

## MODES OF THINKING IN LANGUAGE STUDY

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### Abstract

The concept of language is nothing but a linguistic simplification. It encompasses many realities. Depending on the language spoken, the reality of language is denoted with words belonging to different grammatical categories. The reality implicit in these grammatical categories involves a particular mode of thinking, prompted by the conception of things in accordance with a corresponding mode of being. Because of this it is necessary, then, to distinguish the concept of language as something different from the reality of language and determine the reality or degree of reality of it.

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**Keywords:** Mode of being, mode of thinking, conception of language, speech act, language in its birth, act of knowing

### Introduction

The conception of things has to do with what Coseriu called *the original knowledge of speakers*<sup>243</sup>, that is, *linguistic knowledge*. In this you have to separate, at least, two aspects: a) those aspects of linguistic knowledge having to do with language use, and b) those having to do with *beliefs* in the conception of things. Beliefs, transmitted through the tradition in the technique of speaking by the different languages, constitute the foundation in the conception of things by speakers. Speaking is speaking, saying and knowing. Human subjects speak because they have something to say, and they say something because they are both free and historical to know, conceive of things, say and speak. A human subject is at the same time absolute, that is, free and creative, and historical, a subject who performs himself in participation with others in history, thus contingent and limited. Because of this, a human subject creates his mode of thinking, necessarily free and participated, that is, creative and historical.

The purpose of a linguistic theory is to understand what language *really* is. To do this we must base our theory on the ultimate reality we may find in language analysis, *the radical reality*<sup>244</sup>. The same as with the act of knowing<sup>245</sup>, a theory is nothing but something we add to the things we apprehend and find in the world. Language is nothing but the reality lived, intuited, created, acquired, performed, used and spoken of by speakers.

### Modes of being and modes of thinking

#### *The concept of Being in language study.*

In this paper I want to pose the problem of language from the ultimate and most radical foundation of it. My intention is to answer the following question: *What is language?* A linguist when he wants to study language meets a great difficulty sometimes invincible: his original conception about language is not scientific but taken from his linguistic background. A linguist as a speaker, whatever his language is, has a particular intuitive conception about

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<sup>243</sup> Cf. Coseriu 1988: 66-67; Coseriu 1992: 218.

<sup>244</sup> Cf. § 3.

<sup>245</sup> I would rather use *act of knowing* other than *act of knowledge* to mean that knowledge is active.

language and how it functions, especially in the aspects concerning his native language. The interest the linguist feels to know about language makes him be attentive, as a speaker, to all details in language use in a task lasting all over his life. As a consequence when he tries to study language in a justified manner, that is, as a linguist, he will probably try to justify his original ideas, cultivated by him all over his life. But these ideas are nothing but *beliefs*, something having emerged in us without any rational support on our part<sup>246</sup>. In this sense, the beliefs in force in our tradition of speaking, that is, in our native language, can make us adopt them as if they were reality itself. All languages, any one on its part, transmit a particular conception about things in the world. One of the most important things in that world is language.

In order to avoid all possible beliefs in language study, the linguist must determine if *language really exists, if language can be verified*; he must analyse language to know the *degree of reality* of it; if *language merely manifests itself* and *how and what it manifests itself in*. Language manifests itself in the speaking behaviour of its users. It is nothing abstract but *real*, the language used by speakers. In this sense, and bearing in mind that all speakers bear with them beliefs, we should distinguish three types of behaviour in speakers. First, *speakers live their language*, that is, they identify themselves with the techniques of expression and modes of conceiving of things in their language. Second, their language and the techniques of expression in it are historical systems of speaking, that is, something contingent proper of this or that language, not of language. And third, speakers usually speak of things—thus giving explanation to linguistic facts—in accordance with the mode of thinking in their speech community, their native language.

The techniques of expression of a language bear with them a particular conception of the world, that is, a mode of thinking, a series of beliefs accepted by speakers. As a consequence the original conception of things by linguists is structured in accordance with the original conception of things in force in their native language. Because of this the original conception of linguists must be analysed, revised, rejected or justified. Linguists must radically separate language use from the mode of thinking in their language, that is, they must separate the linguistic behaviour of speakers, *linguistic knowledge*, something manifesting itself in *language use*, and the mode of thinking implicit in the explanation of things and thus in linguistic facts by speakers.

Due to the beliefs transmitted by the western languages the mode of conceiving of things in the western world is peculiar of our civilization. This fact goes beyond language use but it is the support for the conception of things reflected in language use. It constitutes *the mode of thinking* of westerners, the mode of conceiving of things based on a particular conception of what Being is. The mere fact of referring to *language* with a noun makes us conceive of the reality of it as something really existing, something there, something independent from anything else, thus something objective as if it was an entity. The conception of language would be different if the reality of language was denoted by a verb. Compare the different degree of reality in the words *language* and *speaking*. As a matter of fact, in Greek and Latin the reality denoted by the concept *language* was denoted by a verb or an adverb, categories of words used to express different modes of being, an activity or the mode of an activity. For Coseriu, this way of conceiving of the reality of language related much more exactly to the way of being of *real language*. In Greek you could find expressions as *attikísein* (speaking Attic), *barbarísein* (speaking Barbarian) *hellenísein* (speaking Greek)<sup>247</sup>.

<sup>246</sup> Cf. Ortega y Gasset 2005: 172.

<sup>247</sup> Cf. Coseriu 1992: 78-79.

But in Latin this type of referring to the reality of language is even more exact since the activity of speaking appears separated from its mode: *latine loqui, graece loqui* (speaking in the mode of speaking of old Latin people, or the Greek)<sup>248</sup>.

For a modern westerner<sup>249</sup>, the reality of language is thought of as if it was something really existing. In this sense it is fundamental to answer the following question, *does language exist? (or, how does it exist?)*, *Can language be verified? How does language manifest itself?* The answer to these questions constitutes what we call *the degree of reality of things* (the degree of reality of language, in our case).

### **Modes of thinking: the concept of substantive being**

In the history of Thought—referring this expression to western thought—the concept of Being, that is, the concept of how things are to be conceived of, the mode of being—and thus the mode of thinking—, varies largely due to the intervention of the great thinkers in the western philosophy. The original and underlying conception of things in western languages is what we call the *substantive being*<sup>250</sup>, a concept in force all around the Mediterranean, transmitted by our languages<sup>251</sup>.

The first Greek thinkers, Parmenides of Elea and Heraclitus of Ephesus, 6<sup>th</sup> century BC, conceived of things as if they really existed. Being, for them, was something existing as opposing Nought thus something objective. Parmenides said that you cannot say anything about Being, the only thing you can say is that “Being is and it is impossible for it not to be”; and together with this he added, “Non-Being is not and you cannot even speak of it”<sup>252</sup>. That is, Being and Non-being (=Nought) have the same degree of reality, they both existed at the same level or, said in accordance with Heraclitus’ conception: Being is in opposition to Nought<sup>253</sup>. For Parmenides, Being is one, eternal, immobile, it has no beginning or end<sup>254</sup>. In the history of Thought this conception by Parmenides, meant attributing *lógos* to reality, that is, dispossessing reality of the subjective, thus becoming *lógos*<sup>255</sup> (=content).

For Heraclitus of Ephesus, Being is nothing static or inert but something opposing its contrary. I am in as much as I oppose the world: the world opposes me and obliges me to act in opposition to it. Without the world I would not be<sup>256</sup>. Heraclitus’ conception meant the introduction of *lógos* in reality as well, dispossessing reality of the subjective. With this *lógos* was *common*<sup>257</sup>, that is, something in all human beings.

<sup>248</sup> Ibid.

<sup>249</sup> At least for English, Spanish and French speakers.

<sup>250</sup> Cf. Ortega y Gasset 1971: 38.

<sup>251</sup> The major manifestations of substantive being in the western world can be found in the following three facts: a) the concept of science. Science in the West is linked to technics and technology, that is, science aims at dominating the object of study, that is, things in the world. In contrast to this, you can consider the concept of science in the Asian world, connected to individual happiness, that is, science aims at dominating human passions to be happy. From the point of view of a theory of knowledge you can see that in the West science is objective; in the East it is subjective; b) monotheism. The three monotheist religions were born around the Mediterranean. Monotheist religions are absolute, that is, every one claims to be the true one; and c) things are conceived of as if they existed, for example, nature, something encompassing many things, a “linguistic simplification” of all the things and aspects of things making up what we know as nature.

<sup>252</sup> Cf. Ferrater Mora, *Diccionario de filosofía*.

<sup>253</sup> Cf. Ortega y Gasset 1992: 217.

<sup>254</sup> Cf. Ferrater Mora, *Diccionario de filosofía*.

<sup>255</sup> Cf. Ortega y Gasset, *Obras Completas*, IX: 1063.

<sup>256</sup> “Being in Heraclitus is not quietness or anything inert—[...] Being is contrapositive confrontation. And any thing is in as much as it confronts, nothing possible unless the thing in question makes its opposite act. I am in as much as I oppose my resistance, the World—which on resisting lets me and obliges me to act in opposition. Without it I would not be—. Without its resisting there would not be my insisting”. (José Ortega y Gasset, 1994: 417: 264) (my translation).

<sup>257</sup> Cf. Ortega y Gasset, *Obras completas*, IX: 1063.

This mode of thinking, the concept of substantive being<sup>258</sup>, created innumerable metaphysical problems, one of them, the problem of movement: being cannot change because changing involves that something not existing previously now exists.

Before this untenable situation from the level of the real, Aristotle, 4<sup>th</sup>, c. BC, reacted trying to conciliate both previous conceptions, adding a new one. For Aristotle, the concept of Being, ἐνέργεια ὄν, was at the same time something being in itself (ἐνέργεια κατ' ἑργον) thus not needing of anything else to be (=substance); something executing itself (ἐνέργεια κατ' ἐνέργειαν); and something being the potency of its own performance (ἐνέργεια κατὰ δύναμιν). In spite of this, ἐνέργεια ὄν keeps on its original character: it is something there and something objective<sup>259</sup>.

The concept of substantive being, in force in Greek and Mediterranean cultures—Parmenides, did nothing but formulating what was in force in his speech community—has become the mode of conceiving of things in the western civilization, a concept of Being not in force in other parts of the world outside the western civilization<sup>260</sup>.

Substantive being applied to language makes us think of language as something there, something opposing its contrary (=silence), not needing of anything else to be, something objective, that is, as an entity. In this sense language is thought to constitute part of the world, apt to be described in itself. As a consequence, you can take language as the starting point for its study. As a matter of fact most modern theories about language start with this conception of language<sup>261</sup>.

### The modern mode of being: the Cartesian mode of thinking

Descartes (1596-1650) revised the mode of thinking of substantive being, and proposed the “I” and “Thought” as the radical reality in the mode of thinking. He stated, “cogito, ergo sum”. That is, because I can think I can conclude that I am. In this way and after him, Being is something manifesting in thought based on three pillars, *intuition*<sup>262</sup>, *reason* and *deduction*. To intuit, for Descartes, is realizing necessary connections in things thus appearing evident<sup>263</sup>, that is, executing *reason* in the contemplation of things. When you analyse concepts and find out new connections, then you have *deduction*, a new function of the mind different from *intuition*<sup>264</sup> and *reason*. With this conception the character of philosophy changed: before Descartes philosophy asked for Being—*what is Being?*—but after Descartes philosophy asked for the way how Being is known—*how is Being known?*

<sup>258</sup> Cf. Ortega y Gasset, *Obras Completas*, VII: 339: “The most characteristic expression of the Hellenic concept of being is being as a substance, an immobile and invariable being. Even in the ultimate substance, the beginning of all change and movement, in the Aristotelian God you can find an Entity moving everything but not moving Itself” (my translation).

<sup>259</sup> The concept of Being by Aristotle, ἐνέργεια ὄν, has given the base for different interpretations in 20th century linguistics. For Coseriu, the concept of Being by Aristotle, founded on the conception by Wilhelm von Humboldt, is the base to interpret language as free activity, ἐνέργεια (Cf. Martínez del Castillo 2012: 164-167). For Chomsky, trying to interpret Descartes, this concept of being is the base to conclude that language is innate (Cf. Martínez del Castillo 2010: 227-234).

<sup>260</sup> The concept of Substantive Being does not exist in the tradition of Hopi, people living in Little Colorado valley (cf. Whorf 1956: 258); nor does it exist in Ewe, a language in Togo (cf. Benveniste 2007, vol. I: 71-72), or in primitive Hebrew (cf. Boman 1954, apud Ferrater Mora, *Diccionario de filosofía*).

<sup>261</sup> As a general rule linguistics in the 20<sup>th</sup> century is based on this conception about language (cf. Martínez del Castillo, 2012).

<sup>262</sup> For Ortega y Gasset, the modern way of thinking introduced by Descartes is based on analogy. For him, analogy is the foundation of science. With analogy individual items are used as correlates thus making possible to create an image of the class those individual items belong to (cf. Ortega y Gasset, 1992: 148 and ff.).

<sup>263</sup> Cf. Ortega y Gasset, 1992: 328.

<sup>264</sup> Cf. Ortega y Gasset, 1992: 331.

So, today the concept of Being transmitted by our languages (substantive being) radically opposes the way of thinking introduced by Descartes and philosophy after him. Speakers of western languages refer to the reality of language as something there, something existing in itself, something objective, independent from the reality it appears in, that is, something with no or little connection with its creators, speakers. As a consequence and because of this, you can pose the metaphysical problem of asking if language exists or if it is something created by the human thought.

A metaphysical problem is the one posed in terms of contraposition of the material, given to us by our senses, and the mental. In the apprehension of things, apprehension of Being, our senses play an important role. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) established two sources of knowledge, *sensibility* and *intellect*, also called, respectively, *receptivity* and *spontaneity*. For Kant, knowledge is performed as *the synthesis of both faculties*, that is, as a unification of the multiple forms of sensibility by means of the intellect through forms *a priori*. The synthesis of *sensibility* and *intellect* is possible because of *imagination*. Imagination is a *creative force* present in the base of both receptivity and spontaneity. In the synthesis of knowledge made by imagination, both faculties converge<sup>265</sup>.

Metaphysical problems can be summarized in the problem of knowledge: *What do we know? Do we know because of our senses? What do our senses contribute with? Does Man know only through his senses or does he create what he says he knows?* At first sight, we can see that human knowledge does not relate to the thing given by our senses. In order to know, it is necessary at least to change the thing given by our senses and add something to it.

The double reality of knowledge stated by Kant is present in language and its verification. We as speakers can verify the existence of language in our daily life. We live, intuit, create, acquire, perform and use language. In this sense language is real. But, on the other hand, language in as much as it appears in the word ‘language’ and the concept “language” poses the problem of its existence and verification. Language cannot be verified in itself. This means that language does not exist or at least that language does not have concrete existence. Language is good for speaking, saying, knowing and thinking, good for us at manifesting ourselves to others and good for others at manifesting themselves to us. Humans cannot do anything unless through language even when they are alone or think. In this sense, language exists. The problem is to explain how language exists and what extent language is real. The problem with language study thus is to determine the *degree of reality* it has. The reality of language is not simple but complex. It must be guessed out and devised. The first thing to do then is to study language as it manifests itself. We cannot take language as constituting an easy reality. Language is a phenomenon (from φαίνω=make things clear, φανεῖσθαι=show, exhibit oneself, manifest oneself), that is, something existing but mentally, manifesting itself in something else<sup>266</sup>.

### **Modes of thinking in the 20<sup>th</sup> century**

In the history of Thought different modes of thinking have manifested in the 20th century. We can summarize them in three:

a) Being as a phenomenon, that is, Being as manifesting itself. Things are things in so far as they are useful, that is, as they play a function. A chair, for example, made in wood, if we burn to warm up it is not a chair (=a piece of furniture to sit on): it is firewood. Things manifest themselves in front of us;

<sup>265</sup> Cf. Di Cesare, 1999: 35-36.

<sup>266</sup> This is the interpretation of λόγος by M. Heidegger, cf. Heidegger, 2002: 37; cf. also, § 2.

b) Executive Being, the mode of Being in which you live things, thus things acting on you<sup>267</sup>. Something is in the way it is because it executes what it is. Light is something I need, thus being what I expect it to be; nevertheless I shall not consider or mention it unless it is missing.

c) Being as reality. Something is in terms of the action I may execute on it. For Ortega y Gasset, reality means sheer action of the circumstance on me and me on the circumstance<sup>268</sup>. Language is nothing but the thing I create, acquire and use. Its reality consists in my creating and using it. In this sense things are in so far as they relate to the perspective cognizant<sup>269</sup> subjects impose on them.

Language for the speaking subject is to know how to speak, that is, it is *the linguistic knowledge* the speaking subject intuitively lives, creates, acquires, performs, uses and even speaks of. For the listener, language basically is *understanding*. The speaker and the listener live language but differently. Since the speech act is made up of both the speaker and the listener, relieving each other in their respective roles, and since living is conscious, language is both *speaking and understanding*, that is, *διάλογος*<sup>270</sup>.

But, on the contrary, for a linguist, language is merely a *cognizant object*, that is, an object conceived of and apt to constitute the object of a theory. At the same time, if for speakers, language is a unitary reality they “live”, for a linguist, it may be something made up of many aspects. Linguists usually separate different levels constituted by sounds, words and the formation and combination of words, meaning, the production of speech, texts and the content created beyond meaning (saying). Every one of these levels can constitute a branch of knowledge thus forming different disciplines, independent from one another, and to a certain extent independent from the initial conception of language: *phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, text linguistics and linguistics of saying*.

The problem when studying language is analysing what the *reality* of it is, or *what degree of reality* it has. When you refer to language you denote a very vast and complex reality: *a set of connections* you must find out and separate.

### Language study as an act of knowing

For a cognizant subject, to study something is an act of knowing. This is nothing but the attempt to capture the essence, consistency or reality of things. So we can see the following elements. First, *the cognizant subject*: human knowledge is active, something made by an intelligent and creative subject.

Second, *the object known*. For Kant, knowledge is the unification of the thing given to you by your senses and the intellect through forms *a priori*. Forms *a priori* are those statements in the understanding of which you do not need experience. For forms *a priori* to be, it is necessary *the synthetic connection of intuition*<sup>271</sup>. Forms *a priori* are *analytic*, that is, the extent of the content of both the subject and the predicate is the same. For example, you can say  $5+7=12$ . Either if you count the sum in the subject with your fingers or a calculator you will see that the predicate is 12. Analytic statements are necessary and universal, something given in the

<sup>267</sup> “The absolute reality is ‘my life’ consisting in [...] pure execution” (Ortega y Gasset, 1992 [1984]: 127) (my translation).

<sup>268</sup> “Reality consists in purely acting the circumstance on me and me on the circumstance” (José Ortega y Gasset, 1992 [1984]: 127) (my translation).

<sup>269</sup> I’d rather use *cognizant, intellective and cognizance* other than *cognitive and cognition*. From my point of view the latter should be revised (cf. Martínez del Castillo 2008).

<sup>270</sup> “Saying, λόγος, is nothing but the particular reaction of an individual life. Because of this, in strict terms, there are no argumentations but the one of a subject to another one. [...] Saying, λόγος, is extremely real, extremely human conversation, διάλογος—διάλογος—, *argumentum hominis ad hominem*. Dialogue is λόγος from the point of view of the other, the one next to us” (Ortega y Gasset, 1987: 16) (my translation).

<sup>271</sup> Cf. Kant, 2004: 7-52.

very formulation of them. However they are not evident, something you can verify if you operate with upper numbers.

And third, the *synthetic connection of intuition*. In *extensive* statements, those in which the extent of the predicate goes beyond the thing stated in the subject, the synthesis consists in attributing necessity and universality to sensibility. That is, you add something mental not existing in the thing coming to you through your senses. The synthesis determines the conception of the object known just transformed and made into an image of itself because of imagination<sup>272</sup>. These are *synthetic a priori statements*.

Synthetic *a priori* statements are based on *analogy*<sup>273</sup>. If you know a few examples from experience, all of them similar in their nature, reality, essence or consistency, you can assume that all items constituting the same class (or category) must have the same nature, reality, essence or consistency as the ones you primarily know. Synthetic *a priori* statements can even be made on the base of only an item. In both cases the particular items are made into the image of the class they represent<sup>274</sup>. The reason of this is that on the base of the few examples you experienced, you intuitively and based on analogy define the class of items they belong to. For example, *Oil will float on water*. This statement has *a priori* force in the synthesis made since you add universality and necessity to something you experienced as sporadic and temporary facts. The statement is not analytic but extensive and thought of *a priori*, a *synthetic a priori statement*<sup>275</sup>.

The synthesis of sensibility and intellect is present in the formulation of theories. Synthetic *a priori* statements in science are usually called *assumptions* (=theory). You assume that the object known, once it is added necessity and universality, is in the way stated. Because of this the intellect will look for the execution of it in real things since the statement represents the image, that is, the essence of something real. In this sense a theory is the result of *imagination*, something invented by the scientist.

In the synthesis being made the mode of thinking plays an important role. As we saw earlier, some modes of thinking, especially the substantive mode of being, constitute beliefs. Because of this, assumptions may be based on *beliefs* not formulated or analysed. So the major assignment when analysing a theory, or an act of knowing, is determining the ultimate reason prompting the formulation of the assumption. In this sense, the ultimate reason plays a function similar to what Ortega y Gasset calls *the radical reality*.

### The radical reality

For Ortega y Gasset, human beings do not have a static mode of being. The human way of being is nothing prior to their birth, nothing given or made, but something to be made in struggle with the circumstance human subjects are in. The circumstance they are in is determined by the moment in history it occurs<sup>276</sup>. Any one of the many possible modes of being a human being finds constitutes a fundamental experience, which, once performed, may constitute a limitation and be the reason for a new one. Since human subjects are together-with-others<sup>277</sup>, that is, since they constitute society based on *διάλογος*, language and the mode of thinking in force in a particular speech community are participated<sup>278</sup>. All human subjects living in a speech community at a particular moment of history have similar modes

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<sup>272</sup> Cf. Ibid.

<sup>273</sup> Cf. a discussion on the value of analogy in Ortega y Gasset, 1992: 226-30.

<sup>274</sup> Cf. José Ortega y Gasset, 1992 [1984]: 152.

<sup>275</sup> Cf. Kant, 2004: 47-52.

<sup>276</sup> Cf. Ortega y Gasset, 1996 [1979]: 236-237.

<sup>277</sup> Cf. Coseriu 2006: 44.

<sup>278</sup> Cf. Coseriu 1988: 43.

of thinking. They all share common<sup>279</sup> modes of conceiving of things and the world. This constitutes the historical reason, for Ortega y Gasset<sup>280</sup>, and the condition of “otherness”<sup>281</sup>, for Coseriu.

As a consequence, when you want to know about things in the world, you must look for the ultimate reason things are based on. This has to do with what Ortega y Gasset calls *the radical reality*. He says:

We as human beings live in between a multitude of things and modes of being of things, real modes of being of those things. This obliges us to find out the ultimate reality or radical reality to be used as the meter to graduate all other things, in order to range them all rightly and assign them in Being, to make a hierarchy of them, to settle them down and establish them deep in Being<sup>282</sup>.

In some way or another, our thought is structured. We can base our hierarchy of things known either by ourselves finding out *the radical reality* they are based on, or accept the hierarchy of things given to us in our historical tradition<sup>283</sup>. A linguist must find out the radical reality of language, or else he will accept the ultimate reason his historical mode of thinking bears with it. The radical reality cannot admit anything prior to it. The ultimate reason, as opposing the radical reality, since it was not thought but accepted, entirely depends on the conception you have about things, that is, on the mode of thinking and the implicit mode of Being, received from tradition.

In order to find out the radical reality the question to be made is different in any case. For the mode of thinking of substantive being, the question is, *does language exist? Can language be verified?* On the contrary, for the modern mode of thinking, Being as it is intuited, the question is, *how is language universal and necessary in humans?* For the executive mode of being, the question is, *what is language for speakers? What is language for me as a speaker?* For the mode of thinking of being as manifesting itself, the question is, *how does language manifests itself? Is language anything autonomous or something being given in something else?* And finally, for the mode of thinking of being as reality, the question is, *is language real? What is the degree of reality of language? What is the radical reality language is based on?*

In the following example we can see the role of the ultimate reason, as opposing the radical reality. Language, for a particular linguist, may be a mysterious<sup>284</sup> faculty<sup>285</sup>, a common human possession, varying little across the species<sup>286</sup>, something you can describe only in the process of language learning<sup>287</sup>. Because of this language must answer the innate schemata of learning<sup>288</sup> thus revealing linguistic universals<sup>289</sup> and universal grammar<sup>290</sup>. As a consequence language is innate<sup>291</sup> and natural<sup>292</sup>.

The linguist in question may have experienced that he cannot explain language in a particular moment and then he may have felt entitled to conclude that “language is

<sup>279</sup> Cf. Coseriu 1988: 70.

<sup>280</sup> Cf. Ortega y Gasset 1992: 148-50.

<sup>281</sup> Cf. also Coseriu 2006: 44.

<sup>282</sup> Cf. Ortega y Gasset, 1996: 40-41.

<sup>283</sup> Cf. Coseriu 1988: 70.

<sup>284</sup> Cf. Chomsky, 1992: 68; 1992: 70-71; 1992: 171; Chomsky, 2002: 59.

<sup>285</sup> Cf. Chomsky 1992: 55-56; Chomsky 2002: 47; Chomsky 2000: 87.

<sup>286</sup> Cf. Chomsky 2002: 47.

<sup>287</sup> Cf. Chomsky 1965: 27.

<sup>288</sup> Ibid.

<sup>289</sup> Ibid.

<sup>290</sup> Cf. Chomsky 1965: 25 and 27.

<sup>291</sup> Cf. Chomsky 1965: 25-27.

<sup>292</sup> Ibid.



mysterious”. With this assumption, the statement is not about the fact that an individual linguist once experienced the referred to difficulty, but a *synthetic a priori* statement, contemplating connections in it: necessity and universality (=language is and will always be mysterious). Once you have analysed the first assumption you may proceed in the same way with the other assumptions, namely, that language is a faculty, a common human possession, varying little across the species, something you can describe only in the process of language learning, there are linguistic universals revealing a universal grammar, and in consonance with them all, conclude that language is innate and natural.

The problem, then, is finding out whether these assumptions are true. Language, the subject in them all, *does it exist? Can language be verified?*

If you analyse them all you will see that they depend on something previously conceived of. For language to be mysterious, it must be something; for language to be a faculty, it must be something similar to other faculties, they all depending on organs; for language to belong to the human species, it must be something as well since a species manifests itself in individuals with a body; for those linguistic universals and universal grammar to exist, it is necessary that language should exist; for language to be learnt, it should exist, the same as those innate schemata. So you conceive of language as something in the human nature, something objective, existing in human psychology<sup>293</sup> or the psychology of the mind<sup>294</sup>.

The ultimate reason for the existence of language thus is that language is something existing in itself and thus objective. But here the problem lies: *is this conception real?* If language is something objective and natural it must be verified in what it is. *Is language verified in real terms? How can language be verified?*

But language cannot be verified in itself. It can only be verified in speech acts. Prior to the conception of language as something existing in itself, it is the problems of the manifestation of language and the reality of language. Language and its manifestations are merely concepts, something got through abstraction. You will say language, a language, speech or a speech act, when you verify people speaking. At the same time it is the problem of reality of language or the degree of reality it has. And then when we know all this it is necessary to find out the radical reality language is based on.

3.10. The radical reality of language cannot be but human subjects, who speak because they have something to say; say something because they define themselves before the circumstance they are in and compromise before this definition because they are able to know<sup>295</sup>.

## Conclusions

All modes of thinking and the implicit modes of being have to do with the original conception of language:

- a) Speakers intuit language (modern mode of thinking).
- b) Speakers live language (executive mode of thinking).
- c) For speakers, language is *διάλογος*; activity and mode of speaking (mode of thinking of being as manifesting itself).
- d) Speakers create, acquire and use language to perform themselves as human (mode of thinking of being as reality).

<sup>293</sup> Cf. Chomsky 1992: 57; Chomsky 1992: 124; Chomsky 1992: 126; Chomsky 2002: 61-64.

<sup>294</sup> Cf. Chomsky 2002: 61-64.

<sup>295</sup> Cf. Martínez del Castillo 2004. For Coseriu, the radical reality of language is the “speaking being” (cf. Coseriu 1985: 50).

e) Speakers speak of language as a series of entities: language, the English language, meanings, words, speech, speech act, speech sounds, the correct use of words, etc. (substantive mode of thinking).

Correspondingly, all modes of being are necessary in the study of language:

a) Language study involves the creation of a theory, series of *synthetic a priori statements* (modern mode of being).

b) Language study is the description of the linguistic behaviour of speakers, either individually or in participation with others in a speech community (executive being).

c) Language study is nothing but the description of linguistic behaviour since human intelligence and freedom manifest themselves in language (being as manifesting)

d) Language and all aspects in it are to be described in the degree of reality they have in terms of the radical reality they are based on (being as real).

e) The description of language and its manifestations cannot be made unless they are conceived of as entities (substantive being).

That is, human subjects live, intuit, create, acquire, perform, use and even speak of language. Language manifests itself in human freedom and intelligence.

Language is nothing but human subjects who know, define themselves before the circumstance they are in, compromise, say and speak thus making themselves human and manifesting themselves to others.

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