather than the current oil price. Gazprom artificially raised the price by withholding supplies from the spot market, then reaping the benefits of its long-term contracts.

Politicians and corporate leaders in Germany have persistently misjudged the dangers of their reliance on Russian energy supplies while obscuring their role in Russia's war machine. When Germany decided to construct the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline with Russia, circumventing conventional supply routes through Ukraine, they contributed even more to Russia's military expansion. It was no coincidence that Russia held off on striking Ukraine until Nord Stream 2 was completed. Thankfully, Germany has already closed down Nord Stream 2, but the fate of Nord Stream 1 is still unknown.

Impacts on the supply chain and finance market

“Military actions during Russia's invasion of Ukraine will disrupt global supply chains, affecting operations in a variety of sectors. The embargo on Russian exports, as well as Russia's retaliatory embargo on foreign imports, as well as Russia's reluctance to allow foreign goods to travel through its waterways and airspace during the conflict, might disrupt the global supply chain. It has the potential to generate scarcity and raise the price of imported items. Companies have predicted that the disruption created by cross-border blockades and trade prohibitions will result in supply hoarding, resulting in higher pricing. Additionally, commercial flight limitations along the Ukraine-Russian border (Siddi, 2020), as well as intensified security inspections at refugee camps in neighboring countries, may hamper freight flow and border operations, as border authorities process refugees before responding to cross-border products. This will exacerbate the global supply chain disruption and drive up import prices.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has had a little impact on the global banking system. Foreign banks with significant operations in Russia are the only banking segments that have been badly impacted by the invasion. After various nations implemented financial restrictions on Russian institutions and rich individuals, several international banks were impacted. Austria's Raiffeisenbank, Italy's Unicredit, and France's Société Générale are the most affected banks. However, if pro-Russian organizations respond against Western financial sanctions by launching a major cyber-attack on the global payment system, the war might have an indirect impact on the worldwide

banking system. The potential worldwide damages from a cyber-attack on the global payment system might be as high as US\$1.8 billion per day.

As a result of the West's meddling in Russia's war for regional dominance, Russia may be pressured to impose an oil export restriction as retaliation for the sanctions placed on it. This might result in increased energy prices, which would have an impact on economic development. This is due to the fact that firms will have to spend more money on importing raw materials as well as producing goods and services. This will result in increased input and output prices, and individuals may be unable to afford high-priced goods and services. This will result in fewer consumer purchases, as well as a reduction in the supply of products and services, resulting in a drop in economic output. Households will pay more on oil and gas for cooking and heating their houses, affecting consumption spending. This will result in a decrease in after-tax disposable income for households, which would depress consumer purchasing. This will have an impact on GDP's consumer spending component.

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, financial markets throughout the world saw a drop in value. When Russia's invasion of Ukraine was announced, investors fled for safety. The lowest price at which stocks were traded on major stock exchanges during the invasion timeframe is shown in Table 1. It demonstrates that the lowest dip in share prices during a 5-day period (February 18 to February 25) occurred on February 24, 2022, the day of the invasion. The Dow Jones industrial average dropped by almost 100 points. The S&P 500 index dropped almost 250 points. The Europe Next 100 index has dropped by around 400 points. As indicated in table 1, the Shanghai composite index dropped by more than 150 points. However, with the imposition of heavy penalties against Russia by a number of nations the day after the invasion, stocks rose.

Table 1. Global stock markets (the lowest price at which stocks were traded during the time period)

	United States	United States	Australia	Europe	United Kingdom	South Africa	China
	Dow Jones Industrial Average	S&P 500 Index	S&P/ASX 200 Index	Europe Next 100 Index	FTSE 100 Index	JSE	SSE Composite Index
	Lowest price	Lowest price	Lowest price	Lowest price	Lowest price	Lowest price	Lowest price
Year	% change	% change	% change	% change	% change	% change	% change
2022	(Basis points)	(Basis points)	(Basis points)	(Basis points)	(Basis points)	(Basis points)	(Basis points)
Feb 25	3.11 (311)	4.18 (418)	2.242 (224.2)	1.12 (112)	1.12 (112)	1.27 (127)	1.20 (120)
<i>Feb 24</i>	<i>-1.08 (108)</i>	<i>-2.53 (-253)</i>	<i>-2.604 (-260.4)</i>	<i>-4.27 (-427)</i>	<i>-4.45 (-445)</i>	<i>-1.69 (-169)</i>	<i>-1.68 (-168)</i>
Feb 23	-0.84 (-84)	-1.07 (-107)	0.515 (51.5)	1.93 (193)	2.42 (242)	1.74 (174)	0.597 (59.7)
Feb 22	-1.80 (-180)	-1.38 (-138)	-0.664 (-66.4)	-1.55 (-155)	-1.73 (-173)	-0.403 (-40.3)	-0.979 (-97.9)
Feb 21	-	-	-0.633 (-63.3)	-2.19 (-219)	-2.15 (-215)	-1.63 (-163)	0.715 (71.5)
Feb 18	-0.79 (-79)	-1.07 (-107)	-1.104 (-110.4)	-0.63 (63)	-1.70 (-170)	0.817 (81.7)	-0.209 (-20.9)

Impacts on global food resources

Ukraine produces enough food to feed 400 million people throughout the world, including 50 percent of the world's sunflower oil, 10% of the world's grain, and 13% of the world's corn. As of present, the Russian onslaught would prevent up to 30% of agriculture fields in Ukraine from being planted or harvested this year. Furthermore, due of the blockade of the Black Sea ports and the limited capacity to transfer commodities across the Western border, supply lines from Ukraine have been affected.

Farmers are trying to continue planting because of the conflict, which has resulted in city blockades, a scarcity of seeds, and fertilizer shortages. There will be disastrous consequences in the fall if farmers do not begin planting crops now. The markets have already responded to the situation. Wheat prices have risen by nearly 25% in the last year. This will cause a supply problem, affecting food availability for people all around the world.

Ukraine is experiencing a food crisis in various cities, including Mariupol, as a result of the present scenario, with little to no options for bringing in more supplies. This food crisis is part of a larger economic battle precipitated by the invasion of Ukraine. The crisis will not just affect Ukraine, but will also have a significant impact on other Eastern European nations, since prices will rise in the short term and shortages will worsen in the long run.

This is why small farmers require immediate assistance in order to raise food this season and meet the country's domestic demands. Green, sustainable farming techniques must be maintained for the long run.

Impacts on the tension between NATO, the United States, and Russia

Putin has purposefully shattered the possibility for diplomatic solutions, as well as the Paris-based cooperative European security system, by Moscow's invasion of Ukraine. The NATO-Russia Founding Act, the European Security Charter, and the Minsk Agreement are all out-of-date documents. Putin's new narrative of a non-existent Ukrainian nation and its historic desire to return to Russia the territory of a former empire now appears to trump security considerations as a justification for using force for domestic consumption.

The Russian president, on the other hand, has clearly miscalculated Ukraine's will to resist and the West's commitment. He will now accomplish what he hoped to avoid: a more united Ukrainian country, a more united and stronger NATO and EU, and unparalleled military power on NATO's eastern frontier. He will also suffer substantial economic, financial, and political isolation, all of which will have long-term consequences. If Russian soldiers become mired in ugly and time-consuming street combat in Ukraine's cities, their losses will grow, and Putin's internal reputation will suffer, with unforeseeable consequences.

There appears to be little possibility for fresh accords at the outset of a new era. The outlines of a future inclusive European security system, its principles, borders, and areas of influence will not materialize as long as Ukraine's destiny remains uncertain. A fresh military conflict between Russia and the West along a hardened contact line, on the other hand, would be fraught with military mishaps, miscalculations, and escalation. As a result, stabilizing measures such as direct communication between military headquarters, strong incident avoidance procedures, as well as de-escalation, transparency, and military movement limits, would be required even more rapidly to avoid the worst. Once the fog of war has lifted, fresh negotiations and security arrangements will be required.

Impacts on Northeast Asia's Geopolitics

The invasion's consequences are just now beginning to be felt in China, Mongolia, and Japan. The long-term ramifications are still unknown. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is upsetting the post-Cold War established order, with implications for European security and ties between Russia and NATO. While the geopolitical pressure is mostly directed at Russia's west, Northeast Asia is already experiencing the economic and security consequences.

Western sanctions on Russia have taken impact in a variety of ways, wreaking havoc on the country's financial stability and disrupting foreign business operations in the country. While these sanctions, which include import and export limitations, are directed only at Russia, its eastern neighbors

— Mongolia, China, and Japan – are also affected in a variety of areas, including food supply, energy, and military.

The United States authorized a sanctions package addressing Russia's Central Bank on February 28. The European Union quickly followed suit. Energy sanctions against Russia, as well as the disruption of the global supply chain, are expected to cause economic recessions in Northeast Asia, as nations begin to rely on local replacements – if they have that choice – and energy costs continue to rise.

The Foreign Direct Product Rule, one of several Western sanctions mechanisms, and other strong steps to disrupt Russia's import-export commerce are causing a food security concern in China. Despite Xi Jinping's ambitious objectives for China to become self-sufficient in grain production, China has long been dependant on other nations for wheat and other consumer goods, notably Russia, Ukraine, and Japan. Now that wheat supplies from Ukraine have been halted due to the conflict, China will be among the numerous countries seeking to find other suppliers.

China has imported more food from Japan than it has ever before since the COVID-19 outbreak began. "Exports of food, agriculture, forestry, and marine items to mainland China increased 35.2 percent to 222.4 billion yen (\$1.93 billion) in 2021," according to Nikkei.

On the other hand, Mongolia has already seen an increase in the cost of electricity. For example, in Ulaanbaatar, the most widely used gasoline, AI-92, currently costs 2,390 Mongolian tugrik, up from 1,434 tugrik in April last year. Mongolia is also being pressured by inflation and the energy shift since its diesel fuel use is entirely reliant on Russia.

Simultaneously, in this period, if commodity prices continue to rise and Mongolia exports natural resources like coal, the Economic Revival Policy may gain from the shift. External forces, however, are preventing Mongolia from seizing such a tremendous chance. Mongolia's exports to China are on hold as the Chinese government continues to close towns and border posts owing to COVID-19, a reoccurring concern during the epidemic.

A reduction in Mongolia-Russia commerce might potentially affect Mongolia's economy. Air-based trade is likely to be harmed if Russia's economy and banking system are devastated. Mongolians living overseas have already reported being unable to use credit cards issued by Mongolian banks owing to Russia's loss of SWIFT connectivity. However, because Mongolia and Russia are connected by train infrastructure, some trade is likely to continue as usual, although shipments of commodities from Europe are expected to be reduced.

Aside from the economic implications, Russia's recent actions have altered the geopolitical landscape in Northeast Asia. Countries who do not

have a high level of trust and confidence in Russia, such as Japan, are afraid of unanticipated security difficulties.

A Russian helicopter allegedly breached Japanese airspace near Hokkaido Island on March 2, according to the Japanese defense ministry. Japan retaliated by dispatching fighter planes to intercept. To avoid escalation, the two parties have agreed to exercise greater caution in the region. Any tiny misunderstanding or action might exacerbate the existing mistrust.

In light of these rapidly changing geopolitical circumstances, Russia's invasion of Ukraine compelled regional governments to rethink their security strategy while attempting to maintain the status quo. The Asia-Pacific military industry was already growing significantly before 2022, according to Mordor Intelligence, and the present circumstances would further add gasoline to the fire.

Furthermore, Russia's geopolitical drive to hinder NATO's dominance in Eastern Europe poses many concerns for neighboring nations such as Mongolia and China.

Western sanctions on Russia have swiftly evolved into a double-edged sword for China, with US officials threatening to penalize China if it protects Russia financially. China is attempting, at least in the near term, to maintain amicable ties with Russia while avoiding antagonizing Europe and the United States, as seen by its recent abstention from a United Nations General Assembly vote.

Furthermore, the last ten years have been regarded as the pinnacle of China-Russia, Russia-Mongolia, and Mongolia-China ties. "A triangle, Russia, Mongolia, and China, is a specific, relatively independent sub-region of Northeast Asia as well as East Asia," noted Vladimir Graivoronsky of the Russian Academic of Sciences in 2014. These countries' people are from three distinct civilizations: Russian, Mongolian, and Chinese. They have a long history of peaceful and wartime inter-civilizational political, trading, economic, cultural, and military connections." Although Russia's new move may not immediately jeopardize these trilateral ties, it may sow the seeds of distrust over time.

While there are currently a number of unresolved historical and contemporary security challenges in Northeast Asia, Russia's recent invasion of Ukraine may exacerbate future tensions. Governments will aim to prepare for severe security instability by boosting defense spending and investing in technology-based cyber and air defense systems, all while relying on diplomacy to avoid escalation. As the ramifications become clearer, all of Northeast Asia's countries will be highly watchful and observant.

International responses to the invasion

Many Western countries were opposed to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Many governments have publicly condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Several countries replied by imposing sanctions on Russia, notably the United States, the European Union, France, and the United Kingdom. The Asia-Pacific region includes Australia, Japan, Canada, Taiwan, and New Zealand. Some of the sanctions imposed on Russia during the invasion in 2022 are listed here:

1. Trying to restrict some Russian institutions' usage of the SWIFT international payment network. "SWIFT is a high-security network that allows payments to be made between 200 countries' 11,000 financial institutions".
2. The certification of Russia's Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which would bring energy to Europe, has been halted by Germany.
3. As a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, New Zealand has prohibited the shipping of goods to Russian military and security personnel.
4. The US has prohibited the supply of war technology to Russia, significantly limiting Russia's capacity to develop its military and aerospace industries. The embargo will prevent the United States from exporting semiconductors, telecommunications, encryption security, lasers, sensors, navigation, avionics, and marine technology to Russia. Russian financial institutions and the Russian Central Bank were also denied access to their dollar foreign reserves held in the US by the US. This implies that neither Russian financial institutions nor the Russian Central Bank may conduct business in US currency. All Russian oil and gas imports were likewise prohibited by the US.”
5. The European Union slapped financial sanctions on Russia, targeting 70% of the Russian banking market and important state-owned firms. It outlawed deposits of more than €100,000 in EU banks, Russian accounts held by EU securities market storage facilities, and the marketing of euro-denominated commodities to Russian customers. Russian governmentally-owned enterprises' shares are no longer allowed to be traded on EU markets, according to the EU. The purchase, distribution, transmission, or sale of oil refinery technology to Russia is forbidden by the EU. “The EU has banned all aircraft, spare parts, and equipment from being exported to Russian airlines, as well as the Russian space sector. The EU has put a halt to visa accords with prominent Russians. Diplomats, Russian officials, and entrepreneurs will no longer be able to take advantage of visa-easing measures that grant them preferential access to the EU. 3. The EU barred Russia from participating in all cultural and athletic events,

- including the Eurovision Song Contest and the UEFA Champions League.”
6. All valid Russian export licences were revoked by Canada.
 7. The assets of some Russian people housed in Swiss and Japanese institutions have been frozen by Switzerland and Japan.
 8. Australia has slapped travel restrictions and financial sanctions on eight Russian Federation Security Council members.
 9. Visas for citizens of the "Donetsk People's Republic" and the "Luhansk People's Republic" have been suspended in Japan. Japan has also made it illegal to issue and trade new Russian government debt in the primary and secondary markets.
 10. Since 2009, Switzerland has largely halted a visa deal that made it simpler for Russians, especially diplomats, to visit the country. It also imposed travel bans on five unidentified oligarchs with links to Switzerland who are close to Putin.
 11. The UK placed financial penalties on Russian banks by freezing Russian billionaires' assets held in UK institutions. Russia's largest bank, 'Sberbank,' was likewise blocked from clearing payments in Pound Sterling by the UK. By the end of 2022, the United Kingdom will have phased out Russian oil. The Russian airline 'Aeroflot' has been barred from flying in UK airspace.
 12. Russian jets are also prohibited from flying into the airspace of Finland, Belgium, Latvia, Ireland, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic.

Conclusion

The impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on the global economy was investigated in this research. The invasion's global economic consequence, according to the paper, was a global supply chain disruption. This expressed itself in the form of energy and trade supply shocks. It resulted in increased energy prices, commodity prices, and food prices, all of which contributed to a surge in worldwide inflation in many nations. The consequence is that geopolitical disputes have economic spillover effects on other nations, rather than having isolated impacts on the sanctioned country. The Russian-Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that imposing sanctions on a warring nation is not the best answer since it has spillover effects on non-conflict countries, particularly when the warring countries are trading partners of non-conflict countries. Political leaders should make an effort to avoid confrontations like the one between Ukraine and Russia, and should utilize dialogue as a mechanism for conflict resolution. Future research will be able to determine whether conflict resolution through talks is extremely effective in pacifying countries who go to war to safeguard regional power.

Funding

The author receive no funding for this research.

Conflicts of Interests

The author has no conflict of interests to declare.

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National Dialogue of Ethiopia: is it on the right track?

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[Doi:10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p71](https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p71)

Submitted: 01 May 2022

Accepted: 01 June 2022

Published: 30 June 2022

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Cite As:

Andualem D.S. (2022). *National Dialogue of Ethiopia: is it on the right track?*. European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 18 (20), 71. <https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p71>

Abstract

National dialogues are nationally owned political processes made when there happen profound political crisis that the existing government of a given country cannot solve. Ethiopia too is on the process of conducting national dialogue. This paper analyses the ongoing process of the dialogue against national dialogue principles that the United States Institute of Peace, Berghof Foundation, and others use to predict the success or the failure of a national dialogue. The data were collected from secondary sources such as books, televisions channels, websites, and so on. Then the collected data were qualitatively analyzed to evaluate the process of the dialogue. After analyzing the views of political elites, and other concerned citizens of the country towards the actual process of Ethiopia's national dialogue in terms of the principles used as yardsticks, the paper concludes that the ongoing process of the planned national dialogue of Ethiopia is not on the right way to achieve the desired goal.

Keywords: National Dialogue, Ethiopia, Principles, Process, the Right Track

1. Introduction

Researchers such as Odivilas (2016) witness that peaceful community develops better in several aspects. However, violent conflicts that lead to mass distraction of human lives and properties have been part of people's lives in many portions of our planet nowadays (Kungu, Omari, Kipsang, 2015), but

the good news is that there are mechanisms to tackle conflicts that appear in a country. One of such mechanisms is national dialogue.

National dialogues are political processes that are made and owned nationally to generate consensus among a broad range of national stakeholders when there happen deep political crisis in a given country and when the needs come to manage post-war situations or far-reaching political transitions (Blunck et al., 2017). National Dialogues can also be defined as official negotiations forums which are typically convened to address far reaching national concerns which are often long-standing root causes of violent conflicts that political protest or armed insurrection have brought to the fore (Inclusive Peace, (nd)). Such dialogues can transform a given country from a dictatorship system where war is possible to democratic system where peace prevails as liberalists argue that democracy avoid conflicts and promote cooperation (Ozkan and Cetin, 2016). National Dialogues, therefore, can be forums to ease tensions, manage political crisis and deadlock, reach political agreement and reestablish a new institutional framework, and transit from civil war (Berghof Foundation, 2017). In other way, national dialogues are made for broad-based change processes like negotiating a new social contract or narrower objectives (Haider, 2019).

Nowadays, National dialogues are common tools to reform political, social, and economic structures where parties or group are under-represented or marginalized (Harlander, 2016). Especially, for countries where there are ethnic tensions like in Ethiopia, inclusive and genuine dialogue is vital to maintain peace. Such countries have entered into bloody civil war because they failed to solve their problems through dialogues. For instance, nations in countries of the Balkans like Yugoslavia first lost their central cohesion under the name of self-rule, but later, they led themselves towards bloody civil war and disintegration (Ariye, 2015). If they had under gone all-encompassing and honest dialogue among themselves, there would have been a chance to curb the civil war and the disintegration they went through.

Seemingly taking a lesson, Ethiopia, too, is on the process of national dialogue. This national dialogue was announced by the administration of Prime minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed after what he called victory over TPLF and in late December 2021 and proclamation was passed by the Ethiopia's parliament to establish a commission to the national dialogue (Gedamu, 2022). This national dialogue is thought to solve the political crisis and keep the integrity of the country by paving the way for national consensus of the citizens, mainly interest groups (Gedamu). Similarly, Legesse Tulu, Government Communication Service Minister of Ethiopia, states to CGTN Africa on January 15, 2022 that this national dialogue is expected to bring long lasting peace in Ethiopia by strengthening the unity of the country. Taking

this purpose, the commission has been established and the commissioners have been elected.

However, it does not mean that all countries which conduct national dialogue can succeed; some countries have solved their political problems through national dialogues, but others did not. For example, Tunisia has undergone national dialogue and solved its political crisis in 2013 and saved the country from collapse (Kraetzschmar, 2015). Sudan, on the contrary, had held national dialogue from 2014–2016 and failed because the ruling party interfered in the process (Institute for Security studies [IFSS], 2020). This means that there are situations where national dialogues are successful or futile.

There are pre-dialogue, during dialogue and post-dialogue factors which contribute for the success or failure of national dialogues. The pre-dialogue and during dialogue factors are related to the general principles of national dialogues whereas post dialogues are related to implementations of the agreed upon points (IFSS, 2020). According to Haider (2019), USIOP (2015), Berghof Foundation (2017), and IFSS (2020), the key national dialogue principles which must be contextualized are inclusion; transparency and public participation; credible and neutral convener; clear mandate and appropriately tailored structure, rules, and procedures; agreed mechanism for outcomes implementation; the interference of foreign countries; and political context. Following these principles of national dialogue from the beginning to the end of the process is decisive for the success of national dialogues (United States Institute of Peace [USIOP], 2015)

The ruling party vows that the national dialogue in the process will be a solution for the ongoing political crisis in Ethiopia, but studies concerned with experiences of other countries which conducted national dialogue show that fruitful national dialogues are dialogues done properly from the beginning to the end based on the aforementioned principles. What about Ethiopia's national dialogue? Is it on the right way? This paper answers the question by evaluating the process (from the beginning to the present status) of the planed national dialogue, using the discussed principles as yardsticks.

2. Method

This research is purely qualitative as it employed qualitative data. The data concerning the process of Ethiopia's national dialogue were collected from secondary sources such as books, newspapers, websites, televisions channels, and social media. Then the collected data were analyzed in terms of internationally accepted national dialogue principles to evaluate the process of Ethiopia's national dialogue.

3. Result and Discussion

3.1. Inclusion

One of the key principles that contributes a lot for the success of a given national dialogue is that it includes and convenes all sets of stake holders or key interest groups for the process so that underlined real drivers of conflicts can be addressed (Berghof Foundation, 2017; IFSS, 2020; Haider, 2019; USIOP, 2015;). However, scholars argue that the ongoing process of Ethiopia's national dialogue seems to lack this principle. For instance, Edjeta (2022) contends that the government has formed the national dialogue commotion, excluding the opposition parties. Ekubamichael and (2022), and Gemechu (2022) support this idea by stating that the ongoing process of the national dialogue led indirectly by the ruling party is going on forward, excluding key stakeholders like civic institutions, political parties, and religious institutions. Even though one of the purposes of the national dialogue is to end the conflict in the country, TPLF and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), the key players for the violent conflict, have been excluded (Gemechu, 2022). If one of the aim of the dialogue is to solve the ongoing violent conflict and bring lasting peace, excluding the armed groups and the main players of the violent conflict puts the dialogue into question.

Similarly, Ekubamichael (2022,p.2) states that “Three main opposition parties: Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) issued a statement saying the process of the nomination of Commissioners was not impartial [OFC], was unknown [OLF] and lacked representation [ONLF].” In fact, other political parties, too, did not accept it fully. Concerning this, Edjeta (2022; 5) asserts that Ethiopia's national dialogue commission, the beginning of the dialogue process, “came into being without consensus-building among political parties and other stakeholders.” Rahel Bafe, who is chairwoman of the Ethiopian Political Parties Joint Council (EPPJC), a coalition of more than 50 opposition groups, claims that the government did not consult opposition parties when the commissioners were selected (The New Humanitarian [NH], 2022). This shows that the inclusiveness of the national dialogue of Ethiopia has fallen under quotation marks. Whether what the opposition parties argue is true or false, it clearly shows that the planned national dialogue did not get a buy-in in the opposition parties for its success as they felt the government is not neutral, which, in turn, means that the national dialogue loses political will and elite agreement which are, as Haider (2019) says, highly important for a national dialogue to be successful, but Ethiopia's national dialogue seems to lack it.

3.2. Transparency and Public Participation

A national dialogue cannot be successful if it does not facilitate and give adequate opportunity for the public to be informed and participate. Even a dialogue that includes all major interest groups risks losing legitimacy if there are not sufficient opportunities for the public to remain informed about and feed into the dialogue (Haider, 2019, USIOP, 2015, Berghof Foundation, 2017; and IFSS, 2020). The process of national dialogue of Ethiopia, however, has been blamed of its opaqueness from its beginning. For example, Oromo Liberation Front claims that process of the commissioners' nomination is not known (Ekubamichael, 2022). Similarly, Rahel (2022) as cited in the New Humanitarian (NH) (2022:4) complains that "the selection process for the commissioners was 'not clear' and claims that opposition parties were not consulted." This means the dialogue does not allow the actors to be part of the process. Let alone the political parties, all the concerned citizens (youths, adults, elders, girls, boys, women, and men) are expected to participate transparently in the dialogue to be successful (USIOP, 2015). This indicates that, as national dialogues are not one-sided, they should engage divers interests in the negotiation process, but such an aforementioned complain has its own black point on the success of the national dialogue of Ethiopia.

3.3. A Credible and Neutral Convener

Credible, respected and political interest-free convener which can take a form of an organization, or a coalition of organizations, a single person, a group of people is of the extreme importance as it is a key to bring stake holders to the dialogue by reducing and avoiding the perception of bias (Haider, 2019, USIOP, 2015, Berghof Foundation, 2017; and IFSS, 2020).

In the case of Ethiopia's national dialogue, what is questioned is the influence of the ruling party. The initiative was taken by the ruling party rather than by a credible and respected neutral body. Edjeta (2022:6) states the initial process of the national dialogue as "The draft proclamation was prepared by the Council of Ministers, a core part of the executive. Later, it was enacted by parliament, a body controlled overwhelmingly by the ruling party. Thus, the commission's formation was not neutral." The Proclamation cited here refers to proclamation of the national dialogue of Ethiopia, which is the start of the process. In the aforementioned extract, the commission's formation is said to be not neutral because the convener (government) is suspected to use the dialogue for its political interest.

In the first place, national dialogues are carried out when the sitting government and the existing institutions are not able to solve the crisis a country is facing or when they are seen as illegitimate or incredible (USIOP, 2015).

In the case of Ethiopia's national dialogue, however, it is the government (parliament and the council of the minister) that ratified not only the proclamation but also the election of the commissioners who were given to lead the dialogue. Still, it does not mean that the ruling party should not be included, but as has been aforementioned, that is to mean that the ruling party should not lead the process (Woldegiorgis, 2022). Equbamichael (2022) states that the main armed groups, and the main opposition parties do not trust the one who lead the dialogue process of Ethiopia. It is probably the interference of the ruling party which has drawn the process of the national dialogue of Ethiopia into doubt of opposition parties or the people. This is one of the initial defects of the Ethiopia's national dialogue process.

3.4. Agenda that Address the Root Causes of Conflicts.

National dialogue thought to kick its goal does not dangle on superficial and one sided interest based agenda. Rather, it should be based on key issues which are and can be actual or potential root causes of violent conflicts a country is confronting or likely to confront and which can be reached upon with long time (months or even years) negotiating (Haider, 2019, USIOP, 2015, Berghof Foundation, 2017; and IFSS, 2020).

Concerning the far reaching root causes that can be raised in the national dialogue of Ethiopia, they are not yet known.

As far as the knowledge of this essay author is concerned, the system of government (unitary, federalism, confederate -Ethnic or geographical), the issue of constitution, contested historical narratives may be some of the hot agenda that can be discussed. However, the government is blamed from the inception not to be willing to put some of these agenda for discussion. For example, concerning the oppressor and oppressed narration based constitution which is said to be the source of political problems in Ethiopia, Buayalew (2022) states that the government is not willing to amend it.

Whatever the agenda are, that sounds that the interest of the ruling party will dominate them as it has already put its hand in the process. To substantiate this, Rahel (2022) as cited in NH (2022, 5) claims that "the Prosperity Party is approaching the dialogue as the arbiter of the process, rather than as another equal stakeholder against whom accusations will eventually be leveled." This indicates that the ruling party is dominating the process of the national dialogue.

That is one of the reasons that it is recommended that the ruling parties should not take the mandate to process the dialogue. For instance, Woldegiorgis (2022, p.2) argues that "The government cannot be a convener, nor should it have any role in the selection of the participants of the National Dialogue for obvious reasons." However, this is not the case in the national dialogue of Ethiopia.

3.5. Clear Mandate and Appropriately Tailored Structure, Rules, and Procedures

If it is needed to undergo a national dialogue which can achieve its set goals, it should have its own clear mandate which gives purpose and authority to a national dialogue, set of transparent and carefully tailored procedures with mechanisms to break deadlocks and rules so that transparent decisions should be made and composes the nature of far-reaching agenda (Haider, 2019, USIOP, 2015, Berghof Foundation, 2017; and IFSS, 2020).

In this case too, a clear mandate and authority of the planned national dialogue has not been clearly seen so far to address different issues that should be raised in the dialogue.

There are 11 simplistic tasks and responsibilities listed in the Draft Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission Establishment Proclamation, but the game seems to be over when the ruling party interfered in the process. Based on the back ground of the elected commissioners, one can say the mandate of the commission is not different from the mandate of the ruling party (Mulatu, 2022).

3.6. Agreed Mechanism for Implementation of Outcomes

The success of national dialogue is judged not only on the dialogue process and the dialogue itself but also on the interpretation of the dialogue outcomes into practice. Therefore, national dialogues to be successful should put agreed upon plans that can ensure that the recommendation gained from the dialogue can be implemented, being incorporated in new constitution, policy, law, and other programs (Haider, 2019, USIOP, 2015, Berghof Foundation, 2017; and IFSS, 2020).

Since the Ethiopia's national dialogue has not been undergone yet, one cannot definitely conclude about the mechanisms of outcome implementation, but except stating that the commission facilitates to implement the recommendations, the Draft Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission Establishment Proclamation does not state any mechanism that shows how the recommendations are implemented on the ground.

3.7. The Role of External Actors and National Ownership

To conduct national dialogue that can be fruitful for its purpose, the responsible body should keep the balance between external interference like in support (political, financial and Technical support) or resistance of external actors and national ownership which is more decisive than the former (Haider, 2019, USIOP, 2015). When one sees in the ongoing national dialogue of Ethiopia, the government officials who took the initiative seem to have lost confidence. For the success of the dialogue, they have given emphasis to foreign organizations rather than national ownership of the dialogue. For

example, Ambassador Tekeda Alemu, co-chair of the steering committee for an inclusive national dialogue in Ethiopia, and former state minister of foreign affairs and permanent representative of Ethiopia to the United Nations, says to Berghof Foundation (an organization whose base is in Germany), “The fact that there is great need for national consensus in Ethiopia has become more clear than ever... Without the support of the Berghof Foundation, it would not have been possible to achieve what we have been able to do so far.” (Berghof Foundation, 2022:2). This means it is not possible to achieve the goal of the national dialogue without the support of this foreign organization, but the support like this is likely to open the door for the interference of external actors who come under the disguise of technical, financial, and political support (Haider, 2019, USIOP, 2015).

This, in turn, indicates that there may be interference of other foreign organizations and countries behind the scene of the national dialogue of Ethiopia.

The aforementioned principles alone cannot guarantee the success of a national dialogue. Even a national dialogue that fulfills those principles cannot be fruitful if other factors out of the dialogue are not conducive (Haider, 2019). Hidedr states that one of such factors is political context in which a national dialogue is carried out and some of the factors in political context are political will and elite agreement, the links to other transitional processes like constitution-making, Common ground among parties, Public buy-in, the past experience (Haider, 2019). However, the national dialogue of Ethiopia has been planned to take place in the absence of such features.

Conclusion

In Ethiopia’s national dialogue process, the conveners’ neutrality which is the key for other principles of national dialogue has been put under question from the beginning, so have other principles of national dialogue such as representation and inclusiveness. As the initiative for the dialogue has been taken and some of the activities have been done exclusively by the ruling party, it sounds that the ruling party has influenced the ongoing process of the national dialogue. The opposition political parties which should have a buy-in for the dialogue to be successful have already started complaining about being excluded from the initial process of the dialogue. Moreover, the armed groups which are the main players in the political crisis of Ethiopia are not still part of the dialogue process. Based on all these, one can conclude that the national dialog of Ethiopia is not going in the right way to be a solution for the political crisis we see in Ethiopia these days. If it is not corrected from the beginning, the national dialogue is going to be futile as they say, “You cannot change the fruit without changing the root.”

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The International Aspects of the Smuggling of Migrants Across State Borders and the Fight Against it

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[Doi:10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p82](https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p82)

Submitted: 26 July 2021
Accepted: 14 June 2022
Published: 30 June 2022

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Cite As:

Egutidze M. (2022). *The International Aspects of the Smuggling of Migrants Across State Borders and the Fight Against it*. European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 18 (20), 82.
<https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p82>

Abstract

This paper focuses on highlighting the international aspects of the smuggling of migrants across state borders and the fight against it. The relevance of the issue is due to chaotic migration in the process of globalization, the intensification of the illegal movement of migrants across the state border by transnational organized criminal groups, the danger of a merger of migrants and human trafficking, as well as criminal coincidence of migration and terrorism. Historical, statistical, normative-logical comparisons, and a number of other methodologies were utilized in the study. The legal attitude of individual states towards the smuggling of migrants across the state border and the compliance of this attitude with the United Nations conventions and their complementary protocols are also presented in this study.

Keywords: Migration, State border, History, Smuggling, Migrant, Definition, Trafficking, Terrorism, Law, Punishment

Introduction

People have been moving since time immemorial. A large group of scientists believe that about 1.9 to 2 million years ago, early humans began internal migration processes.

The movement of early humans, Homoergaster - “workman” and Homoerectus - “upright man”, first began across the African continent. About 1.9 to 2 million years ago, Homoerectus migrated from Africa to other

continents. Interestingly, this fact took place 1.5 million years ago. The tombs of these people have been found in Greece, Spain, China, and other countries. Homosapiens - the “wise man” has spread all over the world, migrating from Africa and covering the continents of Europe, Asia, and America (Markov, 2018). In 1991, human remains were discovered in Dmanisi, Georgia, about 1.8 million years ago. The man who was found was another species of human between Homohabilis – “handy man”, and Homoerectus- “upright man” and was called the "Georgian man" by Homogeorgicus (Markov, 2018).

Scientists explain the reason for the migration of Homosapiens – “wise man” to Asia in various circumstances such as climate change, the search for a food-rich environment, and others.

Human migration took on an irreversible character due to the process of population movement. However, the process of collective migration of previously unseen tribes of the great population movement began as early as the Middle Ages with the invasion of Germanic tribes from the periphery of Rome to the Roman Empire.

The Goths settled adjacent to the Black Sea coast from northwestern Europe, while the Alemanni invaded Italy. The Franks settled in Gaul, and the Turko-Mongol tribes known as the Huns attacked the Germanic tribes in 375. Rome sheltered the refugees from the Visigoths. However, the Visigoths first destroyed the army of Emperor Valentine and further plundered Rome in 410. They later moved to Spanish territory and founded the Kingdom of Toulouse. The Franks founded the Franks State in Gaul, while Angles, Saxons, and Jutes migrated to Great Britain. In the early Middle Ages, the Finno-Ugric tribes migrated from the southern Urals and the Volga and overthrew the Great Moravia, which led to the creation of the Hungarian State. Emigrated Suomines laid the foundation for the formation of the State of Finland. The Jesuit tribe, the Estadians, formed the State of Estonia.

In 632, the Bulgarians, who had left Central Asia, established the Bulgarian state on the Balkan Peninsula.

After the discovery of America by Christopher Columbus in 1492, the European population began to migrate to the American continent. After the discovery of Australia in 1606, Great Britain began to settle criminals in this area.

The process of migration was accompanied by negative and positive factors. The conquest of culturally far developed countries by the tribes of low cultural development and the delay of the development process were part of the negative factors. An example of this is the migration process of the nomadic Huns. The invasion on the Germanic tribes in 375 was considered the beginning of a great displacement of people, and the Huns destroyed the Burgundian kingdom of the Germanic tribe. More so, they raided and weakened Byzantium, thereby plundering northern Italy. The weakened

Roman Empire was put to an end by the invasion of vandals of Germanic tribes. In 476, the existence of the largest empire with the most powerful civilization in the world at that time ended.

The expansion of Spanish into the continent of America in 1521 was followed by the fall of the Aztec Empire. In 1532, the Spaniards ended the existence of the Inca Empire, and the migration of Europeans to America killed the Maya, Chibcha-Muisi, and other civilizations. Nonetheless, large and powerful states emerged in their place and the symbol of democracy is enough to name such as the United States, Canada, Argentina, and others.

The history of migration reveals that uncontrolled, chaotic migration leads to cultural controversy, which is often accompanied by violence and armed conflict.

Umberto Eco, an Italian culturologist, and others distinguish the issues that exist between migration and immigration. He believes that immigration can be controlled by political means unlike migration to a natural disaster in which you are unable to do anything. Furthermore, it is opined that a clash of cultures could have bloody consequences which will be inevitable to some extent (Umberto Eco, 2001).

The massive invasion of migrants into the continents of Europe and America in the 21st century of highly developed countries has also posed against global challenges.

The essence of migration systems is related to the existence of independent migration processes between countries that are politically, economically, and culturally close to each other. Migration flows are usually directed to one or more destinations (recipient) countries. However, the system has migration links with other countries and other migration systems (Simmons & Piche, 2002).

Douglas Stephen Massey, a professor at the University of Preston and the University of Pennsylvania, in his articles “Why Migration Takes Place, Theoretical Synthesis” and “International Migration Theories: A Review and Evaluation of Migration Network Issues”, concludes that single migration cases provide a solid link. New migrants consisting of already established “skilled” migrants and non-migrants, both in their countries of origin and in their host countries, use their origin, kinship, or friendship to form an emigration network that facilitates their social adaptation to the new environment. More so, their integration into the new society allows them to overcome restrictive migration policies (Douglas, 1993, 1999).

Migration of population – Data of 2020		
Continent	The approximate number of international migrants / in millions /	Number of international migrants In%
Europe	87	61
Asia	86	
North America	59	21
Africa	24	9
Latin America	17	6
The Caribbean		
Pacific	8	3

A migrant is a person who, in anticipation of a better life, voluntarily leaves his home and goes to another country. The reasons for migration include conflict of various kinds such as political wars, economic, socio-cultural, natural, ecological, and others. Wars make people refugees and push them to emigrate from conflict zones to neighboring or more distant countries.

All of this has put Western Europe and North America at a critical juncture as migrants from third world countries migrate to different countries to get to the desired country. Thus, they receive a specific visa that allows them to bypass the embassy after paying a certain amount to individuals or organizations that create forged documents.

The process of migration has especially increased in the 21st century. Tens of thousands of migrants from Africa and Asia Minor enter Europe illegally. The reasons for migration are demand for labor, access to land, good economic opportunities, and political freedom.

A person makes the decision to migrate by simple observation, comparing the situation within his or her host state and the desired state, and by analyzing the cost-benefit economic consequences for him or her based on where he or she expects to stay.

Consequently, in the context of trafficking, the analysis is done not only by the victim who thinks he or she is involved in the migration but also by the smuggler, who calculates whether it is worth transporting the migrant across the border in a particular case and what difficulties he or she will face.

According to current global estimates, there were approximately 281 million international migrants in the world as at 2020. This is equivalent to 3.6 percent of the global population.

Europe and Asia each received about 87 and 86 million international migrants, representing 61% of international migrants.

Migration is taking place all over the world. As for North America, in terms of numbers, 59 million migrants were added in 2020. This represents 21% of international migrants, 9% in Africa, 6% in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 3% in the Pacific.

The proportion of international migrants varies considerably around the world. For example, from 2000 to 2020, the number of migrants in Asia increased by 74%, which equates to 37 million migrants. Europe ranks second in terms of migrants, numbering 30 million international migrants, 18 million international migrants in North America, and 10 million in Africa.

According to 2009 data, the number of people who do not migrate abroad and carry out internal migration is about 740 million.

Worldwide, the number of international migrants is small at 3.6%. Nevertheless, this number varies from country to country. For example, in a country like the United Arab Emirates, more than 88% of the population is made up of international migrants.

In addition, more than 40% of international migrants were born in 2020 in countries such as India, China, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Afghanistan. Mexico ranks second while the Russian Federation ranks third. Significant numbers of immigrants are identified in several other European countries such as Ukraine, Poland, Romania, and Germany.

The United States has been a major destination for international migrants since the 1970s. The number of migrants has quadrupled, reaching 51 million in 2019 (World migration report .iom.int).

Increase in the share of international migrants worldwide in 2000-2020	
Continent	Quantity / In Millions /
Asia	37
Europe	30
North America	18
Africa	10

The uncontrolled chaotic migration of Ossetians in the 17th and 18th centuries, their compact settlement in the Georgian highlands, the annexation of the Republic of Georgia by Soviet Russia, and the creation of an “autonomous region of South Ossetia” in annexed Georgia gave rise to Ossetian separatism. Ossetian separatists who have chaotically immigrated to the Tskhinvali region launched an armed confrontation with Georgians to

expel them from the region. The internal armed conflict had escalated into an international armed conflict due to the aggressive attack of Russia on independent Georgia. This resulted in the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 with the Russian occupation of 20% of the territory of Georgia.

In 1944, Soviet Russia began to artificially change the demographic situation in the Transnistrian region of Moldova. This led to the deportation of 500,000 ethnic Moldovans and the settlement of 300,000 Russian-speaking ethnic groups in their place. As a result, the chaotic migration sparked an internal state armed conflict that was followed by the annexation of Moldova and the declaration of independence.

In the dissertation thesis “Criminological Characterization of Illegal Actions Committed at the State Border of Georgia”, it was revealed that the problems of hundreds of thousands of IDPs who were left homeless and without a minimum income became a heavy burden on the economy of the country. This is because the country was in the process of transition to a market economy. Thus, poverty and the increase in unemployment facilitated labor emigration and the outflow of population from Georgia. Internal migration processes also increased and job seekers from rural and other regions settled in within the capital and other large cities. The establishment of a terrorist state on the territory of Syria-Iraq in the region outside Georgia and the war for its liquidation, as well as the ongoing global processes in the world, led to an increase in the flow of refugees and asylum seekers in Georgia and illegal migration. Subsequently, this gave rise to a significant impact on the criminological situation in the country, alongside other objective and subjective factors.

Unemployment, along with the increase in demand for a cheap workforce, is one of the provocative circumstances of migration and smuggling of migrants across the state border. Through this means, a network of transnational organized criminal gangs is actively involved. Many experts cite unstable economic situation as a cause of migration and related trafficking.

Criminal gangs provide ways to transfer people to a country where they are not citizens and do not have the necessary documents to enter legally for a fee.

Therefore, the issue of differentiation of prevention measures is important in this regard. The prevention system should take into account: trafficking in women and children, sexual exploitation, forced labor in agriculture, construction, family farming, other sectors, and trafficking in human organs (Messina, & Lahav, 2006).

The global process that began in the second half of the twentieth century, the simplicity of crossing state borders, and increased transport traffic facilitated and encouraged migration processes. At the same time,

transnational organized crime activities in this direction are strengthened since it covers almost all countries of the world. An important area of activity of this criminal organization is the smuggling of migrants across the border.

The world community has, however, tried to respond to the challenge with legal regulations. This is evidenced by several UN resolutions addressing the issue, which is noteworthy in the year 1994, 1997, 1999, and 2010.

On November 11, 2000, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was adopted to simplify and intensify international cooperation. The Protocol of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was also adopted on December 12 of the same year, with its focus on “Prevention of Illegal Smuggling of Migrants to the Border by Land, Sea, and Air” (UNITED NATIONS 2000 PROTOCOL). Through the Palermo Protocol on the Suppression of the Smuggling of Migrants to Border by Land, Sea, and Air of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of December 12, 2000, the UN aims to combat and prevent the smuggling of migrants across the border. To achieve this goal, it is important to strengthen cooperation between the Member States, provided that the rights of migrants who cross the border illegally will be protected.

The Convention obliges the Contracting States to declare penalties against actions such as smuggling migrants across the border for the purpose of creating, obtaining, transmitting or possessing false travel or identity documents. Also, it is criminal to allow a person who is a national of the receiving State or a permanent resident to remain in that country. Therefore, it is significantly important to strengthen border control measures to achieve the objectives of the Convention, as well as to prevent and detect the smuggling of migrants.

The provisions of the Protocol stipulate that the smuggling of migrants across the border means “the unlawful entry of a person into a Member State of which he is not a national or a permanent resident for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, financial or material benefits” (Herein Article 13).

Neither the Protocol nor any other international legal norm defines the status of a migrant. The term “migrant” includes all cases where a person makes a decision about migration freely, without coercion, which is dictated for “personal well-being” and takes place without the intervention of an external coercive factor (Glossary on Migration 2019).

When it is a mandatory requirement to take action against migrants in order to obtain the objective composition of the crime, it is necessary in such a situation to establish a legally defined status of the migrant. This is because an asylum seeker, humanitarian status seeker, and refugee have different status from a migrant. The definition of the latter is defined by the United Nations

Convention of 1951 on the “status of refugees and the person” who, for reasonable fear that he or she may be persecuted for his or her race, religion, creed, nationality, social affiliation or political beliefs, is outside his or her country of nationality and is unable or unwilling to enjoy the protection of that country or he/she does not have any citizenship and as a result of similar events when he is outside his former country of residence, he cannot or does not want to return there due to such fear” (Convention relating to the Status of Refugees Article 1951).

According to the report of 2020 of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the number of migrants from 150 million increased by 2.8% of the world population in 2000. However, it was observed that the number increased to 272 million in 2020, amounting to 3.5% of the world’s population. This year it amounted to 14 million people (International Organization for Migration World Migration Report 2020).

Attempts to penetrate other countries in 2014-2018 have documented more than 30,900 deaths of migrants. The highest number of cases was reported in the Mediterranean region, where at least 17,919 people died. In 2018, 813 migrants died while moving from the coast of North Africa to Spain. 570 died in US-Mexico border as a result of smuggling attempts in 2014-2018 (See Footnote). According to the research, 1237 foreign citizens were registered as asylum seekers in Georgia in 2019. However, the number declined to 864 citizens in 2020. Although, 42 citizens were granted refugee status in 2019, the number declined to 10 foreign citizens in 2020. Furthermore, 35 foreign citizens in 2019 were granted humanitarian status but their number reduced to 16 in 2020. 407 persons were denied in 2019, while 351 foreigners were granted status in 2020 (Statistic of the Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia 2019). The Law of Georgia on the “Legal Status of Aliens and Stateless Persons” facilitates international cooperation in the field of illegal migration in order to avoid irregular and spontaneous migration (On the legal status of aliens and stateless persons 2020).

According to the Georgian law, illegal transfer of a migrant to the Georgian border is subject to punishment. Also, according to Article 3441 of the Criminal Code of Georgia, “Illegal transfers of a migrant to the state border of Georgia and/or creation of appropriate conditions for his/her stay in Georgia (promotion) in violation of the rules established by the legislation” is considered a criminal conduct (Parliament of Georgia).

The Prosecutor's Office of Georgia started criminal prosecution for the mentioned crime against 28 persons and 9 persons in 2019 and in 2020, respectively.

Georgia, due to its geopolitical location, is a possible transit hub for the illegal smuggling of migrants across the state border. Hence, within a short period of time, it is possible to completely smuggle a migrant across the state

border by entering the territory of Georgia and end the same action on the same day.

The mentioned crime is not unknown to the reality of Georgia. This is why it is quite relevant to discuss the criminalization of illegal transit of a migrant across the state border of Georgia as an aggravating circumstance under Article 344 of the Criminal Code of Georgia.

In addition, illegal natural processes of migrants in Georgia's neighboring countries are heterogeneous.

According to the 2020 report of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in 2018, Turkey bordering Georgia was the largest country in the world for 5 consecutive years with 3.7 million persons (See Footnote 14 pg.4).

The legal regime of crossing the state border of Turkey and staying in the Republic of Turkey by foreign citizens, including migrants and victims of trafficking is established by Law on “Foreigners and International Protection” (Turkey: Law No. 6458 of 2013).

Foreign citizens who enter or leave the Republic of Turkey in violation of the requirements of Article 5 of the above law will be subject to an administrative penalty, which is a fine of 2000 Turkish LIRA (See Footnote 19 Article 102).

Any direct or indirect action by a person who illegally allows a foreign citizen or stateless person to enter and/or stay in the Republic of Turkey to obtain material benefits and also allows a Turkish citizen or non-citizen to leave the Republic of Turkey illegally as a migrant smuggler shall be imposed with criminal liabilities. This is clearly stated in Article 79 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Turkey (PENAL CODE OF TURKEY 2004).

The regime of movement of a person at the state border of the Republic of Azerbaijan is established by the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan. This law was enacted December 9, 1991, based on the “State Border of the Republic of Azerbaijan” (Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2017). Violators of the state border regime of Azerbaijan or persons who made attempt to cross the state border of Azerbaijan illegally will be held criminally liable by the applicable law of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2017). Organizing illegal entry of a foreign citizen or stateless person into the territory of Azerbaijan is considered an illegal act on the state border of Azerbaijan. Furthermore, organizing illegal transit through the territory of Azerbaijan or organizing illegal departure of any person from the territory of Azerbaijan is also considered an illegal act (Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2000).

Illegal crossing of the state border of the Republic of Armenia is criminalized by the Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia (Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia Article 329.1).

The regime of movement of persons at the state border of the Russian Federation is determined by the Law that applies to “the State Border of the Russian Federation” (About the State Border of the Russian Federation 1996). The organization of illegal migration is criminalized by the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Organizing illegal entry or illegal transit through the territory of the Russian Federation of foreign citizens or stateless persons in the Russian Federation is considered as criminal (Criminal Code of the Russian Federation 2020 Article 322.1).

Preventing illegal border crossings and stopping illegal and chaotic migration remains a challenge in the 21st century for the United States. An obvious expression of this is the decision to erect a protective barrier on the US-Mexico border (gar–United States barrier, 2-05-2020). The erection of this border dam was intended to prevent illegal migration and other illegal actions.

The U.S. Congressional Research Service has released a letter by Michael John Garcia, Acting Director of Research Department, entitled “Barriers Across the U.S. Border: Key Bodies and Requirements”. The author emphasizes the long-standing interest of the federal government and the importance of arranging the state border of the United States. Garcia discusses the construction of a border barrier such as a retaining wall by the State Department to curb illegal crossing of the state border. This is due to the reaction that has arisen around the issue (Michael John Garcia 2017).

According to a study by the International Organization for Migration, international remittances rose to \$ 689 billion in 2018. However, the United States remained the largest remittance country with \$ 68.0 billion. According to the same study, 50,661,149 migrants were registered in the United States in 2019 (WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2020).

U.S. criminal law prohibits the actions of a person, aircraft, transport company, shipowner, owner, commander, agent, shipper, or consignee who smuggles foreigners into the United States from anywhere as such actions are punishable (U.S. Code Title 8. Aliens and nationality 2000).

In addition, U.S. criminal law plays an important role in preventing illegal crossings of the state border by blocking covert border crossings such as underground tunnels and crossings. The U.S. Criminal Code further stipulates up to 20 years imprisonment for the illegal arrangement of border tunnels and crossings. Both the immediate constructor and the sponsor are responsible for the above mentioned. Every individual shall be subject to punishment if she/he commits the said act (Criminal Codes of United States 2017).

According to 2019 data, there are more than 82 million international migrants living in Europe. Compared to 2015, the number of migrants entering from outside the European continent increased from 35 million to 38 million

in 2018 (See Footnote 14 pg.97). The Agency of European Border and Coast Guard also publishes an important study on the number of migrants in Europe, including illegal migration (Front exreleases Risk Analysis 2020).

On March 9, 2016, the EU Parliament and the Council adopted the SCHENGEN Code, which regulates the regime of crossing the borders of the SCHENGEN countries. The Code is binding for all SCHENGEN countries and legitimizes direct action on the borders of member states.

According to the Code, border control is not only set up in the interest of the Member States on the external borders which are exercised but also for all the Member States which have abolished internal border control. Border control facilitates the fight against illegal immigration and trafficking and hinders the internal security, public policy, public health, and international relations of the Member States (Schengen Borders Code 2016).

European states, regardless of whether they belong to the SCHENGEN countries or not, in accordance with their domestic interests and obligations under international treaties, criminalize illegal acts involving the smuggling of persons across the state border, including the smuggling of migrants (Hungarian Criminal Code 2012) (234,353).

Under Polish law, the organization of the smuggling of persons across the state border is punishable (Criminal code of the Republic Poland Article 264, 1997).

Latvian criminal law also criminalizes the illegal crossing of the state border and the smuggling of a person across the state border (Criminal Code of the Republic Latvia/amended 2018) (235,284-285). Similar acts are criminalized under Estonian criminal law which was set up in 2001 but amended in 2019.

According to the Criminal Law of Finnish, the organization of illegal migration is punishable. The subject of a crime involves a person who attempts to bring persons without a passport, visa, residence permit, or other similar document, such as false documents, required to enter the country. Also, trying to bring an alien into Finland through illegal ways is punishable by law. If the act is committed by special humanitarian motives that are related to close family relations or due to circumstances related to the security of the alien that threatens him/her in his/her homeland or country of permanent residence, the act is not considered as organizing illegal migration in this case (Criminal code of the Republic of Finland 1889 amended 2015).

According to a study by the International Organization for Migration, 5 million migrants were registered in Ukraine in 2019. Interestingly, most of them are citizens of Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, and Uzbekistan. The illegal transfer of persons across the state border of Ukraine, including organizing, directing, assisting, and enforcing this action is punishable under the Law of Ukraine. Aggravating

circumstances involves performing an action by a group or by an organized group for any benefit (Criminal Code of Ukraine with changes and additions as of April 13, 2020).

An analysis of the regulations adopted by states on the smuggling of migrants to the state border shows the Protocol to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime which involves the "Prevention of the smuggling of migrants to the border by land, sea, and air". The proviso that the purpose of smuggling a migrant across the state border is the "purpose of obtaining direct or indirect financial or other material benefits" is reflected in different ways in the legislations of states. According to Georgian legislation, the motive and purpose of the crime of smuggling migrants across the state border of Georgia can include various direct or indirect financial or other material benefits, the desire to help a relative, and others. According to Finnish law, a desire to help a loved one is not considered a punishable act if its motive and purpose are of a humanitarian nature. Under Moldovan law, action is punishable only if the motive is to obtain various direct or indirect financial or other material benefits. According to Russian law, the construction of the objective composition of the crime does not count.

There is also a difference in the use of the term "migrant". As long as there is no universally recognized legal definition of a migrant, the term "migrant" is replaced with other terms such as foreigner, foreign citizen, and so on.

Illegal smuggling of migrants to the state border is a deliberate intentional crime. The purpose of the offender is to smuggle a migrant to the destination country, where the relationship between the offender and the migrant ends. This is different from transporting a victim of trafficking across the border (even illegally) because the goal of the offender in trafficking is to exploit the victim. An illegal migrant, despite ending his or her relationship with an illegal smuggler at the border, often becomes a victim of trafficking because it is difficult for him or her to stay abroad illegally or even find shelter and food. More so, helpless conditions may force him/her to agree to the offender on the deliberate exploitation.

In the 21st century, a particularly dangerous form of migration has emerged such as migration for the purpose of carrying out terrorist activities. The horrific terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, was carried out by citizens of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Lebanon who migrated to the United States. In an article published in August 2017 during the News aired on BBC, there were 63 attacks. According to the calculation of researches from September 2014 to August 2017, 424 people died and 1800 were wounded by jihadists in the 63 attacks. Thus, the link between terrorism and migration is complex and multifaceted and has become the subject of

heated debate, which has reached its peak during the crisis of illegal migration in Europe.

The number of attackers who were in the country illegally or came in as refugees is small. Two-thirds of the citizens of the country were attacked, while the rest were legal residents or legal visitors from neighboring countries. In addition, the terrorist act was carried out by persons illegally staying in the West (BBC NEWS August 30, 2017).

In 2006, a terrorist organization was formed in Iraq (an Islamic State) by 11 radical Islamic groups. Due to the influence of fundamentalist leaders, some Muslims around the world began migrating to the area to join terrorist groups and engage in terrorist activities. In order to restrain this process, a relevant legislative regulation has been implemented in the Criminal Code of Georgia. This is in accordance with the Resolution N2178 of the United Nations Security Council, which was established on September 24, 2014, at its 72nd meeting. This regulation declares that an act of “crossing or attempting to cross the state border of Georgia for the purpose of preparing or participating in terrorist activity or terrorist exercise” is punishable (Footnote). In order to manage and control legal migration, states impose different quality regulations. According to international studies, China is one of the largest countries in terms of the origin of migrants (with 10.7 million migrants living abroad). According to Chinese law, it is punishable to organize illegal crossing to the state border, prepare forged documents for this purpose, purchase and sell such documents or use them. Similarly, smuggling third parties to the border envisages severe punishment (Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China). In parallel with the above mentioned, China simplified visa regulations for specialists and highly skilled workers in 2018 to attract talented foreigners (See Footnote 17 Article 323).

Strengthening state border by monitoring and tightening legislation is not enough to prevent the smuggling of migrants to the state border. At the international level, it is necessary to analyze the problems causing migration in the countries of origin of migrants and relevant responses.

The state has a leading role to play in managing migration processes. In this regard, it is important to adhere to such principles as:

- The rule of law, which is derived from the principles of international refugee and human rights law;
- Zero tolerance for human trafficking and smuggling of migrants across the state border;
- Deepening cooperation at the international level;
- Transparency;
- Non-discrimination on racial, national, linguistic, religious, gender, ethnic, political, social or other grounds;

- Proper implementation of international agreements;
- Cooperation with international, regional, and non-governmental organizations;
- Fight against racism and xenophobia.

Conclusion

This study analyzed the history of global migration and its positive and negative aspects. The chaotic uncontrolled migration, the current situation, and the risks associated with it are examined as well.

Regulations, conventions, protocols related to the smuggling of migrants to the state border, and compliance with the domestic legislation of the Contracting States are also discussed.

It has been found that States criminalize the smuggling of migrants to the state border through their legislative acts, which extends the UN's goal and motive for constructing the objective composition of the crime based on its own challenge. However, as long as the term "migrant" does not have a universally recognized international status, the term is replaced by other terms such as foreigners, foreign nationals, and others. Thus, there is need to develop a legal definition of the term "migrant".

The study further examines the interrelationships between international terrorism and illegal migration and, in some cases, their coexistence. Like Georgia, it is advisable for states to criminalize the legitimate or illegitimate crossing of their country's state borders in order to join a terrorist organization or participate in terrorist activities, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator.

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ESJ Humanities

Spatio-Temporal Assessment of Shoreline Changes and Management of the Transgressive Mud Coast, Nigeria

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[Doi:10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p99](https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p99)

Submitted: 26 July 2021
Accepted: 14 June 2022
Published: 30 June 2022

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Cite As:

Popoola O.O. (2022). *Spatio-Temporal Assessment of Shoreline Changes and Management of the Transgressive Mud Coast, Nigeria*. European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 18 (20), 99.
<https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p99>

Abstract

This study investigated changes due to erosion and the consequences of rising sea levels on the Transgressive mud coast of Nigeria using multispectral Landsat images and ALOS PALSAR (AW3D30) elevation models with the view of proffering a management strategy for a sustainable coast. Endpoint Rate (EPR) and Linear Regression Rate (LRR) techniques within the Digital Shoreline Analysis System (DSAS) were used to assess the rates of changes along the shoreline between 1986 and 2021. Inundation models were developed in line with sea-level rise scenarios of the Green House Gas emissions (SSP5-8.5) with GIS to assess sea-level rise's impact on land and structures. Likewise, spatially disaggregated population and economic activity datasets projected to the year 2100 were overlaid on the inundation models to generate exposure indices for the coast. The study revealed that 49.8 km (64.67%) of the shoreline experienced retreat over the entire study period. This rapid rate of shoreline retreat has caused a land loss of 15.1 sq. km to the Atlantic over the last 35 years, which could trigger an additional 1.26 sq. km by the year 2032. Furthermore, the impact of sea-level rise is severe on the transgressive coast triggering submergence of the mud coast by inundation to the extent of 201 sq. km which will increase to 551 sq. km by 2100. Losses in terms of structures, population, and economic activity are recorded. To curtail the ongoing coastal changes, the study recommends the full adoption of the shoreline management plan (SMP) for sustainable

shoreline management.

Keywords: Digital shoreline analysis system, inundation models, sea-level rise, shoreline change, shoreline management plan

Introduction

The coastal zone is the land area most affected by its proximity to the sea, as well as the part of the sea most affected by its proximity to land. The coastal zone is occasionally submerged, due to the action of tides and waves moving sediments inside, outside, and within the nearshore zone (Mentaschi et al., 2018). Coastal areas are some of the world's most productive and biologically diverse ecosystems (Badru et al., 2022). The shoreline is the interface between the land and the sea, and it is always in a state of flux due to sediment transportation and coastal/marine processes (Kankara et al., 2015). These processes possess the tendency to change shorelines on small-time scales ranging from days and years or long-time scales extending to decades or centuries (Fatima et al., 2017). Shoreline changes involve both erosion and accretion processes as well as changes caused by rising sea levels (Popoola, 2012).

Sea level rise (SLR) has been a major driving force affecting the stability of the shorelines as well as causing intense damage to coastal settlements (IPCC, 2021). SLR contributes to shoreline changes especially in low-lying areas, driving net long-term shoreline erosion over large spatial scales. This is accomplished through complex morphological adaptation and exposure to other drivers of morphodynamics (Nicholls & Cazenave, 2010). Coastal states in Nigeria are low-lying and vulnerable to the effects of climate change, including rising seas, inundation, coastal storms, and erosion (Popoola, 2014). Identifying areas vulnerable to erosion and inundation and quantifying their extent is essential for coastal planning and management (Kankara et al., 2015). As estimated by the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), there could be a global SLR of 1.01 m by the end of this century (IPCC, 2021) that could displace sizeable coastal settlements. IPCC (2019) included marine ice sheet instability and results for 2100 under the representative concentration pathways (RCP) 8.5 are higher than in AR5 (0.61-1.10 m). Other studies (Kopp et al., 2017; Wong et al., 2017) have predicted the RCP 8.5 process model estimates to rise to nearly 1.6 m by 2100. Likewise, Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009) used a semi-empirical method linking temperature changes to SLR and suggested the possibility of a rise above 2 m. In Nigeria, the effect of a 1-meter rise in sea level could be enormous as about 18,000 sq. km of land area along the Nigerian coastal zone and 2,016 sq. km of the Transgressive mud coast will be inundated (French et al., 1995). More recent studies that used a space-borne digital elevation model reveal lower

estimates of the effect of a 1 m SLR by 2100 as 2,869 sq. km of the Nigerian coast and 200 sq. km of the Transgressive mud coast will be inundated (Popoola, 2012; Popoola, 2014).

SLR will result in coastal recession and shoreline changes (Ranasinghe et al., 2012), coastal flooding (Aucelli et al., 2018), inundation, and subsidence (Popoola, 2012; Popoola, 2014). It will lead to declining water quality, decreasing fish cultivation, seawater intrusion into freshwater resources, the inundation of wetlands and estuaries, and severe impacts on coastal urban infrastructure (Koroglu et al., 2019). Factors responsible for the landward retreat of the coast include high wave energy, inundation due to low topography, little or no longshore sediment transport, lack of river deposits, sediment composition, clearing and harvesting of mangrove forest, and land subsidence due to oil exploration and exploitation (Dada et al., 2019; Oyedotun, 2015). Sea level rise is a major factor that contributes to the impacts of flooding on floodplains (Olokeogun et al. 2020). Indeed, a gradual rise in sea levels can rapidly increase the severity and frequency of coastal flooding (Vitousek et al., 2017). The impact of flooding events is usually exacerbated by human activities such as wetland degradation and depletion, building on floodplains, and improper siting of drainages for stormwater (Olajuyigbe et al, 2015). Assessing shoreline changes in coastal zones involves monitoring, modeling, prediction of coastal changes, and vulnerability analysis (Koroglu, et al., 2019). Many studies have adopted Remote Sensing and GIS techniques in shoreline and coastal change assessments to estimate erosion, accretion, and inundation and have adequately sufficed to produce results with high correlation and wieldy errors (Becerra et al., 2020; Griffiths et al., 2019). Statistical models such as End Point Rate (EPR) and Linear Regression Rate (LRR) as well as coastal vulnerability indices have been useful for the prediction of shoreline changes due to sea-level rise (Pendleton et al., 2004; Ozyurt and Ergin, 2010).

With increasing shoreline retreat rates per year, many developed countries have implemented measures and policies such as the shoreline management plan (SMP) to manage changes along their coastlines (Leatherman, 2018). SMP is a non-statutory, high-level planning document that involves longer-term strategic planning to reduce risks to people, the built, historic, and natural environment from coastal processes and anthropogenic forces that bring about changes in the shoreline through flooding and erosion (Environmental Agency, 2010). The SMP follows a proactive procedure starting from scoping the SMP, assessments to support policy development, policy development, public examination, finalizing the SMP, and plan dissemination (DEFRA, 2006). SMP has been adopted to manage shoreline issues globally, however, in Nigeria with increasing shoreline retreat, there has been little attention to shoreline management measures nor is there a

shoreline management plan for the coast (Popoola, 2012). Research on the impact of shoreline changes on socio-economic indicators such as population that can be affected, economic activity loss, and wetland loss in the Transgressive mud coast is sparse. Hence, this study will attempt shoreline changes between 1986 and 2021, estimate the extent of sea-level rise on the Transgressive mud coast and its implications on various socio-economic indicators and proffer a shoreline management strategy for the coast.

Methods

Study Area

The Transgressive mud-beach coast is situated in the southwest of Nigeria in between the Lagos barrier lagoon coast and the arcuate coast of the Niger Delta. It lies approximately $5^{\circ}50'38''$ and $6^{\circ}38'45''$ North of the Equator and $4^{\circ}30'18''$ and $5^{\circ}30'18''$ and $5^{\circ}02'52''$ east of the Greenwich meridian. It is approximately 25 kilometers east of the boundary of Lagos and covers about 1,433 sq. km extending 77 kilometers along the coastline (Figure 1). The Transgressive mud coast is an undulating coastal plain with nearly two-thirds of the coast (64.5%) less than 5 meters and 89.4 percent within 10 meters (Figure 2).




Figure 1: Map of Nigeria showing the Transgressive Mud Coast




Figure 2: Elevation Map of the Transgressive Mud Coast
 Source: Author’s Analysis, 2022

The coastal plain is surrounded by 30 to 60 kilometers of freshwater marshes and freshwater swamps with an intricate network of interconnected creeks and lacustrine marshes (Olorunlana, 2013). The climate of the area is a tropical humid condition with an average annual rainfall of about 2,721 mm and an average annual temperature of about 27.8⁰C (Fashae and Onafeso, 2011). Strong winds and dynamic waves characterize the wet season, which typically runs from May to October, whereas the dry season, which runs from November to April, is distinguished by mild winds and waves (Dada et al., 2019). Semidiurnal tides ranging between 1.5 and 1.8 meters are found within the transgressive mud coast (Ihenyen, 2003), however, the coast is dominated by waves generated by storms in the Atlantic Ocean with a wave period of 12 – 25 seconds. This generates swell waves with significant wave heights ranging from 1.2 to 1.5 meters (Popoola, 2012). This was based on the WaveWatch III data Recent studies (Kayode & Koya, 2019) recorded values for significant wave heights to range between 1.003 and 1.824 meters.

Longshore currents are minimal along the coast, thus not significant in transporting sediments and fluvial deposits along the coastline (Ihenyen, 2003). However, ebb currents which is a semidiurnal type of reversing current predominate eroding the shore zone. Large stretches of the transgressive mud coast comprise loose clayey deposits, with steep mud and have been subjected to inundation, flooding, and shoreline erosion due to the extensive destruction of the mangrove forests and overgrazing of the salt marshes along the coast (Fashae & Onafeso, 2011; Olajide & Popoola, 2020; Olajide et al., 2020; Popoola, 2021). Rising sea levels are observed along the Transgressive Mud Coast and this is caused by wave run-up and astronomical tides (Dada et al. 2020). Likewise, flooding events on the coast are caused by the interaction of large wave run-ups and astronomical tides (Dada et al. 2020). In terms of socio-economic characteristics, the population presently stands at 543,259 using the RCP8.5 projections. The predominant socio-economic activity on the coast is fishing, farming, boat construction, lumbering, mat making, net weaving, and trading (Olajide & Popoola, 2020; Olajide et al., 2020). Several natural resources abound on the mud coast such as crude oil, petroleum, glass sand, and bitumen, likewise, there are also agricultural products such as palm oil, timber, raffia, rice plantations, and banana which are produced well (Olajide & Popoola, 2020).

Data and data sources

The study involves analysis of shoreline change and SLR using six multi-temporal and orthorectified Landsat imageries with path/row 190/056 and resolution of 30 m of 1986 and 2021 from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) server. The Landsat images include a Thematic Mapper (TM) for 1986 and 1991, Enhanced Thematic Mapper (ETM+) for 2001 and 2011, and Operational Land Imager (OLI) for 2016 and 2021. The coordinate system of the imageries was in World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS84) but was projected to UTM/WGS84 Zone 31. The imageries were used as proxies for shoreline extraction. ALOS PALSAR AW3D30 digital elevation model (DEM) was obtained from Earth Observation Research Center while spatially disaggregated population and GDP data were obtained from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. The study also obtained data from stakeholders along the coast concerning management strategies. This was done by ascertaining the stakeholders which are mainly the Ministries, Departments, and Agencies responsible for shoreline management, and conducting a qualitative assessment using semi-structured interviews.

Shoreline change

These images were radiometrically calibrated and geographically referenced and selected at the same tidal period and based on the conditions,

the cloud coverage was not significant. The images were subjected to geometrical correction using a set of ground control points (GCPs) made available by the United States Geological Survey (USGS). A reconnaissance survey was conducted to ensure that the GCPs and other features registered on the images tally with each other. For shoreline extraction, the Automated Water Extraction Index (AWEI) was used to delineate the land-water boundary represented by the high-water line as shoreline proxies for the different years using the band rationing and differencing algorithm as used by Feyisa et al. (2014). The Digital Shoreline Analysis System (DSAS) version 5.1 was used to calculate the rate of coastline change statistics from multiple historic shoreline positions by casting transects perpendicular to the baseline at a specified spacing along the coast. The study generated a baseline parallel to the shoreline buffered 1000 meters from the shoreline position for the year 1986 from which transects were cast perpendicularly. This was followed by setting transect parameters that split the shoreline into intervals, and then the rate of change for each transect was calculated. A spacing of 100 meters intervals perpendicular to the baseline was specified along the coastline thus making it 770 transects, covering the entire 77 km coastline of the mud coast. The values estimated from the transects were then used to estimate the rate of shoreline change using the endpoint rate (EPR) for short-term analysis and the linear regression rate (LRR) for long-term analysis (1986-2021). In forecasting future shoreline positions, the study made use of the Kalman Filter model which combines observed and model-derived shoreline locations to estimate future shoreline positions.

Sea Level Rise Inundation assessment

The study performs an overlay analysis by draping the ALOS DEM on critical elements (land, population, GDP, buildings) of the coast with inundation zones of 0 m and projected for 1 and 2 meters SLR scenarios. The 1 and 2-meter scenarios were based on the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) that sea levels could rise to 1.01 m by the year 2100 and that global mean sea level rise approaching 2 m by 2100 cannot be ruled out due to uncertainties in ice sheet processes (IPCC, 2021). The study mosaicked three grids of the ALOS DEM into a single seamless raster. Image analysis was performed to extract the mosaicked elevation data into the delineated feature class of the study area. Inundation zones were derived from the DEM by extracting the pixel value of 0, 1, and 2 from the raster in the elevation field. However, for the present relative SLR estimate which is 0.33 m (GLOSS, 2016), the Inverse Distance Weighted Interpolation tool was used to interpolate the pixels from 0 m to 0.33 m.

These scenarios were superimposed with the delineated coastal extent and the appropriate exposure dataset (critical elements) to extract vulnerable

regions to inundation. In identifying the effect of the SLR on the socioeconomics on the coast, buildings within 5 km of the shoreline were digitized based on the scientific definition of the coastal zone (Kay and Alder, 2005). The study used ArcGIS 10.8.2 version to run a query dialogue to select all buildings that are within the extent of the impact of sea-level rise for each climate change scenario. The uncertainties embedded in the ALOS DEM are critical in estimating the impact of SLR on the critical elements. Indeed, best practices for inundation assessment include discussing derived maps and statistical summaries in terms of the elevation dataset's limitations, which include accuracies and reporting following accepted national and global standards (Gesch et al., 2009). With the ALOS DEM, the vertical accuracy (VA) ranges from 4.1 m to 4.95 meters (Ferreira and Cabral, 2021; Tadono et al., 2015; Santillana and Makinano-Santillana, 2016) and has been incorporated into the results of the analysis.

Stakeholders' assessment

The research conducted interviews with the agencies responsible for managing the coastal zone. These include the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), Niger Delta Ministries (NDM), the Ministry of Environment, the Ondo State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission (OSOPADEC), and the Town Planning Department to assess management strategies employed for the planning and management of the Transgressive mud coast. Responses were transcribed and subjected to Content Analysis to identify patterns and context with regards to the management of the Transgressive Mud shoreline from which strategies of the Shoreline Management Plan emanated.

Results

Shoreline change analysis

The study made use of the EPR and LRR models of the DSAS to estimate short-term and long-term effects of erosion respectively along the Transgressive mud coast. The negative values denote erosion, while the positive values denote accretion.

Short-term variation of the shoreline

The short-term analysis of shoreline changes as used in this study includes 6 periodic intervals: 1986-1991, 1991-2001, 2001-2006, 2006-2011, 2011-2016, and 2016-2021 (Figure 3). The study reveals the erosional and accretional changes that have occurred along the shoreline over the 35 years considered.

Between 1986 and 1991, the shoreline experienced a high rate of erosion (Figure 4a). The EPR parameter shows that the shoreline experienced

an average erosion rate of -22.11m/yr. and average accretion rate of $+12.78\text{m/yr.}$ with a shoreline change of -9.33m/yr. In terms of extent, 61.87% (48 km) of the entire coastline experienced erosion during this period while 38.13% (29 km) experienced accretion, hence, erosion was predominant during this period. The highest erosion rate was observed in the eastern part of the transgressive mud coast.

From 1991 to 2001, the erosion rate stood at -22.56m/yr. The accretion rate was 20.02m/yr. This indicates a net change of -2.54m/yr. for the shoreline. Results also indicate that 58.91% (45 km) of the entire shoreline experienced erosion in this period, and 41.09% (29 km) experienced accretion. Accretion was dominant in the eastern part of the coast and some sections of the western areas of the shore (Figure 4a).

Between 2001 and 2006, the shoreline erosion rate was -23.76m/yr. and the accretion rate was $+18.22\text{m/yr.}$ Approximately 48% (37 km) of the total shoreline extent was accreted, while 52% (40 km) eroded. As revealed in Figure 4a, erosion is dominant within this period with a net rate of -5.54m/yr. Erosion was predominant in the central section of the shoreline while accretion was predominant in the eastern section and the western section.

EPR analysis between 2006 and 2011 shows that erosion rates were more intense in the central section of the coast. The erosion rate recorded was -24.17m/yr. the accretion rate was 17.6m/yr. The net rate of change was -6.57m/yr. As shown in Figure 4a, some patches in the eastern sector also experienced low to high erosion within this period. These are noticeable in Awoye and Gbeke Eke communities. Erosion was also observed in the Ogororo community in the western section of the coast.

During the 2011-2016 period, increased erosion was observed in the western section of the coast compared to the previous period. Erosion remains the dominant phenomenon alongshore with the central section comprising communities such as Yaye, Olotu, Aiyetoro and Bijimi mostly affected (Figure 4b). The erosion and accretion rates recorded rate was -22.27m/yr. and 15.95m/yr. respectively. 65.23% (50 km) of the shoreline extent experienced erosion in this period, 32% (23 km) experienced accretion while 4 km were stable. The net rate of change is -6.32m/yr. indicating high erosion during this period.

In the 2016-2021 period, the erosion rate was -20.18m/yr. accretion rate was 8.71m/yr. based on the EPR result. The net rate of change of erosion increased to -11.47m/yr. As revealed in Figure 4b, some parts of the shoreline's central area that experienced erosion during the last period such as the Ilepete and Obe-Nla communities were seen to have experienced accretion. However, communities such as Omifun Oke, Molume, and Awoye experienced more erosion in this period compared to 2011-2016.

Approximately 65.33% (50 km) of the shoreline extent experienced shoreline erosion in this period.




Figure 3: Shoreline Change rates for different periods
Source: Author's Analysis, 2022




Figure 4a Short-term shoreline changes for different periods on the Transgressive mud coast (1986-1991; 1991-2001; 2001-2006; 2006-2011).

Source: Author's Analysis, 2022




Figure 4b Short-term shoreline changes for different periods on the Transgressive mud coast (2011-2016; 2016-2021)

Source: Author's Analysis, 2022

Long-Term Shoreline Variation

The long-term shoreline variation assessment of the study area is dated from 1986 to 2021. The maximum shoreline change from 1986 to 2021 was 1042.34 m using the shoreline change envelope parameter (SCE). The SCE value represents the greatest distance among all the shorelines that intersect a given transect. Approximately 49.8 km (64.67%) of the entire coastline experienced erosion between 1986 and 2021, causing the retreat of the shoreline landward in those areas, and 27.2 km (35.33%) of the shoreline extent experienced accretion within this period. The LRR statistics suggest that the coastline is experiencing a landward retreat with erosion rates ranging from $<0\text{m/yr.}$ to -22.48m/yr. thus triggering a land loss of approximately 15.1 sq. km to the Atlantic Ocean. As depicted in Figures 5 and 6, the results of the LRR show that the central part of the coastline has experienced high rates of erosion over the 35 years considered in this study. Communities affected include Yaye, Olotu, Aiyetoro, Bijimi, Ilowo, and Ilepete while the Obe-Nla community experienced low erosion rates. Results also indicated that the accretion process has been predominant in the eastern and some parts of the western zone of the coastline. Communities such as Molume, Awoye, and Gbeke Eke are seen to have gained more land between 1986 and 2021. Figure

7 revealed the shoreline changes between the start date (1986) and end date (2021) of this study.

Shoreline forecast

The Kalman Filter model was used in the study to forecast shoreline changes over 10 years. This model requires LRR, the confidence interval of linear regression and the standard error of the estimate. Results show that by the year 2032, an additional 1.26 sq. km would be lost to erosion. Hence, by 2032, the total land area that will retreat is 16.36 sq. km.




Figure 5: Shoreline change rate along the Transgressive mud coast between 1986 and 2021
Source: Author's Analysis, 2022




Figure 6: Shoreline change map for vulnerability to coastal erosion between 1986 and 2021
Source: Author's Analysis, 2022




Figure 7: Shoreline change between 1986 and 2021
Source: Author's Analysis, 2022

Sea Level Rise Assessment

The study assessed and presented the results of the effect of sea-level rise (SLR) on the Transgressive mud coast using 0.33 m, 1-meter, and 2-meter SLR scenarios. Socio-economic implications such as population, buildings, and economic activity were also revealed. Results of the sea level rise assessment show that at the 0.33 m SLR scenario, 200.97 sq. km (13.93%) of the transgressive mud coast is already experiencing inundation (Table 1, Figure 8). In a 1-meter SLR scenario by the year 2100, 551 sq. km (38.18%) of the Transgressive mud coast will be submerged and will increase to 646.18 sq. km (44.77%) in a 2-meter SLR scenario. Results also show that 621, 1840, and 2032 buildings within 5 km of the shoreline will be affected in 0.33, 1, and 2 meters SLR scenarios respectively (Figures 9 and 10). For the population that will be affected, results indicate that at the present sea level situation, 75,675 inhabitants are already displaced along the Transgressive mud coast. With sea levels hitting the 1 m level by the year 2100, results indicate that

461,491 inhabitants will be displaced out of the projected population of 1,208,726, while 541,146 inhabitants will be displaced in the event of a 2 m SLR by 2100. Economic activity expressed (GDP) for the mud coast for the year 2022 is \$1,821,303 which will increase to \$96,625,284 by the year 2100. This study finds out that with the present sea level rise scenario, \$685,011 is already lost. If sea levels increase to 1 m by the end of the century, \$99,607,139 is valued to be lost while \$116,799,678 will be lost if sea levels increase to 2 m by 2100.

Table 1: Vulnerability of the Transgressive Mud coast to sea-level rise

	0.33 m +/- 4.95 VA	1m +/- 4.95 VA	2m +/- 4.95 VA
Impacted area (sq. km)	200.97	551.01	646.18
The land area inundated (%)	13.93	38.18	44.77
Buildings inundated @ 5km of coastline	621 (3.2%)	1840 (9.4%)	2032 (10.3%)
Impacted population @ 2022	75, 675	461,491	541,146
Economic activity (*GDP _{PPP} , US\$)	685,011	99,607,139	116,799,678

Source: Author's Analysis, 2022 *GDP_{PPP} = GDP purchasing power parity

Discussion

As observed from the long-term shoreline variation, erosional processes dominate the central sections of the coast, as erosion rates as high as -65.67 m/yr were recorded in this section and -76.2 m/yr towards the eastern section. Previous studies have also recorded high erosion rates such as Daramola et al (2022) and French et al (1995) with over -100 m/yr. in some locations. Across the shoreline, the average erosion rate is between -1 and -25 m/yr. In previous studies, erosion rates are not far apart from this study with Dada et al (2019) recording rates between -1 and -30 m/yr. and Komolafe et al (2020) between -0.12 and -21.24 m/yr. The total land loss to erosion for the transgressive coast between 1986 and 2021 is 15.1 sq. km which will trigger additional land loss of about 1.26 sq. km by 2032. These rates are a bit higher than previous studies (Dada et al., 2019) which suggest 10.6 sq. km land loss and (Daramola et al., 2022) with 11.3 sq. km. The reasons for the variations include the period they considered to be shorter compared to this study, the duration of assessments, and the vegetation line proxy used in Daramola et al (2022). The noticeable accretion in the western section of the coast is due to the longshore drift of sediment from the Barrier-Lagoon coast from Lagos, rising sea levels, and the deposition of sand and other sediments along the shore. Little bits of erosion noticeable in the western section was due to human activities such as canalization and the deforestation of mangroves (Badru et al., 2022). The eastern sector of the shore zone even with little erosion experienced more land loss due to sea-level rise as the region's topography is low-lying ranging between 0.5 and 2 meters. Findings from previous studies suggest that elevation in the eastern sector of the coast especially in coastal

communities of Awoye and Molume ranges from 0.8 to 1.8 m and are frequently inundated during high tides (Ebisemiju 1987; French et al., 1995).




Figure 8: Transgressive mud coast inundated at different sea-level rise scenarios
Source: Author's Analysis, 2022




Figure 9: Map showing buildings along the shoreline inundated in a 1 m SLR scenario
Source: Author's Analysis, 2022




Figure 10: Map indicating specific buildings that will be inundated in a 1 m SLR scenario
Source: Author's Analysis, 2022

Sea level rise has aggravated land loss in the transgressive mud coast and brought about damages to coastal settlements along the coast (Figure 12). As revealed by Dada et al (2020) the coast experiences regular flooding due to large wave run-ups and astronomical tides. This has weakened the coast's interparticle bonds thereby making the sediments unconsolidated and more vulnerable to erosion by high-energy waves and tidal floods (Ebisemiju, 1987). As found out, 201 sq. km (13.93%) of the mud coast is already inundated with floodwaters which will increase to 551 sq. km by 2100 if the AR6 RCP8.5 projections are anything to go by. Indeed, the AR6 predicted with high confidence that low-lying coasts will experience increased frequency and severity of flooding and erosion throughout this century. Comparing these results with previous studies (French et al., 1995; Popoola, 2012) shows variations. Findings of French et al. (1995) that used the Aerial Videotape-Assisted Vulnerability Analysis (AVVA) technique indicated that with a 1-meter SLR, 2,016 sq. km of land in the Transgressive mud coast will be inundated, which is greater than the results of this study. The dataset obtained with the AVVA technique is not detailed as the resolution range is between 100 and 500 m with a wider range of uncertainties. The findings of Popoola (2012) whose result is smaller than what was obtained in this study indicated that in a 1-meter SLR scenario, 199 sq. km of land in the mud coast will be lost. This result grossly underestimates the impact of SLR along the coast. Reasons attributed to this include the resolution of the elevation dataset used and the non-reporting of its limitations regarding the accuracies of the derived maps and statistical summaries of the mud coast as suggested by Gesch et al. (2009). The resolution of the elevation dataset used by Popoola (2012) is 90 m and the vertical accuracy is +/- 6.13 m whereas the ALOS DEM used in this study possess a 30 m resolution and vertical accuracy of +/-4.95 m. Besides that, this study incorporated this uncertainty into the derived maps and statistical summaries produced which was not done in Popoola (2012) for the coast.

Presently, there is displacement along the coast as the residents must move away from the advancing sea waters. The displacements of the residents have affected communities such as Aiyetoro, and Olotu due to increased wave action and storm surges in the central section of the coast, and Awoye and Molume in the eastern section of the coast which is not unconnected with the presence of the Awoye estuary and the rising tides of the sea. Indeed, most of the previously inhabited areas especially in the eastern section are now flooded which will aggravate with a 1-meter SLR (Figures 7 and 8). The implication of this will be enormous causing more loss of lives, properties, land loss, displaced population with its associated emotional trauma and psychological effects, destruction of the marine life and economy, vegetation loss and loss of livelihoods and income-generating activities of the inhabitants. In an

overlay analysis of the inundation assessment and shoreline change using the LRR (Figure 11), it was evident that erosion was more evident in the central section of the coast coupled with the inundation of the coastal land. In the western section, mild erosion was evident and lower inundation effects compared with the central locations. The eastern locations experience less erosion presently but more land loss due to the low elevations in the region and rising seas from the Atlantic and rising tides from the Awoye estuary.




Figure 11: Overlay of shoreline change on coastal vulnerability to sea-level rise
 Source: Author’s Analysis, 2022

Existing shoreline management challenges

Findings from interviews conducted with relevant stakeholders which include officials of NDDC, NDM, Ministry of Environment, OSOPADEC and the Town Planning Department reveal that there has not been any coastal/shoreline management plan except for some piecemeal approaches which are unveiled in failed government efforts. In a bid to safeguard the shoreline, the Federal Government of Nigeria through the NDDC contracted

out a multimillion-dollar shoreline protection project using geotextile tube technology in 2004 to Gallet Nigeria Limited for USD16 million, and then to Dredging Atlantic in 2009 for USD43 million, however, they both failed to meet their intended purpose. Findings revealed the reasons for its failure to include inadequate knowledge of the dynamics of the mud coast due to the unavailability of historical data that can assist in informed decision-making for shoreline management. The contractors for the project were purely limited to their field of expertise in water and maritime engineering, hence, they could not carry out holistic planning, appraisal, and execution of the project. The pre-contract feasibility study was not adequate, and this was reflected in insufficient sand for the geotextile tube revegetation project. Non-payment of workers on-site and the practice of providing only a 25% mobilization fee for the project contributed to its failure. Lack of cooperation from community members is a factor as they continuously made claims to get undue compensation; and when their demands are not met, they sabotaged the contractors' efforts leading to the abandonment of the project (Figure 12 g&h). There is poor preparation, institutional failure, and corporate negligence. Hence, the need for an integrated shoreline management plan (SMP) for the transgressive mud shoreline is essential for proper monitoring and protection of the shore.




Figure 12: (A.) A typical seashore with broken pieces of houses already submerged by the rising sea. (B.) Happy City College is completely inundated. (C.) Other parts of the seashore with fragments of houses destroyed and submerged. (D.) A typical building being destroyed due to wave action, storm surges and rising sea levels (E.) The aftermath of a sea surge left Aiyetoro flooded. (F.) People already adapted to living on the waters. (G.) A dredger was abandoned by contractors. (H.) Geotube project for revegetation of the Aiyetoro seashore.

Shoreline Management Plan (SMP)

This study has been able to show that coastal retrogradation has been a recurring occurrence along the Transgressive mud coast over the last 35 years through shoreline change and rising sea levels. Many intervention approaches have been suggested for managing the Transgressive shoreline such as identification of potential threats to hazards, flood defenses, land use management, community education and evacuation plan, and the adoption of the managed realignment approach (Daramola et al., 2022; Komolafe et al., 2020). These approaches are good, but unless they are integrated with a planning framework such as an SMP, they are not sufficient for effective shoreline management. With the SMP, long-term balanced sustainability of the shore zone is achievable which will form a basis for sustainable shoreline management policies (Environmental Agency, 2010). This type of high-level planning is essential for the management of shorelines in Nigeria. To date, Nigeria is yet to have a shoreline management strategy as coastal issues are managed sector-by-sector, thus complicating the sustainable management of coastal zones (Famuditi et al., 2014; Popoola, 2012). Managing the Transgressive mud shoreline will involve identifying the best ways to manage risks to people, built and natural environment and how to put these into practice by adopting the full implementation of the SMP process. Such a proactive approach will necessarily require an understanding of the natural coastal processes, coastal defense needs, environmental considerations, and planning issues that involves current and future land use (Ballinger & Dodds, 2020; Cooper et al., 2002).

In adopting the SMP for the Transgressive mud coast, six stages are essential. The first stage is Scope the SMP (DEFRA, 2006). Scope involves initiating SMP by the Ministry of Environment along with the Town Planning department, organizing Client Steering Group committees in determining the scope of work to produce the SMP. The purpose is to identify requirements for the SMP. The next step is identifying key stakeholders and involving them in the SMP. This will then be followed by data collection, management, and review. The second stage is situation assessment. This stage involves a baseline understanding of coastal dynamics, developing baseline scenarios, defining features, benefits and issues, defining objectives, identifying flood and erosion risks, and assessing objectives. The third stage is policy formulation wherein defining scenarios and drafting SMP documents are undertaken by the stakeholders. The four major policy options for SMP include holding the existing defense line, advancing the existing defense line, a managed realignment, and no active intervention (Environmental Agency, 2010). At this stage, the SMP considers policies that will assist with shoreline stabilization and beach nourishment through vegetative plantings, wetland enhancements, and preservation of beaches and natural shorelines (DEFRA,

2006). Stage four is the Public Examination which involves gaining approval from the public, confirming the consultation strategy, producing SMP draft documents for consultation, and conducting consultation activities with the public as it relates to managing the shoreline. The fifth stage is Finalize Plan. This involves determining revisions to the draft SMP, developing an Action Plan, and finalizing the SMP. The last stage is Plan Dissemination. This involves the publication of the SMP and the implementation of the Plan. Coastal Managers and Planners are to drive this process. Hence, the Town Planning Department and the Ministry of Environment should coordinate the SMP process for effective shoreline management.

Conclusion

The study assessed changes along the Transgressive mud coastline using remote sensing and GIS techniques. Specifically, the study assessed shoreline retreat and sea-level rise-induced changes along the coast during the last 35 years. The results showed that the study area has experienced retrogradation, with a retreat of over 64% (49.8 km) of the 77-km long coast. This is due to insufficient sediment supply to prevent the landward retreat of the shoreline which in part is due to rising sea levels. This rapid rate of shoreline change indicates that retrogradation has triggered a land loss of 15.1 sq. km to the Atlantic over the last 35 years with the central sector of the coast the most vulnerable.

Climate change influences are also significant in changes across the shore zone as places inhabited by people before are now being inundated. Going by the AR6 RCP8.5 climate model that indicates that sea-level rise will exceed 1 m by the end of the century, this study established that 551 sq. km (38.18%) of the Transgressive mud coast will be inundated with floodwaters. This will trigger the submergence of 1,850 buildings within 5 km of the shoreline. The population that will be affected is approximately 461,491 while the cost of livelihood and economic activity expressed with GDP will be USD 99.6 million (N57.8 billion). The observed patterns of shoreline changes in the study area are due to waves, rising tides, and anthropogenic forces along the coast which corroborates with findings from Dada et al. (2020) and Daramola et al. (2022). The Landsat dataset used to generate proxies for the shorelines and the ALOS PALSAR digital elevation model may not have sufficient spatial resolution, but they are useful for monitoring coastal changes due to erosion and sea-level rise along the transgressive mud coast.

Temporal analyses of shoreline variations and the effects of sea-level rise are required for the development of a strategic plan for effective management, which an SMP provides. The relevant authorities and especially the Town Planning Department and the Ministry of Environment should coordinate the SMP process to safeguard the coast and improve the socio-

economic development of the coastal area. Spatial planning regulations (such as land-use planning, and development control) that regulate human activities are already embedded in the SMP and they are to be enforced. The SMP when fully adopted will be able to give a clear understanding of the dynamics of the coast with different scenarios, produce and establish the best policy response for different stretches of the coast, and provide measures for monitoring developments around the coast as well as defense measures to mitigate coastal retrogradation and inundation. The SMP will also allow for flexibility as the members of the public and stakeholders can contribute to it and will understand their roles and responsibilities. The decision to award a project for shoreline protection should already be well analyzed and documented within the SMP as this will lessen the expenditure of public funds on vulnerable infrastructure and response mechanisms. Finally, the SMP supports natural beach stabilizations more than engineered coastal barriers.

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Third Parties without Independent Claims in Civil Proceedings

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[Doi:10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p128](https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p128)

Submitted: 13 May 2022

Accepted: 10 June 2022

Published: 30 June 2022

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Cite As:

Morchadze Z. (2022). *Third Parties without Independent Claims in Civil Proceedings*. European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 18 (20), 128.

<https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p128>

Abstract

The civil law process is based on the principles of adversarial proceedings and disposition. The principle of adversarial proceedings implies the exercise of the right of equality between the parties at any stage of the proceedings, and the equal distribution of the rights and duties conferred on them by this Code. The principle of disposition implies the freedom of expression of the will of the parties by the procedures established by this Code to know whether it is filling the claim, filing a motion, withdrawing the claim or other. In addition to the judge, the parties also ensure the running of the process. These are the plaintiff, defendant, and third parties. The institute of third parties in turn is divided into two branches: third parties with an independent claim and third parties without an independent claim. Third parties with an independent claim are almost equal in their rights and responsibilities to the plaintiff and the defendant, while third parties without an independent claim have certain restrictions. These restrictions put them under such legal pressure that in some cases easily regulated issues will, on the contrary, turn into difficult ones to regulate. For a third party without an independent claim to participate in the process, it requires the desire of one of the parties or of that third party itself. The issue of their involvement in the process largely depends on the reasoned reasoning of the parties, which is one of the shortcomings of the procedural order. It is true that without an independent claim, a third party is not the main subject of the case and is not directly involved in the decision. However, the purpose of the article is to prove the opposite of this fact. The article describes not only Georgian but also

civil procedure laws of different countries, which contain certain differences compared to Georgian civil procedure laws. The comparative legal research used in the paper presents the main idea of the paper and sheds light on the real possibility of its realization. The given is manifested in the possibility of granting certain rights to third parties. Based on the case law applied and the analysis of the existing scientific doctrine, the conclusions will be summarized according to which the object of the article, the third party, deserves such enabling rights. The research will help to develop civil procedural law in so far as it is a topical issue today. Both doctrinal and non-doctrinal, comparative-legal, and evaluative legal research methods are used in the paper.

Keywords: Third Party, Claim, Independent Claim, Process, Parties

Introduction

The civil proceeding is a key tool for the public among dispute resolution mechanisms. Following the requirements of the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia, judicial protection of the rights of each person is ensured (Kharitonashvili, 2017). Under the rules of the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia, the court hears cases based on the application of the person who applies to protect his right or interest provided by law.

Due to the transition to market relations, a special role and importance are attached to the administration of justice in civil cases, as many civil cases arising from civil turnover are heard through the courts (Kurdadze & Khunashvili, 2015).

Civil rights exist from an early stage in the development of society. Social and political institutions such as the state and law were originally established in the countries of the Old East. The existence of civil law relations necessitated the existence of rules of due process in these countries. However, when talking about the trial of the mentioned period, it is noteworthy that the circumstance is remarkable. However, this circumstance is a proof that the ancient Eastern civilization still offers certain peculiarities. In particular, “in the trial of ancient Mesopotamia, there is no sharp distinction between criminal and civil proceedings” (Garishvili, 2008). It is noteworthy that in the history of ancient Athens, an important place was occupied by the mortgage of a plot of land (Garishvili, 2008). The multifaceted culture of ancient Athens is influenced by the loan and mortgage agreements of the time, which provided for the existence of a guarantor in transactions. This confirms the existence of many individuals in the processes. In addition to the fact that the plaintiff and the defendant were transformed, their guarantors were also added. The institute of third parties in civil proceedings was known in the early stages of

the development of law. This gives grounds to consider Roman civil procedural law as the homeland of the origin of third parties (Gorelov, 2012).

According to the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia, judges and parties are represented in the court of law. The parties are the plaintiff, defendant, third parties, and accomplices (co-plaintiff, co-defendant) (Civil Procedure Code of Georgia, 1997). Thus, in addition to the plaintiff and the defendant, a person who is interested in resolving this dispute may participate in the trial, as his interests and rights about other persons may be formed by the decision made.

Civil procedure law of Georgia gives every interested person the right to file a lawsuit to protect a violated or disputed right or an interest provided by law. The purpose of the claim or the legal interest of the action, in turn, leads to the existence of different types of lawsuits such as confessional, pecuniary, and transformational lawsuits. Through the correct individualization of the procedural form of the plaintiff's request, the precise selection of this or that type of claim and its submission to the court is a precondition for ensuring its proper trial.

The civil procedural law of Georgia is familiar with the institution of third parties which plays a rather important role in litigation. Third parties, in turn, differ in the process as evidenced by their rights and responsibilities. These are third parties with an independent claim and third parties without an independent claim who have the power to file a claim in civil proceedings.

For the research topic of the paper to be perfected and bring the desired result, several types of legal research methods were used within the framework of doctrinal research (often referred to as library research because of its normative nature) reviewed primary sources of law such as legislation, court decisions, legal manuals, and articles. Non-doctrinal research was conducted to investigate the practical problems of the research issue. For the issue raised in the paper not to be analyzed in one direction, comparative legal and evaluative research methods have been used as well, with the help of which happened according to the examples of different countries, logical analysis of legal facts and events, each separately and in relation to each other.

Third Parties without an Independent Claim

According to Article 89 of the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia, all interested persons who do not assert an independent claim for the subject matter of a dispute or its part may apply to a court to allow him/her to engage as a third party in the proceedings in support of the plaintiff or the defendant because the court decision on this case may subsequently affect his/her rights and duties concerning one of the parties. The engagement of a third party in the proceedings shall be decided by the court which takes into consideration the opinions of the parties (Civil Procedure Code of Georgia, 1997).

Third parties without an independent claim have no independent demands or liability about the subject matter of the dispute. In other words, the court decision does not seem to apply directly to such persons. These are persons whose rights and obligations to one of the parties may be only influenced by a court decision. However, the probable impact that the decision may have on their rights and obligations does not equate to the impact implied by the term "directly related" in the term provided for in Article 422, Part 1, Subparagraph "c" (Civil Procedure Code of Georgia, 1997) of the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia. This is the reason third parties, without an independent claim, have limited access to the procedural rights of the parties. They may not increase or reduce the amount of the claim, change the grounds or the subject of the claim, acknowledge the claim, renounce the claim or settle on the claim amicably, file a counterclaim, and request enforcement of a court decision (Civil Procedure Code of Georgia; 1997) and most importantly, they cannot appeal court decisions on appeal or cassation (Civil Procedure Code of Georgia, 1997). Furthermore, they have the right to be involved in the case on their initiative or that of any party but are not a mandatory participant in the process. The issue of admission of third parties to the plaintiff's side or the defendant's side in the case is based on the opinions of the parties. However the court decides, the involvement of the mentioned persons in the case cannot be initiated by the court on its initiative (Civil Procedure Code of Georgia, 1997).

Third parties who do not have an independent claim on the subject matter or part of the dispute become participants in the ongoing litigation if the court decision can affect their rights and obligations towards one of the parties. The court decision of engagement of the third parties in the process, when a person addresses the court, is based on the views of the parties (Kurdadze, 2006). Third parties of a similar type may participate in the proceedings on the side of the plaintiff's or the defendant's side. Based on the above, they are called third parties without an independent claim (Kurdadze & Khunashvili, 2012). A third party participates in the case in favor of one of the parties. Thus, the benefit or uselessness received as a result of its participation is directly proportional to his rights or obligations to one of these persons. It is better to consider the present-day of other countries as an example to define the concept better. In German law, for example, the involvement of a third party without an independent requirement is called ancillary involvement. In the Netherlands, third parties, like the parties, engage in civil proceedings to disseminate facts and arguments in support of the position of one of the disputing parties. Such involvement is called a connection (Van Rhee, 2013). In German civil proceedings, if a dispute arises over the admissibility of a third party, the court will decide on a private matter with an interim decision on the immediate appeal (Baur & Grunsky, 2000).

A third party without an independent claim is often more active than the defendant during the proceedings. For example, if the defendant lost the dispute with the plaintiff and had to pay damages, he has the right of recourse against a third party and it is from this that the activity of a third party in a given process is derived, as he is very interested in the defendant not losing the process.

Grounds for the Engagement of Third Parties without an Independent Claim in the Case

In court practice, third-party involvement in the review of civil cases by various state bodies is widespread (Liluashvili & Khrustali, 2007). There are also frequent cases when state bodies or officials themselves are involved in the case as third parties. At this point, the court must properly determine their legal interest in the case. In one of the cases, the appellant petitioned the court to involve the Tbilisi City Hall and the mortgagee M.K as the third parties. The first part of Article 90 of the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia defines the procedure of engagement of a third party without an independent claim on the initiative of the party. However, to resolve the issue, it is necessary not only to examine the formal-procedural issue of the request but also to analyze the concept of a third party without the independent claim. The decision of the court regarding the involvement of a third party in the case should be at least under Article 89 of the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia and the legal interest that this person has in the case should be examined (DSCG-სბ-1131-2020; 26/03/2021). The subjective interest of one of the parties in the involvement of a third party in the case is not sufficient. There are cases in practice when a third party is involved in a case, but the court does not indicate which party will be helped by the third party (LiluaShvili & Khrustali, 2007).

According to this norm, the involvement of a third party in the process by the initiative of one of the parties is allowed only when the main party is having a dispute, at the time of the announcement of the involvement of a third party in the proceedings, that he can alternatively exercise the right of claim against a third party if the process related to the main claim fails for him (DSCG-სბ-542-2021, 15/10/2021). To satisfy the motion for the involvement of a third party in the case, the court must determine that the decision will have some effect on the rights and duties of that person about any person involved in the other case. The purpose of involving a third party in a case should also be to assist the court in resolving the case in its favor. Otherwise, a third party may impose certain obligations on either party.

The opinion of Georgian practitioners on the existence of legal interest: "if all persons, that have a general legal interest in the dispute, will be engaged in the case as third parties without an independent claim by the court, it will not be correct as it will cause chaos in court practice because it will be difficult

to determine what is meant by legal interest in general” (Gabelaia, 2016). The interest of a person who does not have an independent claim on the subject of the dispute to enter the process of another should be objective. This means that his interest must be based on the connection of a third party with one of the parties according to the probable material legal relationship (Vikut, 2005). Accordingly, it will be correct to determine whether a third party has the right to participate in the case. The Civil Procedure Code of Georgia will indicate the impact of the court decision on the economic and legal status of the person (Kharitonashvili, 2017). In addition, the legal interest should not be general and it should be the bearer of the probable material-legal connection concerning the request of the claim. It should be noted that the existence of a legal interest, which is required by the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia, exists only when a court decision can affect the rights and duties of a third party (Liluashvili et al., 2014).

The purpose of involving a third party without an independent claim is to avoid consequences that are unfavorable to the decision. In basic cases, the involvement of a third party in the case serves as a basis for a party to file a recourse action against that person, which will impose an additional obligation on a third party. Participation of the third parties in the case allows a party to influence the outcome of a dispute by using the necessary procedural means to protect his rights and interests from the possible adverse consequences of a court decision. If these consequences may be reflected in a third party and become the basis for a recourse liability to a third party, the purpose of the party involved in the case is then to assist the party and the court as much as possible in deciding on their favor. He actually avoids further subsequent claims against himself because in the same lawsuit, he may find himself as a defendant. Accordingly, a study of recourse liability in civil law may conclude that the institution of third parties without an independent claim is a procedural guarantee of the recourse right (the right of one person to claim a return of something from another). Therefore, the basis for involving third parties in litigation is to avoid fulfilling the obligation by the rule of recourse. This circumstance has a significant impact on third parties in the process and determines their procedural capacity.

Georgian and Foreign Practice regarding the Admissibility of Participation of the Third Party without an Independent Claim in the Process

The admissibility of a third party without an independent claim to participate in the process depends on the initiative of one of the parties. In the case of a well-founded motion and the consent of a party, or based on a well-reasoned third-party motion, the court may include the above as a third party in the case. Third parties with an independent claim have relatively limited

rights and obligations under the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia. The purpose of third parties with an independent claim is to facilitate a positive decision for one of the parties in the case. It is for this purpose that they are involved in the case on their initiative or on the initiative of the party against whom the case is to be settled positively. However, this is in direct contact with a third party with an independent claim. The desire to get involved in the process is because the decision to favor one of the parties will not have any impact on a third party who does not have an independent claim. He has certain rights and responsibilities that change concerning one party to the process when making a decision. This definition rightly emphasizes the purpose of involving third parties in the case without an independent claim. However, there is a different opinion that third parties without an independent claim, as well as third parties with an independent claim, are considered parties to the disputed legal relationship and its subjects, but they do not have all the procedural rights that the parties have. Not all subjects in the process may have the same rights and responsibilities, but this does not mean that those with limited rights and responsibilities should not be considered participants in this relationship. The fact that these persons participate in the process with certain rights and responsibilities itself means that they are participants in this process (Kobakhidze, 2003).

Georgia

According to the Supreme Court of Georgia, parties without an independent claim have no independent claim or liability about the subject matter of the dispute. As a result, such persons cannot be "directly" affected by the court decision. These are persons whose rights and obligations to one of the parties may be further influenced by a court decision. However, the probable impact that their decision may have on their rights and duties is not equal in its legal content to the impact implied in the term "directly related" to Article 422.1 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia. That is why third parties without an independent claim have limited access to the parties' procedural rights. They have no right to increase or reduce the amount of the claim, change the grounds or the subject of the claim, acknowledge the claim, renounce the claim or settle on the claim amicably, file a counterclaim, and request enforcement of a court decision (Article 91 of Civil Procedure Code of Georgia). In addition, they have no right to appeal court decisions on appeal or cassation. They have the right to be involved in the case on their initiative or that of any party but are not a mandatory participant in the process. The issue of admission of a third party in the case is decided by the court taking into account the opinions of the parties. However, the court may not involve the mentioned persons in the case based on its initiative (DSCG- სბ-687-687-2018; 20/07/2018).

According to the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia, a third party without an independent claim is deprived of the opportunity to appeal a court decision, and under the same Code, he or she has the right to appeal against judgments rendered in the course of proceedings. The right to appeal to a court is not theoretical and not only ensures the recognition of the right through a final decision but also contains a legitimate expectation that the decision will be enforced (DSCG - სბ-256-256-2018; 18/07/2018). By filing a complaint, the said person can also take such action that will ultimately prevent the execution of the decision. For example, by appealing against the provisional measures the court should revoke that measure.

A third party without an independent claim has no right to appeal the decision to which the Supreme Court makes such an explanation. It is noteworthy that the LEPL Revenue Service requested to involve itself as the third party without independent request (it has not filed a claim on the subject matter of the dispute and has not filed a lawsuit against one or both parties under Article 88.1 of the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia). Even if his motion were satisfied, the LEPL Revenue Service would still not be able to file an appeal petition, as this type of the third party is not considered a subject of Article 364 of the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia (DSCG - სბ-949-899-2015; 23/10/2015).

The third party, who does not have the authority to appeal the decision, does not participate in the case with material and legal burdens and conditions as he/she mainly has procedural-legal burden. However, to establish the truth of the case, it is necessary to establish material-legal issues, for which purpose the Chamber of Cassation, taking into account the legal analysis. This explains that all registered co-owners of the land, in this case, the third party without an independent claim and the issue of the involvement of the defendant in the case of G.G, is primarily related to the clarification of material-legal issues (DSCG - სბ-1234-1175-2014; 23/02/2015).

United States of America

According to FRCP 24(a)(2), the law protects third parties not initially named in a lawsuit. It permits intervention when a nonparty "claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest." Provided that the existing parties do not already adequately represent that interest, intervenors may join the litigation and enjoy near-equal standing with the original parties. They may "participate in discovery, file motions and other papers, introduce direct testimony, conduct cross-examination at trial, and appeal adverse substantive determinations" (Villanueva, 2011).

Japan

According to the Civil Procedure Code of Japan, when characterizing the procedural rights of third parties without an independent claim, it should be noted that the engagement of a third party in the proceedings does not create the status of a party for them, which is why their rights and the rights of the party do not coincide. Third parties engaged in the proceeding may not change the party on whose side they are engaged. However, a third party without an independent claim who is engaged in the proceedings on the side of the plaintiff or the defendant is also recognized by the law as their actions are independent of the party. The third party engaged in the case acts independently in the field of his rights. Procedural actions are not related to the will of the party. It carries out this or that act independently and can request their implementation even when the party does not request it (for example, requesting the interrogation of witnesses, etc.). Therefore, this is unlike the Japanese civil process which stipulates that the third-party proceedings cannot take effect if they contradict the actions taken by the party on whose side they are engaged (Code of Civil Procedure of Japan, 1996).

Appeal a Court Decision by a Third Party without an Independent Claim

Both parties of the proceedings and the third parties with an independent claim are entitled to appeal the ruling of the court regarding the institution of provisional measures (kazhashvili, 2018). Due to the fact that a complaint subject to a time limit is a means of defense, and third parties without an independent claim participate in the proceedings, in that case, they should be legally equated with the parties of the proceedings and with the third parties with an independent claim which is similar to German civil procedure law. The Civil Procedure Code of the Federal Republic of Germany does not directly indicate who has the right to file a complaint subject to a time limit against a ruling, but it is implied that this right is enjoyed by third parties both with and without an independent claim. Nonetheless, the third parties, without an independent claim, use all means of judicial protection at all stages of the proceedings and, in effect, carry out all the procedural actions taken by the parties. They are the procedural accomplices of the party (Davtyan, 2000). Thus, a ruling which does not substantially decide the fate of the case can be appealed by a third party without an independent claim in the prescribed manner.

On the one hand, there are legally independent procedural relations in the case of procedural accomplices. On the other hand, the procedural accomplices may have an interest in assisting the other litigant, if necessary, the litigant in his litigation relationship with the other litigant (Hagenlokhi et al., 2020). If we essentially consider every action taken by a third party, which helps them to resolve a dispute, it is directly related to his rights or

responsibilities. Concerning it, a recourse right may then arise for one of the parties.

Appeals against court decisions are governed differently. This is because a third party without an independent claim is not the subject of the substantive legal relationship of the lawsuit (Treushnikova, 2007). It follows from the fact that the court has no right to reside anything to him or charge them to take any action or refrain from action. According to the construction of the Supreme Court of Georgia, for Article 89 of the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia, the existence of a subjective interest alone is not enough to consider the person as an interested person. Such a person will be considered among those whose rights and responsibilities will be affected by the court decision (DSCG - სს-949-899-2015; 23.10.2015). According to the procedural law, there can be no third party without an independent claim, a party directly affected by the decision, although this is not the case in practice. A third party who participates on the side of one of the parties without an independent claim will be reasonable if he or she will have the right to appeal the decision. His participation is formally perceived as help to a party to the proceedings and the third party himself as a helper. However, in terms of content, he is responsible for himself and takes action to avoid future obligations. The decision may affect his rights and obligations towards other persons and the right of recourse from him may be acquired by one of the parties. The engagement of a third party in the case without an independent claim serves as the basis for escape and release from the above. The position that the third parties are involved in the case on their initiative or the initiative of the parties exactly fits the principle of competition because the judge makes the decision based on the views of the parties.

When considering the right to appeal the decision, the amendments made to the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia at different times should be taken into account. In particular, as it is known, the Code of Civil Procedure came into force on May 15, 1999. It was adopted on November 14, 1997. According to Articles 364 and 391 of the original wording of the Code, parties and third parties had the right to file an appeal and a cassation appeal. That is, a general reference to a third party in these norms meant both types of third parties. However, two days before the entry into force of the Code, on 13 May 1999, it was amended and Articles 364 and 391 were formulated as they stand today. The current regulation, according to which third parties without an independent claim have no right to appeal the decision under the law (despite the above legal practice), is incorrect; it is practically unjustified and leads to the violation of the rights of such persons. Citing a practical example will make clear the shortcomings of the existing rule. In particular, the victim was harmed by an increased source of danger. In such a case, the person responsible for the damage is the owner of the source of increased danger, and

the person who directly caused the damage will be engaged as a third party on the side of the defendant in the case. However, the defendant may not be interested in the successful completion of the case. If anything is imposed on him, he will get it from the defendant by a recourse suit. At this time, the victim may have the intention that the defendant will not be held accountable, as the court will even make a mistake and wrongly impose damages on the defendant. It turns out that if the defendant does not appeal the decision, neither can the third party appeal, and on a recourse claim, he/she will be stripped of rights as the decision on the claim for damages will have a predetermined force on the recourse claim for the ongoing case (Kharitonashvili, 2017).

Conclusion

The participants in the civil proceedings are the judge and the parties of the proceedings. The parties are the plaintiff, the defendant, and the third parties. Third parties are divided into the third party with an independent claim and without an independent claim.

A third party without an independent claim does not enjoy the same amount of rights as a third party with an independent claim. According to the Code of Civil Procedure, the decision on the case may not be directly relevant to the above.

A third party who does not have an independent claim may not be engaged in the proceedings at the initiative of the court. A motion in this regard must be filed by one of the parties or this person himself must apply to the court. An important ground for engagement in legal proceedings is a legal interest which connects the third party to the claim, and which in turn indicates a material-legal connection of the third party with the case.

Giving more preference to a third party without an independent claim will further simplify litigation. There are several countries where these third parties enjoy the same rights as third parties with independent claims. This data is mainly typical for Anglo-Saxon countries. However, it is convenient in terms of practicality and is tailored to the parties. What puts the parties in a favorable position must be established in the legal process.

The number of rights of the third party without an independent claim should be refined and detailed. It would be better to make a direct reservation on the right of third parties without an independent claim to appeal a court decision. According to Articles 364 and 391 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court decision can be appealed in the court of appeal or the Supreme Court of Georgia by the parties and the third parties with an independent claim within the time limit prescribed by law. It is advisable to grant a third party without an independent claim the right to appeal the decisions, and Articles 364 and 391 shall be formulated in such a way as to equip entirely third parties with

the right to appeal the decision. It is true that without an independent claim, third parties are not participants of the material relationship in the original case where they are only engaged as a third party but are participants in the litigation. The above change will give such a third party a full opportunity to protect himself from the future negative consequences caused by the decision made in the case. There are several countries where third parties enjoy this right. The above norm defines the circle of subjects who have the real right to file a claim and they include all persons whose rights are affected by the ongoing dispute in court.

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Perturbation des fréquentations touristiques et crises au Mali de 1990 à 2020 : insécurité et risque sanitaire Covid-19

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[Doi:10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p141](https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p141)

Submitted: 13 May 2022

Accepted: 10 June 2022

Published: 30 June 2022

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Cite As:

Tessougue M.D.M. (2022). *Perturbation des fréquentations touristiques et crises au Mali de 1990 à 2020 : insécurité et risque sanitaire Covid-19*. European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 18 (20), 141. <https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p141>

Résumé

Cette étude, observe les perturbations des flux touristiques au Mali de 1990 à 2020. Le Mali est un pays politiquement agité et soumis à une crise sécuritaire sans précédent depuis 2012. La crise de la pandémie de la COVID 19 depuis décembre 2019, s'y est ajoutée. Il en résulte que les activités touristiques sont gelées. Les flux touristiques internationaux, tarissent pour la destination « Mali ». L'objectif de cet article vise à analyser les régressions de fréquentations touristiques dans les bases de données statistiques du Mali de 1990 à 2020, suite aux crises sécuritaires et risque sanitaire de la COVID-19. La méthodologie, en plus des recherches bibliographiques, s'appuie essentiellement sur la compilation et l'analyse des données annuelles des statistiques touristiques du Mali. Grâce, au logiciel « Excel », certains indicateurs ont été appréciés de 1990 à 2020. Il s'agit de : la variation annuelle des arrivées et des nuitées, l'évolution du parc hôtelier et de la capacité d'hébergement en nombre de chambres, la variation du taux d'occupation (TO) et de la durée moyenne de séjours (DMS) et enfin du classement du top 5 des pays émetteurs de touristes en direction du Mali. Les résultats révèlent que les arrivées et les nuitées ont évolué respectivement, a une raison annuelle de 8,36% et de 8,32% de 1990 à 2008. Cependant de 2008 à 2020, les arrivées régressent annuellement de 19,56% et les nuitées baissent annuellement de 20,37%. Certes le parc hôtelier et le nombre de chambres augmentent régulièrement et respectivement de 9,37% et de 7,57% de 1990 à 2020. C'est aussi durant cette période que le taux d'occupation (TO) se chiffre en moyenne

à 13,66% et la durée moyenne de séjours (DMS), s'établit à 2 jours. De 1990 à 2020, la France avec une part de marché de 40%, demeure le principal pays émetteur de visiteurs internationaux au Mali.

Mots clés : Statistiques touristiques, évolution, crise, insécurité, COVID 19, Mali

Disruption of Tourist Visits and Crises in Mali From 1990 to 2020: Insecurity and Health Risk of Covid-19

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Abstract

This study observes the disruption of tourist flows in Mali from 1990 to 2020. Mali is a politically turbulent country and subject to an unprecedented security crisis since 2012. The crisis of the COVID 19 pandemic since December 2019, is added. As a result, tourism activities are frozen. International tourist flows are drying up for the destination "Mali". The objective of this article aims to analyze the regressions of tourist visits in the statistical databases of Mali from 1990 to 2020, following the security crises and health risk of COVID-19. The methodology, in addition to bibliographical research, is essentially based on the compilation and analysis of annual data from Mali's tourism statistics. Thanks to the "Excel" software, certain indicators were assessed from 1990 to 2020. These are: the annual variation in arrivals and overnight stays, the evolution of the hotel stock and the accommodation capacity in number of rooms, the variation in the occupancy rate (TO) and the average length of stay (DMS) and finally the ranking of the top 5 countries sending tourists to Mali. The results reveal that arrivals and overnight stays have evolved respectively at an annual rate of 8.36% and 8.32% from 1990 to 2008. However, from 2008 to 2020, arrivals decline annually by 19.56% and overnight stays fall by 20.37% annually. Admittedly, the hotel stock and the number of rooms increase regularly and respectively by 9.37% and 7.57% from 1990 to 2020. It is also during this period that the occupancy rate (TO) amounts on average to 13.66% and the average length of stay (DMS) is 2 days. From 1990 to 2020, France with a market share of 40%, remains the main source of international visitors to Mali.

Keywords: Tourism statistics, evolution, crisis, insecurity, COVID 19, Mali

Introduction

L'Organisation Mondiale du Tourisme en 2007, définit, le tourisme comme : « Un phénomène social, culturel et économique qui implique le déplacement de personnes vers des pays ou des endroits situés en dehors de leur environnement habituel à des fins personnelles ou professionnelles ou pour affaires. Ces personnes sont appelées des visiteurs (et peuvent être des touristes ou des excursionnistes, des résidents ou des non-résidents) et le tourisme se rapporte à leurs activités, qui supposent pour certaines des dépenses touristiques. » (Chaire du Tourisme Transat, 2012, p. 19). « La statistique ne comptant comme touristes que ceux qui passent au moins une nuit à l'extérieur, la nuitée est devenue la base du comptage officiel » (T. Hobbes, 2017, p. 21).

La complexité du tourisme tient au fait que, contrairement à d'autres branches de l'activité économique, plus circonscrites, il est un résultat hétérogène de plusieurs activités. Tout comme il peut être la cause première des activités économiques connexes ou voire même être une cause subséquente à d'autres activités économiques situées en amont. La Chaire du tourisme Transat, (2012, p. 5), accepte que : « Le tourisme a pour objet une production et une consommation de biens et de services hétérogènes qui concourent à la satisfaction des besoins de touristes et de non-touristes (produits alimentaires, vêtements, transports, hébergements, loisirs, etc.) ».

Que ce soit pour produire une politique touristique, gérer son entreprise au quotidien, assurer la promotion d'une destination ou rendre compte des impacts du tourisme sur son milieu, l'utilisation de données pertinentes permet de mieux prévoir, planifier, intervenir et mesurer les résultats (Chaire du Tourisme Transat, 2012, p. 6).

Pour allouer les bons efforts de promotion ou d'investissement aux bonnes activités ou pour établir un retour d'expérience efficace, il est donc essentiel de disposer des statistiques les plus fiables et les plus pertinentes que possible à des échelles adaptées de temps (saison, journée, voire quart d'heure pour certains événements) ou d'espace (de la région au quartier d'une ville) (O. Ondet, 2015, p. 78).

L'une des motivations les plus fortes pour la production de données et d'informations tient à l'utilité qu'elles présentent pour la prise de décisions fondées sur l'analyse des faits. Pour être pertinentes, les statistiques doivent répondre à une ou plusieurs des caractéristiques suivantes : avoir de nombreux utilisateurs ; être essentielles à l'accomplissement de la mission de plusieurs organisations ; favoriser le commerce ou le développement ; provoquer des réactions sur les marchés au moment de leur publication ; et créer des inégalités ou une asymétrie de l'information lorsqu'elles ne sont pas disponibles (Nations Unies, 2018, p.7).

Compte tenu des services hétérogènes que le secteur touristique produit pour satisfaire une clientèle venue de plusieurs pays et continents, il va sans dire que tout évènement géopolitique, géoéconomique, géostratégique qui naît en un point de la planète impacte favorablement ou défavorablement, l'essor du tourisme en cette période de mondialisation. En cela, le Mali ne peut nullement faire exception. Cependant, le Mali après avoir vécu une rébellion en 1963-1964 a de la peine à maîtriser les rebellions récurrentes depuis 1990 qui s'amplifient avec l'expansion des groupes armés terroristes et islamiques dans les régions Nord du pays.

En début 2012, le Mali a connu la crise sécuritaire la plus grave depuis son accession à la souveraineté internationale ; il s'agit de l'occupation des régions du Nord par des groupes indépendantistes, djihadistes et terroristes. « Début 2012, le retour de centaines de Touareg armés de Libye précipite l'éclatement d'une rébellion. Iyad Ag Ghali et d'autres notables Ifogha fondent alors Ansar ed-Dine, qui fait cause commune avec al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique (Aqmi) et récupère la majeure partie des combattants des rebelles indépendantistes » (W. Lacher, 2019, p. 24). En fin 2012, ces groupes se sont emparés de plus de la moitié du territoire national. Cet état de fait désaxe l'activité touristique anéantissant du coup toutes les politiques et stratégies de développement touristique, entreprises depuis des années par les plus hautes autorités du pays.

Le Mali, n'a toujours pas retrouvé d'accalmie politique car la crise sécuritaire censée être anéantie par l'intervention des forces françaises et onusiennes depuis 2013 et 2014 ne fait que s'enliser. C'est ainsi que le 18 août 2020, un groupe d'officiers supérieurs, sous la direction du Colonel Assimi GOITA, renverse le président élu en 2013 M. Ibrahim Boubacar KEITA.

En plus de l'insécurité, le Mali à l'image des autres pays du monde est fortement affecté à partir de 2020 par la pandémie de la COVID-19. En mai 2020, l'OMT fait le triste constat que 75% des destinations mondiales avaient complètement fermé leurs frontières, ce qui avait mené à un arrêt total du tourisme international. Dans la région africaine, ce pic s'observait un mois après, soit en juin 2020, lorsque 85% des destinations avaient complètement fermé leurs frontières aux touristes internationaux. Des différences considérables s'observent dans le continent africain au niveau sous régional. Dans l'Afrique de l'Ouest, auquel appartient le Mali, dès le 1er juin 2021, 56% des destinations avaient complètement barricadé leurs frontières, alors que la moyenne dans tout le continent africain avait atteint 19% (OMT, 2021, p. 10). Cette étude s'interroge sur : comment les crises sécuritaires et risque sanitaire de la COVID 19 ont-elles impacté sur les fréquentations touristiques du Mali de 1990 à 2020 ?

L'objectif de cet article vise à analyser les régressions des fréquentations touristiques au Mali de 1990 à 2020, suite aux crises sécuritaire et risque sanitaire de la COVID 19.

L'hypothèse, stipule que sans ces crises (insécurité et COVID-19), la destination malienne pourrait compter en 2020, un flux touristique se chiffrant à plus de 600 000 arrivées.

1. Methodologie

1.1. Collecte et traitement des données

Il a été procédé à la compilation des statistiques annuelles fournies par l'Administration Nationale du Tourisme au Mali de 1990 à 2020. Parmi ces données disponibles, le privilège a été accordé aux statistiques des fréquentations touristiques dans les différents établissements d'hébergement, assimilés aux hôtels. « Les hôtels comprennent les hôtels, aпарthôtels, motels, relais pour routiers, hôtels situés sur la plage, clubs où l'on peut résider et établissements analogues avec services hôteliers plus complets que la préparation du lit de chaque jour et le nettoyage des installations sanitaires et de la chambre » (OMT, 2000, p. 24). Ainsi, pour cette recherche, le choix a porté sur certains indicateurs : flux des arrivées et des nuitées, évolution du parc hôtelier, taux d'occupation hôtelier, durée moyenne de séjour et enfin classement des tops 5 des marchés émetteurs ; sont ici exposés pour apprécier la distorsion des séries statistiques suite aux crises sécuritaire et sanitaire de la COVID 19. Les données de base des statistiques touristiques ont été analysées grâce au logiciel « Excel » pour quantifier les différents indicateurs ci-dessus cités.

❖ Flux des arrivées et nuitées

Le traitement des flux des arrivées et nuitées, passe par l'appréciation de leur évolution annuelle de 1990 à 2020. La formule utilisée à cet effet est : *Taux d'évolution des arrivées ou des nuitées = ((P_n/P_{n-1})-1)*100*. P_n, signifie l'effectif de l'année en cours ; P_{n-1} représente l'effectif de l'année précédente ; 1 équivaut à la constante ; *100 pour exprimer la proportion en pourcentage.

Les calculs des flux moyens ont été opérés en divisant le nombre total des arrivées ou nuitées par le nombre total des années de la période de l'observation soit 31 ans de 1990 à 2020.

La raison de progression ou de régression des effectifs en différentes périodes au sein de la série statistique a été calculée par la formule suivante, énoncée par M. TOM, (2017, p. 15) :

$$r = ((l_n(P_n/P_o))/(T2-T1)).$$

Dans cette formule : I_n = logarithme népérien ; P_n = Effectif en dernier temps ; P_0 = Effectif au premier temps ; T_2 = Dernier temps ; T_1 = Premier temps.

Pour effectuer les projections des arrivées et des nuitées, la formule utilisée est :

$$P_n = P_0 (1+r)^n.$$

Pour cette formule : P_n représente le nombre des arrivées en temps futur (n) ; P_0 désigne le nombre initial des arrivées ; 1 représente la constante ; r équivaut à la raison et n le nombre d'écart en années entre le temps 2 et le temps 1.

Le concept fondamental dans la classification des visiteurs internationaux par lieu d'origine est le pays de résidence et non la nationalité. Les étrangers résidents dans un pays sont assimilés aux autres résidents dans les statistiques du tourisme émetteur. Les ressortissants d'un pays résidents à l'étranger qui reviennent dans leur propre pays, pour une visite temporaire, sont considérés comme des visiteurs non-résidents, bien qu'il puisse être utile de les compter à part dans certaines étude (OMT, 2000, p. 10).

Les flux touristiques sont l'outil de mesure privilégié par l'Organisation mondiale du tourisme (OMT) pour comparer et classer les destinations quant à leur popularité et à leur capacité d'attirer les visiteurs (Chaire du Tourisme Transat, 2012, p. 7). Cela d'autant plus que les comptes satellites du tourisme sont peu répandus.

❖ Évolution du parc hôtelier

L'évolution du parc hôtelier est un indicateur associé à l'offre touristique d'une destination. Son essor, détermine l'aisance et la qualité des services d'hébergement de la destination d'accueil. « La place de premier plan qu'occupent les services d'hébergement commercial s'explique de diverses façons. Lieu où cette clientèle nomade se sédentarise le temps d'un séjour, l'hébergement commercial est le seul service qui rejoint presque exclusivement une clientèle touristique » (Chaire du Tourisme Transat, 2012, p. 50).

❖ Taux d'occupation hôtelier et durée moyenne de séjour

Le taux d'occupation hôtelier et la durée moyenne de séjour sont des indicateurs pour déterminer l'intensité de la visite touristique dans une destination. Ils permettent d'apprécier la demande.

Le taux d'occupation annuel est calculé par la formule suivante :

$$TO = ((NV/NP)*100).$$

Dans cette formule TO représente le Taux d'Occupation ; NV veut dire nombre de Nuitées Vendues et NP équivaut au nombre de Nuitées Possibles ; *100 permet de rendre la proportion en pourcentage.

En ce qui concerne du calcul de la Durée Moyenne de Séjour (DMS), la formule est :

$$DMS = (N/A).$$

Ainsi N représente le nombre total des nuitées et A le nombre total des arrivées. Plus le quotient est important plus le séjour touristique est long.

La durée du séjour ou du voyage est une donnée statistique d'une grande importance car, d'une part, elle est la mesure la plus significative du volume du tourisme en tout genre et, d'autre part, elle intervient également dans la définition du visiteur pour fixer la limite maximale au-delà de laquelle la visite cesse d'être touristique (limite d'un an), ainsi que pour faire la distinction entre un touriste et un visiteur de la journée (excursionniste) (OMT, 2000, p. 17).

❖ Classement annuel des tops 5 des marchés émetteurs

Il s'agit de constater parmi les arrivées des touristes internationaux l'effectif dominant par pays émetteur vers le Mali. Le résultat est de pouvoir effectuer un classement ordinal en se servant des valeurs cardinales des effectifs, allant des plus forts effectifs vers les plus faibles effectifs. Cela nous permet d'apprécier pour chaque année et pour l'ensemble de la série, la provenance des touristes majoritaires suivant leur pays de résidence.


« Pour le tourisme récepteur, il est essentiel de classer les visiteurs par pays de résidence plutôt que par pays de nationalité. C'est dans le pays de résidence où l'on prend la décision de voyager et là où le voyage commence. La détermination du pays de résidence permet d'identifier les visiteurs qui rentrent dans leur pays de résidence et qui doivent, par conséquent, être exclus de la mesure de tourisme récepteur. » (OMT, 2000, p. 19).

1.2. Recherches bibliographiques

Elles se sont déroulées dans les différentes bibliothèques de Bamako durant le mois de Février 2022. Les ouvrages consultés traitent sur l'histoire politique et les objectifs de développement du Mali. En plus des documents physiques, il a été fait recours à internet pour télécharger et consulter des documents numériques qui s'appesantissent sur les statistiques générales et particulièrement sur l'analyse des données touristiques.

1.3. Description de la zone d'étude

Situé au cœur de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, la république du Mali couvre 1241238 Km². Espace de jonction entre le Maghreb et l'Afrique Subsaharienne, le Mali est frontalier à 7 États dont l'Algérie au Nord, le Niger et le Burkina Faso respectivement à l'Est et au Sud-Est, la Côte d'Ivoire au Sud, la Guinée au Sud-ouest, le Sénégal et la Mauritanie à l'Ouest (Carte 1).



Carte 1 : Situation géographique du Mali

Sur le plan climatique, le Mali, en zone intertropicale connaît 2 grandes saisons. Une saison sèche longue allant de Novembre à Mai et une saison pluvieuse ou hivernage, courte de Juin à Octobre. Les principales zones climatiques du Mali du Sud au Nord sont : la zone soudanienne, la zone sahélienne et la zone désertique. L'hydrographie du Mali est dominée par les 2 plus grands fleuves de l'Afrique de l'Ouest qui prennent leur source en Guinée dans le Fouta-Djallon. Sur un parcours de 4200 Km, le Niger arrose le Mali sur 1780 km, soit environ 42,4% de sa longueur totale. Quant au fleuve Sénégal, sur une longueur totale d'environ 1800 Km, il effectue plus de la moitié de son parcours au Mali (INSTAT, 2015, p. 9).

D'après les résultats du dernier Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat (RGPH 2009), le Mali comptait 14,5 millions d'habitants en 2009. Avec un taux d'accroissement démographique annuel de l'ordre de 3,6 %, cette population est estimée à 18,9 millions d'habitants en 2017 (République du Mali, 2018, p. 16). L'économie malienne est dominée par le secteur agricole. Les industries et les activités économiques de services sont minoritaires. Parmi les activités à faible apport dans l'économie nationale

figure le tourisme qui représente moins de 5% du Produit Intérieur Brut (PIB) en 2021. Cette part du tourisme pouvait s'améliorer sans la survenue des crises successives et combinées, liées à la sécurité et à la pandémie de la COVID 19. Notons tout de même que le Mali dispose de nombreux attraits touristiques dont certains classés sur la Liste du patrimoine mondial. On peut citer au titre des biens culturels et mixtes inscrits au patrimoine mondial de l'UNESCO : les villes de Tombouctou et Djenné (1988), les falaises de Bandiagara (1989), le tombeau des Askia (2004) et l'instrument de musique M'bolon (2021). Comme événements culturels maliens, retenus sur la Liste du patrimoine mondial, on peut citer : les fêtes liées à la traversée des bœufs du Yaaral et Degal (2005), les festivités liées à la pêche collective de San ou Sankémon (2009), les cérémonies festives de la réfection septennale de la case sacrée de Kangaba (2009), la charte de Kouroukanfougan (2009), la société secrète des Korodugaw (2011), les airs du balafon (2012) et enfin les airs du violon touareg « Imzad » (2013).


2. Resultats

2.1. Évolution des arrivées et des nuitées

2.1.1. Effectifs et évolutions annuelles des arrivées de 1990 à 2020

Le nombre total de touristes est de 2 991 663 de 1990 à 2020, soit une moyenne de 96 504,3 arrivées par an. Le nombre le plus élevé des arrivées se situe en 2008 avec une valeur de 234 490. Le plus faible nombre d'arrivées des touristes, se passe en 2020 avec seulement 22 538 arrivées (Graphique 1). La série a une étendue de 211 952.

La remarque de cette série est la forme ascendante des histogrammes des arrivées de 1990 à 2018. De 2018 à 2020, l'allure de la courbe est descendante avec une chute vertigineuse de -75,95% de 2011 à 2012 (Graphique 1).




Graphique 1 : Histogramme de l'évolution des arrivées des touristes au Mali de 1990 à 2020

Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

L'allure descendante des histogrammes entre 2018 à 2020, s'explique par :


- La crise économique mondiale 2008 qui a contraint de nombreux touristes à annuler leurs voyages au Mali ;
- L'aggravation de la rébellion au Nord du Mali qui établit une grande césure entre les histogrammes de 2011 et de 2012 avec l'expansion de l'insécurité. En fait, les enlèvements et les assassinats des touristes occidentaux étaient devenus monnaie courante avec le groupe Al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI). C'est dans ce contexte que le Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) devient de plus en plus actif à partir de 2010. En 2012, le MNLA et le groupe Ansar ed-Dine proche d'AQMI, font front commun contre l'armée nationale.
- Pleinement impliqué à partir de 2008 dans une crise financière internationale et dans l'insécurité en zone sahélienne, le Mali doit faire face à la crise de la pandémie de la COVID 19 à partir de 2020.

En ce qui concerne le taux d'évolution, il est très variable de 1990 à 2020. L'évolution annuelle, la plus forte a eu lieu entre 2012 et 2013 avec un taux de 58,6%. Le taux d'évolution annuel le plus faible est de -75,95%, il se situe de 2011 à 2012 (Graphique 2).



Graphique 2 : Courbe d'évolution annuelle des arrivées des touristes au Mali de 1990 à 2020
 Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

La courbe de l'écart à la moyenne nous permet de mieux apprécier, les années ayant des faibles effectifs et ceux ayant des forts effectifs des arrivées entre 1990 et 2020. Il est clair que les arrivées des touristes au Mali de 1990 à 2001 sont demeurées embryonnaires en dessous de la moyenne annuelle. Le flux touristique des arrivées a été important de 2002 à 2011, avec un pic en 2008. De nouveau entre 2012 et 2020, la courbe des arrivées baisse en dessous de la moyenne suite à l'insécurité dans la zone sahélienne et surtout avec la pandémie de la COVID 19 en 2020 (Graphique 3).



Graphique 3 : Écart à la moyenne des arrivées des touristes au Mali de 1990 à 2020
 Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

2.1.2. Projections des arrivées de touristes au Mali de 2008 à 2020 en dehors des crises

Le taux d'évolution des arrivées de 1990 à 2020, s'est effectué avec une raison annuelle de -2,80%. Les arrivées des touristes ont connu une croissance régulière de 1990 à 2008 en 18 ans avec une raison de 8,36% par an. De 2008 à 2020, en 12 ans, le nombre des arrivées des touristes, évolue avec une raison annuelle de -19,52%. Toute chose qui permet de constater la réduction des effectifs des arrivées de façon drastique de 2008 à 2020 (Graphiques 1 et 2). Cependant, en gardant la raison régulière de 8,36% par an entre 2008 et 2020, comme si, la crise économique mondiale 2008 n'était pas survenue, en plus si les crises liées à la sécurité au Sahel ne s'étaient pas empirées dès 2012 et si la pandémie de la COVID 19 n'avait pas apparu en 2020 au Mali, les arrivées des touristes au Mali seraient de 614 503 en 2020 (Tableaux 1 et 2). Ainsi en faisant la différence entre les vrais chiffres enregistrés avec ceux des estimations on se rend compte du grand écart de l'effectif des touristes pour chaque année. Il reste bien entendu que les écarts sont très importants entre 2012 et 2020. Les écarts, sont de 276 437 en 2012 et atteignent le chiffre de 592 005 en 2020. De 2008 à 2020 en 13 ans le Mali aurait perdu au total environ 3 887 179 touristes soit en moyenne 299 014 touristes par an (Tableau 1 et 2).

Tableau 1 : Projections des arrivées annuelles des touristes de 2008 à 2014

Années	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
r	0,0836	0,0836	0,0836	0,0836	0,0836	0,0836	0,0836
1+r	1,0836	1,0836	1,0836	1,0836	1,0836	1,0836	1,0836
Estimation E	234490	254093,36	275335,57	298353,62	323295,99	350323,53	379610,58
Réel R	234490	204006	205124	194868	46859	74315	75986
Différence (R-E)	0	-50087,36	-70211,57	-103485,62	-276436,98	-276008,53	-303624,57

Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

Tableau 2 : Projections des arrivées annuelles des touristes de 2014 à 2020

Années	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
r	0,0836	0,0836	0,0836	0,0836	0,0836	0,0836	0,0836
1+r	1,0836	1,0836	1,0836	1,0836	1,0836	1,0836	1,0836
Estimation E	411346,02	445734,55	482997,96	523376,59	567130,87	614543,01	411346,02
Réel R	35920	67501	34660	38656	38530	22538	35920
Différence (R-E)	-375426,02	-378233,55	-448337,96	-484720,58	-528600,87	-592005,01	-375426,02

Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

Une enquête menée par B. Doumbia en 2008 (p. 23), pour le compte de la Banque Mondiale et de l'Office Malien du Tourisme et de l'Hôtellerie (OMATHO), estime que durant son séjour au Mali, un touriste dépense en moyenne 862 985 FCFA (1 316 €). Ainsi nous pouvons estimer les pertes annuelles éventuelles que le secteur du tourisme a subi suite au développement de la crise économique mondiale, de la crise sécuritaire au Sahel et de la crise du COVID 19 au Mali. Les pertes estimées deviennent de plus en plus importantes de 2009 à 2020. De 43 224 643 822 FCFA (65 891 225 €) en 2009, les pertes atteignent 510 891 434 925 FCFA (778 797 919 €) en 2020). Les pertes totales de 2008 à 2020 sont estimées à 3 354 576 786 323 FCFA (4 027 491 796 €) soit en moyenne 258 044 368 179 FCFA (393 360 317 €) par an (Tableaux 3 et 4).

Tableau 3 : Estimations des pertes de revenus avec la baisse des arrivées des touristes de 2008 à 2014

Années	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Différence (R-E)	0	-50087,36	-70211,57	-103485,62	-276437	-276008,53	-303624,60
Pertes FCFA	0	43224643822	60591531046	89306540365	238559258475	238191626865	262023820625

Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

Tableau 4 : Estimations des pertes de revenus avec la baisse des arrivées des touristes de 2014 à 2020

Années	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Différence (R-E)	-375426,02	-378233,55	-448337,96	-484720,59	-528600,87	-592005,01
Pertes FCFA	323987006610	-326410268490	386908968930	418306952185	456174733985	510891434925


Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

2.1.3. Variations annuelles du nombre des nuitées de 1990 à 2020

La variation du nombre des nuitées de 1990 à 2020 est bien remarquable en deux grandes tendances à l'image des arrivées. Ainsi de 1990 à 2018, le nombre de nuitées, a une tendance générale croissante même si on remarque des légers creux entre 1990 et 1991 puis entre 1992 et 1993. Ces creux évoquent la période tumultueuse du début de la rébellion au Nord du Mali animée par le Mouvement Populaire de l'Azawad (MPA) en 1990. A ce mouvement se sont ajoutés les troubles politiques de 1991 quand le peuple malien aspire au multipartisme et à la démocratie. Sur le plan international survient la guerre du golfe quand l'Irak a envahi le Koweït. Toutes ces crises ont abouti au ralentissement du flux touristique et des nuitées touristiques au Mali (Graphique 4). De 1990 à 2008, la raison de croissance des nuitées est de


8,32%. Tandis que de 2008 à 2020, les nuitées évoluent avec une raison de -20,37% par an. Ainsi, la courbe épouse une allure descendante de 2008 à 2020 (Graphique 4). Les principales crises qui ont secoué et qui secouent toujours le secteur touristique au Mali sont : la crise économique mondiale de 2008, l'accroissement de l'insécurité dans la bande sahélienne depuis 2012 et la survenue de la pandémie de la COVID 19 en 2020. Finalement, on s'aperçoit que de 1990 à 2020, les effectifs des nuitées ont connu une régression annuelle de 3,15%.

Tout compte fait de 1990 à 2020, les touristes ont consommé au total 5 997 482 nuitées soit en moyenne 193 467 nuitées par an. De 1990 à 2020, l'année 2008 a fourni le plus grand nombre de nuitées avec 515 050 et le plus faible nombre de nuitées consommées est enregistré en 2020 avec un total annuel de 44 686. L'observation de la série statistique des nuitées de 1990 à 2020, révèle qu'elle a une étendue de 470 364 (Graphique 4).




Graphique 4 : Histogramme de l'évolution des nuitées des touristes au Mali de 1990 à 2020
Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

La courbe d'évolution annuelle des nuitées est très instable de 1990 à 2020. Cette instabilité de la courbe d'évolution annuelle est même devenue très instable depuis 2012. Le fossé est bien remarquable de 2011 à 2012 avec une baisse de 75,54%. Et brusquement on enregistre une croissance de 62,4% entre 2012 et 2013 et de 76,18% entre 2015 et 2016. Les variations annuelles demeurent basses depuis 2018 (Graphique 5).



Graphique 5 : Courbe d'évolution annuelle des nuitées des touristes au Mali de 1990 à 2020
Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

Le diagramme des barres verticales de l'écart à la moyenne des nuitées annuelles de 1990 à 2020, présente 2 grandes allures. Il s'agit des années inférieures à la moyenne au début du graphique de 1990 à 2001 et en fin de graphique couvrant la période de 2012 à 2020. Ainsi en 31 ans de données on découvre que pendant 21 ans, les nuitées enregistrées sont inférieures à la moyenne annuelle. Les années où le nombre des nuitées est supérieur à la moyenne, vont de 2002 à 2011, soit 10 ans. Il convient de noter que le déclin des activités touristiques que ce soit au niveau des arrivées ou des nuitées, est matérialisé par l'année 2002 quand le Mali a accueilli l'organisation de la Coupe d'Afrique des Nations (CAN) de football (Graphique 6).




Graphique 6 : Écart à la moyenne des nuitées des touristes au Mali de 1990 à 2020
Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

2.2. Évolution du parc hôtelier, du taux d'occupation et de la durée moyenne de séjour


2.2.1. Évolution des unités d'hébergement et de leurs capacités de 1990 à 2020

Les unités d'hébergement de 53 en 1990 sont au nombre de 832 en 2020. Le parc hôtelier malien, a été ainsi réalisé de 1990 à 2020, avec une moyenne annuelle d'environ 28 hôtels par an. L'effectif des unités hôtelières a connu une croissance régulière de 1990 à 2020, avec une raison de 9,37% par an. L'histogramme d'accroissement du nombre des hôtels de 1990 à 2020, décrit un escalier ascendant (Graphique 7).




Graphique 7 : Accroissement du nombre des unités hôtelières au Mali de 1990 à 2020
 Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

En observant le Graphique 8, on aperçoit que les plus fortes croissances annuelles du nombre des unités hôtelières se situent de 2001 à 2002 avec un chiffre de 62,69% puis de 2006 à 2007 avec une valeur de 42,53%. A partir de 2013, après une régression de 2,43% entre 2012 et 2013 puis de 1,36% de 2018 à 2019, les variations annuelles du parc hôtelier jusqu'en 2020, se situent autour des unités comprises entre 2 à 5% par an. Le nombre des hôtels tend à la stagnation de 2018 à 2020 car le taux annuel d'évolution est de 0,86% (Graphique 8).



Graphique 8 : Courbe d'évolution annuelle des unités hôtelières au Mali de 1990 à 2020
 Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021


Tout comme le nombre des unités hôtelières, les capacités d'hébergement évaluées en nombre de chambres ont aussi évolué de 1990 à 2020 au rythme de 7,57% par an. Le nombre de chambre augmente de façon fulgurante entre 1990 et 2012. De 1164 chambres hôtelières en 1990 on passe à 9905 chambres en 2012, soit un taux d'accroissement annuel de 9,73%. Par contre de 2012 à 2020, la croissance du nombre des chambres s'estompe. D'un effectif de 9905 chambres en 2012 on enregistre le nombre de 11 256 chambres en 2020, soit une croissance annuelle de 1,60% de 2012 à 2020 (Graphique 9).



Graphique 9 : Accroissement du nombre des chambres hôtelières au Mali de 1990 à 2020
Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

Tout au long de la série, les années à fortes croissances en effectif des chambres sont respectivement 2008 (30,51%), 1995 (27,68%) et 2002 (24,01). Toutes ces années sont antérieures à 2012, date d'aggravation de la crise sécuritaire au Sahel et à 2020, marquant la survenue et l'expansion de la pandémie de la COVID 19.


Les plus faibles évolutions du nombre de chambres hôtelières interviennent en 1993 (-6,50%), 1994 (-6,35%), 2013 (-3,65%), 2019 (-1,94%) et 2020 (-0,77%). Ces années sont majoritairement situées en aval immédiat des grandes crises comme celles des années 1990 à 1991 (crise politique et rébellion), ou celle de la crise sécuritaire de 2012 qui a eu des répercussions en 2013. De 2019 à 2020, à la crise sécuritaire s'est ajoutée la pandémie de la COVID 19 (Graphique 10).



Graphique 10 : Évolution annuelle du nombre des chambres hôtelières au Mali de 1990 à 2020

Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

Enfin, il convient de signaler que les unités hôtelières au Mali sont de faibles capacités, se chiffrant à une moyenne de 15,43 chambres durant la série d’observation de 1990 à 2020. Cette moyenne, est largement dépassée en 1990 et en 2001 avec une proportion de 22 chambres par hôtel. La proportion régresse à 15 chambres par hôtel en 2008 et à environ 14 chambres par hôtel en 2020. La capacité des hôtels baisse en nombre de chambres depuis 2007 et cette baisse s’accroît après 2012 jusqu’en 2020 (Graphique 11).




Graphique 11 : Capacités des hôtels en nombre de chambres au Mali de 1990 à 2020

Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

2.2.2. Évolution du taux d'occupation hôtelier de 1990 à 2020

Le taux d'occupation hôtelier de 1990 à 2020 se chiffre en moyenne à 13,66%. De 1990 à 2009, le taux d'occupation hôtelier est supérieur à la moyenne et équivaut à 19,20%. Par contre, il fléchit en dessous de la moyenne de 2010 à 2020 avec une moyenne de 3,64%. La période allant de 2012 à 2020 est la plus affectée par la baisse du taux d'occupation hôtelier au Mali (Graphique 12).




Graphique 12 : Évolution du Taux d'Occupation hôtelier au Mali de 1990 à 2020
Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

Bien que le taux moyen d'occupation hôtelier soit supérieur à la moyenne (19,20%) de 1990 à 2009, il existe une année creuse en 1993 où il passe à 10,21%. Ce faible taux de 1993 est la résultante des crises sécuritaires et politiques de 1990 à 1992 au Mali. En 1993, bien que le Mali, avait signé, l'accord de Tamanrasset avec les rebelles du Nord du Mali, l'accalmie sur le front n'était pas totale et à Bamako, le nouveau Président élu est déjà confronté à la grogne estudiantine. Cet état de trouble fera du Mali, une destination touristique déconseillée. A partir 2009, les taux d'occupation hôtelier, s'affaiblissent et s'amointrissent jusqu'en 2020, suite à la crise sécuritaire du Sahel ayant entraîné la suspension du principal vol charter « Point Afrique » de Maurice Freund. Le taux d'occupation hôtelier frôle le nul à partir de 2019 avec l'apparition de la pandémie du COVID 19, ayant cloué plusieurs compagnies aériennes internationales au sol avec la fermeture des frontières (Graphique 12).

2.2.3. Évolution de la Durée Moyenne de Séjours de 1990 à 2020

La durée moyenne de séjours hôteliers (DMS) au Mali de 1990 à 2020 est de 2 jours. Les années durant lesquelles les durées moyennes de séjours, ont été les plus longues sont : 1994 avec 2,61 jours, 1995 avec 2,39 jours et enfin 2004 avec 2,36 jours. Ici encore, le constat qui se dégage est que de 1990 à 2009, soit en 20 ans, la durée moyenne de séjours hôteliers s'établit à 2,1 jours. Tandis que, de 2010 à 2020, soit en 11 ans, la durée moyenne de séjours hôteliers indique 1,75 jours.

La courbe annuelle de la durée moyenne de séjours de 1990 à 2020 est bien restée supérieure ou confondue à la moyenne de 1990 à 2009. Durant cette période, l'année 1993 marque une différence, avec 1,44 jour. De 2010 à 2020, tous les chiffres annuels de la durée moyenne de séjours sont inférieurs à 2 jours. La crise sécuritaire du Sahel de 2012 et la COVID 19 en 2019 – 2020, abrègent les séjours touristiques au Mali (Graphique 13).



Graphique 13 : Evolution annuelle de la durée moyenne de séjours hôteliers au Mali de 1990 à 2020


Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

2.3. Segmentation du marché touristique au Mali

2.3.1. Fragmentation du marché entre visiteurs internationaux et visiteurs résidents

Pour ce classement, les données disponibles détaillées et complètes vont de 1998 à 2020. Durant cette période de 23 ans, l'ensemble des touristes reçus est de 2 661 708 soit en moyenne 115 726 visiteurs par an. De 1998 à

2020, les visiteurs internationaux représentent un effectif de 1 699 815 soit 63,86% et les visiteurs résidents du pays au nombre de 961 893 valent 36,14%. Les visiteurs internationaux gardent la majorité des arrivées de 1998 à 2014. A partir de 2015, les arrivées des touristes continuent de régresser jusqu'en 2020. En cette même période, la proportion des visiteurs résidents devient majoritaire, excepté en 2016 où les internationaux sont majoritaires. Enfin, le constat est que le tourisme malien est trop dépendant du marché extérieur. La crise sécuritaire au Sahel, ayant pris une proportion démesurée au Mali et avec l'expansion de la crise de la COVID 19, les marchés émetteurs étrangers se sont taris. Du coup, les effectifs des arrivées se sont réduits et les résidents du pays commencent à occuper une part importante du marché touristique malien de 2015 à 2020 (Graphique 14).




Graphique 14 : Répartition des arrivées annuelles des touristes au Mali, entre visiteurs internationaux et visiteurs résidents de 1998 à 2020

Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

2.3.2. Classement du top 5 des marchés émetteurs

Le nombre de touristes internationaux reçus au Mali de 1998 à 2020, se chiffre à 1 699 815. Les 5 premiers pays émetteurs de touristes vers le Mali ont fourni dans le marché touristique malien de 1998 à 2020, un effectif total de 1 214 925 visiteurs internationaux, soit 71,5%. Au sein de ce top 5, la France a pourvu un effectif de 489 461 soit 40%, la zone Afrique de l'ouest a émis 365 905 soit 30%, les Etats Unis d'Amérique demeurent la provenance de 139 178 soit 12%, le reste de la zone Afrique a contribué à concurrence de 130 187 soit 11% et enfin le Benelux est la zone de résidence de 130 387 soit 7%. Ainsi, de 1998 à 2020, les principaux marchés émetteurs de touristes internationaux en direction du Mali, reçoivent le classement suivant : 1^{ère} la

France, 2^{ème} la zone Afrique de l'Ouest, 3^{ème} les Etats Unis d'Amérique, 4^{ème} le reste de la zone Afrique et 5^{ème} le Benelux (Graphique 15). La France est 1^{ère} dans l'ensemble et surtout de façon indiscutable de 1998 à 2010. A partir de 2011, avec la crise sécuritaire et la crise du COVID 19, c'est majoritairement la zone Afrique de l'Ouest qui arrive en tête de peloton jusqu'en 2020, exceptée l'année 2014 où la France a offert la majorité des visiteurs internationaux au Mali.



Graphique 15 : Classement des tops 5 par zones de provenance des touristes internationaux au Mali de 1998 à 2020

Sources : Données brutes : OMATHO, 2005 à 2013 ; Direction Nationale du Tourisme (DNTH), 2014 à 2021

3. Discussion

Les résultats révèlent une concordance entre l'évolution des arrivées et des nuitées. Elles ont connu une croissance régulière respectivement de 8,36% et de 8,32% entre 1990 et 2008. L'insécurité, suite aux rebellions enclenchées en 1990 et renouvelées de façon récurrente depuis 2006, freine le flux touristique au Mali. La situation sécuritaire demeure préoccupante avec les actes des groupes armés terroristes de façon constante depuis 2010, les flux touristiques subissent de graves perturbations. Entre 2008 et 2020, les arrivées régressent annuellement de 19,52%. Quant aux nuitées elles régressent annuellement de 20,37%. Cette perturbation s'accroît durant les années 2019 et 2020 avec la survenue du COVID 19. Ainsi, les arrivées avec un effectif de 52 101 en 1990 atteignent 234 490 en 2008 et chutent à 22 538 en 2020. Corrélativement, les effectifs des nuitées de 115 160 en 1990 progressent à 515 050 en 2008 et périclitent à 44 686 en 2020.

Cette insécurité au Mali et dans l'ensemble de la bande sahélienne a joué négativement sur le flux touristique du Burkina Faso. « Le nombre de touristes a augmenté régulièrement passant de 401308 en 2009 à 540 390 en

2018. Cette croissance a connu un ralentissement en 2013 et a même baissé entre 2013 et 2015. Le tourisme interne suit cette même tendance haussière. Par contre le tourisme récepteur a chuté de 2009 à 2017 de 47% avant de connaître une légère hausse de 1% entre 2017 et 2018 » (INSD, 2020, p.189). Dans les autres pays de l'espace de l'Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, l'insécurité des groupes armés terroristes s'est manifestée par les assassinats des touristes dans la réserve des girafes de Kouré à proximité de Niamey au Niger le 09 août 2020, à la station balnéaire de Grand Bassam en Côte d'Ivoire, le 13 mars 2016. Le bilan macabre continue avec les attaques à Ouagadougou du café-restaurant « Aziz Istanbul », le 13 août 2017, du café « Cappucino » le 15 janvier 2016 et dans la réserve de faune de la Pendjari au Bénin, le 1^{er} mai 2019 (Afp.com).

Bien que récente, la pandémie du COVID 19 a eu un impact sur le flux touristique de nombreux pays en Afrique. « Catastrophe sanitaire, mais également véritable virus financier pour les entreprises du tourisme, la COVID-19 a fini aujourd'hui par paralyser l'économie touristique à Saly. La saison 2019-2020 est complètement compromise. Le tourisme international a chuté de 72% au cours du premier trimestre 2020. D'après des estimations, cette baisse pourrait s'étendre à 85% tout au long de l'année », écrit M. Diombera, (2021, p.7) sur l'impact de la COVID 19 dans les activités touristiques à la station balnéaire de Saly au Sénégal. Avec la COVID 19, le ralentissement des activités touristiques a été constaté à Ibadan au Nigeria par H. U. Obuene, (2021, p. 20) avec les propos suivants.

« The level of sales and performance were reported as drastically low by 101 respondents (67.3 per cent), moderate by 16.7 per cent, while 16 per cent said they were high during and after the COVID-19 lockdown. After the COVID-19 lockdown, bookings increased, according to 68 respondents (45.3 per cent); workload increased, according to 18 (12 per cent); 21 (14 per cent) said that rules and regulations were obeyed; 22 (14.7 per cent) said that sales improved ».

La COVID 19, a aussi eu des impacts négatifs sur les activités touristiques aux chutes du lac Victoria au Botswana.

« In April 2019, operating capacities averaged approximately 70 per cent across operators in all three subsectors. In April 2020, one month after the country introduced a national lockdown, tourism capacities across all the subsectors plummeted to below 10 per cent. A partial relaxation of the national lockdown measures allowing for the resumption of tourism during the last quarter of 2020 resulted in a marginal improvement, with average tourism capacities slightly above 20 per cent across the subsectors » (M. Bhebhe, 2021, p. 72).

La croissance des unités hôtelières dans une destination, explique le dynamisme des investissements touristiques et surtout la résorption du chômage par les emplois touristiques liés à la fonctionnalité des hôtels. Au Mali, de 1990 à 2020, l'évolution de l'effectif des unités d'hébergement et de la capacité des hôtels en nombre de chambre n'ont cessé d'évoluer. Il faut cependant noter, le creux annuel de 2012 à 2013. Tout compte fait, l'effectif des hôtels de 53 en 1990 passe à 832 en 2020, avec une croissance annuelle régulière de 9,37%. Le nombre de chambres qui est un élément d'appréciation de la capacité hôtelière, évolue de 1164 en 1990 à 11 256 en 2020, soit une croissance annuelle régulière de 7,5%. « Au-delà des impacts directs sur la construction, l'hébergement et la restauration, qui sont les trois principaux secteurs économiques bénéficiant de l'activité hôtelière, un hôtel génère également des retombées sur l'ensemble de la chaîne de fournisseurs et de sous-traitance ainsi que sur les consommations des ménages qui peuvent bénéficier de façon induite de son activité. » (P. Mescheriakoff, C. Sénéchal-Chevallier, 2019, p. 32).

De par sa haute fréquentation, le parc hôtelier, contribue à la notoriété de la destination touristique. Le Ministère du Tourisme du Québec, (2016, p.4), explique que la notoriété détermine, les liens plus ou moins forts avec les marchés. Elle est la première information stratégique recueillie auprès d'un marché ou d'une clientèle. Elle est la mesure de la renommée publique d'un organisme, d'un produit ou d'un territoire. « L'information client est essentielle à l'amélioration du service, à la création de publicités et de programmes de promotion des ventes efficaces, au développement des nouvelles offres, à leur amélioration, au développement de plans marketing et commerciaux, et au développement et à l'utilisation d'un programme de revue management » (P. Kotler et al., 2016, p. 129).

De nos jours, en 2022, la notoriété de la destination touristique du Mali ne fait pas bonne presse, suite à la crise sécuritaire et au COVID 19. Durant l'année 2010, les populations du Nord du Mali, s'organisent autour de plusieurs groupes armés dont les principaux sont le Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA), les milices religieuses : Ansar ed-Dine (les défenseurs de la religion) de Iyad Ag Ghali et le Mouvement pour l'Unité du Jihad en Afrique Occidentale (MUJAO). Ces groupes armés sont opérationnellement renforcés par les troupes constituées de maliens ayant servi dans l'armée libyenne retournées au pays après la chute de Kadhafi en 2011. « Ces différentes forces, toutes animées de griefs à l'encontre de l'Etat malien, se réunissent et déclenchent une nouvelle rébellion armée en janvier 2012 sous la bannière du MNLA » (C. Grémont, 2019, p. 44). Face à cette crise sécuritaire permanente depuis 2012, s'est ajoutée la crise de la pandémie de la maladie à coronavirus en 2020. « Les deux premiers cas de COVID-19 ont été annoncés le 25 mars » au Mali. (OCHA, 2020, p.1). Auparavant, dès

le 18 mars 2020, le gouvernement malien a édicté les mesures pour amoindrir la propagation du COVID 19. Cela passe par l'interdiction des regroupements et la fermeture des espaces de loisirs.

Toutes ces contraintes sécuritaires et de la COVID 19, vont amoindrir la consommation des offres hôtelières au Mali. Le taux d'occupation hôtelier de 27,48% en 1990, chute à 2,31% en 2012 et à 0,28% en 2020. Corrélativement, la Durée Moyenne de Séjour (DMS) de 2,21 jours en 1990, s'établit à moins de 2% entre 2012 et 2020.

Comparativement au Burkina Faso, voisin qui compte 728 Établissements Touristiques d'Hébergement en 2018, le Mali a 811 hôtels en 2018. « De façon générale l'offre hôtelière du Burkina connaît une croissance remarquable depuis 2010 jusqu'en 2018 et est chiffrée à 127% » (INSD, 2020, p. 190). Ainsi en 2018, les arrivées des touristes au Burkina Faso sont de 540 390 pour 1 070 599 nuitées hôtelières vendues. Le taux d'occupation hôtelier est de 31,01% avec une Durée Moyenne de Séjour de 1,98 (Observatoire National du Tourisme, 2019, p. 14). Seule la DMS du Burkina Faso est similaire à celle du Mali. Les effectifs des arrivées et des nuitées au Burkina Faso en 2018 sont voisins aux prévisions que nous avons faites pour le Mali (523 376 arrivées pour 1 114 344 nuitées en 2018), si les crises sécuritaires et de COVID 19 n'avaient pas perturbé les flux touristiques maliens.

Le tourisme malien est longtemps resté sous la dépendance du marché extérieur. De 1998 à 2020, le marché émetteur avec un effectif de 1 699 815 occupe 63,86% tandis que les résidents du pays au nombre de 961 893 valent 36,14% de l'ensemble des touristes enregistrés au titre des arrivées dans les structures hôtelières du Mali. Les visiteurs internationaux gardent la majorité des arrivées de 1998 à 2014. A partir de 2015, les arrivées des touristes continuent de régresser jusqu'en 2020. Cette dépendance du marché extérieur se répercute dans le classement des tops 5 des pays émetteurs de touristes en direction du Mali. Au sein de ce top 5, la France occupe le 1^{er} rang avec 40%. Au 2^{ème} rang on trouve la zone Afrique de l'ouest avec 30%. Les États-Unis d'Amérique au 3^{ème} rang, avec 12%. La 4^{ème} zone la plus importante d'émission de touriste vers le Mali est le reste de la zone Afrique avec 11%. Enfin, le 5^{ème} rang échoit au Benelux avec 7%. En dehors du Mali, le Burkina Faso, constate aussi la régression des effectifs des touristes en provenance du marché extérieur entre 2014 et 2015. « Au Burkina Faso, les arrivées de touristes au niveau des ETH sont évaluées à 474 585 en 2015 soit une baisse de 2,43% par rapport à 2014, avec 163 492 touristes non-résidents. Ces arrivées ont occasionné 932 626 nuitées parmi lesquelles l'on comptabilise 480 558 nuitées pour le tourisme récepteur. Cela correspond à une baisse de 11,62% des nuitées des visiteurs internationaux dans le pays par rapport à

l'année 2014. Quant à la durée moyenne de séjour, elle s'établit à 1,97 nuitée. » (Observatoire National du Tourisme, 2016, p.1).

Quant au classement des principaux marchés émetteurs, il existe une divergence entre le Mali et Burkina Faso. Au Mali, s'impose la France au 1^{er} rang. « Parmi les étrangers qui ont visité le Burkina Faso en 2018, les africains sont les plus nombreux avec 57%, les touristes européens viennent ensuite en deuxième position avec 27%. Les américains, asiatiques et burkinabés résidents à l'étranger se partagent 16%. Par ailleurs depuis 2016, il y'a un engouement progressif des africains qui entrent au Burkina Faso. Pour la même période, les proportions des touristes asiatiques et américains demeurent quasiment statiques. » (INSD, 2020, p. 190).

Il convient tout de même de noter aussi, que la résilience du tourisme Burkinabé, s'explique beaucoup plus par la progression du tourisme résident contrairement au Mali. « Les arrivées touristiques au Burkina Faso en 2015 se chiffrent à 474 585, correspondant à une baisse de 2,43% par rapport à l'année 2014. Cette baisse est principalement imputable aux arrivées du tourisme récepteur (-14,45 %) qui depuis 2010 affiche cette même tendance. Par contre, les arrivées du tourisme interne continuent leur hausse (5,34%) et représentent 65% des arrivées globales. » (Observatoire National du Tourisme, 2016, p. 8). Sur une période d'observation plus longue de 2009 à 2018, soit en 10 ans, même si le nombre d'arrivées est en croissance, le constat de la diminution régulière des touristes étrangers est bien visible. « Le nombre de touristes a augmenté régulièrement, passant de 401308 en 2009 à 540 390 en 2018. Cette croissance a connu un ralentissement en 2013 et a même baissé entre 2013 et 2015. Le tourisme interne suit cette même tendance haussière. Par contre le tourisme récepteur a chuté de 2009 à 2017 de 47% avant de connaître une légère hausse de 1% entre 2017 et 2018. » (INSD, 2020, p. 189).

Conclusion

Au Mali, l'observation des statistiques touristiques de 1990 à 2020, révèlent des perturbations dans le flux touristique, surtout entre 2012 et 2020. De 2008 à 2020, on assiste à une baisse régulière des arrivées au rythme de 19,52%. Quant aux nuitées, elles régressent annuellement de 20,36%. La Durée Moyenne de Séjour, décroît de 2,20 jours en 2008, établit un creux en 2014 à 1,44 jour et demeure à 1,98 en 2020. Cette période de 2012 à 2020, coïncide avec la persistance de la crise sécuritaire, instaurée au Mali par les groupes rebelles indépendantistes Touareg renforcés par les groupes armés terroristes à connotation islamique comme Ansar ed-Dine et MUJAO. En fin 2019, la crise sécuritaire est couplée par la crise sanitaire du COVID 19. Les statistiques révèlent une paralysie des activités touristiques au Mali. Les pertes dans les flux touristiques de 2008 à 2020, s'estiment à 3 887 179 arrivées et à 8 901 832 nuitées. Ceci correspondrait à un manque à gagner, estimé à 3 354

576 786 323 FCFA (4 027 491 796 €) soit en moyenne 258 044 368 179 FCFA (393 360 317 €) par an pour le secteur touristique malien. La crise sécuritaire et celle du COVID 19, aboutissent au gel du flux du tourisme international qui constitue 63,86% du marché touristique malien de 1990 à 2020. La baisse du flux touristique, surtout celui du tourisme international disposant d'un fort pouvoir d'achat se traduira en crise économique pour le secteur touristique malien qui ne fait plus de recettes au niveau des hôtels et des agences de voyages. Cette étude démontre, la manière dont la crise de l'insécurité et de celle de la COVID 19 ont impacté négativement sur les flux touristiques du Mali de 1990 à 2020.

L'objectif de cet article, est atteint. En effet, l'analyse de la régression de certains indicateurs statistiques du tourisme au Mali de 1990 à 2020, suite aux crises sécuritaire et de la COVID-19, a été faite. Enfin, l'hypothèse qui accepte que sans ces crises (insécurité et COVID-19), la destination malienne pourrait compter en 2020, un flux touristique se chiffrant à plus de 600 000 arrivées est confirmée.

Pour les prochaines recherches, les impacts de la crise sécuritaire et de celle de la COVID 19, doivent être analysés au niveau des différentes régions du Mali pour détecter les régions les plus vulnérables et celles moins vulnérables. La solution de résilience qui consiste à développer le tourisme domestique ne doit pas être balayée du revers de la main. Par un diagnostic rigoureux, il faut déceler la stratégie idoine pouvant intensifier a consommation touristique auprès de chaque résident malien.

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Importation des Nourritures et Securite Alimentaire des Menages a Bukavu

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[Doi:10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p172](https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p172)

Submitted: 13 April 2022

Accepted: 23 June 2022

Published: 30 June 2022

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Cite As:

Kanani A.C., David S.B. & Jérôme R.S. (2022). *Importation des Nourritures et Securite Alimentaire des Menages a Bukavu*. European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 18 (20), 172.

<https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p172>

Résumé

Expliquer les facteurs de la consommation élevée des produits alimentaires importés et relever leur apport à la sécurité alimentaire des ménages à Bukavu ont été les objectifs de cette étude. Le recours à l'observation, l'entretien, le questionnaire et la documentation a permis l'accès aux données dont l'analyse a articulé le qualitatif et le quantitatif. Il est ressorti de cette étude que 56% de ménages consomment plus les produits importés parce que ces produits sont les plus disponibles ; 26% les consomment pour raison de quantité et 15% pour raison de qualité. Cependant, l'enquête a révélé que les produits locaux sont plus préférés (77% des ménages). Quant au sentiment d'être en sécurité alimentaire à partir des aliments importés, 71% des ménages avouent que l'importation des aliments est une alternative à la disponibilité des produits locaux, mais ne leur donne pas le sentiment d'être en sécurité alimentaire. En vue d'une sécurité alimentaire réelle et garantie, les enquêtés suggèrent globalement la relance du secteur agropastoral impliquant la réforme du système de la production rurale.

Mots clés : Importation des aliments, sécurité alimentaire, disponibilité, agriculture, RDC

Food Import and Household Food Security in Bukavu

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Abstract

The objectives of this study were to explain the factors behind the high consumption of imported food products and to identify their contribution to household food security in Bukavu. The use of observation, interviews, questionnaires, and documentation allowed access to data, the analysis of which was based on both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The findings from this study revealed that 56% of households consume more imported products because they are the most available; 26% consume them because of quantity and 15% because of quality. However, the survey revealed that local products are more preferred (77%) by households. As for the feeling of being food secure with imported food, 71% of households admit that importing food is an alternative to the unavailability of local products, but does not give them the feeling of being food secure. In order to achieve real and guaranteed food security, the respondents generally suggest reviving the agro-pastoral sector by reforming the rural production system.

Keywords: Households, food imports, food security, unavailability, agriculture

Introduction

La faim est l'un des fléaux auxquels fait face la population mondiale. Au Sommet mondial de l'alimentation tenu à Rome en 1996, il avait été reconnu l'existence d'une distribution déficiente des ressources alimentaires entraînant la malnutrition de la part de plusieurs millions de personnes (FAO, novembre 1996).

En Afrique, la nutrition et la sécurité alimentaire ont préoccupé les dirigeants africains, dans le cadre de la 35^e édition de l'Assemblée annuelle à Addis-Abeba, en Ethiopie. Ces dirigeants ont voulu savoir comment sortir l'Afrique de sa dépendance alimentaire, alors que le continent possède plus de 60% de terres arables du monde. Sans nulle doute, ils ont préconisé d'utiliser les atouts naturels du continent et développer la production agricole, comme

seul moyen de nourrir la population sans dépendre de l'aide extérieure (Sommet de l'Union Africaine, 5 février 2022).

Dès lors, il n'est point de doute qu'au plan alimentaire, l'Afrique ne parvient pas encore à assurer pleinement l'alimentation de sa population. L'importation est alors l'alternative.

William B. Morgan(1997) constate qu'en Afrique, la production agricole présente un taux d'accroissement plus faible que celui de la population et que des importations de denrées alimentaires ont été réalisées pour compenser les déficiences de la production alimentaire locale.

Citant quelques pays africains dont la RDC, la FAO (Rapport mondial trimestriel de la situation alimentaire, juillet 2021) présente un tableau sombre de la situation alimentaire de pays africains où s'observe un déficit exceptionnel de la production / disponibilité vivrière et une insécurité alimentaire grave.

En République Démocratique du Congo, en particulier, selon l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë de l'IPC réalisée en mars 2021, environ 27,3 millions de personnes souffrent d'insécurité alimentaire en 2021, alors qu'ils étaient 13.1 millions en 2018 (novembre 2021). Selon la même source, cette insécurité alimentaire en RDC s'explique par les conflits, l'insécurité, le manque de pouvoir d'achat, le manque d'accès et d'appui aux services de base, etc.

Quant à la province du Sud-Kivu, elle a vu sa production agricole dégringoler avec le changement climatique, tel que le montre l'étude sur le changement climatique et la production agricole au Sud-Kivu, RDC (Bisimwa Ngabo et al., 2020). Les auteurs observent une évolution décroissante de la production agricole, à l'occurrence la production des légumes et des tubercules dans la province du Sud-Kivu et que cela est dû au changement climatique. La production serait fonction du niveau de précipitations ou de la quantité de pluie au cours d'une période et de la température exprimée en Celsius de la même période.

La baisse de la production agricole en RDC est aussi confirmée par l'étude de reliefweb & OCHA (2018) qui montre qu'entre 2017 et 2018, la production céréalière de ladite période était de 3,2 millions de tonnes (2,4 millions de tonnes pour le maïs, 0,6 million de tonnes de riz, 0,085 million de tonnes de sorgho, 0,016 million de tonnes de millet). En comparant ces chiffres de la production des céréales à la moyenne 2013-2016, la production du maïs est passée de 2,8 millions de tonnes à 2,4 millions de tonnes, soit une baisse d'environ -15%. De même, la production totale de riz est passée de 1,8 million de tonnes à 0,6 million de tonnes, soit une baisse de production de - 64%. La production brute de manioc est passée de 29,8 millions à 18,5 millions de tonnes, soit une baisse de -37%.

A l'évidence des faits, le recours à l'importation des nourritures devient inévitable pour essayer de combler le déficit. C'est pour cela que la Province du Sud-Kivu, en général, et la ville de Bukavu, en particulier, entretiennent des échanges de proximité avec le Rwanda, le Burundi, et dans une moindre mesure, l'Ouganda et la Tanzanie. Le commerce transfrontalier est dynamique entre cette province et les pays voisins.

La faible production vivrière du Sud-Kivu et du Nord-Kivu entraîne des conséquences économiques importantes dont la dépendance vis-à-vis de l'étranger, principalement le Rwanda et la province du Nord-Kivu (Vwima et Rushigira, 2020).

Pourtant, il est communément admis qu'une communauté qui importe l'essentiel de sa nourriture auprès d'une autre résout son problème alimentaire mais si un problème politico-économique éclate entre elles, la communauté vendeuse risque d'arrêter de fournir à celle qui achète et par conséquent, la faim s'accroît chez l'acheteur. C'est la notion d'arme alimentaire (Consortium Congrd Sud-Kivu, 2010).

Vwima Ngezirabona et al. (2013) montre que dans la dynamique transfrontalière, la ville de Bukavu fonctionne comme un grand centre de consommation, tandis que le district de Rusizi au Rwanda s'est positionné stratégiquement comme une ville entrepôt. Ces auteurs constatent que les approvisionnements à partir de l'étranger solidifient encore la dépendance alimentaire de la province du Sud-Kivu, en général, et la ville de Bukavu, en particulier.

Dans un contexte particulier de la Côte d'Ivoire, Jean Roch (1988), avait répertorié les produits qui n'étaient plus importés et ceux qui faisaient plus l'objet d'importation dans ce pays. Ce faisant, il trouve que les produits qui ne faisaient plus l'objet d'importations significatives sont le sucre, le maïs et la farine de froment ; tandis que les produits dont la demande a augmenté et les «nouveaux» produits sont le riz et les produits animaux. L'auteur explique que c'est par l'augmentation de la production que les produits qui étaient jadis importés ont cessé de l'être.

On peut alors affirmer que le développement de l'agriculture et donc l'augmentation de la production est de toute évidence une condition de la souveraineté alimentaire.

Dans la ville de Bukavu, les ménages expriment une grande demande à l'égard des produits alimentaires provenant de pays voisins et plusieurs personnes, les femmes à l'occurrence, traversent les frontières pour se procurer des aliments, soit en tant que commerçants soit en tant que consommateurs. Ce qui est étonnant est que même les produits les plus élémentaires comme le beignet, le piment, le chou, les amarantes, les aubergines, les tomates, ...sont aussi achetés au Rwanda voisin.

Ainsi, la présente étude vise à expliquer les facteurs à la base de la consommation élevée des produits alimentaires importés à Bukavu et vérifier si cette importation contribue à la sécurité alimentaire des ménages dans cette entité urbaine.

Méthodologie

L'observation directe a permis de constater d'une part, la présence des produits importés sur les marchés locaux à Bukavu, et l'ampleur de la demande en termes d'engouement des acheteurs face à ces produits.

Pour sa part, la documentation nous a permis d'accéder à l'existant et élaborer les considérations conceptuelles et théoriques relatives à la sécurité alimentaire.

S'agissant de l'entretien, il a facilité les échanges verbaux avec des responsables des services qui ont l'agriculture, les importations et le contrôle de la qualité dans leurs attributions. Dans cette étude, il s'est agi des services de l'OCC (Office Congolais de Contrôle), SQAV (Service de quarantaine animale et végétale) et l'inspection provinciale de l'agriculture. Ces services ont renseigné sur la nature, la qualité et la quantité des aliments qui entrent dans la ville de Bukavu, en passant par les frontières.

Enfin, le questionnaire d'enquête, constitué des questions les unes fermées et les autres ouvertes, a été administré sur les commerçants et les responsables des ménages, afin de relever les raisons qui motivent le recours aux produits étrangers et l'apport de ces produits sur la sécurité alimentaire des ménages dans la ville de Bukavu.

Cette étude s'est servie de trois niveaux d'échantillonnage : le niveau des ménages dans les trois communes que compte la ville de Bukavu, le niveau des commerçants eux aussi répartis dans les trois communes et le niveau des services publics ayant le contrôle de la qualité ainsi que l'agriculture dans leurs attributions.

Les effectifs de la population et des ménages étant disponibles, le tirage de l'échantillon par voie probabiliste ou aléatoire a été possible dans les ménages ; tandis que pour les commerçants ou vendeurs, un tirage à choix raisonné a été opéré.

De ce fait, pour tirer l'échantillon des ménages à enquêter, nous avons pris pour base les effectifs démographiques de la ville de Bukavu pour l'année 2022, estimée à 1.190,367 habitants (2022 World Population Review, Demographics, maps, Graphs, <https://worldpopulationreview.com>, consulté le 30 avril 2022). La moyenne dans les ménages étant de 7 personnes, on a alors un nombre de 170052,43 ménages pour la ville de Bukavu.

Morgan et Krejcie (1970) présentent une table des statistiques à travers laquelle ils proposent les tailles des échantillons à considérer pour chaque effectif de population. Ainsi, au regard de leur table, pour une population de

1.000 000 d'habitants et plus, la taille de l'échantillon à considérer est de 384 individus; tandis que pour un effectif de 100 000 et plus, la taille de l'échantillon acceptable est de 383 individus. L'effectif de la population de la ville de Bukavu et celui des ménages se trouvent dans cette prévision statistique. Ces auteurs (Morgan & Krejcie, 1970) proposent la formule à base de laquelle on peut trouver les échantillons selon les effectifs de la population :

$$n = \frac{X^2 * N * P * (1-P)}{(ME^2 * (N-1)) + (X^2 * P * (1-P))}$$

Where :

n = sample size

X^2 = Chi - square for the specified confidence level at 1 degree of freedom

N = Population Size

P = population proportion (.50 in this table)

ME = desired Margin of Error (expressed as a proportion)

Avec un effectif de ménages de 17005,43 (N), un degré de confiance(X^2) de 95% et une marge d'erreur(ME) de 5%, la taille de notre échantillon (n) est de 384 responsables des ménages, à raison de 128 par commune. Nous considérons que les préoccupations à l'égard de la sécurité alimentaire seraient les mêmes pour la plupart des ménages urbains, quelle que soit la commune habitée. Cette taille de l'échantillon a été choisi ici pour des raisons de faisabilité, de réalisme et de praticabilité de l'enquête.

Dans chaque commune tous les quartiers étaient considérés et le pas de sondage était de 4 ménages en considérant les deux côtés de l'avenue. Le refus de certaines personnes de nous recevoir ou de répondre à nos questions nous a amenés, après plusieurs tentatives non réussies, à nous concentrer (intéresser) uniquement à ceux qui nous étaient accessibles et de procéder au remplacement des ménages ciblés mais non disponibles.

En ce qui concerne les commerçants et les agents des services ayant l'importation, le contrôle et l'agriculture dans leurs attributions, le tirage a été non probabiliste et donc à choix raisonné. Ainsi, pour avoir l'échantillon des commerçants vendeurs des produits alimentaires dans les différentes communes, nous nous sommes présenté sur place aux points de vente et avons interrogé 62 vendeurs et vendeuses rencontrés à l'heure de notre passage.

Pour ce qui est des services techniques concernés, les responsables des trois services (SQUAV, OCC et l'Inspection Provinciale de l'agriculture) ont été aussi rencontrés sur place (à leurs lieux de travail) et enquêtés par voie d'entretien non directif. Le cumul des trois niveaux d'échantillonnage a donné une taille totale de 449 enquêtés (384 représentants des ménages, 62 commerçants et 3 responsables des services techniques).

En rapport avec le traitement des données et l'analyse des résultats de l'enquête, nous avons jugé nécessaire de combiner l'analyse quantitative et celle qualitative.

a) **L'analyse quantitative ou statistique**

Les données encodées à l'aide du logiciel Microsoft Excel ont été analysées au moyen du logiciel SPSS 21.0. Ainsi, les données issues du questionnaire ont subi une série de traitements statistiques. D'une part, les variables ont été croisées en vue de déterminer les liens de causalité ou de corrélation entre elles et d'autre part, le test de Khi-deux a été effectué, en vue d'établir l'existence ou non de la relation de dépendance entre telles ou telles variables.

b) **L'analyse de contenu qualitatif**

Cette technique a été utilisée en vue d'analyser à fond le contenu des discours ou des opinions des responsables de ménages, des commerçants et des responsables des institutions enquêtés. Les verbatim ont été sélectionnés et utilisés en guise de commentaires ou d'enrichissement de l'interprétation des résultats.

I. Présentation et analyse des résultats de l'enquête

Rappelons que dans le cadre de cette étude, l'enquête a été menée sur les ménages, les commerçants (vendeurs) et les agents de différents services qui ont entre autres dans leurs attributions l'importation des aliments, le contrôle et l'agriculture.

L'analyse de leur profil sociodémographique renseigne que les enquêtés ont été constitués de 97 femmes, soit 58,78%, et de 68 hommes, soit 41,21% de l'ensemble des enquêtés. Leur tranche d'âge la plus élevée est située entre 46 et 55ans; 69,7% d'entre eux sont des mariés; avec une taille de ménage de 6 à 10 personnes pour la plupart. Bon nombre d'entre eux jouissent d'un niveau d'étude secondaire; et en ce qui concerne leurs professions, l'effectif des salariés et des commerçants a été prédominant.

Avant de relever l'apport de l'importation des nourritures à la sécurité alimentaire des ménages à Bukavu, il est nécessaire de répertorier les produits importés les plus consommés dans les ménages et faire ressortir d'une part, les facteurs qui favorisent cette importation des aliments et d'autre part, les raisons de la forte propension des ménages à consommer ces produits importés.

1. Répertoire des produits alimentaires disponibles sur les marchés et consommés dans les ménages à Bukavu

Les produits alimentaires vendus et consommés dans la ville de Bukavu proviennent de plusieurs sources d'approvisionnement mais, comme on va le voir, l'importation y occupe une place importante.

Tableau 1. Produits alimentaires achetés et consommés par les habitants de trois communes de Bukavu

Produits alimentaires provenant de l'étranger et consommés à Bukavu	Effectif	Pourcentage
Farine de maïs	57	14,8
Riz	52	13,5
Haricot	20	5,2
Pomme de terre	52	13,5
Huile	55	14,3
Sucre	55	14,3
Lait en poudre	56	14,5
Viande	11	2,8
Poissons	17	4,4
Tomates et autres produits	9	2,3
Total	384	100


Source : données de terrain, 2021

Ce tableau renseigne qu'à Bukavu, parmi les produits alimentaires les plus achetés et consommés dans les ménages, six produits sont plus remarquables en termes de demande : la farine de maïs, l'huile, le sucre, le lait en poudre, le riz et la pomme de terre. Cependant, à Bukavu, leur quantité est jugée insuffisante pour satisfaire la demande des ménages. Le manioc n'est pas importé mais il est aussi consommé dans plusieurs ménages. Il est l'aliment le plus produit dans presque tous les territoires du Sud-Kivu, comme l'affirme Mastaki J.L. (2006) qu'au Sud-Kivu, 96 % de ses territoires peuvent produire du maïs, 83 % ont des atouts quant à la production de manioc, 87% pour la banane, 70% pour le haricot et 61% pour la patate douce.

Parmi les aliments d'origine animale non disponibles sur les marchés locaux à Bukavu et qui exigent la recours à l'importation, on cite par exemple le lait en poudre, les aliments en boîte de conserve tels que le sardine, certains poissons originaires de la Chine, de l'Ouganda,... et parmi les aliments d'origine végétal ou agricole, on peut citer certains fruits comme la pomme, le spaghetti, le sucre (la sucrerie de Kiliba ne fonctionne plus depuis plusieurs décennies), l'huile d'arachide, l'huile d'olive, l'huile de tourne sol, ...

En prenant l'exemple de la farine de maïs et du riz, on peut se rendre compte que leurs approvisionnements dans la ville de Bukavu passent essentiellement par la frontière Ruzizi et dans une certaine mesure par les provinces. La figure ci-dessous montre que la farine de maïs consommée dans la ville de Bukavu provient plus de l'extérieur de la province.


Fig.1. Provenance des grains et de la farine de maïs à Bukavu



Source : Enquête auprès des vendeurs (commerçants) des produits alimentaires

Cette figure montre qu'à Bukavu, l'approvisionnement en grains et en farine de maïs s'effectue principalement à travers la frontière avec le Rwanda, à savoir Ruzizi 1 et 2. D'autres quantités de grains et de farine de maïs proviennent de la Province du Nord-Kivu et très peu de quantité de cet aliment provient de l'intérieur de la province du Sud Kivu. Pour le riz, la situation est presque la même, tel que l'indique la figure ci-dessous :

Fig.2. origines des approvisionnements en riz dans la ville de Bukavu



Source : enquête auprès des commerçants des denrées alimentaires à Bukavu

On peut retenir de cette figure qu'à l'instar du maïs, une grande partie du riz consommée dans la ville de Bukavu provient de l'étranger à travers l'importation. Les commerçants y accèdent en traversant les différentes frontières avec les pays limitrophes. Il en est de même pour les autres denrées alimentaires, telles que la pomme de terre, le lait, le haricot, les tomates, etc. A partir de là, on se rend compte qu'en ce qui concerne l'alimentation, la ville de Bukavu dépend de l'extérieur, et particulièrement du Rwanda. Vwima et al. (2013) soutiennent ce constat en notant que la balance commerciale frontalière est excédentaire pour le Rwanda et largement déficitaire pour la RDC, et que cette situation témoigne d'un secteur agricole déclinant en RDC et du partage inéquitable des gains de l'échange.

Le tableau ci-dessous renseigne sur la préférence des ménages à l'égard des produits étrangers ou des produits locaux.

Tableau 2. Préférence à l'égard des produits alimentaires importés ou des produits alimentaires locaux

Préférence	Effectifs	Pourcentage	Pourcentage valide
Les produits locaux	296	77,08	77,0
Les produits importés	88	22,9	23,0
Total	384	100,0	100,0

Source : Données de terrain, 2021

Il se dégage de ce tableau que les responsables des ménages ne préfèrent pas consommer les produits importés. Il existe des facteurs qui les poussent à les consommer, mais sans que cela soit leur préférence. Comme on le voit, ce sont les produits locaux qui sont plus préférés (77,08% des ménages). On ne devrait donc pas confondre la propension à la consommation et la préférence.

En effet, dans la province du Sud-Kivu, particulièrement sa partie rurale, la production locale est en baisse. La revue documentaire effectuée dans l'introduction renseigne que la production agricole a baissé à cause entre autres des changements climatiques, l'insécurité en milieu rural, la pression démographique entraînant la rareté des terres et leur infertilité par la surcharge, l'exode rural, etc. En conséquence, sur les marchés locaux, à Bukavu, les produits alimentaires étrangers abondent, au détriment des produits locaux.

Ainsi, pour compenser cette quasi rareté des produits locaux, les commerçants et les responsables des ménages font recours aux produits importés.

2. Facteurs favorisant le recours aux produits alimentaires importés à Bukavu

La disponibilité de ces produits importés ou leur quantité est le critère majeur qui explique leur grande consommation dans les ménages à Bukavu, tel que le montre le tableau ci-dessous :

Tableau 3. Raisons explicatives de la demande élevée des produits alimentaires importés

Raisons	Effectifs	Pourcentage
Qualité	42	11
Quantité	104	27,0
Disponibilité	226	59,0
Prix abordables	12	3,0
Total	384	100,0

Source : Notre enquête et traitement des données par SPSS 21, 2021

Il est ressorti de l'enquête que 59% de ménages consomment plus les produits importés parce que ces derniers sont les plus disponibles sur les marchés locaux; 27% les consomment pour raison de quantité et 11% pour raison de qualité. Ceux qui disent qu'ils préfèrent ces produits importés à cause de leurs prix abordables représentent 3% des responsables des ménages enquêtés.

En analysant ce résultat, nous constatons que pour les ménages, la disponibilité des produits alimentaires importés facilite leur accessibilité. La qualité et le prix de ces produits importés préoccupent moins de ménages. La quantité de ces produits sur les marchés locaux entraîne l'uniformisation et la stabilisation de leurs prix, de sorte que les ménages ne se préoccupent pas tellement de leurs prix, sauf, évidemment, en cas de baisse de la quantité, c'est-à-dire l'entrée d'une petite quantité de tel ou tel produit alimentaire dans la ville en provenance des pays voisins ou étrangers.

En comparant les prix des produits alimentaires locaux aux prix des mêmes denrées provenant de l'importation, nous constatons que les prix sont les mêmes et ne dictent pas le choix des ménages pour certains produits alimentaires.

Tableau 4. Comparaison des prix pour les mêmes denrées alimentaires produits localement et importés

Denrées alimentaires	Prix en \$ ou en FC des denrées		Écart
	importées	produites localement	
Farine de maïs	20\$ pour 25kg	17\$	-3\$
Riz	26\$ pour 25kg	18\$	-8\$
Haricot	20\$ pour 25kg	20\$ pour 25kgs	Aucun
Viande	3\$/ kg	5\$ par kg	-2\$
Pomme de terre	24,3\$ pour 50kgs	25\$ pour 50kgs	-1,3\$
Tomates	500fc pour 4tomates	500fc pour 4tomates	Aucun

Source : Enquête auprès des vendeurs des denrées alimentaires au marché central de Kadutu

Il se dégage de ce tableau que la question des prix des denrées alimentaires importés ou locaux est relative. Pour certains produits, les prix sont différents. C'est le cas du maïs et du riz dont les écarts des prix sont importants. Pour d'autres produits locaux et importés, les prix sont les mêmes sur les marchés, mais les ménages préfèrent consommer les produits importés parce qu'ils sont disponibles.

A ces propos, une femme de ménage explique : « *C'est vrai que les haricots de Goma au Nord-Kivu sont vendus au même prix que les haricots provenant de nos territoires. Mais, je préfère les haricots de Goma car ils n'exigent pas beaucoup de braises ou du bois pour leur cuisson, sachant que le courant est souvent coupé dans notre quartier. Je préfère également la pomme de terre de Goma parce qu'elle est solide pour permettre de cuire les frits, alors que la pomme de terre produite au Sud-Kivu est fragile et ne peut pas faire du bon frit. Nous achetons au même prix la tomate provenant du Rwanda et celle produite dans nos milieux ruraux. Mais, moi je préfère consommer la tomate provenant de nos milieux car elle est naturelle et donc ne résulte pas de l'utilisation des engrais chimiques que nous pensons être nuisibles à la santé* ».

Comme on peut le voir, les mêmes produits locaux et importés peuvent être vendus aux mêmes prix, mais les produits provenant de l'extérieur seront plus sollicités, pour raison de qualité, en plus de la disponibilité.

3. Apport de l'importation alimentaire à la sécurité alimentaire des ménages à Bukavu

Pour exister, la sécurité alimentaire exige la réunion de quatre dimensions, notamment la disponibilité, l'accessibilité, la stabilité et l'utilisation. Ces critères constituent la base de l'appréciation de l'apport des produits importés à la sécurité alimentaire. Toutefois, la qualité qui entre dans l'utilisation, la disponibilité et l'accessibilité sont prises en compte beaucoup plus dans cette analyse.

3.1. Appréciation par les ménages de la qualité des produits importés

Le tableau ci-dessous permet de jauger l'appréciation des consommateurs à l'égard de la qualité des produits alimentaires importés à Bukavu.

Tableau 5. Satisfaction des ménages à l'égard de la qualité des produits importés

Appréciation de la qualité	Effectifs	Pourcentage
Très satisfait	88	23
Satisfait	158	41,0
Pas satisfait	138	36,0
Total	384	100,0

Source : Nos données de terrain, 2021

La qualité des produits alimentaires importés est jugée de satisfaisante par 41% des ménages, de très satisfaisante par 27% et de non satisfaisante par 36% des ménages.

L'écart entre le pourcentage de la satisfaction et celui de l'insatisfaction à l'égard de la qualité des produits alimentaires importés est de 5%. En général, la qualité des produits importés inspire confiance dans la plupart des ménages, mais sont aussi nombreux les responsables des ménages qui doutent de la qualité de ces produits. C'est plutôt leur disponibilité qui fait plus l'unanimité (cfr tableau 3), et non leur qualité.

En croisant l'appréciation de la qualité de ces produits avec les raisons de préférence de ces produits, on trouve la situation suivante :

Tableau croisé 6. Appréciation de la qualité des produits importés et critères de leur consommation

	satisfaction de la qualité des produits importés			Total
	Très satisfait	Satisfait	N'est pas satisfait	
Critères de consommation des produits importés	0	39	34	73
	14	72	35	121
	47	79	16	142
	0	42	6	48
Total	71	222	91	384

Source : Nos analyses avec SPSS 21, 2021

En lisant ce tableau, on se rend compte que la satisfaction des enquêtés est plus orientée du côté de la disponibilité et de la quantité des produits importés; tandis que le sentiment d'insatisfaction est orienté plus vers la qualité et le prix. Cependant, ceux qui ont estimé être satisfait de la qualité et du prix de ces produits sont aussi plus nombreux que ceux qui ont dit qu'ils n'en étaient pas satisfaits.

A propos de la nécessité ou non de l'importation des produits alimentaires à Bukavu, le tableau ci-dessous dégage la position des enquêtés.

Tableau 7: Nécessité d'importer les aliments

Nécessité	Effectifs	Pourcentage
Valide	2 292	76,0
	92	24,0
	384	100,0

Source : Données de terrain, 2021

Il ressort de ce tableau que 76% des ménages enquêtés affirment que le choix de l'importation alimentaire n'est pas nécessaire pour nourrir les ménages, vu les potentialités pédologiques, climatiques que regorgent la province du Sud-Kivu.

En analysant ce résultat, nous constatons qu'il rejoint l'hypothèse d'une agriculture intensive de l'Agence Nationale pour la Promotion des Investissements (ANAPI, 2019) qui estime que la RD Congo peut produire suffisamment pour nourrir 2 milliards de personnes de par l'abondance de ses sols fertiles, son climat tropical et ses autres atouts.

Pour d'autres responsables des ménages (24%), l'importation alimentaire est importante afin de favoriser les échanges commerciaux et permettre d'apprécier, par comparaison, la qualité et la quantité des produits importés et locaux. La présence concurrente des produits diversifiés et d'origines différentes sur un même marché peut aussi permettre d'équilibrer les prix et donc de faciliter l'accessibilité des ménages à ces différents produits. Aussi, il existe des denrées alimentaires non disponibles, non produits à l'intérieur de la province, alors qu'ils font partie des besoins alimentaires des ménages. Certains enquêtés sont unanimes que ces produits doivent faire l'objet d'importation.

3.2. Perception de la sécurité alimentaire par les ménages à Bukavu

A Bukavu, ce que les ménages considèrent comme étant la sécurité alimentaire est un ensemble composite d'éléments présentés dans le tableau ci-dessous.

Tableau 8. Éléments constitutifs de la sécurité alimentaire dans les ménages à Bukavu

Être en sécurité alimentaire à Bukavu c'est:	Effectifs	Pourcentage
Manger en quantité et se rassasier	138	36
Manger en qualité même si on n'est pas rassasié	15	4,0
Manger les aliments diversifiés et en quantité suffisante	46	12,0
Manger 3 fois par jour en quantité suffisante et en qualité diversifiée	182	48,0
Total	384	100,0

Source : Données de terrain, 2021

A Bukavu, la sécurité alimentaire comporte plusieurs conceptions, mais pour la plupart des enquêtés (48%), être en sécurité alimentaire c'est manger en quantité et en qualité suffisantes et de façon diversifiée, au moins trois fois par jour. A partir de ces différentes perceptions dégagées dans le tableau, on trouve que les critères implicitement exprimés par les ménages

sont la disponibilité et l'utilisation. Les ménages évoquent la quantité disponible des aliments dont ils ont besoin et accessibles sur les marchés locaux, mais aussi leur qualité. La suffisance alimentaire se trouve donc au centre de ce qu'ils appellent sécurité alimentaire.

Tableau 9 : Sentiment d'être en sécurité alimentaire

Être en sécurité alimentaire	Effectifs	Pourcentage
Oui	180	47
Non	196	51
Indécis	8	2
Total	384	100,0

Source : Données de terrain, 2021

On peut constater avec ce tableau que l'écart entre le sentiment d'être en sécurité alimentaire et le sentiment contraire est de 4%. L'avis affirmatif l'emporte, mais sans écraser le poids de l'avis négatif. Bon nombre de responsables des ménages considèrent implicitement, que l'importation des produits alimentaires les place dans une situation de dépendance de l'extérieur. D'autres ont de doute (qu'ils ont du mal à expliquer) à l'égard de la qualité de ces produits importés. Un responsable de ménage résidant dans la commune de Kadutu déclare : « *Nous ne sommes pas en sécurité alimentaire du fait que nous ne sommes pas informés de produits chimiques utilisés dans le processus de production des ces aliments, leur conservation et leur transport* ».

Dans la ville de Bukavu, une opinion couramment rependue laisse croire que la consommation des aliments provenant de l'étranger entraînera à long terme des conséquences néfastes sur la santé, puisque ce sont, selon cette opinion, des organismes génétiquement modifiés(OGM). Par ailleurs, la population n'a pas confiance envers les services commis au contrôle à la frontière. Elle craint que ces agents ne puissent se faire corrompre par des commerçants et autoriser l'entrée dans la ville, des aliments non certifiés et peut-être des aliments avariés.

Aussi pense-t-on que les pays voisins en profitent pour mépriser les citoyens congolais en les accusant d'être des paresseux.

De tout ce qui précède, on se rend compte que l'importation des aliments est considérée comme étant une alternative aux problèmes de disponibilité des produits locaux, mais cela ne donne pas à certains ménages le sentiment d'être en sécurité alimentaire.

Dès lors, il se dégage que les ménages auraient souhaité fonder leur sécurité alimentaire sur la production locale. Pour y contribuer, il est nécessaire de :

- Œuvrer pour l'amélioration quantitative de la production locale. Cela exige des préalables, tels que la réhabilitation ou l'aménagement des routes de desserte agricole, des réformes du secteur foncier, la mise en place des conditions de conservation et de commercialisation. Il faut aussi lutter contre l'insécurité qui prévaut à l'intérieur de la province du Sud-Kivu, en vue de stimuler l'activité agricole.
- Intensification du contrôle des aliments aux frontières : les services attitrés nécessitent d'être bien équipés et motivés pour décourager la tendance de certains commerçants à faire entrer dans la ville de Bukavu des produits alimentaires dont la qualité n'est pas certifiée.

2. Discussion des résultats

Cette étude a abouti à un certain nombre de résultats dont les plus importants méritent un regard particulier, en comparaison avec les résultats identifiés dans l'inventaire documentaire. Les figures 1 et 2 renseignent que la ville de Bukavu est largement dépendante des importations en ce qui concernent différents produits alimentaires, en l'occurrence le maïs et le riz. Ce résultat se rapproche de celui de l'étude menée par Vwima et al. (2013) qui ont soutenu que la balance commerciale frontalière est excédentaire pour le Rwanda et largement déficitaire pour la RDC.

Ce résultat est également proche de celui de William B. Morgan(1997) qui constate qu'en Afrique, la faible production agricole présente un taux d'accroissement plus faible que celui de la population et que des importations de denrées alimentaires ont été réalisées pour compenser les déficiences de la production alimentaire locale.

L'étude de Bisimwa Ngabo et al. (2020) trouvant les mêmes résultats, confirme la baisse de la production agricole, à l'occurrence la production des légumes et des tubercules dans la province du Sud-Kivu, avec le changement climatique. L'étude montre également que d'après 59% des enquêtés, la disponibilité de ces produits importés ou leur quantité est la raison majeure de leur grande consommation dans les ménages à Bukavu. Ce résultat n'est pas éloigné de celui qu'a trouvé Misselhorn et ses collaborateurs (2012) qui ont montré que la disponibilité alimentaire est déterminée par le niveau de production alimentaire, les niveaux de provisions, et le commerce.

Aussi, la présente étude a trouvé qu'à Bukavu, la plupart des enquêtés (48%) estiment qu'être en sécurité alimentaire c'est manger en quantité et en qualité suffisantes et de façon diversifiée, au moins trois fois par jour. Ce résultat rejoint d'une part les analyses de J-F. Cruz et al. (2020) selon lesquelles la sécurité alimentaire est perçue en termes de disponibilité physique des aliments, d'augmentation de la production alimentaire et de l'utilisation.

Conclusion

L'importation des produits alimentaires occupe une place de choix dans la constitution du panier de la ménagère dans la ville de Bukavu. Les ménages consomment plus les produits importés étant donné que ces derniers sont plus disponibles sur les marchés locaux.

L'explication la plus fiable de cette forte tendance à consommer les produits alimentaires importés se situe dans la baisse de la production agricole dans la province.

Cette baisse de la production est à son tour causée entre autres par l'insécurité provoquant l'exode rural, le changement climatique, l'infertilité des sols, l'explosion démographique, l'absence d'intrants, le mauvais état des routes de desserte agricole entravant les interactions commerciales ville-campagne.

S'agissant de l'incidence de l'importation des nourritures sur la sécurité alimentaire des ménages, l'étude a analysé deux types de sentiments opposés de la part des responsables des ménages : le sentiment d'être en sécurité alimentaire (51%) et le sentiment de ne pas être en sécurité alimentaire (47%). La satisfaction des ménages tient au fait qu'ils accèdent mieux aux produits importés qui sont disponibles. Les ménages insatisfaits de leur niveau de sécurité alimentaire déplorent non l'indisponibilité et l'accès aux produits importés, mais l'état de dépendance qu'entraîne l'importation.

Pour aller vers une sécurité alimentaire réelle à Bukavu, il importe de planifier une politique agricole de relance du secteur agropastoral avec comme préalables la sécurité en milieu rural, l'aménagement du territoire en termes des routes de desserte agricole, l'accessibilité aux intrants par les paysans et les mécanismes efficaces de conservation des produits.

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AFRICOM and the Burdens of Securitisation in Africa

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[Doi:10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p190](https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p190)

Submitted: 06 April 2022

Accepted: 31 May 2022

Published: 30 June 2022

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Cite As:

Nyiayaana K. & Nwankpa C.I. (2022). *AFRICOM and the Burdens of Securitisation in Africa*. European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 18 (20), 190.

<https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p190>

Abstract

This article aims at analyzing the nature and role of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in the governance security in Africa. It depended on secondary data, which were obtained from journals, newspapers, books, and annual reports on the activities of the Command. A combination of thematic, content and historical methods of data analysis was used to interpret and explain the nature, role, and challenges of AFRICOM in the governance of security in Africa. Guided by the theory of securitization, the results indicate that the nature of AFRICOM's security governance reflects continuity and change in the United States' militarism in Africa and the evolving character of the securitization order in the continent since the events of 9/11. The analysis shows that the securitization role of AFRICOM involves competitive militarisation strategically designed to contain the rising economic and political influence of China on the continent. Yet, its counterterrorism operations fall short of addressing the structural sources of Africa's security predicaments. In these contexts, AFRICOM's activities have had little or any significant impact on the protection of life and property in Africa. In fact, by articulating and reproducing Africa as security deficient and security dependent on the West, the concept and activities of AFRICOM broadly constitute a phase in the genealogies of coloniality of Western militarism and securitization in the continent.

Keywords: AFRICOM, security, Africa, China, United States, politics of protection

Introduction

Fifteen years on, the controversy over the rationale for establishing the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has reemerged in the African security debate. President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria generated this round of debate in April 2021 when he called for the relocation of AFRICOM's headquarters from Stuttgart, Germany to Africa. President Buhari had argued that the relocation of the AFRICOM would draw the Command closer to Africa, enabling it to swiftly respond to the different types of insecurities that plague the continent. Specifically, Buhari drew the attention of the US government to the rising security and related development challenges in West and Central Africa, the Gulf of Guinea, the Lake Chad region, and the Sahel. Implicitly, Buhari's plea to the US questioned the effectiveness and relevance of AFRICOM to Africa. At the same time, the request contradicted the position taken by most African states including Nigeria, which denied the AFRICOM an operating base in the continent (see Adebayo, 2021; Mustafa, 2008).

Reactions to Buhari's argument suggest that the physical presence of AFRICOM in Africa cannot be the magic wand for the diverse security challenges facing African states (Adebayo, 2021; Onor, 2021). The case of the presence of French military bases across its ex-empire, namely, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Mali, and Senegal (French, 1996), and the fragility they generate are widely cited. In Mali, France has maintained a significant military presence since 2013 but the situations in the country continue to worsen from violent Islamic extremism to one military coup or the other. The American response to Buhari's request also forms a crucial aspect of the recent debate on the relationship between AFRICOM and the African security crisis. The US government refused to accede to Buhari's demand, arguing that the relocation will increase costs and undermine the effectiveness of the Command (Abioye, 2021).

Taken together, the divergent arguments and different nuances in the debate implicate the need to interrogate the nature of AFRICOM's security engagements in Africa since 2007 and America's wider security relationships in the continent. It can be argued that between 2007 and 2021, AFRICOM has matured, both institutionally and operationally, to benefit from an empirical analysis of its role as a security provider in Africa, especially in the context of growing security challenges. Going through the literature, most existing studies on AFRICOM are responses to the security framework during its formative and development stage that either interrogated why the AFRICOM

was rejected by many African states or questioned the imperial intentions of the United States. These sets of literature are insightful. Nevertheless, it is important to understand how AFRICOM has actually responded to the security challenges of Africa since 2008 when it became operational, explaining whether AFRICOM is a radical departure from the historical role of American militarism and its imperial assertiveness in Africa during the Cold War era or not.

The article is structured into eight sections. Following the introduction is the literature review. Section three deals with the methodology for data collection and analysis while section four is the theoretical framework. Based on the securitization theory, this section situates the AFRICOM within the context of the politics of protection. Section five provides a background to the formation of AFRICOM that questions a reinvention of American militarism in Africa after the 9/11 attacks. The next section explains the US threat perceptions of China in Africa and the nature of AFRICOM's responses to these threats. The rest of the sections examine the nature of the governance of security by AFRICOM and its implications for insecurities. The last section concludes and offers policy advice.

AFRICOM in the Existing Scholarly Literature

The existing literature on AFRICOM reflects two major contributions. The first examined the reactions of the African states in terms of the initial rejection and subsequent acceptance of the AFRICOM initiative by African leaders. On the issue of rejection by African states, which was widespread at the time, some authors, mostly policy analysts of American foreign policy and security establishments argue that AFRICOM was poorly communicated and marketed to the African audience hence the rejection (Burgess, 2008). Still, on the issue of rejection, other radical scholars posit that the initial rejection reflected a deep-rooted anti-imperialist posture (Tella, 2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015; Nathan, 2009) and fears that the AFRICOM will be used as a tool for securing control over oil resources in the Gulf of Guinea (Badmus and Afolabi, 2017).

On the other side of the debate, the transition from rejection to acceptance of the AFRICOM more or less represented acquiescence, and this raised issues of weak power politics of African states. In fact, the argument is that those that depend on American aid were quick to support it while the less dependent rejected it. Overall, acceptance was much more a function of economic, political, and security vulnerabilities of African states than principled stand, which implicitly conveys and reinforces a sense of burdensomeness on Africa (Carl, 2010).

The second strand of arguments in the literature explains the social determinants and implications of the AFRICOM for Africa. Being amongst

early scholarly responses to the AFRICOM, this set of literature is largely predictive. It analyzed the intentions of the US government, interrogating whether the establishment of the AFRICOM was underpinned by political motivations of pursuing a neo-colonial security policy of militarism in Africa and, therefore, a threat to the continent or not (Jamieson, 2009; Nathan, 2009; Gilbert, Uzodike and Isike, 2009; Hofstedt, 2009). However, for the US policymakers and other scholars sympathetic to the American security strategy, AFRICOM represented an opportunity in security cooperation, designed to promote humanitarian interventions, human security, stability, and social order in Africa (Pham, 2008; Berschinski, 2007). Ugwuja's (2018) study, for example, espoused the view that AFRICOM is a blessing to African states despite some of its inherent weaknesses. The present article contributes to the latter by exploring the nature and effectiveness of AFRICOM in the governance of security against the backdrop of the rising security threats throughout the continent.

Data Sources and Methods of Data Analysis

The principal sources of information for this article were secondary data obtained from books, journal articles, newspapers, and annual reports on the activities of AFRICOM. Each year, for example, the Commander of the AFRICOM submits progress reports on the achievements and challenges of the Command to the American Congress. These reports summarize and provide basic details of the nature of the counterterrorism operations including capacity enhancement and development activities undertaken by the Command during the year. Some of these reports, such as that of 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 are currently available on the AFRICOM's website.

We combine thematic, content, and historical methods of data analysis to interpret and analyze the nature, role, and challenges of AFRICOM in the governance of security in the continent. Themes that emerged from the content analysis highlight issues of strategic control of Africa, politics of protection, geopolitics, American energy security, and militarization aimed at exercising influence in commerce, economy, and politics in the continent. Generally, the data point to the fact that AFRICOM is a necessary institutional structure for gaining and maintaining a geopolitical and strategic hold on Africa by the United States in the struggle to protect its national interests, especially in the emerging new world order defined by post-9/11 complexities and the assertive influence of China in global affairs. In this regard, African security interests are marginal to the United States. Indeed, complementing content analysis with historical data helps us to contextualize a historical pattern in America's security behavior that draws some parallels from the Cold War era when America competed militarily with Russia to contain the spread of communism in the continent.

The data reveal, for instance, that AFRICOM's activities related to these dynamics of change and continuity in America's security strategy in terms of defending democracy and capitalist ideology in the continent in such a way that aptly captures the struggle between the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Consensus (Davies, 2008). As the Commander of AFRICOM, General Stephen J. Townsend, points out in his 2020 report to Congress, the growing influence of China and Russia in Africa constitutes a threat to America's liberalism and long-term interests in advancing democratic development, which AFRICOM must confront through increased American aid to support African security and human rights protection. To put it differently, "China and Russia's corrupt and exploitative investment and security assistance often prioritize their own gains rather than building long-term African security capacity, and their activities often undermine transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights" (Townsend, 2020, 4). Similarly, Waldhauser's (2019) report notes that Russia's increasing penetration in Africa through arms sales and funding of autocratic regimes as in the Central African Republic is a growing challenge to inclusive governance, democratic stability, and human rights in Africa.

Theoretical Grounding

This article is based on the theory of securitization, which is popularly associated with Barry Buzan and Ole Waever otherwise known as the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. The central theoretical insight of the securitization school of thought is that the social construction of security threats constitutes a form of insecurity in itself. According to Buzan and Waever, the intersubjective process of constructing and politicizing threats starts with a speech act where a securitizing actor with an institutional voice frames an issue as an existential threat with a corresponding declaration of emergency actions to address the security situation (Buzan and Waever, 2003). Accordingly, the action taken to respond to the imagined threat does not always follow a normal democratic process of policymaking because it forms part of the politicization of security.

The securitization theory has many nuances including desecuritization. According to Fasakin (2022), the use of violent protests by the subaltern in post-colonial contexts in Africa to emancipate themselves from state and elite oppression is a form of desecuritisation that draws on Fanonian violence. The argument is that when members of the subaltern successfully mobilize themselves in protests to collectively challenge and confront their real or perceived threat, they are involved in the process of desecuritisation. For Fasakin (2022), therefore, there is a link between desecuritisation and violence of the oppressed. There are also criticisms of the securitization theory such as the marginalization of women in its analysis as well as the fact that security

threat is often constructed by state actors, thereby underappreciating the role of non-state securitizing actors (Fasakin 2022, Simonds, 2016).

These different nuances and criticisms notwithstanding, the conceptual underpinnings of securitization are “preemption, imminence, and asymmetric threats” (Filimon 2016, p.49). These themes have had a critical influence on the formation of AFRICOM in 2007, and provide insights into the performative power behind the security architecture of the AFRICOM and the security practices of threat construction of the United States. As many scholars had acknowledged, the American war on terrorism globally, and Africa in particular after the Islamic terrorist attacks of 9/11, has been decidedly preemptive. Some have argued that as of 2007, the incidence of terrorism was not a significant issue of concern to the African continent. Nevertheless, by conceiving Africa as a zone of war and the United States as the zone of peace, AFRICOM fits into the theoretical articulation of preemptive response to prevent the dangers posed by rising poverty and underdevelopment in Africa to the American state on one hand, and the imminence and significance of deterring asymmetric threats of terrorism and insurgency on the other.

Against these backgrounds, migrant refugees from the third world have generally been constructed as threats to the sovereignty and political and economic survival of Western states and in some instances, violence has been deployed to deprive them of asylum and their basic rights of protection. These violent activities of the securitizing states against refugees have found expressions amongst others in the restrictive visa policies and the violent nature of border control practices. Jones (2016) has argued that “the hardening of the border through new security practices is the source of the violence, not a response to it” (p.16). In other words, “militarized borders do not stop migrants from attempting to cross borders, but merely prompt them to risk their lives by using more dangerous routes such as deserts, seas or jungles” (Jones, 2016, p. 16). Part of this securitization of the border resonates with Mbembe’s (2021) articulation of the border as a political instrument for determining “who is my neighbor, how to treat an enemy, and what to do with the foreigner” (p. 90).

The Reinvention of American Militarism since 9/11

The background of American militarism in Africa dates back prominently to the Cold War era, and AFRICOM reflects an important historical continuum in contemporary times. During the period of the Cold War, America’s militarism manifested in proxy wars, the establishment of military bases, and the proliferation of weapons on the continent. Then, the main driving force of the American militarization of Africa was the ideological rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. The struggle was to defeat the expansion and spread of communism in Africa. Even when the Cold

War ended, American militarism in Africa took new forms. There was the proliferation of specialized private security companies that offer both military and police services, which were previously the preserve of the state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Victor Ojaborotu, 2010). Similarly, the changing dynamics of the 9/11 incidents provided immediate structural conditions for the reinvention and continuation of American militarism within the context of the creation of AFRICOM in 2007. More specifically, the devastating social, economic, political, and psychological consequences of the 9/11 attacks on American power influenced a redefinition of imminent threats and the nature of responses to them, which basically revolve around the adoption of preventive and anticipatory strategies (Badalič, 2021; Gilbert, Uzodike, and Isike, 2009). These strategies found practical expression, both locally and internationally. At the domestic political level in America, September 11 influenced the nature of law enforcement as well as the creation of new institutions such as the Department of Homeland Security in 2002. On the international front, September 11 shaped the antiterrorism strategy of the United States and the Global War on Terrorism (Badalič, 2021). Given these contexts and with specific reference to Africa, 9/11 forced a reassessment of the presence of Islamic extremist groups and their imminent threat implications for the United States. Thus, preventing and responding to crimes of terrorism and violent conflicts in Africa was a crucial determinant of the evolution of AFRICOM ((Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Victor Ojaborotu, 2010).

Furthermore, the geostrategic calculations and conceptions of threats emanating from Africa in a post-September 11 world were not restricted to the violent activities of terrorist and rebel groups in the continent. Rather, the social and economic conditions of poverty, unemployment, diseases, and corrupt and failed governance systems that often provide breeding grounds for terrorism were broadly conceived as critical sources of security threats to the US and should be responded to. In this sense, Africa was conceived as the zone of conflict/insecurity and poverty that threaten the Western and American zone of development and peace. Consequently, from the American perspective, the formation of the AFRICOM represented a shift in its foreign policy goals that seek to respond to the intersections of security and development in Africa. Conceptually, this approach highlights prevention measures grounded in the visions of strategic peacebuilding and the determination to address structural violence (Pham, 2008). It is important to note that until the AFRICOM initiative, American security policy had been traditionally and historically concerned with a short-term kinetic approach to governing insecurity in the continent. However, as the analysis questions in a latter section, the soft power approach that seeks to institutionalize security as development merely camouflages AFRICOM's deeply entrenched practices and the primacy of militarization and militarism.

Finally, the US security in the post-9/11 context was also conceived in terms of the stability of the sources of energy in Africa in which the protection of the Gulf of Guinea by AFRICOM was a strategic consideration in the US geopolitical calculations of threats. It would be recalled that following the American-led war on terrorism in Iraq in 2003 and the instability it caused to the oil supply in the Middle East, the US energy security was threatened. A pragmatic response to this threat by the American government was to look for other alternative sources of energy supply elsewhere, and as Jamieson (2009) argued, Africa which was relatively stable compared to the Middle East at the time, came into sharp focus. In fact, by 2007, Angola and Nigeria were the major suppliers of oil to the United States, and projections pointed to the Gulf of Guinea as a stable source of supply. Moreover, the threat posed by China and India's increasing interests in African oil was considered a strategic factor in the formation and role of the AFRICOM.

Given the foregoing, AFRICOM is more or less a reinvention of American militarism that underlines the significance of continuity and change in the deployment of military might by the US in the pursuit and protection of its vital interests in Africa, especially in the context of a new scramble for African resources (Petry 2011; Davies, 2008; Large, 2008; Obi, 2008; Navarro, 2007; Klare and Volman, 2006).

The Securitising Burdens of Containing China

Given the competitive struggle for geopolitical influence and strategic control of natural resources and markets in Africa by the US and China, the formation of AFRICOM has been arguably linked to the containment of China or more aptly, as a response to the Chinese Question in the continent. The Chinese Question has two broad interpretations, namely, the African and Western perceptions of China's rising profile in Africa and its ramifications for security and development. From the African point of view, especially from radical African and Africanist scholarships, China is conceived as a late colonizer in Africa, scrambling for territories, trade, markets, and resource extraction through the strategic application of both soft and hard power that have the trappings of imperialism (Tella, 2016; Navarro, 2007. Holslag, 2006). The conceptual representation of China as a Dragon in the continent effectively captures this viewpoint of the late colonizer, a view that is somewhat shared by the West in articulating the politics of Africa-China relations on one hand (Obi 2008) and China-America engagements in Africa on the other (Large, 2008; Klare and Volman, 2006).

The second perspective, which is represented by the United States, argues that the Chinese Question includes but is not limited to the evolving economic domination of markets and increasing militarization in Africa, but extends to the fears of spreading the values of China's State capitalism, bad

human rights records, corrupt practices and the ideological threats they pose to the neoliberal world order (Townsend, 2021; McNally, 2012; Mearsheimer 2001). This second view is particularly relevant in understanding the international political economy of the containment of, and or engagement with China in Africa by the US and its linkages to the securitizing implications by the AFRICOM. In order to appreciate this notion of the Chinese Question, it is important to highlight the broader contexts of the rise of China as an emerging global power and the evolving nature of its economic, military, and political relationships with Africa, and how these relationships have been securitized as constituting a threat to American interests in the continent.

The Rise of China and Strategic Rivalry

Historically, by the end of the 20th century, the emergence of China as a global power to reckon with constituted one of the significant developments in world politics. Through visionary and effective domestic leadership, China adopted and adapted Western capitalism and World Bank policies to its culture, local circumstances, and national aspirations to engineer rapid technological and economic development. In fact, given its brand of state capitalism, authoritarian capitalism, or what McNally (2012) calls Sino-capitalism, China has been able to sustain steady economic growth such that it was projected that by 2025, it will most likely replace the US as a world power (US Intelligence Council Report, 2008). For Ikenberry (2008), “China heralds a profound shift in the distribution of global power in the 21st century” (p.26).

Interestingly, like all powers in history, China’s new global power status and rise to prominence are, however, not without some complications for the existing international economic and political order. McNally (2012, p.741) argues that “as China’s political economy gains in importance, its interactions with other major political economies will shape global values, institutions, and policies, thereby restructuring the international political economy.” China is already demonstrating this challenger behavior by leading other emerging powers into negotiations on how to create new institutions that will serve as alternatives to the Bretton Woods. More instructively, it is also noted that China cannot rise peacefully because the contradictions of great power politics impose on China not to act otherwise (Conteh-Morgan, 2021; Mearsheimer, 2001). Conceivably, as China grows, even in the context of the relative decline in American hegemony, the strategic rivalry appears destined between the US and China, making them be adversaries (Conteh-Morgan, 2021; Mearsheimer, 2001).

In several regions of the world including Africa, the significance of strategic struggles for geopolitical influence is self-evident in the activities of the US and China with some repercussions that resemble Cold War politics of

divide and rule. In its 2020 Report to the American Congress, the Commander of AFRICOM highlighted the nature and practical implications of the growing Chinese threats to American interests in Africa as follows:

China is outpacing all of its competitors in Africa, where, with the construction of a military port and helicopter landing pads, it is converting its first overseas military base in Djibouti into a power projection platform. We know they seek to open more bases and their unprofitable seaport investments in East Africa and Southern Africa track closely with involvement by Chinese military forces. These Chinese seaports are not genuine commercial ports; these investments are geo-economic tools to increase the PRC's geopolitical influence throughout the continent. China continues to invest heavily in African infrastructure and currently maintains 52 embassies in Africa – three more than the U.S. and a 24% increase since 2012 (Townsend, 2020, p.3).

In addition, China has steadily engaged in the militarization of the continent through military aid such as the donation of 100 million USD to the African Union (AU) in 2017 to establish the African Union Standby Force; its ongoing military cooperation with the 55 members of the AU; and its active involvement in UN Peacekeeping Missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, Mali, and South Sudan, among others. In fact, China currently deploys more troops than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council in its peacekeeping role in Africa. In summary, “there has been a slow but steady trend towards militarization and securitization of Africa by China” (Conteh-Morgan, 2021, p. 279).

The other aspects of the Chinese threat include its peculiar strategy of development financing that can be described as “debt-trap diplomacy” (Pay and Nwosu, 2020, p. 351); support for the repressive governments and arms sales in Africa. In the last seven years, “China has sold over two billion USD in arms to African partners (Townsend, 2020, p.3). Crucially, whether expanded trade, rising political influence, militarization, or the nature of infrastructural development projects in Africa, “increased Chinese involvement in Africa is in part designed to counter Western dominance (Petry 2011, p. 27). Obi's (2008) research shows that in relation to investments in oil in Africa, Western dominance and monopoly had held sway since the 20th century. This has also been the case in the Middle East. Except in Iran, China is strategically excluded from the sources of energy in the Middle East for its growing economy, making Africa the next battleground in geopolitical competition to get secured access to energy sources. It is against this background that the aggressive tendencies and increasing space of the acquisition of African energy reserves as in “Angola, Sudan and Nigeria by

Chinese national oil corporations can be understood (Davies, 2008, p, 136). For Obi (2008), China is a dragon to be feared when it comes to investing in oil, especially in volatile regions of the world such as Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta. Similarly, China has invested heavily in large-scale industrial fishing infrastructure in the Gulf of Guinea, and in the context of growing pirate activities in the region and attendant security challenges, such investments must be protected by the Chinese state at all costs.

Consequently, as part of its strategic military engagements in Africa aimed at protecting and advancing economic and political interests, China's establishment of its first overseas naval military base in Djibouti in 2018 is instructive. Interestingly, the Chinese military base in Djibouti is only a few miles from Camp Lemonnier, which houses approximately half of the U.S. military personnel in AFRICOM. This mini AFRICOM military base in Djibouti enables the U.S. to "protect the Red Sea and project power across East, Central, and Southern Africa ..." (Towsend, 2021, p.11). Strategically, therefore, the US views access to Djibouti as a top priority in order to ensure that her interests are not deterred. Accordingly, the strategic struggle to control Djibouti and the dialectics of containing Chinese military and economic influence effectively illustrate the character of securitisation and militarisation of Africa. As stated in the 2007 National Security Strategy, Africa must be protected for the realization of American vital interests in terms of responding to the rise of key strategic competitors like China and Russia. But even more challenging for the US is the fact that beyond China and Russia, there is an increased engagement of non-traditional security actors, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Japan and the United Arab Emirates in Africa that also seek to carve a strategic foothold in the continent. These emergent new competitors not only pose crucial challenges to America's political economy (Waldhauser, 2019), but also deepens fears and anxieties of more complicated burdens of securitisation in the continent.

Governing Insecurities?

There are basically two broad activities that AFRICOM undertakes in the governance of security in Africa. The first is counterterrorism operations and interventions that respond to crisis situations in the continent such as actions directed at degrading and countering the expansion of Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs). The second is capacity building including governance/diplomatic-related functions. The Command has leveraged partnerships and collaborations with different US agencies and Departments such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State, and other international organizations such as NATO, the European Union, the UN, the African Military, and African Union to carry these activities in the continent. As the Commander of AFRICOM, General

Thomas D. Waldhauser notes in his 2019 Report on the activities of AFRICOM: “Each day, we have approximately 7,000 personnel conducting their assigned tasks on the African continent” (Waldhauser, 2019, p.7). For example, the Command Surgeon leads Africa Malaria Taskforce Programme to support African efforts in Malaria prevention as part of the implementation of the US Presidential Programme on Malaria Initiative (The 2018 Report, p.21). Similarly, “USAFRICOM supported U.S. efforts to provide COVID-19 assistance in 43 countries, including the delivery of nearly \$500M in medical supplies (Townsend, 2021, pp 2-3).

In the area of capacity building, AFRICOM has trained and provided military equipment to African Armed forces and regional peacekeeping troops. In West Africa, AFRICOM supports the activities of the Multinational National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) by providing military intelligence, training, and equipment in the battle against the Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP). The training targets improving the capacity of the MNJTF to counter the effective deployment of IEDs. As the 2018 Annual Report of the activities of AFRICOM to the American Congress notes, “Over a hundred MNJTF soldiers are now less vulnerable to IEDs employed by violent extremists.” (p. 18). The Command is also a key partner and supporter of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISON). It has been providing training for the AMISOM troops. In Tunisia, AFRICOM works with the military to develop its counterterrorism and border security capabilities. In fact, on border security, “Tunisia is making use of U.S.-provided mobile ground surveillance radar systems and ISR aircraft to better monitor its border with Libya” (The 2018 AFRICOM Report, p. 14). Relatedly, the governance functions seek to develop and improve the capacity of the African military in human rights protection and security governance; effective civil-military relations, and the observance of the principles of laws of armed conflicts.

On the other hand, counterterrorism/combatant operations involve the application of kinetic force to contain terrorist activities. AFRICOM’s interventions in Libya and Somalia are striking illustrations. In Libya, following the uprisings after the fall of Gadhafi in 2011, AFRICOM conducted several kinetic operations in support of the “Libyan Government of National Accord to degrade violent extremist organizations” (Waldhauser 2019, p.25). Similarly in Somalia, AFRICOM has been engaged in military operations that seek to free the country and the rest of East Africa from the terrorist activities of al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia. In 2021, precisely on Jan 1, AFRICOM in conjunction with the Federal Government of Somalia, conducted an airstrike in Somalia, targeting the al-Shabaab and killing about three of its members.

A recent evaluation of the performance of the AFRICOM argues that its activities are a blessing to the African continent (see Ugwuja, 2018).

Clearly, there are upsides to the security and governance roles of AFRICOM in Africa. These are in the area of building and improving the professional, operational, and institutional capabilities of African militaries. But even at this, the capacity building role, has, however, been conceived and implemented as tools in strategic competition with other major security actors in Africa such as China and Russia. They fall in line with some form of strategic competition in Africa aimed at fostering, increasing, and reinforcing America's closer ties in security cooperation with African states relative to the Chinese.

On the balance, the realities of both the development functions and military operations of AFRICOM suggest that they have not practically translated into viable peace, stable and a secure Africa. In fact, juxtaposing AFRICOM's activities with the existential security threats that Africa currently faces, AFRICOM can be described as a case of governing insecurities. As highlighted by President Buhari in 2021, the security situations in Africa, whether interpreted from the human security perspective or physical safety, have deteriorated. Moreover, some specific cases of AFRICOM military operations such as the involvement in the overthrow of the Libyan leader in 2011 and the security crises witnessed in Libya since then demonstrate the nature of its securitization activities in the continent (Wai, 2014). Yet, the development oriented-functions of AFRICOM such as the provision of aid fall short of responses that address basic human needs in Africa's underdevelopment crisis, which America's imperial relationships deepen and in turn reproduce in the form of terrorism, insurgency, rebellion, and armed banditry in the continent.

Conclusion

The relationship between AFRICOM and the governance of security in Africa is problematic in the sense that peace and security are elusive in most regions and communities across the continent. Utilizing the securitization theoretical framework for analysis, this article explains how AFRICOM represents the burdens of a complex process of securitization in Africa that is historically consistent with America's militarism in the continent since the Cold War. For example, the redefinition of Africa's strategic importance to the United States after the 9/11 attacks and the struggle to contain other strong competitors in the continent, especially China through the militarisation activities of AFRICOM raise issues of the third Scramble for Africa. The establishment of AFRICOM's mini military base in Djibouti, amongst others, performs surveillance functions over the activities of China, which also incidentally has a military base in the same Djibouti effectively illustrates the nature of the new scramble for African territorial space and resources with implications for militarisation and insecurities. Conceivably, all of these

struggles signify how Africa has featured in the global security politics and how America's calculations of its vital interests have created a context for the occurrence of permanent securitization in the continent. AFRICOM's deployment of militarism to degrading terrorist groups in Africa, particularly in Somalia and Libya has compounded the resolution of conflicts and security issues in these regions. This is because AFRICOM's kinetic operations fall short of responding to the underlying causes of terrorism in Africa, such as the development challenges of poverty, social and political exclusion, and structural issues of identity contestations. AFRICOM's involvement in the overthrow and killing of Muammar Gaddafi of Libya in 2011 and the political chaos and security crises that had bedeviled that country with spillover effects in other parts of Africa is a classic illustration of the failure of militarism.

The other crucial aspect of AFRICOM's security governance activities in Africa is the training of African soldiers and the development of security cooperation agreements with African states with the aim of contributing to state and institutional capacity building. The impact of this capacity enhancement training is not in doubt. Nevertheless, these training programs more or less reflect efforts in strategic competition, designed to draw African states closer to the United States relative to other foreign competing powers in the continent. In all, dependence on external security actors of other nations by Africa as suggested by President Buhari's call for the redeployment of AFRICOM is not a sustainable solution to the African security crisis. Instead, the way out of the present security challenges is that African leaders must provide democratic and accountable governance that engenders economic, political, and social inclusion; build and sustain strong independent institutions including state security institutions for the provision and management of public security.

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Diagnostic de l'application du droit international humanitaire durant la crise burundaise de « 1994-2004 »

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[Doi:10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p207](https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p207)

Submitted: 13 April 2022

Accepted: 17 June 2022

Published: 30 June 2022

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Cite As:

Anaclet N., Steven N.S., Arthémon K., Ndayisaba V., Bandyatuyaga A., Obadie N., Médiatrice K., Dévote N., Virginie M. & Godefroid B. (2022). *Diagnostic de l'application du droit international humanitaire durant la crise burundaise de « 1994-2004 »*. European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 18 (20), 207. <https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p207>

Résumé

Cette étude démontre que l'affrontement entre l'armée burundaise et les mouvements rebelles était un conflit armé non international, car tous les belligérants étaient burundais. De plus, le conflit répondait aux critères d'organisation et d'intensité de violence retenus par la jurisprudence pour la qualification de conflit armé. Les dégâts humains et matériels qu'a occasionnés le conflit témoignent du degré d'animosité des belligérants et de l'intensité des atrocités qui ont transformé la situation de violence interne en un conflit armé. De plus, les rebelles avaient des branches politiques pour assurer la diffusion de leur propagande et l'encadrement idéologique de leurs combattants. Ces groupes armés menaient des opérations militaires coordonnées et répondaient militairement aux assauts de l'armée gouvernementale. La configuration organisationnelle des mouvements rebelles leur conférait des pouvoirs directionnels et disciplinaires dont la titularité sou tendait l'obligation de respect des règles du DIH dont ces mouvements armés étaient débiteurs. Ils étaient à mesure de soumettre les combattants à leur commandement, d'évacuer les blessés à l'étranger et de récupérer les corps des leurs tombés sur le champ de bataille. Mais au fur et à mesure que la guerre évoluait, l'inhumanité des belligérants s'est accrue suite aux lourdes pertes qu'ils s'infligeaient mutuellement et l'esprit revancharde a relégué aux oubliettes les obligations du DIH. L'analyse postule qu'en plus de la bonne foi des protagonistes, le respect et l'application du DIH sont indissociablement liés à la connaissance de ses règles. Or, dans la situation d'avant-guerre, aucun mécanisme n'était prévu pour promouvoir et faire respecter le DIH. Les belligérants étaient dès lors peu ou pas familiarisés au cadre normatif du DIH. C'est au regard de ce constat de déficit organique et d'ignorance que l'étude propose de former les corps de défense et de sécurité, le personnel qualifié et les conseillers juridiques en temps de paix pour être opérationnel en temps de guerre.

Mots-cles: Crise burundaise, droit international humanitaire, protection des victimes de la guerre, conflit armé burundais

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Abstract

This study showed that the armed conflict between the regular army and the rebel movements was a non-international armed conflict since all the belligerents were Burundians and the conflict met the criteria of organization and intensity of violence established by the case law for the definition of armed conflict. The human damage caused by the Burundian conflict reflects the

degree of animosity between the belligerents and the intensity of the atrocities that turn the internal violence situation into an armed conflict.

Moreover, the rebels had a political wing to develop their ideology. These armed groups conducted coordinated military operations and responded militarily to government army assaults. They were able to evacuate the wounded abroad and recover the bodies of their fallen on the battlefield.

These directional, disciplinary and organizational powers reinforce the obligation to respect the rules of IHL for which these armed movements are obligated. But as the war progressed, the inhumanity of the belligerents increased as a result of the heavy losses they imposed on each other, and the spirit of revenge relegated the obligations of IHL to the "Greek calendar".

Moreover, the analysis postulates that knowledge of IHL is a condition for its respect and hence for its application, even if the will of the protagonists remains decisive. However, in the pre-war situation, there was no mechanism for enforcing IHL. The warring parties were little or no acquaintance with the rules of IHL. It is in the light of this organic deficit and ignorance that the study proposes to train defense and security forces, qualified personnel, and legal advisers in peacetime to be operational in wartime.

Keywords: Crise Burundaise, droit international humanitaire, protection des victimes de la guerre, conflit armé burundais

Introduction

L'assassinat du Président Melchior NDADAYE et plusieurs de ses hauts dignitaires ont entamé le tissu social burundais. Il a provoqué le chaos et créé une période d'instabilité politique et institutionnelle notoire ainsi que plusieurs mois de massacres (Vandeginste, 2009). La rupture de l'ordre constitutionnel a ébranlé la cohésion sociale et entraîné un courant de révolte ayant conduit à la formation des mouvements de résistance armée (Conseil National de Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD)) et à la radicalisation de ceux qui existaient déjà (Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu ayant comme branche armée le Front National pour la Libération (PALIPEHUTU-FNL)).

L'intensification des affrontements entre l'armée régulière et les groupes armés a exposé les personnes et les biens au péril et les infrastructures sociales et économiques aux destructions massives (Bugnion, 2001). Le désespoir était consommé chez les combattants blessés ou capturés, les femmes, les enfants et les civils ne participant pas aux atrocités. Ils étaient à la merci de leurs bourreaux. Ceux-ci n'étaient pas non plus exonérés de la violation de leur droit et leur sort était parfois en sursis. Seul le droit international humanitaire (DIH) s'emploie à redonner l'espoir perdu par la

protection des droits qu'il tente d'assurer en pleine situation de conflits armés (Mumbala, 2016-2017).

En dépit des résolutions onusiennes (Résolution 1072 du Conseil de sécurité, 1996, Déclaration du Président du Conseil de sécurité, 2002, résolution 1286, 2000) appelant au respect de la dignité humaine et dénonçant les violences sordides des protagonistes, les affrontements entre les belligérants ont emporté environ 250 000 à 300 000 vies humaines, surtout des civils, et ont entraîné des destructions importantes des biens (Unicef au Burundi, 2004). Les estimations portent à 500 000 le nombre de réfugiés burundais occasionnés par le conflit alors que plus de 800 000 personnes, soit 12 pour cent de la population du pays, étaient des déplacés internes (Résolution 1286 du conseil de sécurité des Nations unies sur la situation au Burundi, 19 janvier 2000).

Ce lourd bilan traduit le mépris des belligérants envers le DIH, qui pourtant, comporte des règles devant assurer la conduite des hostilités et la protection des victimes de guerre (Chetail, 2013 ; Gaggioli, 2013). Par ailleurs, les règles du DIH imposent aux belligérants la protection des personnes ne participant plus au combat ainsi que la sauvegarde des objectifs non militaires qui ne peuvent pas faire objet d'attaque de même que les personnes ou les biens bénéficiant d'une protection spéciale.

Au fil des ans, les groupes armés avaient progressivement renforcé leur arsenal jusqu'à constituer de véritables forces politico-militaires dont la communauté internationale a dû tenir compte dans le processus de paix au Burundi (Nindorera, 2012 : p13). Cette situation conflictuelle, avec son lot de dégâts humains et matériels, a repositionné la question controversée de qualification du conflit burundais de laquelle dépendait l'application ou non des règles du DIH.

En l'absence d'une définition communément acceptée de « conflit armé », une seule et même situation factuelle peut être sujette à des interprétations divergentes selon les intérêts politiques des parties au conflit (Frend, Actes du Colloque de Bruges, 18-19 octobre 2012). D'où la préoccupation de cette étude d'examiner la nature du conflit burundais de 1994 afin de déterminer sa qualification au regard des règles du DIH. La recherche de cette qualification du conflit n'est pas une simple gymnastique intellectuelle. Comme l'affirme cette pensée, « [L]a compréhension du régime légal applicable à des circonstances données est d'une importance primordiale, dès lors que ce régime déterminera l'avis juridique pratique qui sera donné aux forces armées engagées dans un conflit et établira les paramètres de ce qui constitue une action ou conduite permise, obligatoire ou prohibée » (Frend, Actes de colloques de Bruges, 18-19 octobre 2012).

Au demeurant, cette qualification permet de déterminer si oui ou non l'application des règles du DIH pouvait être déclenchée dans le cas du conflit

burundais et partant, d'analyser la problématique de son respect par les belligérants.

Pour traiter ces diverses articulations du thème, l'étude recourt aux méthodes de recherche documentaire et analytique. La méthode documentaire a permis de réunir la documentation pertinente pour mieux scruter cette étude. La méthode analytique a servi à confronter et à exploiter la documentation rassemblée, les divers rapports, les conventions, protocoles et déclarations ainsi que la jurisprudence relative au DIH.

Au regard des informations recueillies, l'étude est organisée autour de deux axes. Elle examine d'abord l'application mitigée du DIH (I) au regard des controverses qui entourent la qualification des conflits armés internes. Ensuite, elle se charge de la caractérisation de la crise burundaise pour examiner l'application du DIH au regard de ses violations avérées lors de la période sous étude (II).

I. Une application mitigée dans la qualification de la crise

Le DIH s'emploie à réglementer les méthodes et moyens de guerre des parties en conflit ainsi que la protection des personnes et des biens affectés par le conflit (Megret, 2011). Il impose des limites sur le choix des moyens et méthodes de guerre, protégeant ainsi les civils et limitant les dommages et la destruction des infrastructures civiles (Cinquième rapport du CICR sur le droit international humanitaire et les défis posés par les conflits armés contemporains, 2019).

La qualification des situations de violence est actuellement différemment appréhendée par les traités internationaux (Conventions de Genève de 1949 ; article 3 commun; protocole additionnel II, article 1er; Statut de Rome de 1998, article 8) et la jurisprudence des juridictions pénales internationales telles que le Tribunal pénal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie (TPIY) et le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda (TPIR) (TPIY : Procureur c. Duško Tadić, CPI : l'article 8 du statut de Rome de 1998, TPIR : Procureur c. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutanga). Cet exercice de qualification comporte des répercussions et des conséquences importantes sur le sort des victimes (10e Colloque de Bruges, 22-23 octobre 2009). La préoccupation du DIH étant de préserver des valeurs fondamentales d'humanité en péril dans des situations belliqueuses (10e Colloque de Bruges, 22-23 octobre 2009), la qualification des scènes de conflits armés constitue un pilier de son effectivité.

A. Les contours de la qualification

La qualification d'un conflit est un exercice laborieux vu l'absence d'un cadre national ou supranational chargé de qualifier les situations conflictuelles (Grignon, 2014 : p112). Cette lacune organique complique

l'exercice et accentue les risques de surqualification ou de sous-qualification des situations de conflit par rapport au DIH (Mumbala, 2016-2017). Malgré la souveraineté des États et leur responsabilité à faire respecter le DIH, ils n'ont pas de monopole de qualification des situations conflictuelles. Ils ne peuvent pas non plus invoquer leur souveraineté pour se soustraire à l'application du DIH (Niyungeko, 1990). Les scénarios de conflits armés varient dans leur genre et diffèrent tellement par leur intensité que les textes internationaux préfèrent clarifier ce concept non pas par une définition (Grignon, 2014), mais par des conditions, ou mieux des critères, d'appréciation pouvant amener à qualifier une situation de combat (Grignon, 2014).

Les règles du DIH s'appliquent automatiquement dès que les conditions matérielles telles que définies par l'article premier du Protocole additionnel II (PA II) sont remplies. Cette disposition constitue le socle du système de DIH qui a pour but de ne pas faire dépendre la protection des victimes des conflits armés d'une décision arbitraire des autorités concernées (Mumbala, 2016-2017). Dans le même ordre d'idées, le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR) estime que l'application des critères posés par l'article 1er PA II ne doit pas dépendre de l'appréciation des parties. Telle est aussi la position du TPIR lorsqu'il soutient que les belligérants auraient tendance à en minimiser l'intensité (TPIR : Procureur c. Jean-Paul AKAYESU). Cette position du TPIR renforce l'idée selon laquelle cette prérogative de qualification des conflits devrait être confiée à un organe indépendant et impartial, distant des belligérants et des institutions qui les soutiennent. C'est cette neutralité qui est la condition sine qua non pour dissiper les doutes sur l'interprétation tendancieuse des règles du DIH (Mumbala, 2016-2017). Le CICR se positionne comme prétendant attitré pour remplir cette tâche (Mumbala, 2016-2017). Cette organisation a déjà le mandat en ce qui concerne la protection des victimes de guerre et la promotion du DIH. Avec cette confiance des États à son actif, lui conférer la prérogative de qualifier les situations conflictuelles susciterait moins de désaccords.

L'actualité de la problématique de qualification des violences armées est aussi alimentée par l'évolution et la sophistication des moyens de guerre qui bouleversent la stabilité des règles du DIH (Cinquième rapport du CICR sur le droit international humanitaire et les défis posés par les conflits armés contemporains, 2019). En l'occurrence, le développement de l'intelligence artificielle et de nouvelles méthodes de guerre avancées rendent de plus en plus difficile la qualification de la nature des conflits (Droege, 2012 ; Grondin, 2017). Au regard de ces évolutions, la compréhension traditionnelle de la guerre est ébranlée par les attaques cybernétiques et les systèmes d'armes utilisés (drones, robots de combats, armes à laser...) (Backstrom et Henderson, 2012). Les valeurs fondatrices du DIH sont donc remises en cause par la nature actuelle des conflits (Bernard, 2014). Cette évolution des

méthodes de guerre complique l'application du DIH aux conflits armés contemporains, mais elle rappelle également l'idée de dynamisme du DIH. Comme toute règle, il ne serait pas figé et devrait être sujet à interprétation, évolution et développement (Bernard, 2014). La détermination du champ d'application du DIH devient équivoque (Bernard, 2014) et relance la nécessité de sa relecture pour renforcer son efficacité et l'ajuster aux exigences guerrières qui se modernisent au rythme de la technologie, compliquant davantage la qualification des violences armées.

Selon le DIH le pays en proie à des violences armées peut basculer soit dans une situation de tension interne, de troubles intérieurs, de conflit armé non international ou de conflit armé international. Les tensions internes sont des situations ou circonstances de moindre violence. Elles engendrent des arrestations massives, un nombre élevé de détenus politiques, la pratique de torture ou d'autres formes de mauvais traitements, des disparitions forcées ou la suspension des garanties judiciaires fondamentales (CICR, 1993 : pp 238-244).

L'intensité des violences augmente dans le cas de troubles intérieurs. Ceux-ci sont des situations dans lesquelles des affrontements avec des actes de violence spontanés et graves, qui durent parfois, opposent les groupes plus ou moins organisés aux autorités étatiques qui recourent à la force pour rétablir l'ordre (CICR, 1971 : p78). Ces situations de tensions et de troubles internes sont sous le régime juridique national ou de droit de l'homme et n'appellent pas l'application des règles du DIH (PA II ; article 1 § 2).

Durant le conflit burundais de 1994, les affrontements dépassaient de loin le niveau de tensions internes et de troubles intérieurs. Il s'agissait d'une véritable lutte armée durant laquelle les forces armées gouvernementales débordées par les attaques des groupes armés ont fait recours au service militaire obligatoire (loi rendant les services militaires obligatoires au Burundi : 1997). Le service était ouvert à tous les élèves, garçons et filles, qui terminaient leurs études secondaires (immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Burundi : services militaire et alternatif au Burundi, 1998). Les forces armées burundaises dépassées par les attaques ont même enrôlé de jeunes gardiens de la paix pour participer à des opérations militaires (rapport de Human Rights Watch, décembre 2003). Ces circonstances conflictuelles remplissaient-elles pour autant les critères d'un conflit armé non international ou international ? Le critère fondamental de distinction d'un conflit armé international et d'un conflit armé non international est la qualité des parties. Les affrontements entre les forces de deux ou plusieurs États sont qualifiés de conflit armé international. Autrement dit, le pays est en situation de guerre avec pour adversaire les forces armées d'un autre État. Par contre, dans le cas d'un conflit armé non international, c'est un État et un groupe armé organisé

non étatique, ou bien plusieurs de ces groupes entre eux, qui s'affrontent (rapport du CICR, 1er décembre 2011).

La Chambre d'appel du Tribunal pénal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie a souligné qu'«un conflit armé existe chaque fois qu'il y a recours à la force armée entre États ou un conflit armé prolongé entre les autorités gouvernementales et des groupes armés organisés ou entre de tels groupes au sein d'un État » (TPIY, procureur c Tadic, chambre d'appel).

L'article 3 commun aux quatre Conventions de Genève s'applique en cas de conflit armé non international (Conventions de Genève : article 3 commun). Par conséquent, cette disposition lie tous les belligérants, c'est-à-dire les forces régulières du pays et les groupes armés (Les Conventions de Genève de 1949 ont été ratifiées par le Burundi en 1971 et le Protocole additionnel II en 1993). Paradoxalement, cette disposition se refuse de définir la notion de conflit armé non international. Elle ne détermine pas non plus à quel moment de la violence où le DIH commence à s'appliquer (Rapport du CICR, 2011 : p10).

Le PA II s'applique tout particulièrement à certains conflits non internationaux de haute intensité opposant les forces armées d'un État à des groupes armés organisés qui exercent sur une partie de son territoire un contrôle tel qu'il leur permette de mener des opérations militaires continues et concertées (Dereme, 2015-2016 : p3). Un analyste averti conclurait facilement que le PA II de 1977 concernant les conflits armés non internationaux ne fait que développer et compléter l'article 3 commun aux quatre Conventions de Genève de 1949 (Condorelli, Boisson de Chazournes, 1984 : p17-35).

B. Conflit armé non international comme qualification retenue

Dans ses affaires Tadic et Boškoski le TPIY a retenu l'organisation des groupes armés et l'intensité de la violence comme critères cumulatifs montrant que la situation de violence interne a atteint le seuil d'un conflit armé non international (TPIY : Procureur c Duško Tadić & CPI : procureur c. Lubanga Dylo).

Relativement à ces critères de qualification, les groupes armés burundais étaient dotés d'une organisation militaire au centre de laquelle il y avait un commandement général. Le CNDD FDD avait établi son état-major dans la Kibira pendant que les FNL avaient leur base dans Bujumbura rural. Chacun de ces mouvements disposait des arsenaux militaires lourds leur permettant de mener des attaques réussies contre les forces armées régulières (Rapport de Human Rights Watch, 2003).

Ils étaient organisés en régions militaires dont chacune était sous le haut commandement d'un officier rebelle. Celui-ci qui rendait compte à sa hiérarchie. La rébellion était non seulement interne, mais elle avait pris racine dans les pays voisins et même éloignés, jusqu'en Afrique australe

(Résolution 1286 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, 2000). Les groupes armés étaient à mesure de mener des opérations militaires coordonnées et de répondre militairement aux assauts de l'armée gouvernementale. Ils avaient la capacité d'évacuer les blessés à l'étranger et de récupérer les corps des leurs sur-le-champ de bataille. Ces actions témoignent de l'existence d'un niveau d'organisation et de discipline avancé.

Les groupes armés, que ce soit le CNDD FDD ou le Palipehutu FNL, s'étaient dotés d'une structure politique avec à la tête un bureau politique (Nindorera, 2012 ; p18). Leurs structures administratives étaient hiérarchisées du sommet à la base. Leur soutien provenait de la population, de la diaspora burundaise, des commerçants et sociétés privées (Nindorera, 2012 : p20). Ils levaient des impôts, recevaient des contributions et assuraient leur subsistance grâce aux butins en armes et biens prélevés sur les forces armées burundaises.

En 2002, les CNDD FDD comptaient près de 10 000 combattants, et les FNL, un peu moins de 3 000 combattants (Rapport de Human Rights Watch, 2003 : p7) qui bénéficiaient de l'encadrement idéologique de leurs responsables politiques et militaires. Sans un niveau minimum d'organisation, la gestion d'aussi grands groupes armés en plus de la dangerosité qu'on leur reconnaît aurait été quasiment impossible. La période des négociations a d'ailleurs démontré la maturité de leur organisation à la suite de leur entente nonobstant une éphémère contradiction, mais qui n'a pas ébranlé leur unité.

Cette organisation a permis aux groupes armés d'accroître l'intensité de la violence. À cet effet, les types d'armes et autres équipements militaires ainsi que le nombre et le calibre des munitions utilisés permettent de se rendre compte de l'intensité de la violence et de montrer que la crise était un conflit armé non international. En usant de leurs équipements, les groupes armés ont assiégé, en juillet 2003, la ville de Bujumbura et les affrontements ont duré environ trois semaines. La même année, ils ont mené une attaque contre le camp militaire chinois (Rapport de Human Rights Watch, 2003). Des actions d'une telle envergure visant des symboles du pouvoir nécessitent du matériel militaire important avec un stock de munitions suffisamment garni. La persistance de la violence a interpellé le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU témoignant ainsi de l'intensité du conflit (Rapport du CICR, 28 novembre-1er décembre 2011).

Le conflit burundais a occasionné des dégâts humains qui témoignent du degré d'animosité des belligérants d'alors. Selon les estimations, les hostilités ont emporté environ 250 000 à 300 000 vies humaines, surtout des civils (Unicef au Burundi, 2004). La violence a atteint son paroxysme en contraignant 500 000 personnes à se réfugier dans les pays voisins et plus de 800 000 personnes, soit 12 pour cent de la population du pays à quitter leurs familles (Résolution 1296 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, 2000).

La violence a par ailleurs entraîné des dégâts matériels indénombrables tels que les destructions des infrastructures routières, scolaires, de soins de santé et administratives. Les attaques étaient menées sans respect du principe de distinction alors que la protection des civiles et des objectifs non militaires relève des obligations fondamentales des belligérants durant les violences armées (Niyungeko, 1990, Conventions de Genève ; article 3 (1) commun, Protocole additionnel II ; article 1er). Ces faits décrivent mieux le scénario conflictuel du Burundi de l'époque et leur gravité justifie sa qualification de conflit armé non international appelant l'obligation d'appliquer le DIH.

II. Une application justifiée dans la sanction des violations avérée

D'une intensité déconcertante et de violence inouïe, le conflit burundais remplissait tous les critères de conflit armé non international et autorisait par conséquent le recours aux règles du DIH pour assurer la protection de la population, des biens civils et des forces combattantes hors d'état de nuire.

A. Un conflit armé non international appelant l'application du DIH

Le DIH s'applique dans deux types de situations très différentes : les conflits armés internationaux et les conflits armés non internationaux. Dans les textes, ces derniers sont appelés conflits armés ne présentant pas de caractère international (Sassoli & Bouvier, 2012). Comme précédemment démontrés, tous les actes de violence perpétrés à l'intérieur d'un État ne constituent pas un conflit armé. Le seuil de violence pour l'application du DIH aux conflits armés non internationaux est donc, sans aucun doute, plus élevé que dans le cas des conflits armés internationaux (Sassoli & Bouvier, 2012). Il en est ainsi, car dans l'ordre international, il y a interdiction de recourir à la force alors que cette interdiction n'existe pas au niveau interne (Kreß & Megret, 2014).

La mise en œuvre du DIH couvre toutes les mesures qui doivent être prises pour assurer le plein respect de ses règles (Gueldich, 2019-2020). En temps de guerre, certaines règles humanitaires doivent être observées même à l'égard de l'ennemi. Ces règles sont principalement énoncées dans les quatre Conventions de Genève, dans leurs Protocoles additionnels et dans les règles coutumières. Dans ce sens, les règles reprises à l'article 3 commun aux conventions de Genève de 1949 sont considérées comme faisant partie du droit coutumier. Elles représentent une norme minimale de laquelle les belligérants ne devraient jamais s'éloigner (Gueldich, 2019-2020). En outre, l'article premier, commun aux Conventions de Genève, oblige toutes les hautes parties contractantes à respecter et à faire respecter le DIH en toutes circonstances (Devillard, 2007 ; Condorelli & Boisson de Chazournes, 1984 ; DJAMCHID, 2003).

Dans l'arène internationale, les conventions internationales doivent être exécutées de bonne foi par les hautes parties contractantes (Convention de Vienne, article 26 ; Condorelli & Boisson de Chazournes, 1984). Mais, le conflit armé étant une situation particulière, les règles s'y appliquent aussi de façon particulière sans toutefois exonérer les États de leur respect. Par voie de conséquence, toute personne confrontée à des conflits armés est en droit de chercher son respect (TPIY : Procureur c Zoran Kupreskic et consorts, 2000). Mais, plusieurs obstacles se dressent quant à leur application. Une des difficultés majeures pour mettre en œuvre le DIH durant la période de conflits armés non internationaux tient au principe de la souveraineté des États (Gueldich, 2019-2020). Les conflits armés internes sont perçus par les gouvernements comme relevant d'abord de leur compétence réservée, de leur sphère de juridiction nationale (Milanovic, 2014). Avec une pareille conception, l'application du DIH à ce type de conflit heurte de front la souveraineté des États (Boustany, 1993). Les juridictions pénales internationales essaient de combler cette lacune à travers leurs pratiques et jurisprudences (Mumbala, 2016-2017). Dans ce même ordre d'idées, la violation des dispositions de l'article 3 et autres règles de DIH engage la responsabilité individuelle (Statut de Rome, article 8).

Point n'est besoin de rappeler ici le rôle de la communauté internationale qui rappelle constamment aux belligérants leurs obligations de respecter le DIH. Le CICR rencontre souvent une vive résistance de la part des États lorsqu'il s'agit d'obtenir d'eux un engagement sous forme conventionnelle tendant au respect et à l'application du DIH dans le cas de guerre intraétatique (Mumbala, 2016-2017). Pourtant l'article 3 commun aux Conventions de Genève encourage les parties à un conflit armé non international à conclure des accords spéciaux rendant effectives toutes ou une partie des autres dispositions des Conventions de Genève (Conventions de Genève, article 3 commun, Kelly, 2012-2013). Cet accord prend la forme d'un accord politique pris avec le gouvernement concerné.

Le Burundi a ratifié les Conventions et Protocoles additionnels de Genève (Ces Conventions ont été ratifiées le 27 décembre 1971). Il avait dès lors contracté l'obligation de respect des règles du DIH qui s'appliquent à ce statut de conflit armé non international que revêtait la crise de 1994. Les groupes armés n'étaient pas non plus exonérés du respect du DIH. Ils sont tenus de déclarer unilatéralement leur acceptation des règles du DIH. Celui-ci leur est ainsi applicable même si les mécanismes juridiques pour sa mise en œuvre sont adressés aux États (Kelly, 2012-2013). Les groupes armés étaient souvent marginalisés sur la scène interne et internationale. Ces groupes étaient souvent qualifiés d'assaillants, de bandes armées, de bandits armés, de groupes de tribalo-terroristes génocidaires par le gouvernement burundais qu'ils combattaient. Ils étaient peu enclins à s'engager envers la communauté

internationale ou adhérer aux normes émanant de cette dernière (Kelly, 2012-2013). Rares sont des cas où ces groupes se sentent aussi responsables, en tant que Partie à un conflit armé, de l'application et de la mise en œuvre de ce droit (Kelly, 2012-2013).

B. Application déficitaire des règles du DIH durant le conflit burundais

Le tribunal spécial pour la Sierra Leone a confirmé ce qui suit : « It is well settled that all parties to an armed conflict, whether states or non-state actors, are bound by international humanitarian law, even though only states may become parties to international treaties » (TSSL, Procureur c Sam Hinga Norman, 31 mai 2004). Autrement dit, tous les acteurs étatiques et non étatiques restent dans tous les cas tenus de respecter le DIH. Au regard de cette position du tribunal, les groupes armés ne pouvaient pas faire la sourde oreille au respect du DIH. Le rapport de la Commission d'enquête internationale à propos du Darfour a réitéré cette obligation envers le DIH pour les groupes armés en énonçant : « Tous les rebelles qui se sont dotés d'une certaine organisation, ont acquis une certaine stabilité et exercent un contrôle effectif sur une partie de territoire, jouissent de la personnalité morale internationale et sont dès lors tenus par les règles pertinentes du droit international coutumier gouvernant les conflits armés internes » (Rapport de la Commission internationale d'enquête sur le Darfour, 2004).

La connaissance du droit international humanitaire est une condition de son respect, mais aussi de son application (Kelly, 2012-2013). L'ignorance est, en effet, la cause de nombreuses violations et peut se traduire par la perte de vies humaines (Junod, 2014). Dans le conflit burundais, les belligérants étaient peu ou pas familiarisés aux règles du DIH. Cette ignorance du droit entrave considérablement les efforts visant à mieux faire respecter le DIH et à régler les comportements des parties en conflit.

Dans le cadre du conflit burundais, aucun mécanisme n'était prévu pour faire respecter le DIH. Des attaques sans discrimination et des pillages des biens des civils étaient commis aussi bien par les forces régulières que les groupes armés. Les victimes des combats étaient à la merci de leurs bourreaux et le respect du DIH dépendait de leurs humeurs (Kelly, 2012-2013). Il est probable qu'aucune des parties en conflit n'était dotée de mécanismes d'application du DIH ou des conseillers juridiques ayant reçu de l'instruction ou de la formation nécessaire pour faire respecter et promouvoir les règles de DIH sur-le-champ de bataille.

Tout au long des dix ans de guerre civile qui ont secoué le Burundi, les belligérants s'infligeaient mutuellement des dégâts et l'inhumanité s'est de toute part développée, éloignant ainsi la volonté d'appliquer les règles du DIH. Les soldats de l'armée burundaise et les combattants des mouvements rebelles

se sont rendus coupables d'exactions contre les civils, en contravention aux règles du DIH (Rapport de Human Rights Watch, 2003 ; p 23).

Les groupes armés s'attaquaient souvent aux forces gouvernementales sans se soucier du sort des populations. En représailles à leurs attaques, les forces gouvernementales s'attaquaient aux civils et aux groupes armés sans distinction. On peut noter en l'occurrence le carnage d'un seul coup de plus de 400 civils sur le marché de KIVYUKA en 1996 (Rapport de reliefweb, 1996), les massacres des civils sur le terrain de RUZIBA en 2003, et les massacres de KABEZI en 2003 (Rapport de Human Rights Watch, 2003 ; p23-37).

Les belligérants burundais, groupes armés et forces armées, effectuaient des recrutements forcés, y compris d'enfants (Rapport de Human Rights Watch, 2003). Les femmes étaient prises pour cibles et faisaient l'objet de violences sexuelles. Un tel traitement constitue une atteinte à l'intégrité physique et à la dignité humaine (Robinson, 2010). Pourtant les femmes et les enfants doivent faire l'objet d'un respect particulier et être protégés contre toute forme d'attentat à la pudeur (Convention IV de Genève, article 24). Le DIH prévoit que certaines règles humanitaires fondamentales doivent être respectées, quels que soient le type de conflit et le statut ou les activités des personnes touchées par un conflit. En dépit de la prohibition des traitements inhumains et dégradants (Conventions de Genève : article 3 commun ; Protocole additionnel II : articles 4 et 7), les protagonistes recouraient au meurtre, à la torture, aux peines corporelles, aux mutilations, aux atteintes à la dignité de la personne et aux exécutions sans jugement.

Parallèlement à cette application déficitaire par les belligérants, les agents du CICIR ainsi que les ONG humanitaires rencontraient pas mal de difficultés pour accéder aux zones de combat (Schwendimann, 2011). Pourtant, l'article 18 du Protocole II impose aux parties à un conflit armé non international de permettre aux agences humanitaires et impartiales de délivrer de la nourriture, du matériel médical et les autres secours aux populations. Des travailleurs humanitaires ont aussi été attaqués, et ont fait l'objet d'enlèvement ou d'embuscade (Rapport de Human Rights Watch, 2003). Les menaces pour leur sécurité ou l'absence de garanties de sécurité empêchaient d'accéder à certaines zones ou aux parties en conflit, ce qui constituait un obstacle général à tout dialogue, quel que soit le sujet, y compris sur le droit humanitaire (Rapport du CICR, février 2008). Ces activités étaient pratiquement impossibles. Pour illustration, les combats à Bujumbura en 2003 ont mis dans l'impossibilité le Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM) d'envoyer de la nourriture à Rutana, Ruyigi, Gitega et dans des parties de Bujumbura où environ 25 000 personnes survivaient dans l'attente de cette aide (Rapport de Human Rights Watch, 2003). Les parties au conflit burundais ont donc failli à

leurs obligations de respect des règles du DIH et ont entravé son efficacité en écartant sa mise en œuvre dans leur confrontation armée (Kelly, 2012-2013).

Conclusion générale

L'analyse des Conventions de Genève a pourvu nos analyses de bases théoriques sur les obligations des belligérants en guerre au regard du DIH. La réflexion s'est appuyée sur la jurisprudence ayant étayé la portée de certaines dispositions du DIH ainsi que sur l'examen factuel de la situation de l'époque conflictuelle burundaise pour démontrer qu'il s'agissait d'un conflit armé non international. Cette qualification crée pour les belligérants, rebelles ou forces armées régulières, l'obligation de soumission aux règles du DIH et que par voie de conséquence, tous les moyens de guerre ne sont pas autorisés durant le conflit armé. En dépit de ces exigences fondamentales, les parties en conflit se sont cyniquement livrées aux violations au mépris du principe de discrimination, du respect des objectifs non militaires, de la protection des enfants et des femmes auxquels le DIH confère pourtant une protection spéciale durant le conflit armé.

Certes l'ignorance du DIH et la mauvaise foi des belligérants ont grandement contribué dans la commission des crimes de guerre, mais le manque de cadre institutionnel et légal adéquat a empiré la dégradation de la situation humanitaire. En l'absence d'un pareil cadre chargé de faire respecter et de contrôler le déroulement des conflits armés, les règles de DIH restent obsolètes. C'est en effet ce cadre qui permet de raviver les mécanismes généraux et spécifiques du DIH pour garantir un minimum de respect pour l'individu en cas de conflit armé. L'éducation des membres des parties belligérantes sur les règles du DIH aurait permis de plus les humaniser et les emmener à comprendre que, même en temps de conflit armé, l'ennemi est un être humain qui mérite le respect.

Relativement aux limites du cadre légal de l'époque, l'un des enseignements que le Burundi en a tirés a consisté à promulguer la loi n° 1/27 du 29 décembre 2017 portant révision du Code pénal pour réprimer les violations de lois et coutumes de guerre en cas de conflit armé non international (Loi n° 1/27 du 29 décembre 2017 portant révision du Code pénal, articles 200, 203 et 204). Cette avancée reste néanmoins insuffisante et un effort supplémentaire reste à consentir pour former les corps de défense et de sécurité, le personnel qualifié et les conseillers juridiques en temps de paix pour être opérationnel en temps de guerre.

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ESJ Humanities

La epidemia de peste a fines del siglo XVI: un análisis comparativo de los Imperios Otomano y Español

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[Doi:10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p227](https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p227)

Submitted: 22 April 2022

Accepted: 01 June 2022

Published: 30 June 2022

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Cite As:

Yanar O. (2022). *La epidemia de peste a fines del siglo XVI: un análisis comparativo de los Imperios Otomano y Español*. European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 18 (20), 227.

<https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2022.v18n20p227>

Resumen

La peste, que es una enfermedad infecciosa producida por la bacteria *Yersinia pestis*, ha alcanzado la dimensión de pandemia en el mundo varias veces a lo largo de la historia. En este sentido, la peste comenzó a afectar también al Imperio otomano por etapas desde mediados del siglo XV y alcanzó su punto máximo en casi todo el imperio a finales del siglo XVI. Dado que no es posible abordar todo este proceso en un artículo, el presente artículo se centra a finales del siglo XVI, cuando la peste se intensificó en casi todo el imperio. Sin embargo, este artículo pretende analizar principalmente el proceso, las condiciones, la dinámica y los efectos de esta epidemia basada en el Imperio español con el método comparativo de la historia. La peste surgió en el Imperio otomano desde la década de 1570 y se intensificó entre 1591-1596. En el mismo período, la epidemia también surgió en España. El brote asoló a España especialmente entre 1596-1602. La peste provocó la caída de la producción agrícola, interrumpió las cadenas de suministro a los otomanos y en España y, por lo tanto, agravó las condiciones de hambre experimentadas en este período. No se puede presentar el número total de muertos causados por la peste en el Imperio otomano. Por el contrario, se ha calculado el número de muertos por la peste en unas 500.000 personas, equivalente al 6-6,5 % del total de la población (alrededor de 8-8,5 millones) en España. Todo ello revela que la epidemia de peste de finales del siglo XVI, al menos sobre la base de España, no afectó únicamente al Imperio otomano, y que esta epidemia era parte de una epidemia en el Mediterráneo.

Palabras clave: Otomano, Español, Peste, Epidemia, Comparación

The Plague Epidemic at the end of the 16th Century: A Comparative Analysis of the Ottoman and Spanish Empires

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Abstract

Plague is an infectious disease caused by the bacterium *Yersinia pestis*. It has been responsible for widespread pandemics in the world throughout history. In this regard, the plague began to affect the Ottoman Empire in phases from the middle of the 15th century and reached its peak in almost the entire empire at the end of the 16th century. Since it is not possible to deal with this whole process in one article, this article focuses on the end of the 16th century, when the plague intensified in almost the whole empire. However, this article aims to mainly analyse the process, conditions, dynamics and effects of this epidemic based on the Spanish Empire with the comparative historical method. The plague appeared in the Ottoman Empire from the 1570s and intensified between 1591-1596. In the same period, the epidemic also appeared in Spain. The outbreak hit Spain in particular between 1596-1602. The plague caused decline in agricultural production, disrupted supply chains in the Ottoman and Spanish Empires, and thus aggravated the famine conditions experienced in this period. The total number of deaths caused by the plague in the Ottoman Empire is unclear. In contrast, it is estimated nearly 500,000 people died from this epidemic, equivalent to 6-6.5% of the total population (around 8-8.5 million) in Spain. All this reveals that the plague at the end of the 16th century, at least based on Spain, did not affect only the Ottoman Empire and that this epidemic was part of an epidemic in the Mediterranean.

Keywords: Ottoman, Spanish, Plague, Epidemic, Comparison

Introduction

La peste, en sentido general, es una enfermedad infecciosa causada por una bacteria llamada *Yersinia pestis*.¹ La peste se divide en dos formas

¹ Durante la epidemia de peste en Hong Kong en 1894, el médico y bacteriólogo francés Alexander Yersin descubrió que la peste estaba causada por una bacteria gramnegativa y los roedores, como las

principales: *bubónica* y *neumónica*. La peste bubónica es la forma más frecuente de la enfermedad. Se denomina así por los ganglios linfáticos inflamados (bubones) que generalmente se desarrollan en la primera semana posterior a la infección. Los bubones están situados en la ingle, la axila o el cuello. Los bubones, que pueden ser aproximadamente del tamaño del huevo de una gallina. Son muy sensibles y firmes al contacto físico. Otros signos y síntomas de la peste bubónica son similares a la gripe. Los signos y síntomas incluyen: Fiebre y escalofríos, debilidad extrema, dolor abdominal de cabeza y dolor en el cuerpo, diarrea y vómitos, sangrado de la boca, la nariz, el recto o debajo de la piel y choque. La peste bubónica es una enfermedad mortal. Sin tratamiento, el paciente se deteriora rápidamente con muerte ocasionada en dos-tres días. La enfermedad también puede afectar a los pulmones y causar fiebre, tos con sangre o esputo, dolor de cabeza y en el pecho, decaimiento y dificultad para respirar. En este punto, cuando predomina la afectación pulmonar, la enfermedad recibe el nombre de peste neumónica. Es la forma menos frecuente de la peste, pero es la más preocupante, porque se puede contagiar de persona a persona. Este tipo de peste se agrava rápidamente y, si no se la trata a la brevedad, puede ser fatal.²

La peste se ha extendido en forma de pandemia varias veces a lo largo de la historia. En este punto, a nivel mundial se ha tenido conocimiento de 3 grandes pandemias.³ La primera pandemia fue la peste de Justiniano, que recibe su nombre del emperador bizantino Justiniano. La peste de Justiniano fue una pandemia que afectó Asia, Europa y África entre los años 541 y 750.⁴ La segunda pandemia de la peste negra, que se originó en Asia en los años 1330, llegó a Europa en los años 1340 y afectó a todo el continente. Solo entre 1347 y 1351, se estima que murieron más de 200 millones de personas en todo el mundo por esta pandemia. Así se convirtió en uno de los brotes más mortales en la historia de la humanidad.⁵ Tras la gran pandemia de la peste negra, la enfermedad se quedó en Europa durante 400 años. La tercera pandemia se registró en Hong Kong por primera vez en 1894. La enfermedad se extendió por casi todo el planeta a través de las rutas comerciales marítimas.⁶

La peste, que se ha convertido en una pandemia en el mundo varias veces a lo largo de la historia, también golpeó la mayor parte del territorio del

ratas, portan esta enfermedad. En honor a este último investigador, desde 1970 se empezó a denominar esta bacteria como *Yersinia pestis*. Véase Benedict, 1996: 131-149.

² Benedict, 1996: 4; Varlik, 2015: 7.

³ Little, 2011: 270-71. Sobre por qué tal periodización de las epidemias de peste no coincide con los procesos epidémicos de peste en el Imperio otomano, véase Varlik, 2014.

⁴ Para obtener más información sobre la primera pandemia, véase Horden, 2005; Conrad, 1981; Little, 2007.

⁵ Para obtener más información sobre la segunda pandemia, véase Dols, 1977; Benedictow, 2004. Para los efectos de esta pandemia en Anatolia, véase Schamiloglu, 2004.

⁶ Para obtener más información sobre la tercera pandemia, véase Echenberg, 2007.

Imperio otomano. Como se verá más adelante, si bien existen estudios muy detallados sobre la epidemia de peste en el Imperio otomano en el período moderno, no es posible decir que se hizo un análisis comparativo de esta epidemia con diferentes áreas geográficas e históricas. La detección de la epidemia de peste en el Imperio Español casi al mismo tiempo cumplió dos condiciones necesarias acogidas por destacados historiadores como March Bloch para la historia comparada: “cierta similitud entre los hechos observados y una cierta diferencia entre los medios donde se produjeron para utilizar el método comparativo en los enfoques históricos”.⁷ Considerando el punto al que han llegado los estudios realizados basados en la comparación de los imperios desde varios puntos de vista especialmente en las últimas décadas, se puede decir que los estudios de historia otomana en Turquía están todavía en el nivel inicial en este sentido. Desde este punto de vista, este estudio trata de analizar la epidemia de peste en el Imperio otomano a finales del siglo XVI basado en el Imperio español, en el marco de la solución del problema revelado anteriormente. Así, el objetivo principal de este estudio se centra en estudiar si la pandemia de peste del Mediterráneo oriental y occidental son similares en términos del tiempo, severidad y efectos, o si difieren el uno del otro en ciertos aspectos. Con el logro de este objetivo, se pretende presentar nuevas perspectivas que permitan evaluar la epidemia de peste en el Imperio otomano en un nivel más amplio, al menos durante el período especificado, y hacer inferencias más aceptables y generales sobre la naturaleza de esta pandemia.

La terminología de la peste en el Imperio Otomano

Cuando se aborda el tema de la peste en el Imperio otomano, en primer lugar, es necesario mencionar qué tipo de terminología se utilizó. *Tâ'ûn* y *vebâ* fueron los términos más utilizados por los otomanos en referencia a la peste. Estos términos tienen su origen en el árabe clásico. Hay una diferencia teórica de significado entre los términos *tâ'ûn* y *vebâ*. En teoría, mientras que *tâ'ûn* se usaba en referencia a la peste bubónica específicamente, *wabâ'* se refería a la pestilencia o enfermedad epidémica en general. Por lo tanto, los eruditos que escribieron en árabe después de la Peste Negra de mediados del siglo XIV sugirieron que “cada *tâ'ûn* es un *wabâ'*, pero no todo *wabâ'* es un *tâ'ûn*”.⁸ No obstante, en fuentes otomanas, especialmente en fuentes no médicas, estos dos términos se usaban generalmente en el mismo sentido. Sin embargo, *yumurcak* y *hyarcik* se usaban a menudo para referirse a la peste bubónica, particularmente antes del siglo XVI. Además, la palabra *ölet* se utilizó para expresar muertes masivas en fuentes no médicas.⁹ Sin embargo, desde finales

⁷ Bloch: 1992: 64.


⁸ Conrad, 1982: 279.

⁹ Ünver, 1978.

del siglo XVI, con el efecto creciente de la epidemia, como se observa más adelante, se han comenzado a utilizar expresiones como *vebā*, *hastalık* o *maraz* en lugar de expresiones como *yumurcak*, *ölet* y *tâ'un* para expresar la epidemia.¹⁰

La severidad, las áreas de propagación y los efectos de la peste en los imperios otomano y español a finales del siglo XVI

Después de revelar qué tipo de enfermedad es la peste y su desarrollo en el proceso histórico en todo el mundo, en este capítulo se puede examinar el curso de la epidemia en el Imperio otomano. Los investigadores¹¹ que estudian en esta área discuten generalmente el desarrollo de la peste en el Imperio otomano en tres fases: 1453-1517, 1517-1570 y 1570-1600.¹² La parte de la peste hasta la década de 1560 está más allá del alcance de este estudio. Este estudio se centra en la tercera fase (1570-1600), cuando la epidemia de peste alcanzó su punto máximo, a partir de la década de 1560. En este proceso, la peste alcanzó el tamaño de una grave epidemia y se propagó en oleadas por gran parte del imperio. Las áreas de propagación de la peste en el Imperio otomano en este proceso se muestran en el Mapa 1. A continuación, estas áreas de propagación mostradas en el mapa se analizan con más detalle.



¹⁰ White, 2011: 86; Varlık, 2015: 11-12.

¹¹ Para un repaso de estos estudios, véase White, 2010; 2011: 85-91; Varlık, 2015: 203.

¹² White, 2010: 550-551; Varlık, 2015: 133. Para obtener más información sobre la primera y la segunda fase véase Varlık, 2015: 131-159 y 160-184.

¹³ Varlık, 2015: 188.

La epidemia de peste en el Imperio otomano comenzó a intensificarse a partir de la década de 1570; no obstante, se ve que la epidemia comenzó a mostrar sus efectos en la década de 1560. Debido a la epidemia registrada en Alepo en 1564, los trabajadores del molino harinero de la ciudad fallecieron, por eso, el molino de grano tuvo que parar sus trabajos. Debido a que no pudo pagar el precio ese año, el molino de grano, que funciona bajo una forma de agricultura fiscal conocida como *iltizam*, trató de superar esta situación pidiendo ayuda al pueblo.¹⁴ Se registraron los casos de peste en la ciudad de Karaman en 1565. La inspección que debía hacerse en esta ciudad fue aplazado por causa de la peste.¹⁵ El brote de peste afectó a Tesalónica en 1568.¹⁶ Los lugares donde se registró la peste en el Imperio otomano en 1570 son Morea,¹⁷ Samokov¹⁸ y el pueblo de Lapseki.¹⁹ La epidemia se registró en Caffa en mayo de 1571²⁰ y en Estambul en junio.²¹ La peste, que asoló Estambul en las dos fases mencionadas más arriba, siguió afectando a la ciudad de forma ininterrumpida hasta finales de siglo. Así, Estambul se convirtió en el centro de la peste del imperio en las décadas hasta 1600.²² Además de Estambul, en junio de 1571, la peste se registró alrededor de Valaquia y el Danubio.²³ La epidemia también se registró en los pueblos costeros de la costa del Adriático a partir de 1571.²⁴ En el año 1572, esta vez la epidemia de peste llegó a Chipre. Se afirma que algunos de los poseedores de *timar* (sipahis) que fueron a Chipre desde Karaman durante este período murieron debido a la epidemia en la isla.²⁵ Se entiende que la epidemia de

¹⁴ BOA, MD, 6/114.

¹⁵ BOA, MD, 5/369.

¹⁶ BOA, MD, 7/1686.

¹⁷ La epidemia azotó especialmente los fortalezas en el sur del Morea a lo largo del año 1570. BOA, MD, 14-1/171, 177, 651.

¹⁸ La epidemia que surgió en septiembre de 1570 en Samokov, que hoy se encuentra en el suroeste de Bulgaria y es conocida por sus ricas minas de hierro, se extendió hasta 1571 y provocó la huida de los trabajadores del hierro de la ciudad. BOA, MD, 14-1/661. Dado que Samokov también era un lugar importante en términos de hierro para la armada otomana, esta situación afectó negativamente a la armada Otomana. BOA, MD, 14-2/1224.

¹⁹ Como resultado de la epidemia en el pueblo de Lapseki, el número de hogares disminuyó de 45 a 19. BOA, MD, 14-2/904.

²⁰ Después de la huida de muchas personas de la fortaleza de Caffa debido a la peste, se ordenó al gobernador de Caffa que prohibiera la salida de la fortaleza a la población contribuyente a causa de la peste. BOA, MD, 14-2/1543.

²¹ BOA, MD, 14-2/1570 y 17/39

²² Varlik, 2015: 192.

²³ BOA, MD, 14-2/1578.

²⁴ BOA, MD, 18/180.

²⁵ BOA, MD, 19/407.

peste estalló en Tesalónica en julio de 1572²⁶ y continuó en agosto.²⁷ Un año después, Edirne fue atacada por la peste.²⁸

Se entiende que la peste continuó en Tesalónica en 1574 en el Imperio Otomano.²⁹ Al mismo tiempo, la peste continuó en Edirne.³⁰ Aparte de Tesalónica y Edirne, otro lugar donde se registró la peste en el mismo año es una vez más Morea.³¹ En 1574, la peste también apareció en Sanjacado (sancak) de Üzeyir.³² La peste, se documenta en nuevas localidades. Por ejemplo, la peste apareció esta vez en Erdel en 1576³³ y en Timișoara en enero de 1577.³⁴ Otros lugares donde se registró la peste en 1577 fueron Ereğli, una ciudad en la costa norte del mar de Mármara³⁵ y una vez más Tesalónica.³⁶ Se entiende que la epidemia ocurrió en Erzurum en el mismo año, debido al informe de los muertos causadas por la peste en la ciudad y la demanda del aplazamiento del censo de contribuyentes para el próximo año.³⁷ También se reportó que muchas personas huyeron de la fortaleza debido a la peste en la ciudad.³⁸ La epidemia estaba en Gümüşhane en enero de 1578.³⁹ La epidemia comenzó a intensificarse en 1579 porque en este año la peste se documentó en casi todo el imperio. Por ejemplo, este año la peste apareció en Tesalónica,⁴⁰ Sanjacado de Amid,⁴¹ Egipto⁴² y Basora (parte sur de Irak).⁴³ Al año siguiente, se extendió a Bosnia⁴⁴ y en 1581 a Herzegovina.⁴⁵ En el mismo año, la peste

²⁶ Los judíos de Tesalónica solicitaron permiso para salir de la ciudad con sus familias debido a la epidemia de peste en la ciudad. BOA, MD, 19/417.

²⁷ BOA, MD, 19/610.

²⁸ Esta epidemia provocó que muchas personas abandonaran sus pueblos y el surgimiento del bandolerismo. Ante estos acontecimientos, el gobierno central tomó algunas medidas. BOA, MD, 22/82.

²⁹ Debido a la epidemia de peste, los tejedores de lana huyeron de la ciudad. Esta situación provocó retrasos en el envío de los tejidos que debían enviar a Estambul. BOA, MD, 26/922.

³⁰ BOA, MD, 26/767.

³¹ BOA, MD, 24/7.

³² Se entiende que la peste golpeó severamente a este sanjacado porque se reportó que solo 60 de los 226 hogares de *derbençi* permanecieron allí y no fue posible garantizar la seguridad de la carretera con este número. BOA, MD, 24/262.

³³ BOA, MD, 28/84.

³⁴ Se entiende que la provincia sufrió el azote de la peste severamente, ya que los contribuyentes de Timișoara exigieron amnistía fiscal. BOA, MD, 29/269.

³⁵ BOA, MD, 29/313.

³⁶ BOA, MD, 31/124.

³⁷ BOA, MD, 33/352.

³⁸ BOA, MD, 33/360.

³⁹ BOA, MD, 33/401.

⁴⁰ BOA, MD, 36/738.

⁴¹ BOA, MD, 37/3190.

⁴² BOA, MD, 40/654.

⁴³ BOA, MD, 40/662.

⁴⁴ Se entiende que la epidemia golpeó a Sanjacado de Izvornik a partir de octubre de 1580, debido a la gran cantidad de muertos que provocó y la necesidad de reorganizar los libros de impuestos por este motivo. BOA, MD, 43/547.

⁴⁵ BOA, MD, 46/715.

también apareció en Batumi.⁴⁶ Al año siguiente, la peste volvió a estallar en el Morea⁴⁷ y en 1583 en Plovdiv.⁴⁸

En 1584, la epidemia se intensificó en Estambul durante los meses de verano. Hacia finales de siglo existen informaciones detalladas sobre la peste en Estambul, especialmente en la crónica de Selaniki Mustafa Efendi. Selaniki afirma que todo el séquito de İbrahim Han, que fue enviado a Estambul por el iraní Shah Hüdabende para exigir la paz, murió a causa de la peste.⁴⁹ A continuación, él explica la epidemia en 1584 como sigue: "Debido a la peste, la tristeza y los gemidos de la gente llegaron al cielo en Estambul. No quedó nadie que no sufriera el dolor de la muerte y que no llorara. No había límite para lo que la enfermedad golpeó."⁵⁰ La epidemia continuó en Estambul en 1585⁵¹ y 1586. Mientras escribe detalles sobre la muerte y el funeral de Ahmed Sadık de Tashkent, un místico naqshbandi, a causa de la peste el 2 de agosto de 1586, Selaniki también afirma que la peste destruyó todo en la ciudad durante estos meses.⁵² La epidemia se convirtió casi en una cosa común o un evento estacional en Estambul en este momento. Selaniki afirma que se alivió relativamente a fines de 1590 y los pacientes comenzaron a recuperarse.⁵³ Mientras tanto, la peste se registró en Egipto⁵⁴ y Erzurum en 1587,⁵⁵ en Trípoli y Siria en 1589 y en Argelia en 1590.⁵⁶ Aunque la peste disminuyó a fines de 1590, continuó en 1592. Con la participación de altos ulemas y jeques, se realizaron oraciones comunales y procesiones contra la epidemia.⁵⁷ Luego, por orden del sultán Murad III, se cerraron las tiendas de la ciudad y los ulema y la gente fueron transportados a Alemdağı en el lado de Anatolia con los barcos preparados, donde pasaron la noche y rezaron con la salida del sol. Además, se sacrificaban animales y se distribuían a los necesitados como limosna; los prisioneros fueron liberados con la esperanza de que Dios aceptaría y respondería a sus oraciones. Selaniki afirma que el número de muertos, que era de 325 por día en total, se redujo a 100 después de las acciones tomadas contra la epidemia en la ciudad, y los pacientes fueron curados.⁵⁸ Mientras

⁴⁶ BOA, MD, 46/605.

⁴⁷ BOA, MD, 48/238.

⁴⁸ BOA, MD, 49/137.

⁴⁹ Tarih-i Selânikî, I: 146-47.

⁵⁰ Tarih-i Selânikî, I: 148.

⁵¹ Debido al alto número de muertos provocada por la peste, en mayo de 1585 se pidió al juez (kadı) de Estambul que registrara los legados de los muertos y que los distribuyera entre los herederos y el tesoro. BOA, MD, 58/180 y 58/224.

⁵² Tarih-i Selânikî, I: 173.

⁵³ Tarih-i Selânikî, I: 229.

⁵⁴ BOA, MD, 62/135.

⁵⁵ BOA, MD, 62/277.

⁵⁶ Varlık, 2015: 200.

⁵⁷ Tarih-i Selânikî, I: 285.

⁵⁸ Tarih-i Selânikî, I: 287.

tanto, la peste ocurrió en Kocaeli,⁵⁹ Antalya⁶⁰ y Edirne⁶¹ en el mismo año. La epidemia de 1595, a la que Selaniki se refirió como "*maraz-ı ta 'un*", se detalla en la narración del embajador veneciano en Estambul durante este período.⁶² Al afirmar que la enfermedad también se transmitió a su propia familia, el enviado enfatizó que la epidemia era "una peste extremadamente severa y letal (*peste acutissima, et mortifera*)".⁶³ La epidemia también se registró en Chipre en 1595⁶⁴ y en Siria, Egipto, Azerbaiyán, Bagdad y la Península Arábiga en 1596.⁶⁵

En el año 1598, la epidemia se registró una vez más en Estambul. Selaniki escribe una vez más que hubo una epidemia en la ciudad en los años 1597 y 1598. Después de este brote, el sultán Mehmed III ordenó que los visires se prepararan para la oración comunitaria, y muchos en Estambul se reunieron en Okmeydanı con este objetivo.⁶⁶ A finales de siglo, la peste se documentó en Marruecos, Marrakech y otras ciudades portuarias marroquíes en 1598 y 1599, y en Alepo en 1600.⁶⁷

Como se reveló más arriba, la peste, que afectó a casi todo el imperio desde la década de 1570 hasta la de 1600, provocó la interrupción de la producción y la cadena de suministro en todas las áreas, particularmente en la producción agrícola. Esto agravó el hambre⁶⁸ ya experimentada durante este período.

Después de revelar la severidad, las áreas de propagación y los efectos de la peste en el Imperio otomano a finales del siglo XVI, en este contexto ahora se puede examinar a España. Fuentes españolas⁶⁹ afirman que una gran epidemia de peste estalló entre 1596 y 1602 y arrastró al imperio a una crisis demográfica en el siglo XVII. Esta situación afectó profundamente la estructura económica y social. Por ejemplo, Martín González de Cellorigo, el 30 de mayo de 1599, escribe que "...luego [la enfermedad] se alborotó nuestra ciudad [Valladolid] y poco a poco se fue encendiendo...".⁷⁰ González de Cellorigo afirma sobre el mismo tema que "...[debido a la enfermedad] muchos desampararon a sus mujeres y otros a sus deudos necesitados y padres

⁵⁹ Karademir, 2014: 170,

⁶⁰ BOA, MD, 69/125. Véase también Kılıç, 2004: 55.

⁶¹ BOA, MD, 69/145.

⁶² Tarih-i Selânikî, I: 545.

⁶³ White, 2011: 153.

⁶⁴ BOA, MD, 73/786.

⁶⁵ Tarih-i Selânikî, I: 545; Ünver, 1935: 77; Varlık, 2015: 202.

⁶⁶ Tarih-i Selânikî, I: 545.

⁶⁷ Varlık, 2015: 202.

⁶⁸ Para obtener más información sobre en el Imperio Otomano a fines del siglo XVI, véase White, 2011: 78-103; Karademir, 2014: Yanar, 2021: 92-101.

⁶⁹ Para los estudios sobre la peste 1596-1602 en España, véase Domínguez Ortiz, 1963, I: 68-70; Bennassar, 1969; Pérez Moreda, 1980; Pérez Moreda, 1994.

⁷⁰ Martín González de Cellorigo, 23.

a hijos...”.⁷¹ En este punto, según Alvarez Ossorio y Redin; “Seis accedentes destruyen la multitud: la primera ociosidad; la segunda, hambre; la tercera, peste; la cuarta, expulsión de bassallos; la quinta, guerra; la sexta, faltar el Don de Consejo...”.⁷² Sancho de Moncada, por otro lado, al revelar las causas de la caída de la población en 1619, dice que: “Otros confiesan la falta de gente, pero carganla a las pestes, guerras y expulsión de los moriscos. Pero nada de esto ha habido de pocos años acá, que es cuando se conoce más la falta de ella.”⁷³ Es decir, Sancho de Moncada admite que la epidemia de peste afectó a la población a finales del siglo XVI, pero afirma que ya no puede considerarse entre las causas de la caída de la población en el período que escribe.


La propagación y la severidad del brote 1596-1602, la mayor epidemia del período, asoló el norte y el centro de España, así como Andalucía, se muestra en el siguiente mapa. En España hay dos regiones más afectadas por la peste que asoló casi toda la península entre 1596 y 1602. Primero, la costa cantábrica, desde Santander hasta la frontera francesa, y su interior, es decir, la región de la Montaña y todas las provincias vascas, así como las zonas de alrededor de Logroño y Navarra. En segundo lugar, toda la región central, dentro de un área circular que comprende partes de Valladolid, Madrid y Toledo, y centrada en la totalidad de las provincias de Ávila y Segovia. Estas dos grandes áreas estaban conectadas por un estrecho cinturón compuesto por la parte central, de norte a sur, de la provincia de Burgos y una franja paralela de la provincia de Palencia. La peste se extendió desde la costa cantábrica, por Burgos y Aranda, extendiéndose por Castilla la Vieja, y cruzando la cordillera central por el paso de Somosierra para invadir Madrid y toda la zona central del norte de Castilla la Nueva. Las referencias a la expansión de la peste por Asturias (evidenciado por el caso de Oviedo en 1598) y Galicia, así como en una pequeña parte de Valencia en la zona de Alcoy y Onteniente, en la frontera entre Valencia y Alicante, son menos numerosas y menos confiables. Sin embargo, se documentó que la epidemia afectó severamente a ciudades como Sevilla, Jaén y Lisboa.⁷⁴ Además, no hay duda sobre la propagación de la enfermedad por toda Andalucía y en particular por el oeste de Andalucía, el sur de Portugal y posiblemente ciertas partes del sur de Extremadura. La epidemia también apareció en ciudades como Soria, Guadalajara y Cuenca. El siguiente mapa muestra la propagación y la severidad de la peste en España.

⁷¹ Martín González de Cellorigo, 27.

⁷² BNE, mss. 8456, punto primero, fol. 64r.

⁷³ Sancho de Moncada, 47.

⁷⁴ Sedeño, 1953; Bennassar, 1969; 28, 41, 101.



Mapa 2: Zonas de expansión de la epidemia de peste de 1596-1602 en España⁷⁵

Como se ve en el Mapa 2, la peste afectó a casi toda la Península Ibérica entre 1596 y 1602. El nivel de muerto causado por la peste en España a finales del siglo XVI y principios del XVII se muestra en la siguiente tabla basada en algunas regiones.

Tabla 1: Mortalidad por peste: Aumento de defunciones en torno a 1599⁷⁶

Localidad	Fecha	Periodo base	% de aumento
Vitigudino	1599	1581-1590	574,4
Vitigudino	1599	1601-1610	917,5
Navalcarnero	1598	1593-1600	644,3
Navalcarnero	1598	1601-1610	786,8
Fuentelaencina	1600	1601-1610	290,2
Chiloeches	1599	1603-1610	539,5
Arévalo (San Martín)	1599	1580-1589	306,9
Arévalo (San Juan)	1599	1600-1607	278,9
Collado de Contreras	1599	1586-1594	262,2
Acebo	1599	1600-1609	148,7
Torre de D. Miguel	1599	1590-1600	131,4
Torrejoncillo	1597	1591-1596	171,3
Belmonte	1599	1601-1610	109,5
Bajaras de Melo	1601	1590-1599	153,3
Fuenterrebollo	1599	1600-1607	528,6
Mozoncillo	1599	1590-1600	366,1
Mozoncillo	1599	1600-1609	733
Almazán (San Andrés)	1599	1600-1609	197,1
Almazán (N.Sra. Campanario)	1599	1590-1598	91,4
Castillejo de Robledo	1600	1581-1590	733,3
Lumbrales	1598	1582-1589	233,7

⁷⁵ Pérez Moreda, 1980: 259.

⁷⁶ Pérez Moreda, 1980: 278-279.

Fuente de San Esteban	1598	1590-1600	339
Villar de la Yegua	1597	1581-1590	110,3
Retortillo	1601	1602-1610	428,9
Ciudad Rodrigo (San Andrés)	1598	1581-1590	227

Se entiende de la Tabla 1 que la peste se intensificó en torno a 1599 y provocó un aumento significativo en las tasas de mortalidad. Sin embargo, como se indicó más arriba, además hubo un hambre extremo durante este período. El hambre también provocó las muertes, particularmente de los grupos más desfavorecidos. Al mismo tiempo, surgieron enfermedades como la fiebre tifoidea, la malaria, la neumonía y la gripe. Dado que estas enfermedades también provocaron muertos, no es posible decir que los aumentos en las tasas de mortalidad que se muestran en la tabla fueran totalmente a causa de la peste. No obstante, en cualquier caso, hacia 1599, la tasa de mortalidad en España aumentó drásticamente. El siguiente gráfico muestra claramente las tasas de mortalidad en España basadas en el período que va desde finales del siglo XVI hasta mediados del siglo XIX. Allí se pueden apreciar los efectos causados por la peste.




Gráfico 1: Intensidad de las crisis de mortalidad general en el interior de España, 1575-1855⁷⁷

El gráfico 1 revela que la epidemia de 1599 fue el mayor desastre que provocó pérdidas de población en los aproximadamente 300 años de historia española. La epidemia de 1596-1602 en España afectó sobre todo a niños y mujeres. Esto se ve claramente en la siguiente tabla.

⁷⁷ Pérez Moreda, 1980: 122.

Tabla 2: Sexo y edad de las muertas por peste en España en torno a 1599⁷⁸

Localización	Hombres	Mujeres	Niños	Total
Pamplona	75	113	88	276
Toledo	57	83	104	244
Fuenterrabia (San Sebastián)	36	99	84	219
Gutiérrez Muñoz (Avila)	4	8	20	32
Santo Tomé del Puerto (Sepúlveda)	55		150	205

Según la Tabla 2, en la ciudad de Pamplona donde murieron 276 personas; 75 de los muertos eran hombres, 113 mujeres y 88 niños. En este caso, el 31,9 por ciento de los muertos eran niños. De nuevo en la ciudad de Toledo, donde murieron 244 personas; 57 de los muertos eran hombres, 83 mujeres y 104 niños. En este caso, el 42,6 por ciento de los muertos en Toledo eran niños. En Fuenterrabia, donde murieron 219 personas; 36 de los muertos eran hombres, 99 mujeres y 84 niños. Estos datos muestran que la mayoría de los muertos en Fuenterrabia fueron mujeres y niños. De las 205 personas que murieron en Santo Tomé del Puerto, 55 eran adultos (sin identificar por género) y 150 niños. Según esto, el 73,2 por ciento de los muertos eran niños.

En España, la peste afectó especialmente a los pobres. Según los escritores de la época, informantes de la Corona, médicos, autoridades municipales, cronistas locales y párrocos, eran las víctimas de la peste principalmente entre la población hambrienta.⁷⁹ Pérez de Herrera también afirma que la epidemia afecta principalmente a los pobres.⁸⁰ Además, se entiende por los informes preparados por los *corregidores* sobre los efectos de la peste en sus regiones que la peste golpeó más a los pobres. Por ejemplo, en mayo de 1599, la persona autorizada de Sepúlveda afirma en su informe que "Los enfermos y muertos son las calidades de pobres y miseria...".⁸¹ En total, unas 500.000 personas murieron como consecuencia de la peste 1597-1602.⁸² En este punto, Elliot afirma que esta epidemia se llevó probablemente a un 15 por ciento del incremento de la población durante el siglo XVI y abrió una era de estancamiento en la historia demográfica castellana.⁸³ No obstante, considerando que la población total del Imperio español en este período era alrededor de los 8-8,5 millones⁸⁴ y el número de muertos era alrededor de 500.000, se puede decir que la peste se llevó probablemente a un 6-6,5 por ciento de la población.

⁷⁸ Bennassar, 1969: 18-50.

⁷⁹ Pérez Moreda, 1994: 38.

⁸⁰ Vilar, 1974: 101.

⁸¹ "Carta del corregidor Licenciado Varahona a Felipe III, 26 de mayo de 1599." AGS, Est, leg. 183, fol. 254. Esta carta fue publicada en Bennassar, 1969: 172.

⁸² Domínguez Ortiz, 1963, I: 68-70.

⁸³ Elliot, 1977: 294.

⁸⁴ Domínguez Ortiz, 1963, I: 53-157; Nadal, 1966: 37-88; Lynch, 1994: 173.

En España, hay una relación directa entre la elevada mortalidad provocada por la peste 1596-1602 y la depresión rural porque los campesinos, afectados ya por el hambre, eran víctimas fáciles del brote. Como resultado de esto, cuando estalló la epidemia, la agricultura se deterioró aún más, porque la mano de obra estaba debilitada y su número se había reducido.⁸⁵ Esto aumentó la severidad del desastre porque la peste provocó la caída de la producción agrícola, interrumpió las cadenas de suministro en España y, por lo tanto, agravó las condiciones de hambre experimentadas en este período. Considerando que la principal actividad económica en las sociedades preindustriales era el sector agrícola, no es difícil estimar el impacto de la peste en la economía. Las otras consecuencias económicas de la peste se manifestaron en la crisis laboral. La epidemia provocó un aumento del 30 por ciento en los salarios entre 1596 y 1599.⁸⁶ La peste también desempeñó un papel importante en las grandes migraciones de las zonas rurales.⁸⁷ Como resultado, la peste afectó profundamente la estructura social y económica del Imperio español desde finales del siglo XVI.

Cuando los datos arriba presentados se evalúan juntos; la peste que comenzó a verse en el Imperio Otomano en la década de 1560, se intensificó entre 1591 y 1596 y afectó a gran parte del imperio. La peste, que asoló el Imperio Otomano en este período, también azotó a España casi en el mismo período. Aunque las fuentes del período del Imperio otomano se centraron en la peste, no hay una evaluación de cuántas personas murieron a causa de la peste. En el período moderno tampoco hay predicción en este sentido. Por eso, no se puede presentar el número total de muertos causados por la peste en el Imperio otomano. Por el contrario, se ha calculado el número de muertos por la peste en unas 500.000 personas, equivalente al 6-6,5 % del total de la población (alrededor de 8-8,5 millones) en España. La peste agravó las condiciones de hambre experimentadas en este período y provocó la migración en las zonas rurales en los Imperios Otomano y español a finales del siglo XVI y principios del XVII. Todo ello revela que la epidemia de peste de finales del siglo XVI, al menos sobre la base de España, no afectó únicamente al Imperio otomano. Por el contrario, este desarrollo fue el resultado de la epidemia en el Mediterráneo.

Conclusiones

Se ha determinado que la peste, que se ha extendido en forma de pandemia en el mundo varias veces a lo largo de la historia, comenzó a aparecer a partir de la década de 1570 y se intensificó especialmente entre 1591-1596 en el Imperio Otomano. Casi en el mismo período, entre 1596 y

⁸⁵ Lynch, 1994: 7.

⁸⁶ Elliot, 1977: 294.

⁸⁷ Para obtener más información sobre estas migraciones, véase Yanar, 2022: 171-78.

1602, surgió una grave epidemia de peste en España. Desde este punto de vista, se puede decir que la peste no apareció solo en el Imperio otomano. Al menos sobre la base de España, se puede llegar a una conclusión que esta peste fue una gran epidemia en los lados este y oeste del Mediterráneo.

La existencia de registros que muestran que la peste ocurrió en el Imperio Otomano, desde Erzurum hasta Egipto, desde Estambul hasta Caffa, y desde Caffa a Valaquia y alrededor del Danubio, da una idea clara sobre la propagación y la severidad de la peste. Sin embargo, situaciones como la oración colectiva por el fin de la epidemia con la participación de altos ulemas y jeques o la evacuación de prisiones también revelan la severidad de la epidemia. A pesar de esto, no se puede presentar el número total de muertos causados por la peste en el Imperio otomano. Sin embargo, es posible llegar a la conclusión de que esta peste causó pérdidas significativas solo porque se afirmó que 325 personas murieron por día en Estambul o todo el séquito del embajador que llegó a Estambul murió a causa de la peste. Por el contrario, se estima que aproximadamente 500.000 personas murieron como consecuencia de la peste 1597-1602 en el Imperio Español. Teniendo en cuenta que la población total del Imperio español en este período era alrededor de los 8-8,5 millones y el número de muertos era alrededor de 500.000, se puede decir que la peste se llevó probablemente a un 6-6,5 por ciento de la población. Como resultado de esto, la peste provocó la caída de la producción agrícola, interrumpió las cadenas de suministro en los Imperios otomanos y español, por lo tanto, agravó las condiciones de hambre experimentadas en este período.

Se cree que los hallazgos de este artículo son importantes en términos de ayudar a evaluar la epidemia de peste que surgió en el Imperio Otomano a finales del siglo XVI en un nivel más amplio y revelar nuevas perspectivas que permitirán hacer inferencias acerca la naturaleza de esta epidemia.

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