Is There a Role for the International Community in Palestinian State-building?

Marton Seidner
University of Public Service, Hungary

Abstract

The European Union is known to be in favour of a two-state solution, but the question arises whether the two-state solution is a pan-European position, or there are Member States that have a "separate" policy, either in support of their national interests or because of historical and religious traditions and might have a different vision of the Middle East peace process. In my research, I am looking for answers to the question about the existing role of the international community in the creation of a Palestinian state. As a precondition for the emergence of an independent state, I hypothesize that EU member states do not recognize unanimously the legitimacy of a Palestinian State, despite the European Union's collective belief in the creation of a two-state solution. The research also highlights that the parties involved in state-building and peacebuilding do not necessarily shape their relations and policies in the interests of the international community. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process can partly facilitate the creation of a Palestinian State. Individual interpretations of the agreements and inflexibility on both sides have meant that neither the peace process nor state-building has made much progress in recent decades. In the research methodology, I conducted theoretical and empirical research and examined the resolutions of the UN General Assembly between 2012 and 2022. For each resolution, I examined the voting mechanism of the EU Member States in terms of whether they support the creation of Palestine or whether they support Israel. The evaluation of these results and the drawing of independent conclusions are the individually added values of the research. I

draw conclusions from the voting mechanisms I have evaluated and from the involvement of the international community as to whether the involvement of the international community in state-building has been effective.

Keywords: International community, Palestine, Israel, state-building, peacebuilding

Introduction

In the 1960s, there was a demand within the international community for the creation of a Palestinian State. In the 1980s, thanks to the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), was proclaimed as a President of Palestine and formally elected as a President by the PLO Central Council in 1989. The 1990s brought significant progress in the peace process, as there was a commitment of the international community to support Palestine and the peace process. Even then, it was clear that the success of the peace process depended mainly on the ability of the two parties, Israel, and Palestine, to be able to reach an agreement. Stagnation continued to characterize the Middle East peace process in the 21st century.

The state is an organization with a monopoly of legitimate physical violence in a given territory, with sovereignty over its territory and has authority over the legislative and the judicial powers. It is also an important characteristic of a state that it is recognized by other states and can act autonomously in the international arena. However, it is also important to stress that states have not only rights but also obligations.[1]

One of the most important obligations is that a state must guarantee that it will not launch any action or operation that could pose a threat to another state or even to the international community. Palestinian state-building cannot take place without Israeli negotiation and compromise.

In a European context, two important factors are needed to be examined. The status of agreements between Palestine, Israel and the international community, and Israel's legal position in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. There are several agreements between the Palestinians and Israel, but many of these are no longer in force. The agreements that remained in force tend to be interpreted by both sides in a way which is more favourable to their interests. However, the international community recognizes the agreements as legally binding.

Since the 1967 Israeli war, the international community has interpreted Israel as an occupying power, because the war was fought with a

---

[1] Max Weber (1970) Állam, Politika, Tudomány. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó. Budapest

territorial motive. The territories in question are the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In 2005 Israel withdrew its troops from the Gaza Strip, but the territory remained under Israeli control. For this reason, the Gaza Strip is still considered by international policy as an occupied territory. Israel's control over the Gaza Strip would continue even if a Palestinian State were to be established, as the Gaza Strip would then be in terms of territory a part of the newly established State of Palestine. The Palestinian Authority's operations in the West Bank are limited, with some total prohibition of interaction in certain areas, such as infrastructure, airspace, and the Israeli population. The same applies to East Jerusalem.[2]

Concerning to the World Bank's report, it makes sense to separate Israeli security measures from the exploration of Israeli-Palestinian economic opportunities, because the establishment of a Palestinian State would provide many opportunities to boost economic relations, thus allowing a comprehensive peace agreement soon to be reached and would also allow for rapid economic development in the Palestinian territories.[3]

The Palestinian state and the international community

In 1988, at the Palestinian National Council meeting in Algiers, Yasser Arafat proclaimed the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, which also marked the establishment of the Palestinian State. Under the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, Jerusalem was designated as the capital of the Palestinian State. The United Nations did not recognize the existence of a Palestinian State after the declaration of independence. The United States of America and Israel, of course, opposed the creation of a Palestinian State.

The Palestinians have repeatedly attempted to declare a Palestinian State unilaterally. In 1994, Israel and the Palestinians concluded an interim agreement, which was interpreted differently by the two sides. According to the Palestinians, they had five years from the adoption of the agreement to establish a Palestinian State. The Israeli position is that a final agreement should be reached within five years. Considering this, in 1999 the Palestinians attempted to declare their state, but still, unsuccessfully. The next such attempt was in 2009, a year after the declaration of independence by Kosovo, but this time the Palestinians did not succeed either.

---

[2] Nagy Milada (2017) A palesztin államiság kérdése és a nemzetközi közösség. Mediterrán és Balkán Fórum. XI. évfolyam 1. szám Pécs pp. 38-40.
[3] https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/960071513228856631/pdf/ACS22471-REVISED-Palestine-Trade-Note-Web.pdf Downloaded:01.07.2023

The international community is committed to a two-state solution.[4] The prospect of a Palestinian State was an integral part of international politics in 2004, when the UN sought the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the defense wall that Israel had built. The wall separates Palestinian territory from Israeli territory. Israel's position is that the International Court of Justice should not even deal with this issue, as it is not a dispute between two states. The ICJ did not explicitly want to play a role in the settlement of this dispute but stressed that a negotiated agreement would be necessary to resolve the conflict. The resolution also stated that a Palestinian State should be established as soon as possible. This implicitly meant that the International Court of Justice did not recognize Palestine either.

In 2009, the Palestinian Authority informed the International Criminal Court (ICC)[5] that it was willing to submit itself to ICC's legislative authority. With this political move, the PA[6] wanted the ICC to investigate whether a crime had been committed by Israel. The Palestinians have invoked the Rome Statute to request the ICC to investigate, because the Statute allows for an investigation to be opened on non-member state territory.

This request by the Palestinians has caused great outrage and concern within the international community. The ICC treaty was not signed by the Palestinian Authority, but the Oslo Accords have been concluded between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, with the proviso that the PLO cede limited powers to the PA, thus assuring the other party (Israel) that a Palestinian State would not be established. Under the agreement, the PA was not allowed to conduct foreign policy activities, which were the exclusive responsibilities of the PLO. Under the agreement, the PA was confronted with the fact that it would be a violation of international law if PA would unilaterally declare a Palestinian State. This political move would provoke opposition from the international community.

A further condition for statehood is that a state dominated by a fundamentalist political force (Hamas) or proclaiming the total elimination of another state (Israel) cannot be recognized. The PA put the issue of a Palestinian State back on the agenda in 2012, preceded by the 2006 Lebanon war and the 2009 Gaza war.

In 2012, PA leader Mahmoud Abbas took the case for statehood to the UN. Disappointed with the mediation of the United States and the European Union, Abbas asked the UN Security Council directly for help in

---

[4] Nagy Milada (2017) A palesztin államiság kérdése és a nemzetközi közösség. Mediterrán és Balkán Fórum. XI. évfolyam 1. szám Pécs pp. 40-42.

[5] International Criminal Court

[6] Palestinian Authority

establishing the state. Due to the composition of the UNSC, this effort failed, but in 2011 Palestine became a permanent member of UNESCO. Following the decision, Israel and the United States of America withdrew their financial support and stopped funding the organization.[7]

In 2012, the UN General Assembly elevated Palestine to the status of "non-member observer state". If an international entity recognizes Palestine as a state, it has the possibility to become a contracting party in multilateral treaties, which could lead to a significant pressure on Israel. If Palestine's status and role in the UN is strengthened, it can once again request the position of the International Criminal Court in the investigation of crimes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In December 2022, the UN General Assembly voted 87 in favour, 26 against and 53 abstentions in favour of a resolution calling on the International Court of Justice (ICJ)[8] to rule on whether Israel has committed crimes in the occupied territories.[9]

The possibility of the establishment of the Palestinian State was greatly influenced by former US President Donald Trump's announcement in December 2017, that he would move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This de facto means that Jerusalem is only the capital of Israel. The Palestinians could not accept this measure, there were demonstrations, bombings and assassinations against Israel, and not only the Palestinians but also Arab states expressed their displeasure. In the framework of the Oslo Accords, the city, Abu Dis, near East Jerusalem, was offered as the capital of a potential Palestinian State, but the Palestinians refused to accept it. Jerusalem is envisioned by the international community as the capital of two states, but the US position under Trump has been quite different.

This counts as further evidence that the international community's vision of a dual state is not clear and does not necessarily reflect a collective decision. The Trump administration's decision is presumably motivated by a desire to contain Iranian radicalism. Supporting the containment of Iranian radicalism, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, together with the US, have sought to redress the geopolitical balance in the Middle East.[10]

---

[7] Nagy Milada (2017) A palesztin államiság kérdése és a nemzetközi közösség. Mediterrán és Balkán Fórum. XI. évfolyam 1. szám Pécs pp. 40-44.
[8] International Court of Justice
[9] https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20221231-un-asks-icj-to-consider-consequences-for-israeli-occupation-of-palestinian-territories Downloaded: 01.08.2023
[10] Nagy Milada (2017) A palesztin államiság kérdése és a nemzetközi közösség. Mediterrán és Balkán Fórum. XI. évfolyam 1. szám Pécs pp. 44-46.

The role of the European Union in the Palestinian state-building

The European Union has been calling for the creation of a Palestinian State since 1977. At the time, the EU's predecessor, the EC, recognized the rights of the Palestinians, and the 1980 Venice Declaration and later, in 1999, the European Union's Berlin Declaration laid down the foundations for a framework between the two states. In the early years of 2000, the Seville Declaration laid down the need to establish a Palestinian State along the 1967 borders. Since the 1980s, the Palestinians have received economic support from the EC, and, in addition to economic support, political assistance as well.

In 2011, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, under external pressure (British and American) changed the EU's position and stopped calling for recognition by the UN General Assembly and started calling for the status of the Palestinian state to be raised. This also helped the Israeli idea, because in this case the Palestinian State cannot appeal to the UN Security Council and cannot file a case against Israel at the International Court of Justice. Ashton has been criticized for her decision and has tried to shift some of the responsibility to the EU Member States, urging them to develop a common position in the light of which the EU can pursue a united policy on the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. This would also consolidate the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on an international level.

On the 29th of November 2012, the UN General Assembly voted on the status of a Palestinian State. On that occasion, 14 states voted in favour, Bulgaria, Estonia, the Netherlands, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Great Britain, Germany, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia abstained, and the Czech Republic was the only EU member state who voted against.[11]

Javier Solana summarized the case for calling for the creation of a Palestinian State as follows. First, the concept of a two-state solution must be kept alive. Secondly, the European Union invests one billion euros a year in achieving a two-state solution. The establishment of a Palestinian State should also be urged in terms of European security and energy supply issues, and, last but not least, the establishment of a Palestinian State would be a tangible and positive result of the EU's common foreign and security policy.[12]

The European Union's state-building efforts have not only taken place in the context of the conventions and legal frameworks listed above, but also

---

[11] Nagy Milada (2017) A palesztin államiság kérdése és a nemzetközi közösség. Mediterrán és Balkán Fórum. XI. évfolyam 1. szám Pécs pp. 45.

[12] Nagy Milada (2017) A palesztin államiság kérdése és a nemzetközi közösség. Mediterrán és Balkán Fórum. XI. évfolyam 1. szám Pécs pp. 45.

in the context of actual missions. Missions launched by the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) which, in addition to the legal framework, were designed to achieve security. EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS are two civilian operations that are particularly important. Both the conceptual and empirical approaches can be set aside, because the operationalization of the missions revealed the actual, micro-political conflicts.

The Palestinian state-building process started after the Oslo Accords. In 1995, administrative areas were created by dividing the West Bank and Gaza Strip into three parts. Area A of the West Bank, which is approximately 17% of the West Bank territory, was fully under the jurisdiction of the PA. In Area B, which is 21% of the territory, the PA has only civilian control functions, with Israel carrying out the security control functions. In Area C, Israel exercises exclusive authority, over 60% of the territory of the West Bank.

This has created a rather fragmented territory, which from the outside might seem to be a political decision against state-building. On the one hand, this division of territory has transferred certain rights to the Palestinian Police (Oslo II), but it has also led to the acceptance of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Palestinian territories.

Following the second intifada, the Danish EU Presidency was tasked with establishing a state-building plan for a two-state solution. The Middle East Quartet[13] launched two civilian missions in the region.[14]

EUBAM Rafah

In 2005, Israel agreed with the Palestinian Authority to transfer the supervision of the Gaza Strip, and the Rafah crossing will be jointly supervised by the PA and Egypt, under the control of a third party. The United States has not taken on the role of being an inspector, the EU has been designated for this role. In Israel's view, this was not the best solution, but it allowed Israel to give a role to the EU. The EU, on the other hand, was happy with this opportunity, as it had been trying for years to be an international policy player in Middle East politics, and this role was a good opportunity to do so.

The European Union also wanted to gain Israel's trust and to convince Israel to cede certain rights to the PA under supervision.[15] The mission's aim was to help the Palestinians improve their border control capabilities with

[13] USA, UN, EU, Russia

[14] Dimitris Bouris (2019) Unintended Consequences of State-building Projects in Contested States: the EU in Palestine, The International Spectator, 54:1, 92-95

[15] Anders Persson (2018) Palestine at the end of the state-building process: technical achievements, political failures, Mediterranean Politics, 23:4, 436-438.

EU support and to deepen relations between Egypt, Israel and the PA. The control of the Rafah border was not a particularly difficult task, but it was an opportunity for the EU to develop closer relations with Israel and, not least, to contribute to state-building and, at the same time, also to the peace process. Since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip, Israel has imposed a blockade on the Gaza Strip, and EU observers have not been allowed to enter the area.[16]

EUPOL COPPS

EUPOL COPPS is also a civilian mission in support of law enforcement and rule of law processes. It was also aimed at implementing two-state solutions prepared by the Danish Presidency. The mission had to be launched in rather difficult circumstances, as Hamas won the Palestinian elections in 2006. The main task of the mission was to support the Palestinian Police and help to establish the rule of law. The actual work of the mission started after President Salam Fayyad came to power. Fayyad's political view was, that the main building block of state-building was the establishment and maintenance of security. It is important to underline that EUPOL COPPS has contributed significantly to the successful cooperation with the Palestinian Police.[17] The EUBAM Rafah mission has succeeded in achieving a positive Israeli perception of the European Union's engagement in state-building and peace-building. As a result, the European Union can claim that it has been a part of the solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. When the mission was launched, it was clear that this was a bilateral agreement between Egypt and the PA, but that Israel would have the final word in all the decisions. The EU's hidden agenda was to gain more leverage, slightly overshadowing the original objective. This claim is fully borne out by the EU's position that it wanted to be an indispensable active player in the Middle East peace policy. This was also the case with the Iranian nuclear program and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In the case of EUPOL COPPS, the success of the mission is questionable because it was able to operate in a very limited area. This was essentially due to territorial fragmentation, which meant that the mission was able to operate under a number of constraints. In the case of both missions, the European Union's aim was to play a central role, but nothing could be done without Israeli control and approval. The question arises: why were these missions launched? No significant progress in state-building can be seen, but rather a

---

[16] Dimitris Bouris (2019) Unintended Consequences of State-building Projects in Contested States: the EU in Palestine, The International Spectator, 54:1, 92-96
[17] Dimitris Bouris (2019) Unintended Consequences of State-building Projects in Contested States: the EU in Palestine, The International Spectator, 54:1, 96-97

regional balance of power competed with the European Union, which may or may not represent the international community.[18]

UN General Assembly voting outcomes 2012-2022

Since 2014, positions in favour of Palestinian aspirations have become much more widespread within the international community. Sweden was the first Western European country to recognize Palestine. Subsequently, the Spanish, French and British parliaments adopted a special resolution recognizing Palestine, but stressing the importance of a two-state solution. Increasing international pressure may prompt Israel to push again for peace talks with the Palestinians. These issues are likely to intensify, given the UN General Assembly resolution against Israel at the end of 2022, which does not make the foreign and domestic policy of the recently returned Benjamin Netanyahu any easier.

I will support these empirical findings by examining the UN General Assembly resolutions from 2012 to 2022. I have examined the resolutions dealing with Palestine during the period indicated and the mechanism by which EU Member States vote on these resolutions.

The first table lists the resolutions I have examined. The second table shows the votes of the EU Member States (A: abstained, Y: yes, N: no). The third table shows the percentage distribution of the number of votes. For each of the decisions examined, all EU Member States voted, so there is no 'no vote' data.

For the first five decisions, a significant proportion of votes fall into the 'no' or 'abstention' categories. Abstention was most common for the countries. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that even after all these years, countries are not necessarily taking a position. This is in stark contrast to the position often taken in Europe or by the international community.

If the votes were equally divided between 'yes' and 'no' votes, we could partly assume that the voting mechanism in the Member States would reflect the position of the European Union. In comparison, Member States either abstain or vote in favour. These resolutions are all in favour of Palestinian rights, we can also draw a conclusion that in half of the resolutions Member States abstain and in the other half of the resolutions vote in favour of Palestine.

In the case of the resolutions on the occupied territories and the human rights of Palestinians, the "yes" vote is almost always over 90%, while 85% abstained concerning the evaluation of the work of the commission in regard the occupied territories. This difference also confirms

---

[18] Dimitris Bouris (2019) Unintended Consequences of State-building Projects in Contested States: the EU in Palestine, The International Spectator, 54:1, 97-100

the assumption that Member States are less able to decide which position to take.

What is clear is that Hungary consistently voted "no" on all issues, with a clear explanation: Hungary has a very good relationship with Israel and fully supports it.

The fourth table shows the overall voting record of the EU Member States. Malta and Cyprus have a Palestinian position in 82% of their votes, and all other EU Member States except Hungary and the Czech Republic have a Palestinian position in almost 50% of their votes. Hungary voted "no" in all cases and the least supportive of the Palestinian position after Hungary are Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Lithuania and the Netherlands. In other words, with the exception of some countries (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta), almost half of the EU Member States are in favour of a Palestinian position, the other half abstain.

The conclusion to be drawn from this voting mechanism is that there is no coherent consensus among EU Member States, and therefore the idea of a two-state solution, as preferred by the international community, cannot be translated onto the Member States' vision. It can therefore be said that the European Union is not formulating its policy-making direction through a collective decision-making mechanism but is entering the international political arena with the intention of actively participating in international politics as it has done in the past.

Decision number	Decision	Decision link
2018/37	Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1654161?ln=en
2019/33	Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3837829?ln=en
2019/70	Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3837827?ln=en
2019/97	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting	https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3839966?ln=en

	the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	
2020/84	Division for Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3893463?ln=en
2020/95	Special information programme on the question of Palestine of the Department of Global Communications of the Secretariat : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3893459?ln=en
2020/96	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3894281?ln=en
2020/100	Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3894278?ln=en
2021/37	Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3949881?ln=en

	2021/84	Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3950798?ln=en
	2021/86	Work of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3950806?ln=en

Table 1. UN General Assembly resolutions on Palestine 2012-2022

Country	2018/37	2019/33	2019/70	2019/97	2020/84	2020/95	2020/96	2020/100	2021/37	2021/84	2021/86
AUSTRIA	A	A	N	A	N	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	N
BELGIUM	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
BULGARIA	A	A	N	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
CROATIA	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
CYPRUS	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
CZECHIA	A	N	N	A	N	Y	Y	A	A	A	N
DENMARK	A	A	N	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
ESTONIA	A	A	N	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
FINLAND	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
FRANCE	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
GERMANY	A	A	N	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
GREECE	A	A	N	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
HUNGARY	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
IRELAND	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
ITALY	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
LATVIA	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A

LITHUANIA	A	A	N	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
LUXEMBO URG	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
MALTA	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
NETHERLA NDS	A	A	N	A	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
POLAND	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
PORTUGAL	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
ROMANIA	A	A	N	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
SLOVAKIA	A	A	N	A	N	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A
SLOVENIA	A	A	A	A	N	Y	Y	A	A	A	N
SPAIN	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
SWEDEN	A	A	A	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A

Table 2. EU Member States' votes for the decisions examined

	2018/ 37	2019/ 33	2019/ 70	2019/ 97	2020/ 84	2020/ 95	2020/ 96	2020/ 100	2021/ 37	2021/ 84	2021/ 86
yes %	7%	7%	7%	0%	7%	96%	96%	85%	89%	89%	0%
no %	4%	7%	44%	4%	44%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	15%
abstaine d %	89%	85%	48%	96%	48%	0%	0%	11%	7%	7%	85%

Table 3. Voting mechanism of EU Member States in %

Country	Y %	N %	A %
AUSTRIA	36%	27%	36%
BELGIUM	45%	0%	55%
BULGARIA	45%	18%	36%
CROATIA	45%	0%	55%
CYPRUS	82%	0%	18%
CZECHIA	18%	36%	45%
DENMARK	45%	18%	36%
ESTONIA	45%	18%	36%
FINLAND	45%	0%	55%
FRANCE	45%	0%	55%
GERMANY	45%	18%	36%
GREECE	45%	18%	36%
HUNGARY	0%	100%	0%

IRELAND	45%	0%	55%
ITALY	45%	0%	55%
LATVIA	45%	0%	55%
LITHUANIA	45%	18%	36%
LUXEMBOURG	45%	0%	55%
MALTA	82%	0%	18%
NETHERLANDS	45%	18%	36%
POLAND	45%	0%	55%
PORTUGAL	45%	0%	55%
ROMANIA	45%	9%	45%
SLOVAKIA	36%	18%	45%
SLOVENIA	27%	18%	55%
SPAIN	45%	0%	55%
SWEDEN	45%	0%	55%

Table 4. Distribution of votes in EU Member States in %

Conclusion

The international community has been trying for decades to achieve its goal of a two-state solution for Palestine. Negotiations between the parties have failed and it is increasingly apparent that Israel needs to find new supporters, both regionally and globally, as pro-Palestinian views in the international community appear to be gaining strength.

The much-vaunted unity of the international community seems to be breaking down. Theoretical and empirical research has shown that state-building and security are not clearly the responsibility of the international community. The positive effects of the various missions and economic aid cannot be denied, but it must be recognized that neither the political nor the legal framework for resolving a Palestinian-Israeli conflict is in place, and that a two-state solution is only viable if the two parties concerned can reach an agreement.

As the geopolitical, economic, historical and religious orientations in the Middle East are completely different from those in the transatlantic world or the European Union, it is difficult to bring this multipolar system under one roof.

The outcome of the UN General Assembly's voting concerning Palestine also shows that the presumed international community position, as presented in international and domestic literature, that a two-state solution can achieve state-building and a sustainable peace settlement, is not reflected in the voting behavior of EU Member States.

It is clear that the European Union wishes to play an active role in peace-building in the Middle East, but it is equally important for the EU to develop a system of relations with the Mediterranean that is indispensable in the current international political situation?

In my opinion, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not be resolved by the Quartet policy, but possibly by certain regional realignments, which will lead Israel and the PA territories to seek new allies.

It is quite certain that the international community, with the exception of one or two countries, is more in favour of the Palestinian position. Closely linked to this is the UN General Assembly resolution adopted at the end of 2022, which will allow the International Court of Justice to make a recommendation on whether Israel has committed crimes against the Palestinians in the occupied territories, but the most exciting question is whether the newly formed Israeli government, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, will be forced to pursue an offensive or defensive policy in this situation.

References:
1. Anders Persson (2018) Palestine at the end of the state-building process: Technical achievements, political failures, Mediterranean Politics, 23:4, 436-438.
2. Dimitris Bouris (2019) Unintended Consequences of State-building Projects in Contested States: The EU in Palestine, The International Spectator, 54:1, 92-95, 92-96, 96-97, 97-100
3. Max Weber (1970) Állam, Politika, Tudomány. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó. Budapest
4. Nagy Milada (2017) A palesztin államiság kérdése és a nemzetközi közösség. Mediterrán és Balkán Fórum. XI. évfolyam 1. szám Pécs pp. 38-40, 40-42, 40-44, 44-46.
5. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/960071513228856631/pdf/ACS22471-REVISED-Palestine-Trade-Note-Web.pdf Downloaded:01.07.2023
6. https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20221231-un-asks-icj-to-consider-consequences-for-israeli-occupation-of-palestinian-territories Downloaded:01.08.2023
7. https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/76   Downloaded 01.06.2023