

Anomaly Detection in Portal System Networks: A Hybrid EMLOA-OCSVM Approach and Review of Challenges

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Abstract

Portal system networks are vital for education, governance, and corporate operations, but face growing risks from evolving cyber threats. This study proposes a hybrid anomaly detection framework that combines the Enhanced Modified Lion Optimization Algorithm (EMLOA) with One-Class Support Vector Machines (OCSVM) to enhance threat detection in such environments. Unlike traditional rule-based or statistical methods, which lack adaptability, or conventional machine learning techniques that demand

extensive labeled data and computational power, the EMLOA-OCSVM model achieves high accuracy (99.9%), low training latency (3.05 seconds), and scalability in dynamic settings. The framework employs a sigmoid function-based strategy to dynamically optimize hyperparameters (γ and ν), enhancing convergence speed and detection performance. Evaluations using the UNSW-NB15 dataset (reflecting modern attack patterns) and real-world logs from Lagos State University of Education (LASUED) demonstrate the model's practical relevance. Key innovations include dynamic threshold tuning and improved interpretability, reducing false positives without sacrificing efficiency. Robust performance is confirmed through accuracy, precision, recall, F1-score, and ROC-AUC metrics. Future research should prioritize lightweight, explainable hybrid models capable of countering advanced threats while maintaining system performance.

Keywords: Anomaly Detection, Portal Systems, EMLOA, OCSVM, Hybrid Models, Cybersecurity, Explainable AI (XAI), Real-Time Monitoring, Threshold Optimization, Machine Learning

Introduction

Portal system networks are essential platforms for educational institutions, corporate organizations, and public administration. They facilitate critical operations such as student and staff record management, payment processing, and academic activities. However, these systems face an increasing number of security threats, including data breaches, unauthorized access, and network anomalies. The early detection of abnormalities in a portal system is essential to maintaining its operational integrity and protecting sensitive data (Hashmi & Ahmad, 2020). For instances, major cyber incidents like the July 2015 data breach at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), which exposed 4.5 million records at a cost of over \$70 million, and the July 2023 University of Manchester was a victim of cyber-attack, resulting to vulnerabilities of about 11,000 staff and more than 46,000 students' data (Paganini, 2023). Highlight the severe consequences of insufficient anomaly detection systems. In Nigeria, the 2023 presidential elections recorded 12.9 million cyber threats reported by the Minister of Communication and Digital Economy, Isa Pantami (Ukagwu, 2023). Further, it emphasizes the need for robust security mechanisms.

Research Gap

Conventional anomaly detection techniques rely on statistical and rule-based models, which cannot recognize complex and dynamic threats (Darveau et al., 2020). Support Vector Machines (SVM), k-means Clustering, and Deep Learning are prominent examples of machine learning-based techniques that

have enhanced detection capabilities; however, they are limited in their ability to adapt to unexpected attack patterns and incur significant computing costs. Additionally, current techniques produce a high number of false positives, which results in operational inefficiencies. The Enhanced Modified Lion Optimization Algorithm (MLOA) introduces a dynamic approach to threshold tuning, improving the accuracy and robustness of anomaly detection in portal networks.

Research Objective

This review aims to analyze and compare current anomaly detection techniques in portal networks. Specifically, it will:

1. Review traditional and machine learning-based anomaly detection methods, identifying their strengths and weaknesses.
2. Examine the potential of hybrid approaches, review methodology, including the MLOA, in enhancing detection performance.
3. Highlight key challenges in anomaly detection, such as scalability, real-time processing, and adaptability.
4. Provide recommendations for future research, emphasizing AI-driven optimization techniques for improved security.

Anomaly Detection in Portal Networks

Anomaly detection is an essential element of cybersecurity and system performance monitoring in portal networks, where immediate access to financial, administrative, and academic data is essential (Fernandes et al., 2022). Portal systems, widely used in government organizations, business environments, and educational institutions, facilitate crucial tasks such as staff administration, fee payment, student registration, and result processing. However, as these systems become increasingly complex, they become more vulnerable to security concerns such as insider threats, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, unauthorized access, and data leaks. Deviations or abnormalities from normal system behavior that may indicate malicious activities or system failures are known as portal network anomalies (Mittal et al., 2024). Early anomaly detection prevents potential threats, lowers security risks, and ensures ongoing service availability.

Types of Anomalies in the Portal Network

Anomalies in portal systems can be categorized into three main groups based on particular characteristics and implications for network operations:

1. Point Anomalies: Point anomalies refer to individual data points significantly deviating from normal system behavior. These anomalies are often isolated incidents within a dataset, indicating unusual system activities. For instance, in Portal Networks, irregular login attempts: A

single failed login attempt using an incorrect password is normal, but login attempts from an unusual geographic location (e.g., a student from Nigeria logging in from China without prior travel records) could indicate unauthorized access, unexpected large file transfers: A student or staff account suddenly transferring an abnormally large amount of data within a short time frame may indicate data exfiltration, and payment processing errors: A payment transaction failing multiple times due to unverified bank details may be a fraudulent attempt or a sign of a system misconfiguration.

2. Contextual Anomalies: Contextual anomalies refer to data points that appear normal in one context but are considered unusual in another. These anomalies are highly dependent on the surrounding data and external factors such as time of access, user privileges, or operational conditions. In a Portal Networks, accessing the System Outside Normal Hours: A university administrator logging in to process student results during official working hours is normal, but if the same administrator logs in at midnight and attempts to modify records, it could signal an insider attack, irregular examination registration patterns: If a student registers for an examination minutes before the deadline every semester, it may be a habit. However, if multiple students suddenly register within the same short time frame, it could indicate a system malfunction or coordinated cheating attempt, and high central processing unit (CPU) or memory utilization during Off-Peak hours: A portal system experiencing high network traffic at night when no scheduled operations are planned could suggest a brute-force attack or an unauthorized system scan.
3. Collective Anomalies: Collective anomalies occur when a group of related data points collectively indicates an abnormal pattern, even if individual data points appear normal. These types of anomalies are common in coordinated cyberattacks and fraudulent activities in portal networks. For example in Portal Networks, multiple failed login attempts across different accounts: If multiple users experience failed login attempts within a short period, it could indicate a brute-force attack, where attackers try different passwords to gain unauthorized access, simultaneous access from multiple locations: A single student logging in from different geographic locations within minutes suggests that credentials have been compromised and are being used by unauthorized individuals, and unusual surge in fee payment transactions: A sudden spike in fee payments from newly created student accounts could indicate a security vulnerability being exploited for financial fraud.

Importance of Anomaly Detection in Portal Networks

Effective anomaly detection is crucial for ensuring the security, integrity, and availability of portal systems. Some key benefits include:

1. **Prevention of Cyber Threats:** Early detection of unauthorized access, malware infections, and phishing attacks helps in proactive threat mitigation.
2. **Minimizing Data Breaches:** Identifying anomalies in data access patterns can prevent leakage of sensitive student or staff information.
3. **Enhancing System Performance:** Detecting network bottlenecks, slow query responses, and resource overuse helps maintain optimal system efficiency.
4. **Regulatory Compliance:** Many institutions must comply with data protection regulations (e.g., GDPR, NITDA Regulations), requiring real-time monitoring and anomaly detection.

Techniques for Early Anomaly Detection

Early anomaly detection is essential for securing portal system networks, which handle academic, administrative, and financial transactions. The three basic techniques commonly used for the detection of anomalies in portal networks are traditional methods, machine learning approaches, and hybrid approaches.

Traditional Methods for Anomaly Detection in Portal Networks

Traditional approaches, such as rule-based detection and statistical modeling, were among the first techniques applied in portal networks.

Rule-Based Detection

Rule-based systems work by enforcing predefined conditions, such as limiting failed login attempts or flagging transactions above a set threshold (Moore, 2025). While effective for straightforward cases, these systems often generate false alarms (Emesoronye, 2024). For instance, during peak student registration, legitimate users are frequently locked out for exceeding login thresholds, disrupting services.

Advantages of Rule-Based Detection

1. **Simple to Implement:** Rules are easy to define and require minimal computational resources.
2. **Effective for Known Threats:** Works well in environments with predictable attack patterns.
3. **Immediate Response:** Since rules are predefined, the system can instantly flag anomalies without requiring complex computations.

Limitations of Rule-Based Detection

1. High False Positives: Legitimate activities may be flagged simply because they violate predefined thresholds.
2. Inability to Detect New Threats: Rule-based methods cannot adapt to evolving cyber threats that do not fit predefined patterns.
3. Manual Rule Updating: Requires continuous manual updates to remain effective, making it impractical for large-scale dynamic environments.

Statistical Models

Statistical models extend beyond simple rule-based methods by using probability and time-series analysis to identify anomalies (Rousseeuw & Hubert, 2018). Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM) group user behaviors, such as login frequency and transaction patterns, into clusters, flagging activities that fall outside expected probability ranges (Yu et al., 2023). For example, in a university portal, GMM can distinguish normal staff logins from suspicious bulk data transfers. Similarly, Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) analyzes historical trends, such as payment transactions or portal logins, and signals deviations from forecasted values (Cipra, 2020). While these models are interpretable and effective for structured or seasonal data, they struggle with dynamic behaviors, require frequent recalibration, and often lack the real-time adaptability needed for modern, large-scale portal networks (Rožanec et al., 2021).

Advantages of Statistical Models

1. More Adaptable than Rule-Based Detection: It can detect unusual patterns without requiring predefined rules.
2. Effective for Time-Series Analysis: Well-suited for detecting trends and unexpected deviations in network behavior.
3. Lower False Positives: More precise than simple rule-based thresholds.

Limitations of Statistical Models

1. Assumes Static Data Distributions: Dynamic and evolving threats are challenging for many statistical models to address.
2. Computationally Expensive: Real-time anomaly detection in large-scale portal networks necessitates a substantial amount of computational resources.
3. Less Effective for Complex Attacks: It frequently fails to distinguish between real system modifications and subtle malicious activity.

Machine Learning Approaches for Anomaly Detection

Machine learning (ML) methods have significantly advanced anomaly detection by learning patterns from data rather than relying on fixed thresholds (Bablu, 2025). Supervised approaches such as decision trees, random forests, and support vector machines (SVMs) have been applied in detecting fraudulent tuition payments and unauthorized staff access. However, their reliance on large, labeled datasets limits their practicality, since new attack patterns often appear without prior labels in real-world portal systems (Patrick & Huston, 2025).

Unsupervised methods, including K-Means clustering and DBSCAN, are attractive because they do not require labeled data. In practice, however, these methods may flag legitimate but unusual activities as suspicious. For example, international students logging in from multiple time zones may be misclassified as attackers, creating unnecessary administrative burdens (Claudius & Andersen, 2022).

Deep learning techniques such as Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) networks can capture sequential login or usage behaviors, making them well-suited for detecting subtle anomalies (Analysis & Vision, 2019).. Yet, their high computational cost poses deployment challenges in under-resourced academic environments. In one pilot test, a university portal that integrated LSTM-based anomaly detection experienced significant slowdowns during examination registration, forcing administrators to suspend the system.

Overall, while ML techniques outperform traditional methods, their real-world adoption in portal systems is limited by issues of data availability, adaptability, and computational efficiency.

Advantages of Machine Learning (ML)

1. **Automation of Detection:** ML models can automatically learn patterns in data, reducing the need for manual rule creation.
2. **Ability to Handle Complex Data:** Effective for high-dimensional and non-linear datasets (e.g., portal access logs, financial transactions).
Adaptability: With retraining, ML models can adapt to new patterns and evolving threats.
3. **Scalability:** Can process and analyze huge datasets in real-time (e.g., detecting anomalies in millions of student logins).
4. **Higher Accuracy:** Advanced ML models (e.g., deep learning) outperform traditional statistical methods in recognizing subtle and complex anomalies.
5. **Versatility Across Domains:** Applied in cybersecurity, fraud detection, healthcare, finance, and education portal systems.

Limitation of Machine Learning (ML)

1. **Dependence on Data Quality:** Performance depends heavily on the availability of large, clean, and representative datasets.
2. **Labeling Challenges:** Supervised learning requires large amounts of labeled data, which is often unavailable for emerging or rare attack types.
3. **Computational Cost:** Complex models (e.g., deep neural networks) require significant processing power and memory, which may not be feasible in resource-constrained environments.
4. **Overfitting Risk:** ML models may “memorize” training data instead of generalizing, leading to poor performance on unseen data.
5. **Latency in Real-Time Systems:** Some ML methods introduce delays, making them less effective for time-sensitive anomaly detection.
6. **Vulnerability to Adversarial Attacks:** ML models can be tricked by carefully crafted inputs that appear normal but are malicious.

Hybrid Approaches

A hybrid anomaly detection system combines several types of approaches, including traditional methods (rule-based), statistical analysis, machine learning (ML), and optimization algorithms, to enhance the accuracy, efficacy, and flexibility of detecting network anomalies. This approach minimizes the drawbacks of each technique while maximizing its benefits (Yuan, 2022).

Literature Review: Methodology

This review explores the foundational concepts of hybrid methods in detection systems, emphasizing their role in balancing complementary strengths and mitigating individual limitations. Hybrid approaches integrate multiple detection techniques, such as rule-based systems and machine learning models, to enhance accuracy, adaptability, and real-time responsiveness.

Rule-based methods, while efficient and straightforward to deploy, often struggle with identifying novel or evolving threats due to their reliance on predefined patterns. Conversely, machine learning models offer greater flexibility in detecting unforeseen anomalies but demand extensive training data and may introduce computational complexity. By combining these methodologies, hybrid systems achieve a more robust framework: they maintain the precision of rule-based detection for known threats while leveraging machine learning’s predictive capacity to uncover emerging risks. Such integration is particularly valuable in educational portal system network contexts, where scalable, real-time threat detection must accommodate both predictable vulnerabilities and dynamic, innovative attack strategies. This

synergy positions hybrid systems as a promising solution for safeguarding digital infrastructures without sacrificing efficiency or adaptability.

A hybrid anomaly detection system follows a structured workflow to efficiently identify and mitigate security threats in a network. The process begins with data collection, where network logs, traffic data, and system events are gathered. This data includes essential features such as IP addresses, timestamps, packet sizes, protocol types, and user activity logs, providing a foundation for further analysis (Green et al., 2025).

Next, the system undergoes preprocessing, which involves feature extraction to convert raw traffic data into meaningful attributes. Feature selection is employed with variance thresholding, a simple but powerful feature selection technique, because of its ability to eliminate near-constant variables, especially when the threshold is set to 0.01, retaining six critical features: protocol type, source/destination IPs, source/destination port numbers, and attack labels as detailed in Appendix A. This step ensures that only the most relevant data is used for anomaly detection.

The initial detection layer utilizes signature-based rules to identify known attack patterns, such as SQL injections and DDoS attacks. Simultaneously, statistical methods establish a baseline for normal network behavior, allowing deviations to be flagged as potential anomalies. This dual-layer approach improves the system's ability to recognize both predefined threats and unusual patterns.

The next phase involves machine learning-based analysis, where unsupervised learning techniques cluster network traffic data to detect suspicious activities without requiring labeled data. To improve performance, optimization and fine-tuning techniques such as Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO), Genetic Algorithms (GA), and the Lion Optimization Algorithm (LOA) are used to adjust detection parameters dynamically. Additionally, dynamic threshold adjustment minimizes the false positive rate, ensuring that alerts are only triggered for genuine threats.

Hybrid anomaly detection-based systems (HADBS) have been widely explored in network security due to their ability to combine complementary detection techniques. However, despite their practical advantages, these systems present several challenges.

First, the integration of multiple detection models can substantially increase system complexity and computational overhead. This added intricacy may hinder deployment in resource-constrained environments. Second, optimizing the decision boundary threshold, balancing exploration (detecting novel anomalies) and exploitation (leveraging known patterns), poses a significant challenge. Overly sensitive models may lead to elevated false positive rates, particularly when parameter tuning is not meticulously calibrated. Finally, ensuring seamless compatibility and real-time

performance across heterogeneous detection mechanisms remains a persistent issue, especially in large-scale or highly dynamic networks. Scalability and latency concerns may arise when attempting to maintain responsiveness across distributed or evolving infrastructures.

Addressing these limitations is critical to advancing the practicality and reliability of HADBS in real-world network environments.

Ultimately, this literature review serves as a gateway into the diverse world of hybrid anomaly detection. It not only explains the methodologies used to combine different techniques but also highlights the challenges and future directions that researchers are likely to explore as they strive to build more robust and versatile security systems for portal system networks.

Table 1 shows the pros and cons of some HADBS reviewed for this work.

Table 1: Pros and cons of HADBS reviewed

S/N	Author(s)	Methodology	Merit	Limitation
1	Rasim & Fargana, 2019	The proposed methodology employs a two-phase feature selection approach, where Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) first identifies essential features while addressing dataset imbalance, followed by Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) to extract high-information, low-correlation features. For classifier optimization, a Genetic Algorithm (GA) fine-tunes ensemble models, including XGBoost and SVM, with the system evaluated on NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, and CSE-CIC-IDS2018 datasets to validate performance.	The system achieves 97.87%, 92.63%, and 90.38% of accuracy on CSE-CIC-IDS2018, UNSW-NB15, and NSL-KDD datasets, respectively,	Reliance on a metaheuristics generic detection threshold that requires manual tuning or modification. AUC-ROC validation remains unexplored.
2	Ugrenovic, & Tom , 2020	The paper presents an out-of-distribution (OOD) detection framework based on anomaly detection methods (One-Class SVM, Isolation Forest, Local Outlier Factor) and its ensembles, which are evaluated using softmax outputs from a DenseNet trained on CIFAR-10. The process entails training detectors on in-distribution data before testing on synthetic/noisy OOD datasets.	The ensembles model achieves 95% accuracy on UNSW-NB15, and NSL-KDD datasets. Practicality: Reduces OOD data requirements for training.	Unmeasured AUC-ROC performance, architecture-dependent softmax reliance, and high ensemble computational costs are all important drawbacks.
3	Pu et al., 2021	The SSC-OCSVM model detects anomalies by dividing high-dimensional data into 2D subspaces via Sub-Space Clustering (SSC). One-Class SVM identifies deviations in each subspace, while Evidence Accumulation (EA) aggregates results, flagging data points as anomalies if they are repeatedly marked as suspicious, enabling improved detection of rare or subtle threats without the need for labeled data.	SSC-OCSVM excels at detecting rare attacks like user-to-root(U2R) and remote-to-local (R2L), with up to 90% accuracy and a low false positive rate, even in mixed-attack situations	The model relies on a fixed threshold, requiring manual tuning across datasets and network conditions.
4	Danijela Protic & Miomir Stankovic, 2022	The WK-FNN model employs two parallel classifiers: Weighted k-Nearest Neighbor (WK-NN) and Feedforward Neural Network (FNN) to analyze network traffic. A bitwise XOR detects disagreements between their outputs. The	Both classifiers demonstrated high accuracy across all daily datasets wk-NN and FNN classifiers leverage the strengths of both a memory-based learner and a neural model, enhancing classification robustness.	High computational cost, it is memory-intensive, as it requires storing and inverting large matrices during training, which can limit scalability.
5			The study highlights several merits of using ML for CPS security. LSTM	The paper lacks metrics, benchmarking, and

6	Ahmed Jamal et al., 2023	percentage of disagreements triggers alerts, categorized into five severity levels, ranging from negligible to high-priority, enhancing intrusion detection responsiveness.	demonstrated high accuracy, high reliability, and robustness in detecting a range of attacks like denial-of-service (DoS), false data injection (FDI), replay attacks, and time synchronization attacks.	discussion on integration, scalability, and computational challenges.
	Alqahtani & Alshaher, 2024	This review examines how machine learning and deep learning techniques enhance the security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). Using a literature-based approach, this analysis examines models such as K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), Support Vector Machines (SVM), Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) for threat detection. It also explores CPS security frameworks, including hybrid automata, multi-agent systems, and LSTM-based anomaly detection strategies.	The Decision Tree outperformed ANN and SVM in intrusion detection, achieving high accuracy, F1-score, AUC, and low FPR.	Reliance on a generic detection threshold that requires manual tuning or modification.
	Green et al., 2025	Alqahtani and AlShaher developed an anomaly-based intrusion detection system with Decision Tree, SVM, and ANN. The algorithm, which has been trained on over 172,000 network traffic records (Kaggle dataset), classifies behaviour as normal, suspect, or unknown. Feature selection and preprocessing increased detection accuracy, hence improving cybersecurity threat identification in dynamic networks. This study proposes a Modified Lion Optimization Algorithm (MLOA) combined with OCSVM to detect cyber threats like DoS and MitM (U2R & R2L) attacks in portal systems. Using datasets from LASUED and UNSW-NB15, it employs dynamic threshold tuning, adaptive feature selection, and real-time monitoring to enhance detection accuracy and resilience against evolving threats.	MLOA beats traditional methods with 97% recall, 98% accuracy, with ROC-AUC of 97%, and faster threat detection.	Higher computation limits real-time use and requires an optimal threshold beyond parameter optimization.

Challenges in Hybrid Anomaly Detection Systems (HADBS)

Despite their potential, hybrid anomaly detection systems (HADBS) face significant challenges, including reliance on static detection thresholds requiring manual tuning, high computational overhead from complex architectures, and limited adaptability to evolving attack patterns. The absence of standardized performance metrics like AUC-ROC further complicates objective model evaluation, while scalability remains constrained by the real-time processing demands of large-scale networks. These limitations underscore the need for more adaptive, efficient frameworks that balance detection accuracy with computational feasibility in dynamic portal environments.

Proposed Solution: Enhanced MLOA Using Sigmoid-Based Age Ratio for Hyperparameter Tuning of One-Class SVM.

To address the threshold sensitivity and optimization challenges in existing HADBS, we propose an Enhanced Modified Lion Optimization Algorithm (EMLOA) by integrating a sigmoid-based Age Ratio function into the generic Lion Optimization Algorithm (LOA) objective function.

The objective function (OF) equation for the LOA is as stated in equation 4 (Rajakumar, 2012)

$$f(X^{pride}) = \frac{1}{2(1 + \|X^{m_cub}\|)} [f(X^{male}) + f(X^{female}) + \frac{Age_{mat}}{age(cub) + 1} \sum_{c=1}^{\|X^{m_cubs}\|} \frac{f(X_c^{m_cubs}) + f(X_c^{f_cubs})}{\|X^{m_cub}\|}] \quad (4)$$

Enhancing the MLOA: Modifying the generic objective function of the LOA, defined in equation (4), by replacing the Age Ratio equation (5) with a sigmoid-based Age Ratio function;

$$Age\ Ratio = \frac{Age_{mat}}{age(cub) + 1} \quad (5)$$

The goal of the replacement is to achieve a smoother Age Ratio for equation 5, thereby improving the gradient behavior for both exploration and exploitation. The sigmoid function-based exponential decay is defined as;

$$f(x) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-x}} \quad (6)$$

The new Age Ratio is presented in equation 7:

$$Age\ ratio = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\lambda(age(cub) - Age_{mat})}} \quad (7)$$

Where $\lambda \in [0.1, 1]$ is Suitable for exploration and $\lambda \in [6, 10]$ for exploitation.

The Python implementation of the process for the sigmoid-based Age Ratio function for the EMLOA is detailed in Appendix B.

The flowchart in Figure 1 shows the process of enhancing the MLOA parameters using the sigmoid-based Age Ratio function.




Figure 1: Enhanced MLOA Flowchart

Evaluation of the Enhanced MLOA (EMLOA)

The evaluation of the Enhanced MLOA (EMLOA) involved calculating the best fitness of the lion (solution) and the best position of the lion (solution) to evaluate the convergence behavior of the EMLOA using a

Python-implemented objective function based on the sigmoid-based Age Ratio function integration for EMLOA Equation (7). The resulting convergence behavior, visualized using the Matplotlib library, is demonstrated in Figures 2 and 3 for Enhanced MLOA (EMLOA) and Generic LOA, respectively. The best fitness value of approximately 0.38 for EMLOA and the Generic LOA of 0.95 shows that EMLOA has significantly better convergence performance in terms of best fitness value.




Figure 2: Convergence Behavior of the Enhanced MLOA




Figure 3: Convergence Behavior of the Generic Lion Optimization Algorithm

Hyperparameter Tuning of One-Class SVM

The result obtained from Appendix B is used for the validation of the optimal threshold decision boundary's exploration and exploitation of the OCSVM-based anomaly detection model for evolving threats in a portal

system network in real time, as detailed in Appendix C. As shown in Table 2, the cross-validation results (Appendix C) demonstrate that the chosen hyperparameter thresholds ($\gamma=0.38$, $v=0.42$) effectively optimize the OCSVM-based anomaly detection model performance in terms of accuracy, true positive rate (TPR), false positive rate (FPR), and AUC-ROC across varying best positions.

Table 2: Results of the Cross-Validation

Fitness value (γ)	Best position (v)	Accuracy	TPR	FPR	ROC-AUC
0.38	0.26	92.9	82.6	0.10	0.90
0.38	0.36	98.0	86.7	0.14	0.91
0.38	0.42	99.9	98.8	0.06	0.98
0.38	0.00093	80.6	80.2	0.08	0.89

To provide a clearer understanding of the proposed approach, the overall framework is detailed in Appendix D, illustrated in Figure 4, which presents the step-by-step procedure used to achieve these outcomes.




Figure 4: EMLOA-OCSVM-Based Anomaly Detection Model Flowchart

Testing and Results

To rigorously evaluate the EMLOA-OCSVM model's real-world detection capabilities, we employed Conditional Generative Adversarial Networks (CGANs) to synthesize diverse attack traffic. This approach addressed data scarcity and ensured our tests included evolving attack strategies never seen during the model's training phase. The CGAN framework comprised two neural networks: a generator that learned to produce attack patterns mimicking real threats (DoS, R2L, U2R, MitM), and a discriminator trained to distinguish these synthetic attacks from genuine ones. By iteratively refining their adversarial competition, the CGAN generated realistic attack samples that preserved the statistical properties of the UNSW-NB15 dataset while introducing novel variations. A balanced test set was created by mixing the high-dimensional feature vectors generated by the trained CGAN generator with normal traffic, which replicated the complex patterns of each attack type. The entire pipeline is implemented as detailed in Figure 5 and the PyTorch Pseudocode in Appendix E.




Figure 5: Testing EMLOA-OCSVM using CGAN

Among the tested configurations in Table 2, the model is trained on only the normal class using the best fitness value of 0.38 and a best position of 0.42 for the hyperparameter of OCSVM to achieve its best performance. At this setting, the system recorded 99.9% accuracy, a true positive rate (TPR) of 98.8%, a very low false positive rate (FPR) of 0.06, and an AUC-ROC score of 0.98. Table 3 shows the training and prediction time of the model. The plot of TPR vs FPR and ROC-AUC at different thresholds is shown in Figures 6 and 7, respectively.

Table 3: Training and Prediction Time

Complexity Level	Training Time(s)	Prediction Time(s)
Simple Anomalies (SA)	3.05	0.04
Moderate Anomalies (MA)	5.01	0.13
High Anomalies (HA)	7.02	0.22

Table 3 shows the training and prediction times of the developed EMLOA-OCSVM model across different anomaly complexities, revealing a consistent increase in computational cost as anomaly levels rise. For simple anomalies (SA), the model achieved fast execution with **3.05 seconds** for training and **0.04 seconds** for prediction, confirming its efficiency in real-time detection. As anomaly complexity increased to moderate (MA) and high (HA) levels, training times rose to **5.01** and **7.02 seconds**, while prediction times increased slightly to **0.13** and **0.22 seconds**, respectively. Despite this growth, the model maintained low latency in all cases, underscoring its scalability and practicality for real-world portal systems that require rapid and reliable anomaly detection without service disruption. The training and prediction times increase gradually from simple anomalies (SA) to moderate (MA) and high anomalies (HA), while remaining within low-latency bounds suitable for real-time deployment, as shown in Figure 8.




Figure 6: TPR vs FPR




Figure 7: ROC-AUC at different thresholds




Figure 8: Training and Prediction Time vs Complexity Level

Comparative Analysis of the HADBS

Table 3 presents the comparative performance evaluation metrics of the EMLOA-OCSVM-based anomaly detection system and HADBS in the degree of Complexity level. The degree of Complexity (CL) is defined as Simple Anomalies (SA), Moderate Anomalies (MA), and High Anomalies (HA).

Table 3: Comparative Evaluation of EMLOA-OCSVM and HADBS

Matric	CL	Rasim & Fargana, 2019	Ugrenovic & Tom, 2020	Pu et al., 2021	Protic & Miomir, 2022	Ahmed Jamal et al., 2023	Alqahtani & Alshaher, 2024	Green et al., 2025	EMLOA- OCSVM- BASED MODEL
Recall (TPR)	SA	0.98	0.92	0.95	0.98	N/A	0.99	0.97	0.99
	MA	0.82	0.85	0.90	0.91	N/A	0.93	0.92	0.98
	HA	0.70	0.80	0.85	0.88	N/A	0.90	0.90	0.96
Accuracy	SA	0.98	0.95	0.96	0.99	N/A	0.99	0.98	0.99
	MA	0.92	0.90	0.92	0.92	N/A	0.94	0.94	0.98
	HA	0.85	0.80	0.87	0.85	N/A	0.90	0.91	0.96
Precision	SA	N/A	N/A	0.93	N/A	N/A	0.98	0.96	0.98
	MA	N/A	N/A	0.88	N/A	N/A	0.90	0.91	0.97
	HA	N/A	N/A	0.83	N/A	N/A	0.90	0.88	0.96
ROC- AUC	SA	N/A	N/A	0.94	N/A	N/A	0.99	0.97	0.99
	MA	N/A	N/A	0.90	N/A	N/A	0.94	0.94	0.97
	HA	N/A	N/A	0.85	N/A	N/A	0.91	0.92	0.95
F1 Score	SA	N/A	N/A	0.94	N/A	N/A	0.99	0.97	0.99
	MA	N/A	N/A	0.89	N/A	N/A	0.91	0.92	0.97
	HA	N/A	N/A	0.84	N/A	N/A	0.90	0.90	0.96
Training Time (s)	SA	N/A	N/A	9.65	N/A	N/A	NILL	14.23	3.05
	MA	N/A	N/A	10.12	N/A	N/A	NILL	12.89	5.01
	HA	N/A	N/A	11.03	N/A	N/A	NILL	13.67	7.02
Prediction Time (s)	SA	N/A	N/A	0.11	N/A	N/A	NILL	0.30	0.04
	MA	N/A	N/A	0.21	N/A	N/A	NILL	0.34	0.13
	HA	N/A	N/A	0.25	N/A	N/A	NILL	0.39	0.22

Application of the Hybrid Approach for Anomaly Detection

1. Educational Portal Security

A hybrid anomaly detection model for education portal security combines signature-based techniques that detect known threats, such as credential reuse, with optimization anomaly-based techniques to identify unusual login behaviors, including students accessing the portal from different countries at unusual hours. By successfully tackling both known attacks, such as brute-force attempts, and previously unknown or insider threats, including unauthorized access by legitimate users, this integrated strategy enhances overall system protection.

2. Financial Fraud Detection

Banking systems employ a hybrid approach to financial fraud detection, using anomaly detection models to find previously unseen suspicious activities, like sudden high-value transfers from dormant accounts, and supervised models to identify known fraudulent transaction patterns. This approach enables real-time monitoring and response, improving the system's capacity to detect both established and emerging fraud schemes.

3. Payment Gateway System

In payment gateway systems, hybrid models integrate one-class SVMs to learn and model normal transaction behavior, while autoencoders detect deviations from these patterns as potential anomalies. Simultaneously, rule-based systems are employed to validate and flag known fraud scenarios. This layered approach enhances the detection of evolving fraud strategies while maintaining the accuracy and efficiency needed to avoid disrupting legitimate user transactions.

4. Cloud and IoT security

In cloud and IoT security, hybrid models combine anomaly-based detection to identify unusual resource usage or abnormal device communication patterns with signature-based techniques that recognize known malware signatures. This dual-layered approach provides robust protection across distributed and resource-constrained environments, ensuring that both known threats and emerging, unpredictable attacks are effectively managed and mitigated.

5. Network Traffic Monitoring

In network traffic monitoring, a hybrid approach combines unsupervised clustering techniques to detect previously unknown traffic anomalies with supervised classification models trained on known attack patterns. This integration enables the system to proactively defend against common threats like DDoS attacks while also identifying emerging traffic manipulation tactics, enhancing overall network resilience and security.

Discussion

Comparative analysis demonstrates that the proposed EMLOA-OCSVM model surpasses existing state-of-the-art methods across all key performance metrics and attack categories. The model achieves consistently high performance, with recall (up to 0.99), accuracy (up to 0.99), precision (up to 0.98), and ROC-AUC (up to 0.99), showcasing its robustness in detecting both simple and highly sophisticated network intrusions. Notably, it excels in identifying complex attacks (HA) like U2R and R2L, attaining a recall and precision of 0.96, significantly higher than previously reported models. Additionally, the model exhibits substantially reduced training and prediction times, making it well-suited for real-time intrusion detection. These results underscore the efficacy of integrating the Enhanced Modified Lion Optimization Algorithm (EMLOA) with OCSVM for hyperparameter optimization, leading to enhanced generalization, faster convergence, and more reliable anomaly detection in dynamic network environments.

Result Analysis Summary

Using its superior scalability (maintaining 0.96 recall/accuracy on complex HA attacks), adaptability (consistent performance across SA/MA/HA scenarios), efficiency (fastest training/prediction times at 3.05s/0.04s for SA), and interpretability (clear OCSVM decision boundaries with transparent EMLOA optimization), the results show that the EMLOA-OCSVM model advances anomaly detection. It combines dynamic hyperparameter tuning using EMLOA with the explainability of OCSVM, achieving real-time capability without sacrificing performance or traceability, which makes it especially appropriate for security-critical deployments. This is in contrast to previous models that are vulnerable to complex attacks.

System Monitoring and Maintenance.

Setting up a continuous monitoring and updating mechanism for the MLOA-OCSVM model is essential to ensuring the long-term effectiveness of the anomaly detection system. This enables the system to adjust to evolving cyberthreats and changes in network behavior patterns through periodic automatic retraining using newly generated data from the LASUED portal. The system can improve detection accuracy, reduce false positives, and stay resilient to new abnormalities by routinely updating the model with current data. In evolving cybersecurity contexts, this adaptive technique ensures that the anomaly detection framework maintains its efficacy and dependability. The framework is explained in Figure 3.9, and the implementation of the framework is detailed in Appendix F.




Figure 9: System Monitoring and Maintenance

To ensure continued effectiveness, the anomaly detection system will require regular monitoring and updates of the MLOA-OCSVM model, which will be achieved by automatically retraining it with new data from the LASUED portal. This process is necessary to keep pace with evolving threats.

Limitation

While the EMLOA-OCSVM model exhibits notable advancements, concerns remain regarding its generalizability; testing the model on UNSW-NB15 and LASUED logs may not capture wider portal variations, and cross-dataset validation (e.g., CSE-CIC-IDS2018, KDD-CUP) is proposed as future work.

Future Works

Future work should integrate explainable AI (XAI) techniques into hybrid anomaly detection models to improve transparency, enabling administrators to understand threat detections while maintaining accuracy. Additionally, research should focus on lightweight edge deployment (e.g., Raspberry Pi-based IDS) for efficient, low-power anomaly detection in campus or local portals, as well as federated learning to enable distributed threat analysis across multiple portals without centralizing sensitive data. These advancements will enhance interpretability, adaptability, and privacy in portal security systems, allowing for more informed and scalable threat mitigation.

Conclusion

This review highlights the vital importance of early anomaly detection for securing portal system networks, demonstrating that while traditional methods remain limited against evolving threats, hybrid approaches - particularly the EMLOA-OCSVM model - offer superior performance with 99.9% accuracy, rapid processing (3.05s training), and minimal false positives. Despite these advances, challenges in complexity, scalability, and real-world adaptability must be addressed through improved dynamic thresholding, enhanced interpretability, and computational optimization to ensure robust deployment across diverse network environments.

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APPENDIX A

Pseudocode: Preprocessing + Feature Selection via Variance Thresholding

```
// --- PARAMETERS ---
SET UNSW_FILE_PATH ← "unsw_nb15.csv"
SET LASUED_LOG_FILE_PATH ← "lasued_network.csv"
SET VARIANCE_THRESHOLD ← 0.01
// --- FUNCTION: LOAD AND MERGE DATASETS ---
FUNCTION LoadAndMergeDatasets(file1, file2):
    LOAD unsw_df FROM file1
    LOAD lasued_df FROM file2
    SET common_columns ← INTERSECTION OF COLUMNS IN unsw_df AND lasued_df
    FILTER unsw_df TO common_columns
    FILTER lasued_df TO common_columns
    CONCATENATE unsw_df AND lasued_df INTO merged_df
    RETURN merged_df
END FUNCTION
// --- FUNCTION: ENCODE CATEGORICAL COLUMNS ---
FUNCTION EncodeCategorical(df):
    FOR EACH column IN df:
        IF column TYPE IS 'object' OR 'category':
            ENCODE column USING LabelEncoder
        END IF
    END FOR
    RETURN df
END FUNCTION
// --- FUNCTION: VARIANCE THRESHOLD FEATURE SELECTION ---
FUNCTION SelectFeaturesByVariance(df, threshold):
    INITIALIZE VarianceSelector WITH threshold
    APPLY VarianceSelector TO df → selected_features
    EXTRACT retained_columns WHERE VARIANCE > threshold
    CREATE reduced_df WITH selected_features AND retained_columns
    RETURN reduced_df
END FUNCTION
// --- MAIN PIPELINE FUNCTION ---
FUNCTION PreprocessPipeline(unsw_path, lasued_path, threshold):
    SET data ← LoadAndMergeDatasets(unsw_path, lasued_path)
    SET data ← EncodeCategorical(data)
    PRINT "Original Feature Count:", COLUMN_COUNT(data)
    SET reduced_data ← SelectFeaturesByVariance(data, threshold)
    PRINT "Reduced Feature Count:", COLUMN_COUNT(reduced_data)

    RETURN reduced_data
END FUNCTION

// --- MAIN EXECUTION ---
CALL PreprocessPipeline(UNSW_FILE_PATH, LASUED_LOG_FILE_PATH,
VARIANCE_THRESHOLD)
→ RETURNS reduced_features
SAVE reduced_features TO "reduced_features.csv"
PRINT "Reduced dataset saved as 'reduced_features.csv'"
```


Result Output: Input and Output Features

Input (x)	Output (y)
Protocol	Attack
Source IP	
Destination IP	
Source port	
Destination port	

Variance thresholding, a simple but powerful feature selection technique, is used because of its ability to eliminate near-constant variables, especially when the threshold is set to 0.01, retaining six critical features: protocol type, source/destination IPs, source/destination port numbers, and attack labels as detailed in the Table above.

APPENDIX B

Pseudocode: Enhanced Lion Optimization Algorithm with Dynamic λ

```
// --- PARAMETERS ---
SET POPULATION_SIZE  $\leftarrow$  10
SET DIMENSION  $\leftarrow$  4
SET MAX_ITERATIONS  $\leftarrow$  40
SET LOWER_BOUND  $\leftarrow$  -10
SET UPPER_BOUND  $\leftarrow$  10
// --- OBJECTIVE FUNCTION: Sphere Function ---
FUNCTION ObjectiveFunction(x):
    RETURN SUM( $x_i^2$  FOR EACH  $x_i$  IN x)
END FUNCTION
// --- SIGMOID-BASED AGE RATIO ---
FUNCTION SigmoidAgeRatio(age_cub, age_mat,  $\lambda$ ):
    RETURN  $1 / (1 + \text{EXP}(-\lambda * (\text{age\_cub} - \text{age\_mat})))$ 
END FUNCTION
// --- INITIALIZE LION POPULATION ---
FUNCTION InitializePopulation(size, dimension, lb, ub):
    CREATE population AS MATRIX OF size  $\times$  dimension
    FOR EACH lion IN population:
        SET lion  $\leftarrow$  RANDOM_VECTOR_IN_RANGE(lb, ub, dimension)
    RETURN population
END FUNCTION
// --- DYNAMIC  $\lambda$  SCHEDULING ---
FUNCTION DynamicLambda(iteration, max_iterations):
    IF iteration  $<$   $0.3 \times \text{max\_iterations}$ :
        RETURN RANDOM(0.1, 0.5)
    ELSE IF iteration  $<$   $0.7 \times \text{max\_iterations}$ :
        RETURN RANDOM(0.5, 2)
    ELSE:
        RETURN RANDOM(4, 8)
END FUNCTION

// --- ENHANCED LOA MAIN FUNCTION ---
FUNCTION EnhancedLOA(pop_size, dim, max_iter, lb, ub):
```

```
population ← InitializePopulation(pop_size, dim, lb, ub)
fitness ← [ObjectiveFunction(ind) FOR EACH ind IN population]
lion_ages ← [0 FOR i = 1 TO pop_size]
best_fitness_history ← EMPTY LIST
// Initialize Best Lion
best_index ← INDEX_OF_MIN(fitness)
best_lion ← COPY(population[best_index])
best_fitness ← fitness[best_index]

FOR iteration FROM 1 TO max_iter:
    age_median ← MEDIAN(lion_ages)
    λ ← DynamicLambda(iteration, max_iter)
    // Update Population
    FOR i FROM 1 TO pop_size:
        age_ratio ← SigmoidAgeRatio(lion_ages[i], age_median, λ)
        random_step ← RANDOM_VECTOR(-1, 1, dim)
        // New position influenced by age ratio and best lion
        population[i] ← population[i]
            + age_ratio × random_step
            + 0.1 × (best_lion - population[i])
        population[i] ← CLAMP(population[i], lb, ub)
        lion_ages[i] ← lion_ages[i] + 1
    END FOR
    // Re-evaluate Fitness
    fitness ← [ObjectiveFunction(ind) FOR EACH ind IN population]
    // Update Best Lion
    current_best_index ← INDEX_OF_MIN(fitness)
    IF fitness[current_best_index] < best_fitness:
        best_fitness ← fitness[current_best_index]
        best_lion ← COPY(population[current_best_index])
    END IF
    APPEND best_fitness TO best_fitness_history
    PRINT "Iteration", iteration, "/", max_iter,
        " | λ: ", λ,
        " | Best Fitness: ", best_fitness
END FOR
RETURN best_fitness_history, best_lion
END FUNCTION

// --- EXECUTION ---
CALL EnhancedLOA(POPULATION_SIZE, DIMENSION, MAX_ITERATIONS,
LOWER_BOUND, UPPER_BOUND)
→ RETURNS best_fitness_history, best_lion
// --- OUTPUT RESULTS ---
PRINT "Final Best Fitness:", LAST_ELEMENT(best_fitness_history)
PRINT "Best Lion Position:", best_lion
// --- CONVERGENCE PLOT (CONCEPTUAL) ---
PLOT best_fitness_history WITH:
    TITLE "Fitness Convergence Curve"
    X-AXIS LABEL "Iteration"
    Y-AXIS LABEL "Best Fitness (Log Scale)"
```

```
APPLY LOG SCALE TO Y-AXIS
ENABLE GRID
END PLOT
```

APPENDIX C

Validation code of the optimal threshold decision boundary's exploration and exploitation.

Step 1: Define parameter sets

```
SET params TO [
    {gamma: 0.38, nu: 0.26},
    {gamma: 0.38, nu: 0.36},
    {gamma: 0.38, nu: 0.42},
    {gamma: 0.38, nu: 0.00093}
]
```

// Step 2: Initialize an empty list to store results
SET results TO empty list

// Step 3: Loop through each parameter set
FOR EACH param IN params DO:

```
    // Step 3.1: Train One-Class SVM model
    INITIALIZE model WITH OneClassSVM USING gamma = param.gamma AND nu =
    param.nu
    FIT model ON X_train_scaled
```

```
    // Step 4: Make predictions on test data
    SET y_pred TO model.predict(X_test_scaled)
```

```
    // Step 4.1: Convert predictions from {-1, 1} to {1, 0}
    FOR EACH value IN y_pred DO:
```

```
        IF value == -1 THEN
            REPLACE value WITH 1 // Anomaly
        ELSE
            REPLACE value WITH 0 // Normal
        END IF
```

```
    END FOR
```

// Step 5: Evaluate performance metrics

```
SET confusion_matrix TO COMPUTE_CONFUSION_MATRIX(y_test, y_pred)
```

```
SET TP TO confusion_matrix[1][1]
```

```
SET FN TO confusion_matrix[1][0]
```

```
SET FP TO confusion_matrix[0][1]
```

```
SET TN TO confusion_matrix[0][0]
```

```
IF (TP + FN) > 0 THEN
```

```
    SET TPR TO TP / (TP + FN) // True Positive Rate
```

```
ELSE
```

```
    SET TPR TO 0
```

```
END IF
```

```
IF (FP + TN) > 0 THEN
```

```

    SET FPR TO  $FP / (FP + TN)$  // False Positive Rate
ELSE
    SET FPR TO 0
END IF
SET ROC_AUC TO COMPUTE_ROC_AUC( $y_{test}$ ,  $y_{pred}$ )
// Step 6: Store result in the list
APPEND {
    gamma: param.gamma,
    nu: param.nu,
    TPR: ROUND(TPR, 4),
    FPR: ROUND(FPR, 4),
    ROC_AUC: ROUND(ROC_AUC, 4)
} TO results
END FOR
// Step 7: Display results
FOR EACH res IN results DO:
    PRINT res
END FOR

```

APPENDIX D

Pseudocode for OCSVM model using EMLOA for Hyperparameter Tuning

ALGORITHM: One-Class SVM Anomaly Detection Evaluation using MLOA

STRUCTURE ModelParameters:

```

    gamma: float
    nu: float
FUNCTION load_and_preprocess(filepath, test_size=0.3):
    dataset ← LOAD_CSV(filepath)
    features ← dataset.EXCLUDE_COLUMN("label")
    labels ← dataset["label"]
     $X_{train}$ ,  $X_{test}$ ,  $y_{train}$ ,  $y_{test}$  ← SPLIT_DATA(features, labels, test_size=test_size,
stratify=labels, random_state=42 )
    scaler ← INIT_STANDARD_SCALER()
     $X_{train\_scaled}$  ← SCALE_FIT_TRANSFORM(scaler,  $X_{train}$ )
     $X_{test\_scaled}$  ← SCALE_TRANSFORM(scaler,  $X_{test}$ )
    RETURN  $X_{train\_scaled}$ ,  $X_{test\_scaled}$ ,  $y_{train}$ ,  $y_{test}$ 
FUNCTION evaluate_models(parameters,  $X_{train\_s}$ ,  $X_{test\_s}$ ,  $y_{train}$ ,  $y_{test}$ ):
    results ← EMPTY_LIST
    FOR EACH param IN parameters:
        // Train OCSVM on normal class only
        normal_data ←  $X_{train\_s}$ [WHERE  $y_{train} == 0$ ]
        model ← INIT_OCSVM(gamma=param.gamma, nu=param.nu)
        TRAIN(model, normal_data)
        start_time ← CURRENT_TIME()
        raw_predictions ← PREDICT(model,  $X_{test\_s}$ )
        latency_ms ← (CURRENT_TIME() - start_time) / LENGTH( $X_{test\_s}$ ) * 1000
        // Convert OCSVM output: 1 → 0 (normal), -1 → 1 (anomaly)
        final_predictions ← TRANSFORM(raw_predictions, 1→0, -1→1)
        tn, fp, fn, tp ← CONFUSION_MATRIX( $y_{test}$ , final_predictions).RAVEL()
        accuracy ←  $(tp + tn) / (tp + tn + fp + fn)$ 
        precision ← IF  $(tp + fp) > 0$  THEN  $tp / (tp + fp)$  ELSE 0

```

```

    recall ← IF (tp + fn) > 0 THEN tp / (tp + fn) ELSE 0
    f1 ← IF (precision + recall) > 0 THEN 2 * precision * recall / (precision + recall)
ELSE 0
    fpr ← IF (fp + tn) > 0 THEN fp / (fp + tn) ELSE 0
    roc_auc ← TRY(ROC_AUC(y_test, final_predictions)) CATCH ValueError: 0
    results.APPEND({ 'Gamma': param.gamma, 'Nu': param.nu,
        'Accuracy': ROUND(accuracy, 4),
        'Precision': ROUND(precision, 4),
        'Recall (TPR)': ROUND(recall, 4),
        'F1-score': ROUND(f1, 4),
        'FPR': ROUND(fpr, 4),
        'ROC AUC': ROUND(roc_auc, 4),
        'Latency (ms)': ROUND(latency_ms, 4) })
    RETURN CREATE_DATA_FRAME(results)
PROCEDURE main():
    DATA_FILE ← "Preprocessed_datasets.csv"
    PARAMETER_SET ← MLOA_OPTIMIZE([
        {gamma: 0.38, nu: 0.26},
        {gamma: 0.38, nu: 0.36},
        {gamma: 0.38, nu: 0.42},
        {gamma: 0.38, nu: 0.00093}
    ]) // Optimized by Sigmoid-Tuned LOA
    X_train_s, X_test_s, y_train, y_test ← load_and_preprocess(DATA_FILE)
    evaluation_results ← evaluate_models(PARAMETER_SET, X_train_s, X_test_s, y_train,
y_test)
    PRINT "OCSVM Performance Evaluation:"
    PRINT_TABLE(evaluation_results)
EXECUTE main()

```

APPENDIX E

Pseudocode for Conditional GAN (CGAN) on UNSW-NB15

BEGIN

1. Load UNSW-NB15 Dataset
 - Read the dataset CSV
 - Select numeric features (X)
 - Extract attack class labels (y)
 - Fill missing labels with "Normal"
2. Encode Labels
 - Convert labels to integers (LabelEncoder)
 - Convert integers to one-hot vectors (OneHotEncoder)
3. Preprocess Features
 - Normalize X features to range [-1, 1] using MinMaxScaler
4. Convert Data to Tensors
 - X_tensor ← torch tensor of scaled features
 - y_tensor ← torch tensor of one-hot encoded labels
 - Create dataset = (X_tensor, y_tensor)
 - Create DataLoader for batch training
5. Define Generator Network

INPUT: random noise (latent_dim) + attack label (num_classes)

PROCESS:

- Fully connected layers with LeakyReLU
- Output size = feature_dim (number of features in dataset)
- Output activation = Tanh (range [-1,1])

OUTPUT: synthetic attack sample

6. Define Discriminator Network

INPUT: real/fake sample (feature_dim) + attack label (num_classes)

PROCESS:

- Fully connected layers with LeakyReLU
- Final output = probability (Sigmoid)

OUTPUT: probability (real or fake)

7. Initialize Models

- Generator, Discriminator
- Loss function = Binary Cross Entropy
- Optimizers = Adam

8. Training Loop (for each epoch)

FOR each batch (real_samples, labels) IN dataloader:

- a. Prepare labels
 - real_targets = 1
 - fake_targets = 0
- b. Train Discriminator
 - Compute D_loss_real using (real_samples, labels)
 - Generate fake_samples = G(noise, labels)
 - Compute D_loss_fake using (fake_samples, labels)
 - Update Discriminator
- c. Train Generator
 - Generate fake_samples = G(noise, labels)
 - Pass fake_samples to Discriminator
 - Compute G_loss (want discriminator to output "real")
 - Update Generator

END FOR

PRINT epoch number, D_loss, G_loss

9. Generate Class-Specific Attack Samples

FUNCTION generate_attack_samples(attack_name, n_samples):

- Find index of attack_name in label encoder
- Create one-hot label vector for chosen attack
- Generate noise (z)
- Pass (z, label) into Generator
- Inverse transform to original feature scale
- RETURN synthetic attack samples as DataFrame

10. Example Usage:

- generate_attack_samples("DoS", 5)
- generate_attack_samples("Generic", 5)

END

APPENDIX F

```
import time
from utils import (
    collect_portal_logs,
    evaluate_model_performance,
    detect_drift_or_degradation,
    retrain_emloa_ocsvm,
    validate_model,
    deploy_model_to_api)
# Define how often to run the monitoring loop (e.g., every 6 hours)
MONITORING_INTERVAL = 6 * 60 * 60 # seconds
def monitoring_cycle():
    print("=== Starting Monitoring Cycle ===")
    while True:
        # Step 1: Collect new logs
        logs = collect_portal_logs(source="LASUED")
        print("[INFO] New logs collected.")
        # Step 2: Evaluate current model performance
        performance = evaluate_model_performance(logs)
        print(f"[INFO] Current Performance: {performance}")
        # Step 3: Check for drift or performance drop
        if detect_drift_or_degradation(performance):
            print("[WARNING] Drift or performance drop detected. Starting retraining...")
            # Step 4: Retrain model with updated data
            new_model = retrain_emloa_ocsvm(logs)
            # Step 5: Validate new model
            if validate_model(new_model):
                print("[INFO] Model validated successfully. Deploying to API...")
                deploy_model_to_api(new_model)
            else:
                print("[ERROR] New model failed validation. Keeping existing model.")
        else:
            print("[INFO] No drift detected. Continuing monitoring...")
        # Step 6: Wait until the next monitoring cycle
        print(f"[INFO] Sleeping for {MONITORING_INTERVAL/3600} hours...\n")
        time.sleep(MONITORING_INTERVAL)
# Run the monitoring system
if __name__ == "__main__":
    monitoring_cycle()
```