

JORDANIAN AND SAUDI STAND TOWARD BAGHDAD ALLIANCE

Tariq Turki Al-Ammary

Master in Political Sciences

Mohammad Ali Al-Rousan, PhD

Assistant Professor

Tarik Mohammad Al-Azzam, PhD

Assistant Professor

Abstract

This study aimed at understanding, analyzing and explaining the stand of both Jordan and Saudi Arabia towards Baghdad Alliance. The research revealed the fact that Baghdad Alliance, under the control of Britain, divided the Arabs into supporters and opposers of it. Iraq was one of the first countries to join it and encouraged others to do the same, especially Jordan, the fact which put Jordan in the middle of conflict. An opposing Arab front was formed which consisted of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The first considered it as a threat to its leading position in the Arab World, while the other considered it as a point of strength to its enemies in Iraq and Jordan. Therefore, they both sought to oppose the alliance by sharing roles. Egypt took the informational role to influence the Arabs' public opinion, while Saudi Arabia took the funding role to establish opposing popular and political fronts, the fact which led to its failure, paving the way for the United States to take Britain's place through Eisenhower's Project.

Keywords: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Baghdad Alliance, Egypt.

Introduction:

This study is important because it investigated one of the Western alliances, namely, Baghdad Alliance in light of the world conflict situation about the region of influence and domination, and the political circumstances which encountered the alliance.

Study Problem:

One of the most important results of the Second World War was the split of the world into two camps: Western and Eastern, the fact which led to the breakout of a cold war between them, in which each camp sought to extend its political and intellectual influence in the World. Baghdad Alliance was one of the phenomena of that cold war, which stemmed from an American initiative. It was carried out by British planning and implementation, through which it sought to maintain its interests and influence in the region.

Aims of the Study:

This study aimed at investigating the beginnings and justifications which urged the United States, Britain and some countries in the Middle East to take part in political and military alliances. The study concentrated on the search for the justifications which were behind the Jordanian, Saudi and Egyptian stand toward the alliance.

Beginnings And Justifications of the Alliance:

Baghdad Alliance started as an idea of the Western countries in 1951 to establish an alliance which included the great states and a great possible number of the countries of the region. After Egypt's abolishment of the Alliance Treaty in 1951 and Collective Defense held with Britain in 1963, the Western countries presented a project which aimed at establishing a collective military organization to defend the Middle East (Mukalled, 1979, p. 241), to internationally isolate the Soviet Union and to limit its influence in it (Abdulfattah, 1981, p.303.).

On October 14, 1951, the United States, Britain and France issued a statement in which the Arab countries were asked to participate in the Middle East Defense Organization and put their military bases, ports and transport routes under the control of the Commander General of the region. It was followed by a second statement of the three countries on November 10, 1951 to exercise pressure on the Arab countries in order to join the American Projects stating that "defending the Middle East is a vital issue for the free world (Al-Hamdani, 2004, p.270).

In 1952, the British Prime Minister presented a paper about the International British Strategy which included the justifications for the concern about the Middle East Region, the most important of which were: the existence of political conventions and British commitments with some regional countries such as Iraq, Jordan, Sudan and the Arab Gulf countries. It sought to restore its political and military influence in the Middle East Region by holding alliances with regional countries, which were considered unabandonable spheres of influence (Al-Shalabi, 2006, P. 159) by replanning its policies in the Middle East (Al-Tarawnah, 2004, P. 150).

The importance of the region, had a role in increasing justifications. The region represents the centre of the Islamic world, which means that the Alliance of Britain with the countries of the region could give a kind of incentive for the co-operation of the rest of the other Islamic countries with Britain. There were also other aims represented in cutting off the way of the colonial Soviet aspirations in Al-Dardani, as well as the great economic and political importance of the Middle East countries. Egypt is especially important because of its geographic location and the special strategic position of Suez Canal (Ruane, Mar., 2005, PP 181-182).

Those British aspirations were not confined to the Western countries, but they were met positively by the Iraqi government, looking forward to building a regional alliance in the region which could guarantee sovereignty and leadership. Following the assassination of King Abdullah I of Jordan on 20 July, 1951, the Iraqi call for annexing Jordan to Iraq was intensified. This attitude was confirmed on July 23, 1951 when the Iraqi minister for foreign affairs, Salih Jabr, suggested to the British commissioner Frederick Pride the idea of unifying both Hashemite thrones under the leadership of King Faissal the second.

In his attempt to implement this project and to influence the decision of Jordanian Parliament, the Iraqi government formed a committee to circulate the idea of this unity, which he called the unity of unifying Iraq and Jordan. It started its job in August, 1951 by supporting the candidates backing the unity project between both countries. However, the results of elections brought out representatives who were non-supportive of this unity. King Talal also refused the project after taking over his constitutional authorities and being nominated a king by the House of Representatives. King Talal believed that Abdulilah, the throne Regent of Iraq sought to overthrow him in an attempt to take his place (Al-Shalabi, PP. 107-110).

Moreover, Iraq wanted to strengthen its political influence in the region because the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri Al-Sa'eed and his government were concerned about the possibility of a Soviet attack on Iraq (Al-Sa'eed, PP. 13-14).

In March, 1953 and in an attempt to form the alliance, the American Minister for foreign Affairs, John Foster Dallass started his visits to the Arab Region. He warned the leaders of the region of the existence of a danger threatening the region, represented in Communism. One of the suggestions was the institution of an alliance to defend the Middle East, confirming the support of the United States of that alliance. Britain found the alliance as a substitute for the treaties signed with some Arab Countries (Daradkah, PP 76-77).

John Foster Dallass- during his tour in the region- had a meeting with president Jamal Abdunnassir to circulate the project of instituting “the Organization of Middle East Defense”. But Abdunnassir refused the offer saying that: “such projects do not serve the countries of the region, do not reflect them, but they will make them countries following the great countries’ aspirations and policies (Abdulfattah, PP. 331-332).

Dallass continued his visits to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece and Libya. He returned to his country in May, 1953 carrying an impression of the existence of two specific sides in the Middle East Region: The first conformed with the West, and the other opposed the West. He stated that the countries supportive of the alliance were Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan (Al-Hamdani, P. 402).

The alliance was signed in Baghdad (Abdulfattah, P. 337) as Nouri Al-Sa'eed was the first supporter of Dallas’ idea of “Northern Sector Collective Defense” (Al-Sa'eed, P. 107). He made a visit to Cairo and London to discuss the American initiative, and in Egypt, Nouri Al-Sa'eed explained the importance of that alliance for Iraq, in which he had a friendly meeting with Egyptian President, Abdunnassir.

The Egyptian leadership showed a political courtesy and not an official stand. Nouri Al-Sa'eed confirmed the Egyptian understanding of the Iraqi Justifications of taking part in the alliance (Eden, PP. 108, 147-148). Then, Nouri Al-Sa'eed visited London and on his way home, he visited Turkey where he met the Turkish Prime Minister and agreed upon all the items of the agreement (Al-Sa'eed, P. 78). On 12 January, 1955, Adnan Mandress, Prime Minister of Turkey, visited Baghdad, where he stated that Turkey and Iraq signed a military agreement which aimed at achieving co-operation and security stability in the Middle East, and he asked the Arabic governments to join it (Daradkah, P. 78). Later, Britain, Pakistan and Iran joined the alliance (Al-Tarawneh, PP 149-150). The United States of America sent observers to take part in the meetings without joining the alliance (Al-Sa'eed, PP. 109-110).

In signing Baghdad Alliance, Iraq faced opposition led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Abdulanssir found in it a threat to the role of the Arab League (Al-Tarawneh, P. 151), and consequently, the leading role of Egypt in the Arabic region (Mahmoud, 1999, P. 540)

So, Egypt called for a meeting of the heads of Arab countries on January 22, 1955, with the aim of maintaining the Arabic status of Egypt, politically isolating Iraq and mobilizing Arabic opposition against the alliance and Iraq. It also aimed at preventing the Arab countries from joining the alliance. However, the Arab leaders did not agree upon a conclusion statement (Daradkeh, P. 78), and the meeting did not reach an agreement about what Egypt wanted (Abdulfattah, P. 336). So, Egypt followed another way against the alliance through its broadcast and press (Al-Majali, 2009, P.153), saying that the alliance was a colonial project which did not serve but the interests of the West (Abdulfattah, PP. 337-339) and that it pushed the Arab countries in the cold war between the Western and Eastern Camps (Al-Majali, P. 153), in a way that put the Arab countries in danger in case of the breakout of war between both camps ⁽²⁶⁾, and that it would lead to the Waste of Palestine (Nuseibah, 1990, P.41).

Through this way, Egypt was able to attract the public opinion and provoke it against governments as happened in Jordan after the visit of Templer the chief of staff of British armies (Al-Tarawneh, P. 151). So, on 20 October, 1955, Egypt signed a bilateral military agreement with Syria and then with Saudi Arabia on 27 October, 1955. On 11 March, 1956, the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria issued a statement in which they confirmed their commitment to non-alliance, and that defending the Arab world should be from within the Arab world and not through foreign alliances, which could be considered as treason to the Arab cause in general, and Palestine cause, in particular⁽²⁹⁾. On 21 April, 1956, the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen signed a charter of collective defense (Abdulfattah, PP. 340-341), and Egypt signed a military agreement with Jordan on May 5, 1956. Egypt believed that Saudi Arabia played an important and effective role in persuading the United States not to join the alliance (Al-Hadrami, P. 21) because they had close relations. Egypt thought that the alliance presented several privileges to Iraq, the fact which could reinforce its position and increase its superiority to Egypt (Al-Suweidi, P.554).

Jordanian Stand Toward Baghdad Alliance:

Jordan played a prominent role in the Arab region in spite of its small size and scarcity of potentials, especially in regard to the Palestinian Cause. Its great role was evident in protecting parts of Palestine. So, many Arab countries did not like this role (Al-Madhi,

1988, P. 534), especially after the unity of the two Banks in 1950, the fact which made several Arab countries deny this role. They considered the West Bank as an advantage to Jordan, refusing to accept the fact that it was a burden which the other Arab countries did not bear its responsibility (Abu Nuwwar, 1990, P. 215). One of the most important difficulties was the confrontation of the repeated Israeli aggressions against the villages and people of the West Bank, besides the burden of hosting more than a half million Palestinian refugees who were forced to emigrate from their land (Al-Madhi, PP. 583-594). It is no exaggeration to say that the Arabs were busy in their conflicts and disputes instead of the Palestinian Cause and their Israeli enemy. They were not concerned about strengthening themselves against their enemies who were supported by the West. In light of those hardships which faced Jordan in the West Bank, Baghdad Alliance came to increase Jordan's hardships by putting it in the Middle of Arab leadership conflicts led by Egypt.

Since the first day of declaring the alliance, Nouri Al-Sa'eed, Iraqi Prime Minister did his best to convince Jordan to join it (Daradkeh, P.82), and Britain did the same promising to support the Jordanian state in the region, besides benefiting from the financial, economic and military aids offered to the countries of the region by the Western Countries to face the Soviet Union (Rubins, 2004, P. 92).

It seems that joining the alliance was a temptation to Jordan, because it could enable it to modify the treaty and lessen its period with the continuity of financial and defensive aids, especially after the failure of Jordanian- British negotiations in regard to modifying the treaty between the two countries (Al-Majali, P. 152), besides the possibility of increasing the number of Jordanian armed forces in men and weapons, getting a number of modern air fighters, providing money to advance Jordan's industrial and agricultural economy and get rid of the British domination over the leadership of the army (Nuseibah, P. 41). Britain proposed to Jordan the modification of Jordanian- British treaty, provision of arms, including a number of free air fighters (Eden, PP. 122, 124) and increasing financial aid to Jordan (Nuseibah, P. 102).

During the period which followed the endorsement of the alliance between Iraq and Turkey, the Jordanian cabinet welcomed that agreement. But Jordanian government took a moderate stand with all Arab countries and sought to help Iraq to have close relations with other Arab countries and end disputes. Meanwhile, Iraq strongly wanted Jordan to join Baghdad Alliance (Eden, P 123). However, Jordanian Prime Minister, Tawfeeq Abulhuda, and his minister for foreign affairs, Waleed Salah, were not biased to Iraq in the conference of the Heads of Arab Governments which was called for by Egypt. But the Jordanian

Minister for Foreign Affairs attacked Iraq and asked for ousting it from the Arab League, after the return of Jordanian Prime Minister, Tawfeeq Abulhuda, to Jordan, in a way that contradicted with the opinion of his government. His view was faced by disagreement from Awni Abdulhadi, the other member of the Jordanian delegate. The same happened by both Syrian and Iraqi envoys. Then Jordanian Prime Minister issued strict instructions of opposing any sanctions that might be taken against Iraq (Al-Majali, P.154). Hazza' Al-Majali- a politician and a Jordanian Prime Minister at the time of Baghdad Alliance- hinted that Waleed Salah's stand came as a result of the non-response of the Iraqi charge' d'affaires to Waleed Salah's demand of support. However, support did not come from Iraq, but from Saudi Arabia. Hazza' Al-Majali stated that this stand was hinted by Abulhuda himself as Waleed Salah told him. Strong relations linked Abulhuda to Saudi Arabia (Al-Majali, P. 154).

After that, the Jordanian government held several meetings to determine its stand toward the alliance. It was decided to explore the views of Britain and the United States about the benefits that could be obtained from joining the alliance. So, the ambassadors of Turkey, Britain and the United States were called to know the views of their governments (Al-Tarawneh, P 152). But Abulhuda's opposition against Baghdad Alliance and the accusations of his relations with Saudi Arabia resulted in the resignation of his government on 28 May, 1955 (Al-Bashayrah, P. 153). Sa'eed Al-Mufti formed a government which was described as coming to make Jordan join Baghdad Alliance. Al-Mufti Government encountered the accusation of treason from Saudi Arabia (Al-Tarawneh, P. 153) and it was attacked by the Saudi government represented in its ambassador in Amman, Al-Sheikh Al-Kuheimi (Al-Majali, PP. 160-161).

During this period, King Hussein visited Britain and presented his country's demands which concentrated on increasing financial aid, arming the army and providing Jordan with airfighters. Britain promised to fulfill the Jordanian demand after conducting talks between the two countries to examine the developments which happened in the region and in order to make Jordan join Baghdad Alliance (Al-Majali, P. 161).

Also, the president of Turkish Republic, Jalal Bayar, visited Jordan on 2 October, 1955 with the aim of practicing pressure on Jordan and pushing it to join the alliance. Bayar met Jordanian officials who presented Jordan's financial and military needs (Eden, P. 161). King Hussein replied that Jordan was in need for money because it was a poor country, but Bayar apologized saying that Turkey was undergoing a fierce economic crisis and he said that Jordan should write to Britain to increase its financial aid and that Turkey would support that

demand (Daradkah, PP. 87-88). Bayar expressed the readiness of the Turkish army to help the Jordanian army in case of any aggression against Jordan. It is noticeable that King Hussein was trying to obtain as much as possible of weapons and aifighters in return for Jordan's joining the alliance (Al-Bashayrah, P.79). Negotiations ended with the agreement of Jordan to join the alliance (Abdulfattah, P. 360), but Bayar's visit was not welcomed by Jordanian people because of Turkey's relations with Israel (Al-Majali, P. 167). Following Jalal Bayar's visit, the Jordanian Government wrote to Britain asking for its financial and military demands, referring to its readiness to join the alliance (Abdulfattah, P. 360). Things went further when Nouri Al-Sa'eed and Jalal Bayar met in Baghdad with the Jordanian Ambassador, Farhan Shbeilat and asked him to convey a message to King Hussein promising to provide Jordan with weapons and economic aid, besides British aids (Eden, PP. 361-362). Iraq put the condition of joining Baghdad Alliance on Jordan when it sent a delegate asking for a loan from Iraq. When the Jordanian delegate refused any conditions, the Iraqis gave Jordan a loan of a million and six hundred thousand JDs to finance some projects that Jordan demanded the loan for (Al-Majali, PP. 167-168).

Late in 1955, Chief of Staff of the British Army came to discuss the issue and persuade the Jordanian leadership to join the alliance talking about military, political and financial gains (Daradkah, PP. 93-94). It seems that Jordan decided to accept the alliance pushed by the many temptations offered, the most important of which were summarized by Hazza' Al-Majali in a statement to the Jordanian people then (Al-Majali, PP. 168-169):

- 1- Jordan's need to shorten and modify the British-Jordanian Treaty from 12 years to four years, namely, getting rid of the British domination sooner.
- 2- Increasing the number of Jordanian military forces and obtaining new weapons and constant finance of the army.
- 3- Jordan's obtaining financial and economic aids to establish projects.
- 4- Liberation of the Arab army from the British leadership in four years.

It seems that Jordan was encouraged to take a decision of joining Baghdad Alliance as it would bring great benefits, the most important of which was the liberation of Jordanian Army from the British military domination, besides the financial and military aids which would enhance the capabilities of the Arab Jordanian Army in facing the Israeli enemy and increase the economic potentials of Jordan, taking into account that the Arab Countries did not show any initiative of supporting and helping Jordan to encounter its problems and

concerns (Nuseibah, P. 41). What has already been mentioned formed gains to Jordanian political officials like Hazza' Al-Majali.

In the period which preceded Templer's visit to Jordan, Abdul Hakeem Aamir (General Commander of the Egyptian Army) visited Jordan where he read Jordan's note to the Turkish government and the demands included. He praised what it included and conveyed a copy to president Jamal Abdunnassir. Templer's visit to Jordan was contemporary with Anwar Al-Sadat's visit to it (he was a minister of state during the period of the Egyptian Revolution) who did not object to the Jordanian-British negotiations and suggested that Jordan should get the help of Egyptian experts to determine the type of arms demanded in return for joining the alliance (Al-Majali, P. 170).

But Templer's negotiations failed after meeting all Jordanian ministers. Some of them circulated the negotiations with Templer to the Jordanian people, the fact which aroused rumors. During that period, thirty representatives petitioned the Minister of Public work, Na'eem Abdulhadi, then, in order to present him a motion of "no confidence". So, this minister provoked the ministers of the West Bank to resign, in order to get out of that critical situation, using the negotiations for joining Baghdad Alliance as an excuse for claiming that Baghdad's charter will harm the Palestinian cause and that the resignation of the ministers came for the sake of Jordan (Eden, P. 125).

The Jordanian ministers split in their views about the note which determined the Jordanian demands that would be presented to Templer. The ministers of the West Bank, Headed by Awni Abdulhadi wanted the note to be examined by Egypt before being examined by Britain lest it should include any negligence of the Palestinian cause. This led to the failure of negotiations and resignation of the West Bank Ministers (Al-Bashayrah, PP. 90-91). Templer did his best to assure the ministers and Jordanian government that Baghdad Alliance would not affect the Palestinian cause, but his efforts failed⁽⁶⁴⁾. Al-Mufti government resigned (Al-Majali, PP. 170-171) and Hazza' Al-Majali formed the government in a period which witnessed confusion and the Jordanian public opinion was full of a group of thoughts, the most important of which was the belief that the talks with Templer were the way that would lead to the waste of Palestine and its cause. The role which Saudi Arabia and Egypt played contributed in provoking the Jordanian street, besides what has already been mentioned in regard to the circulations of the ministers of Al-Mufti government and their resignations (Eden, P. 171). Anwar Al-Sadat, during his visit to Jordan, contemporary with Templer's visit, tried to express a different view which was provocative against the alliance, especially during his tour in Amman and Jerusalem, besides the Saudi money which played a

role in weakening Al-Mufti Government (Al-Tarawnah, P. 157). Anthony Eden stated that he was worried about the reactions of the Jordanian street which were affected by the Egyptian propaganda and Saudi money (Eden, P. 122). Moreover, Jordanian parties, with their different thoughts, played an important role in opposing the alliance. This started with the visit of Turkish President, Bayar, to Jordan when the parties organized demonstrations and marches against the visit and his efforts to join Jordan to the alliance (Al-Bashayrah, PP. 92-93).

During this period, Hazza' Al-Majali formed his government with the aim of maintaining Jordan's interests, trying to obtain other gains through the negotiations of joining the alliance. This happened through the economic and military conditions of Jordan (Al-Majali, PP. 176-178). Hazza' had a condition that Templer should return to his country during the formation of his government and Templer returned to Britain (Al-Majali, P. 172).

The Egyptian Arabs' Voice Broadcast played a role in provoking the Jordanian Street with rumors (Al-Bashayrah, P. 108), especially when the Egyptian government tried to fail the alliance. So, the Arabs' Voice Broadcast spread out rumors that there were demonstrations and clashes between the two sides: the government and people which resulted in deaths and injuries.

Ali Abu Nuwwar stated that the army tried to repress the demonstrations, but it failed. Abu Nuwwar lessened the role of Egyptian information in provoking demonstrations saying that the reason was the awareness of Jordanian people (Abu Nuwwar, P. 161). Hazza' Al-Majali tried to contain the demonstrations and refused to repress them by force (Al-Majali, PP. 172-173), as they were comprehensive and included all Jordanian cities and villages in both Banks (Al-Bashayrah, PP. 96-97). He sought to find a democratic solution through the parliament, but the people did not trust the way of choosing the council (Al-Majali, PP. 172-173). When Hazza' Al-Majali failed to reach a solution with the continuity of Protests (Abdulfattah, P. 361), great opposition against the government and Baghdad Alliance (Al-Bashayrah, PP. 98-99), spread out violence, resulted in a number of dead people and the resignation of three ministers from his government, he resigned just after less than a week of his government formation (Al-Tarawnah, P. 158). He requested the King to dissolve the Parliament and it was dissolved (Al-Majali, PP. 172-174). It is noticeable that the Arabs' Voice Broadcast had its clear role in provoking the Jordanian Street to move against its government. Moreover, the Saudi money had a role in tempting a lot of people to oppose the policy of Jordanian government, as well as the role of Jordanian parties and the awareness of people in the eruption of the demonstrations against Hazza's government.

In spite of the formation of a new government by Ibraheem Hashim, demonstrations continued in Jordanian cities. In this period, the higher council of the constitution gave its opinion of the illegality of dissolving the Parliament. So, Hashim's government was dissolved and the parliament was reinstated. Then Sameer Al-Rifa'i formed his government and took some measures to prevent demonstrations and control the state of disorder.

The government declared a state of emergency in the country and curfew was imposed. The army took charge of gathering arms from cities and villages, a lot of people were arrested or imprisoned or exiled (Al-Bashayrah, PP. 104-105). Jordan asked for the help of Britain which sent two battalions to Jordan. King Hussein asked Britain to be an intermediary with Iraqi government in order to send reinforcements from the Iraqi army to help in restoring stability in Jordan (Daradkah, P. 100). It is important to mention that Jordan, after the formation of the government by Sameer Al-Rifa'i started to move away from the special thoughts of Baghdad Alliance (Al-Majali, P. 181) when Al-Rifa'i stated that the government's policy was not to join any new alliance (Al-Bashayrah, P. 105). King Hussein addressed the Jordanian people declaring that Jordan would not give up its strife and support of Palestinian people to return to their homeland (Al-Bashayrah, PP. 105-106). This shows that the Jordanian leadership as a king and a people abandoned all the gains that would be obtained from Baghdad Alliance. This happened for the sake of maintaining the unity in stand between leadership and people. To keep Jordan away from intrigue and state of political and security disorder and belief that Jordan's joining Baghdad Alliance would create a state of tension that might be exploited by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, the fact which could affect the internal security and stability of Jordan (Al-Tarawnah, P. 155), especially in light of the state of Arabic controversy and dispute.

During that period, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria proposed an offer of providing a financial aid instead of the British aid to the Jordanian army which was (12.5) million sterling pounds (Abu Nuwwar, P. 162), with the aim of lessening the British domination over Jordan (Al-Majali, P. 181). In this period, Al-Rifa'i sought to clarify his government's policy to the Arab countries through his visits to many of them, talking about his government's opposition to alliances' policy, and that it wanted to have friendly relations and friendship with all countries without any exception, and his government would follow a non-allied policy in its relations with Egypt and Iraq. But in spite of all the efforts and political statements of Al-Rifa'i's government, Egypt was not satisfied. The Egyptian and Syrian broadcasts continued in their attack against Al-Rifa'i's government, because Egypt did not want Jordan to be non-allied in dealing with Iraq, but to take an opposing stand against it (Eden, P. 182). So, Egypt

sought to create a state of tension and suspicion about Jordanian army by distributing leaflets which carried the signatures of Free Officers, distributed by the Egyptian military attaché in Jordan and his provocation of rebellion (Abu Nuwwar, PP. 163-164). It is worthwhile to refer back to Abu Nuwwar's statement because it presented a contemporary narration of a person close to the events of the period of the study. He was one of the superior officers in Jordan and a military escort of King Hussein Bin Talal and he was chief of the Jordanian Army after Arabization.

Egypt went further than that when it made Jordan in its greatest worry of constant clashes with Israel though the work of its intelligence in the West Bank when it recruited young people in order to carry out operations against Israel, in an attempt to occupy Jordan in fierce confrontations with it. Meanwhile, Egypt refused to sign any military agreement with Jordan in spite of Jordan's endeavors (Mahafzah, 2005, P. 200). During that period, the Jordanian army was Arabized by the ousting of Klobe Basha from its leadership (Abu Nuwwar, PP, 195, 198, 230), by a decree from King Hussein Bin Talal who criticized him for many things. He saw in him the domination of Britain over Jordan and the Arab region (Al-Majali, P. 186), the thing which Britain did its best to maintain through the policy of alliances.

In the same year, the tri-aggression was launched on Egypt by Israel, France and Britain. That aggression had the great effect of ending the British existence in the region (Al-Shalabi, P. 172).

After its participation with Israel and France in the attack against Egypt, Britain confirmed in that all the previous charges stated by Baghdad Alliance opposers in the Arab Region, and that it was the first ally of Zionism as it created the Zionist existence. In that way, it proved again that it was a colonial state which did not seek but its influence in the region and being an enemy against any Arabic aspirations.

What confirmed this view was Hazza' Al-Majali's statement, who was one of the greatest advocates of joining Baghdad Alliance, that Britain in its participation in the tri-aggression committed a great stupidity by taking the side of Israel. It passed up its wide interests in the Arab region and made its Arab friends abandon it and leave its support (Al-Majali, P. 204). This confirms the weakness of the Arabic political memory and the non-existence of a real Arabic conception of dealing with the West.

Jordan announced its support of Egypt during the tri-aggression. After the war, Jordan's demands of Arabic aid were renewed when a Jordanian representative in Parliament asked the Arab countries for financial aid, the fact which aroused Syria's grudge and its

ambassador in Jordan, who described this demand as embarrassing for both Syria and Egypt, and that they were incapable of responding to it. It was said that the idea of the financial aid to Jordan was a kind of threat to Britain in order not to exploit Jordan's need for financial aid and impose its will on it (Eden, P. 207). This confirms the fact that the Arab countries were not serious in offering the Arabic aid to Jordan.

It seems that this talk about the negligence of British aid to Jordan made Britain enquire about the stand of Jordanian government toward the abolishment of Jordanian-British Treaty, and the Jordanian government wanted to make sure of the Arab countries' promises to offer a financial aid instead of the British aid, taking into account that the abolishment of the treaty with Britain meant stopping its aid to Jordan, which was badly needed. Therefore, a Jordanian delegate went to Egypt which agreed upon the aid to Jordan, its amount, payment way and the share of each country, Saudi Arabia announced its agreement about what was achieved in Egypt. Finally, the delegate visited Syria on 19 January 1957. King Saud, President Abdunassir and President Al-Kuwatli met when they signed the treaty of Arab solidarity which confirmed the commitment of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria to pay the financial aid to Jordan, the amount of which was (12.5) million sterling pounds (Daradkah, PP. 136-137). That was followed by Jordan negotiating Britain to end the Jordanian- British Treaty and it was ended on 13 February, 1957 (Al-Tarawnah, PP. 164-165).

The Saudi Stand Toward Baghdad Alliance:

The Institution of an alliance in the region led by Iraq was not appealing to many Arab countries. Each one of them had its own justifications and incentives, but they combined in one common stand and one aim, namely, failing and overthrowing Baghdad Alliance. Therefore, the Egyptian stand was corresponding with the Saudi's toward Baghdad Alliance despite the difference in political systems. Saudi Arabia, from the beginning, took an opposing position, rejecting any attempts to institute alliances led by the Iraqi government. It seems that certain factors and justifications made Saudi Arabia take this stand, work with Egypt against the alliance and do its best to fail it in spite of the friendly relations which linked Saudi Arabia to the United States, the initiative and supportive country of the alliance. One of the most prominent factors of the alliance of Saudi Arabia and Egypt in confronting Iraq and Baghdad Alliance was the hostility between the two families: the Saudis and the Hashemites, which was dated back to the events that the Arabian Peninsula witnessed during the Ottoman rule and after. The Arabian Peninsula witnessed a conflict between the chiefs of tribes on power which mounted to a military confrontation between the Sherif of Mecca and

Saudi family. This conflict was ended by the triumph and control of Al-Hijaz by Ibn Saud (Al-Suweidi, P. 539).

Therefore, the relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia were not friendly (Abu Nuwwar, P. 263) but they were hostile (Morris, P. 191) despite the many agreements signed which stated good neighborhood and the endeavors of successive Iraqi governments to improve the relations between the two countries, but they all failed (Abdulfattah, P. 353). The reason was the Saudi opposing stand against the Iraqi calls for the Iraqi-Syrian Unity (Eden, P.353), and its call for unity with Jordan since the beginnings of the fifties of the last century before the institution of Baghdad Alliance (Al-Hadhrami, P. 21). The Iraqi ambitions were the reason for the Saudi Protest (Al-Shalabi, P. 117), for fear of the institution of a strong state for the Hashemites on the Northern borders of Saudi Arabia, which would call again for restoring Al-Hijaz that the Saudis controlled and annexed to their State in 1925 (Ibn Sa'ud, PP. 4-6). King Abdulazeez sent a message to Britain, asking for practicing pressure on Iraq's Prince regent to prevent him from interfering in Jordan (Al-Shalabi, P. 117). The Saudi opposing policy against Baghdad Alliance continued after the appointment of King Saud Bin Abdulzeez following the passing by of King Abdulazeez.

In spite of all that, the United States and Britain did their best to join Saudi Arabia to Baghdad Alliance under several justifications, one of which was the threat of some Gulf countries, like Iran, to Saudi Arabia. But Saudi Arabia had its vision and opposing stand rejecting the alliance. It stood by Egypt and supported it in its opposition. We can say that this support played an efficient role in failing the project of Baghdad Alliance. Saudi Arabia's opposition against Baghdad Alliance started earlier during the period of negotiations when it issued a statement on 18 January, 1954 in which it supported the opposing stand of Egypt against Baghdad Alliance (Abdulfattah, PP. 353-354). This was followed by King Saud Abdulazeez's address to the Arab Nation that it was tested in its precious thing, namely, the Arab League, and that one of its countries (he meant Iraq) departed its unanimous resolution. He also sent a message to Nouri Al-Sa'eed warning him of taking an isolated stand that could affect the Arab Unity. He stated that Iraq acted badly to the Arab Unity (Daradkah, PP. 102-103).

Saudi Arabia took the side of Egypt in the conference of Arab Prime ministers where its complete support of the Egyptian stand appeared through the statement of Prince Faissal Bin Abdulazeez: "I believe that this alliance is the beginning not the end and the cause of the destruction of Arab countries (Abdulfattah, P. 354). It is noticed that Saudi Arabia and Egypt confirmed the importance of maintaining the Arab League as being the best form which

represented the concepts of Arab Unity that they did not want to go out of its frame, the fact which could affect and threaten the Arabic position of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, especially when things were related to the stand and status of the Hashemites and their influence and the elevation of international and regional status of Iraq, the fact which threatened the Saudi interests.

Besides the hostilities of Saudi Arabia against the Hashemites in Iraq (Al-Suweidi, P. 539), there were hostilities against Britain which took an opposing stand against Saudi Arabia in the conflict about the rich oil Braimy Oasis in 1954 (Eden, PP. 110-111). As a result, Saudi Arabia had close relations with the United States of America which were connected with common interests since the thirties of the twentieth century (Al-Auteibi, No. 14571, May 16, 2008). Saudi Arabia began to drift away from British policy after its role had become secondary (Al-Tarawnah, P. 153).

For these reasons, Saudi Arabia took its stand against its two enemies, namely, Iraq and Britain to face this project strongly and fail it. This was frankly stated by British Prime minister, then, Anthony Eden (Eden, PP. 106, 110).

It held an opposing alliance with Egypt and spent lots of money in Syria and Jordan and gave bribes to officials to group opposition against Baghdad Alliance (Al-Tarawnah, P. 153). Saudi Arabia and Egypt took roles in their actions. Egypt worked by propaganda and intelligence, while Saudi Arabia worked through money which was described by Iraqi ambassador in Saudi Arabia, then, Ameen Al-Mumeiz as the diplomacy of gold (Al-Tarawnah, P. 153). Saudi Arabia bought some newspapers to announce its opposing stand against the alliance and consider joining it as a treason of Palestinian cause (Daradkah, PP. 104-105). The Saudi influence seemed strong in Jordan through its ambassador Abdulazeez Al-Kuheimi who had close relations with a lot of Jordanian politicians. He played an important role in solving political disputes which lasted for several years between Abu Al-Huda and Sameer Al-Rifa'i in an attempt to establish a unified Jordanian front that would be supporting Saudi Arabia and opposing Baghdad Alliance (Al-Majali, P. 159). Saudi Arabia paid monthly amounts of money to Abu Al-Huda's government (Daradkah, P. 84) in the same way as it paid for three of Al-Majali's ministers to fail Templer's efforts of making Jordan join the alliance (Eden, P. 101).

The Iraqi documents issued by the Iraqi commissariat in Amman on October, 1955 stated that the Saudis spent large amounts of money for recruiting Palestinian refugees in Syria, by cooperation with Egypt in order to infiltrate to Israel, and Jordan was suspicious of the possibility of secret aims in Jordan (Al-Tarawnah, PP. 153-154). The document stated

that Abu Al-Huda, after returning from Saudi Arabia, got lots of money that were deposited in Beirut, and that he made contacts with Jordanian opposition in Damascus with the aim of coordinating the work of the opposition against the policy calling for Baghdad Alliance which was based on the policy of King Hussein and Al-Mufti government. The document added that the Saudis increased their propaganda following King Saud Bin Abdulazeez's visit to Jordan, when donations were distributed to charity societies in Jordan. The amount of money paid by the Saudi embassy was about thirty thousand JDs in one month, the fact which led to dismissing the Saudi ambassador, Al-Kuheimi, from Jordan in November, 1955 (Eden, P. 154), especially after his several attempts to confront and embarrass Al-Mufti government. This was apparent after the protest note sent by him when Sherif Nassir performed prayer in the memory of the Palestinian martyrs who were executed in Saudi Arabia following their coup attempt (Al-Majali, P. 160).

On September 5, 1955, King Hussein visited Saudi Arabia escorted by his mother Queen Zain Al-Sharaf and his uncle Sherif Nassir Bin Jameel. It seems that this visit came to soften the climates with Saudi Arabia after the dismissal of the Saudi Ambassador Al-Kuheimi, and to ask for financial aid to Jordan (Al-Tarawnah, P. 154).

After that, Saudi Arabia tried to be close to Jordan through the invitation of a number of Arab countries to a conference in Riyadh. This conference which was called Riyadh Conference was held in 1956 in which Saudi Arabia offered its share of the Arabic aid that was 250,000 JDs (Abu Nuwwar, PP. 212-214). Following the abolishment of the Jordanian-British Treaty, Saudi Arabia paid its share of the financial aid which was five million sterling pounds. On the other hand, both Egypt and Syria did not fulfill their financial commitments to Jordan which they promised in the Arab Solidarity Agreement, the fact that led to the deterioration of the financial situation in Jordan after the cut-off of the British aid (Daradkah, P. 142). This was the last amount of the Arab aid offered to Jordan.

Saudi Arabia was one of the most important countries which supported Jordan and was committed to paying its share of the financial aid to it after signing the Arab Solidarity Agreement with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. It seems that Saudi Arabia started to play a new role by the new influence of the United States of America in the region in place of Britain which lost its influence after Jordan's abolishment of its treaty.

Saudi Arabia worked for the success of Eisenhower Project by practicing pressure on the Arab countries like Jordan through the breaking of already agreed upon commitments, and linking any aid by the agreement upon the American Project. In light of its financial crisis, Jordan was obliged to join Eisenhower's Project, aiming at solving its financial

problems which resulted from the Arabs' breaking their promises of help and support, disregarding the fact that the project will bring Jordan under the umbrella of American domination in place of British domination.

For the importance and effect of Saudi money in confronting the alliance in the Arab region, British Prime Minister (Eden, PP. 110, 123, 111), Anthony Eden asked the United States to interfere in persuading the Saudis to invest their money in a more beneficial way for themselves instead of using it in fighting the British Policy in the Arab region (Eden, PP11, 123). This urged Nouri Al-Sa'eed to ask the United States not to pay for the purchases of Saudi oil for six months at least. Had the United States agreed to do that, things would have changed in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt and that would have led to an Arabic-Israeli settlement (Eden, PP. 123-124). This confirms the fact that Saudi Arabia paid abundant amounts of money to stir up disturbance with the aim of having pressure on Jordanian government, exploiting the bad financial conditions of Palestinian refugees and tempting them with money to carry out disturbance (Al-Tarawnah, P. 159).

A confidential report was sent to prime minister Anthony Eden by British Minister for Foreign Affairs Yumak Harold Macmillan about Baghdad Alliance Conference. It was dated 25 January, 1955 in which the British minister criticized the Saudi Policy by saying: "the important point which emerged clearly from what I heard in Baghdad and Beirut is that the situation in the Middle East is undergoing destruction and corruption via the Saudi money (Abu Shakra, No. 10428, 17 June, 2007)".

American historian George Linshovisky explained that the fierce opposition expressed by King Saud against the alliance reflected his fear that the Hashemites would avenge the defeat which happened to them thirty years ago, and so came the Saudi reaction. This is confirmed in the statement of American ambassador in Jiddah: "King Saud feels that Baghdad Alliance was just a British conspiracy implemented by Nouri Al-Sa'eed to overthrow the Saudi throne and remove Al-Hijaz (Al-Mumeiz, PP. 590-591)".

It appears from what has already been mentioned that the effect of the Egyptian-Saudi opposition was efficient. It was able to eliminate the project of Baghdad Alliance and prevent the Arab countries from joining it and to be completely finished after the participation of Britain in the aggression against Egypt. That participation was a confirmation that Britain was a colonial state working for its interests and as being the first ally of Zionism (Morris, P. 197) and Israel the Arabs' enemy and the usurper of their land and rights.

It is noticeable that the United States did not join the alliance in a complete way in spite of the fact that it was its main moving power as being the first to initiate its idea, design

it and determine its general frame (Eden, P. 112). Its role was confined to the participation in the works of economic and military committees, and "anti-destructive action" committee. The United States authorized the task of leading the alliance to Britain, while planning for the defensive strategies of the alliance and real authority in taking important decisions remained in the hands of the United States (Williamson, P. 599). This stand aroused a lot of questions which needed different explanations, one of which was that the United States did not want to press Saudi Arabia to change its stand rejecting the alliance (Eden, P. 110) in order to maintain its relations with it (Al-Hadhrami, p. 21), in spite of having all possible means of pressure and influence on Saudi Arabia, with its capability to give sufficient guaranties that would eliminate fears. In spite of all the reasons that have already been mentioned, it seems that the United States did not take part in the alliance as it believed it would form a threat to Israel. It would strengthen the military potentials of Arab countries (Nuseibah, PP. 41-42). This reason would not give a logical analysis, because the aids offered to participating countries in the alliance were limited. They would not change the balance of power to the advantage of Arab countries. But the truth lied in different reasons because the United States wanted to explore and examine political and social situations in the Arab region and its stand in regard to alliances with Western countries after the appearance of an anti-west Arab movement (Abdulfattah, PP. 333-336). So, it considered achieving what it aspired for without the possibility of failure by leaving the leadership of the alliance project to Britain. The United States was aware of the weak political and diplomatic potentials of Britain in persuading the Arab countries to join the alliance, taking into account that its picture was deformed for its role in the institution of Zionist existence in Palestine, besides its bad relations with some countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

This American stand against British policy was clear when the United States objected to the tri-aggression on Egypt and through its pressure on Britain to force it to stop the aggression (Nating, Issue 2, 1993, PP. 212-213, 215,219). In all that, it sought to end British existence to be a substitute for it in the region. We should not disregard the role of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Propaganda against Baghdad Alliance and its failing (Nuseibah, P. 41). The Soviet Union sought to support the Arab national thought against the west and its projects by strengthening its commercial and military relations with Egypt and Syria, especially after the agreements of arms deals with Egypt in 1955 (Mahafzah, P. 202).

We do not exaggerate when we say that the United States sought to fail Britain in that project and leave it to strife for its success in spite of the effective means the United States

had for exercising pressure on the Arabic opposition (Eden, P. 112), the most important of which was the ability to fail the Egyptian-Saudi alliance which was the most influential one (Abu Nuwwar, P. 263). However, the subsequent events confirmed the fact that the aim of the United States was not the alliance, but the failing of Britain and driving it away from the Arab region and replacing it (Al-Shalabi, PP. 160, 163). The United States realized the strategic and economic importance of the region as it had two thirds of the oil reserve in the world (Al-Bashayrah, PP. 152, 161).

The United States accomplished its aim by instituting Eisenhower Project in 1957 which came to fill in the gap after the retreat of British influence in the region, and the pledge to protect participating countries (Al-Tarawnah, P. 166), and offer financial and military aids to them. So, the United States was able to be a substitute for Britain.

Conclusion:

The investigation of Arabic stand toward Baghdad Alliance reveals a lot of the features of Arabic policy then. The project started as an American-British one, through which the Western countries sought to confront the Soviet influence by increasing their influence in the Arab region and providing financial and military temptations to the Arab countries.

Some Arab countries responded to that project, the first of which was Iraq. In that alliance, Iraq found a way for strengthening its political and military influence in the Arab region in order to compete with great Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In addition, the alliance placed Iraq in an important and high position at international and regional levels. That is why Iraq did its best for the success of Baghdad Alliance Project in order to urge the other Arab countries to join it, especially Jordan which had close family relationships with it. Iraq was careful about Jordan's joining the alliance in order to be split and isolated from the Arabs. Iraq's attempts, then Turkey's, to persuade Jordan to join the alliance met a responsive reaction in spite of the reluctant non-supportive Jordanian stand toward the alliance from the beginning. But the economic and military offers presented to Jordan created an incentive to the Jordanian leadership represented in King Hussein Bin Talal and Jordanian government, taking into account that those economic and military offers were badly needed in order to be able to encounter the repeated Israeli aggressions. So, Jordan considered the alliance as an opportunity to strengthen the military potentials of its army in order to face the west-supported Israeli power which the Arabs were not able to encounter in 1967 as a result of their inability to retaliate (Nuseibah, PP.41-42). This thing was not certain because the alliance represented the greeds of the western side which supported Israel.

The alliance failed as the Arabs split between supporters and opposers. Egypt and Saudi Arabia opposed it and Egypt, after the revolution, represented the Arab national movement which sought to face the west and its greeds by refusing its domination. Egypt followed a non-allied policy and at the same time did its best to maintain its position as a leader of the Arab world, taking the excuse of the Arab League and Arab unity. Saudi Arabia also considered the alliance as a way of strengthening its conventional enemies in both Iraq and Jordan, thinking of Baghdad Alliance as a way of strengthening Iraq and Jordan, the fact which threatened it and its land. Moreover, Saudi Arabia did not want the Hashemites to take the lead of unity movement and leadership in the Arab World which was sought by King Abdullah Bin Al-Hussein with all means (Makkawi, PP. 244-251, 248). Saudi Arabia was not at ease with King Abdullah's aspirations and desires in regional expansion in the region and considered him a possible danger and threat to Al-Hijaz (Eden, P. 262).

Therefore, both Saudi Arabia and Egypt agreed to oppose Baghdad Alliance and split the way of work and opposition. Egypt sought to stir up the Arabic opinion and charge it with anti-alliance thoughts claiming that the alliance was a waste of Palestinian cause and Arab rights in Palestine. This was done through the Arabs' Voice Broadcast which accused Baghdad Alliance, Iraq and all those who supported it, to the extent that people got to the habit of listening to it. Al-Suweidi, in his notes, stated that people were in the habit of listening to the Arabs' Voice Broadcast cursing Baghdad Alliance as they ate and drank (Al-Suwaedi, P. 553). This indicates the power which that broadcast had and the informational influence against Baghdad Alliance as Hazz'a Al-Majali said, "the broadcasts opposing it formed an overwhelming current which could not be faced (Al-Majali, P. 174)". On the other hand, Saudi Arabia followed an other way which was not less important than the role of Egypt, namely using money for buying political views in Jordan and other countries to reject the alliance and to form a general opposing opinion driven by money as it happened in Jordan. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, through propaganda and money which were able to constitute a strong political opposing front against Baghdad Alliance in Jordan. This action persuaded King Hussein and Jordanian government to abandon the idea of joining the alliance in spite of the significant temptations for the sake of the unity of Jordan and to avoid an endless intrigue. The events related to the alliance developed quickly following the participation of Britain in the tri-aggression on Egypt when it lost every support in the Arab region. The aggression was the turning point and the beginning of the end of the British influence in the region. After that, it lost the most important centre of its influence in Jordan by the Arabization of the army and the abolishment of the British-Jordanian Treaty, when the

Arab countries, represented in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, promised to offer a financial aid to Jordan which was previously offered by Britain yearly. However, these Arabic promises were just techniques by Saudi Arabia and Egypt to fail Britain and its allies. The Arab countries did not keep their commitment, except for Saudi Arabia which offered its share only once. That action had the most negative effect on the Arabic policy. Instead of supporting and containing Jordan and enhancing its independence, after abolishing its treaty with Britain and resorting to the Arabs, we find that the Arab countries did not fulfill all their commitments, the fact which led to a dangerous financial crisis that threatened its existence. Moreover, those Arab countries plotted conspiracies for a military coup through Egypt by urging a number of Jordanian officers to do that. Meanwhile, Jordan asked Egypt for help and aid (Abu Nuwwar, PP. 306, 308). In this way, intentionally or unintentionally, the Arab countries paved the way for the United States to enter the Arab region. Saudi Arabia really sought to make Jordan join Eisenhower Project. From what has already been presented, it seems that Baghdad Alliance revealed the Arab political shortsightedness. It confirmed the non-existence of a real Arab Solidarity. The matter was a conflict of power between power centres in the Arab countries. Moreover, the failure of Baghdad Alliance was to the advantage of the United States which tried to weaken it. It neglected all Britain's demands of support to face the Saudi opposition. By this, it failed the alliance, ended Britain in the region and replaced it with no effort.

References:

- Abu Nuwwar, Ali, When the Arabs Disappeared, Notes in Arabic Politics (1948-1964), Dar Al-Saki, London, Issue 1, 1990.
- Eden, Anthony, Eden's Notes, ex-Prime Minister of Britain, Translated by Kheiri Hammad, Dar Maktabat Al-Hayah, Sec. 2, Beirut.
- Al-Hamadani, Hamid, Nouri Al-S'eed the Man of British Great Tasks, Dar Feeshon Media, Sewden, 2003.
- Al-Hamdani, Hamid, Pages of Modern History of Iraq (1945-1958), Dar Feeshon Media, Sweden, Issue 1, 2004.
- Al-Hadhrami, Omar, Jordanian Saudi Relations, Dar Majdalawi, Amman, Issue 1, 2003.
- Daradkah, Fathi Muhammad, The Political History of Jordanian-Saudi Relations (1953-1967), Publications of the Higher Committee for Writing Jordan's History, Amman, 2009.

Al-Sa'eed, Issmat, Nouri Al-Sa'eed the State man and the Human, Published by Mabarrat Issam Al-Sa'eed, London, 1992.

Al-Sa'eed, Nouri, Nouri Al-Sa'eed's Address from Iraqi Broadcast, 17 December, 1956, Dar Al-Sayyid Mamounah, No Publication Place or Date.

Al-Suweidi, Tawfiq, My Notes About A Half Century of Iraq's History and the Arab Cause, Dar Al-Hikmah, Beirut, Issue 2, 1999.

Al-Shalabi, Suheila Suleiman, Jordanian-British Relations (1951-1967), The Centre of Arabic Unity Studies, Beirut, 2006.

Abdulfattah, Fikrat Namiq, The Foreign Policy of Iraq in the Arab Region (1953-1958), Dar Al-Rasheed, Baghdad, 1981.

Al-Majali, Hazza', My Notes, Ministry of culture, Amman, 2009.

Al-Mahdi, Muneeb and Suleiman Al-Mousa, The History of Jordan in the Twentieth Century (1900-1959), Al-Muhtasib Bookshop, Amman, Issue 2, 1988.

Mahafzah, Muhammad Ahmad, The Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom: Its Institution and Fortification in Twenty Years (1946-1969), Irbid, 2005.

Mahmoud, Abdulmun'im Hamzah, The Secrets of King Hussein's Stand and Decisions Between Supporters and Opposers, The Scientific Book, Cairo, 1999.

Mukallid, Ismael Sabri, International Strategy and Policy, Al-Dar Al-Arabiyyah, Beirut, 1979.

Makkawi, Najlaa Sa'eed, Great Syria Project: A Study of One of the Arabic Unity Projects in the First Half of the Twentieth Century, The Centre of the Arabic Unity Studies, Beirut, Issue 1, 2010.

Al-Mumeizz, Ameen, The Saudi Kingdom As I Knew It, Beirut, 1963.

Morriss, James, The Hashemite Kings, Translated by Yousuf Al-Mikdadi, Revised by Khalid Dahbour, Al-Ahliyyah for Publication and Distribution, Amman, Issue 1, 2009.

Nating, Anthony, Nassir, Translation of Shakir Ibraheem Sa'eed, Madbouli Bookshop, Cairo, Issue 2, 1993.

Nusseibah, Hazim, The Political History of Current Jordan Between 1953 and 1967, Publications of the Committee of Jordan's Histroy, Amman, 1990.

Meulen, Van Der, The Wells Ibn Sa'ud, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1957.

Robins, Philip, A History of Jordan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2004.

Ruane, Kevin, Seato, Medo, and the Ghaghdad Pact: Anthony Eden, British Foreign Policy and the Collective Defense of Southeast Asia and the Middle East, 1952-1955. *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Mar 2005, Vol. 16, Issue 1.

Ruane, Kevin, Spring 2006, *Anglo-American Relations: The Cold War and the Middle East Defense 1953-1955*, *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 4, Issue 1.

Williamson, Daniel, G., *Understandable Failure: The Eisenhower Administration's Strategic Goals in Iraq 1953-1958*. *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, Sep. 2006, Vol. 17, Issue 3.

Al-Bashayrah, Ali Ibraheem, *Jordan and The Western Defense Projects of the Middle East, An Unpublished Master Thesis*, Yarmouk University, Irbid, 1994.

Al-Tarawnah, Ahmad Muhammad, *Jordanian-Saudi Relations (1921-1964)*, An Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Jordan, Amman, 2004.

Abu Shakrah, Aiyad, *British Documents, Middle East*, No. 10428, 17 June, 2007.

Al-Auteibi, Abdulmuhssin, *Saudi-American Relations*, Saudi Riyadh Newspaper, Electronic Version, No. 14571, May 16, 2008.