

# GLOBALISATION AND SUB-STATE NATIONALISM: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN GLOBALISATION AND THE RISE OF MINORITY NATIONALISM

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## Abstract

This article evaluates and analyses the literature on the relationship between minority nationalism and the process of globalisation and identifies the key trends in nature and direction of the modern sub-state nationalism. The finding suggests that the creation of opportunities by globalisation for minority nations is dependant on the level of the economic development and economic integration of sub-state entities and their host nation-states. The overall picture that emerges from analysis of the economic data suggests that it is mainly the minorities in developed countries that are reported to benefit from economic globalisation for the promotion of their nationalist agenda through peaceful means.

The paper consists of three parts.

In part I, some cases of sub-state nationalisms in developed countries are reviewed. In part II the result of studies on minority nationalism in relatively developed and developing countries are examined and in part III, a summary and analysis of the key findings is provided. Through an examination of the GDP figures, the relation between the level of economic development and the reported rise of sub-state nationalism is evaluated. A similar process is repeated for evaluating the relationship between the level of economic integration and the reported opportunities for sub-state nationalists and relevant trade data is used for this purpose. Other factors such as the impact of suprastate entities, the role of new global economic order and sub-state's instrumental approach to globalisation are also considered.

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**Keywords:** Minority Nationalism, Globalization, Globalisation, Sub-State Nationalism

## **Introduction**

Studies of sub-state minority nationalism by Keating & McGarry (2001), Shulman (2000), Drover & Leung (2001), Paquin (2002), Hamilton (2004), Holitscher & Suter (1999) suggest that globalisation has led to the rise of sub-state nationalism and it provides minority nationalists with opportunities to promote their sub-state nationalist agenda in developed countries. While Studies by FitzGerald, Stewart & Venugopal (2006) suggests global factors contribute to the violent nature of self-determination movements in developing countries. The focus of this paper is on providing a brief overview of some cases of sub-state nationalisms in European Union, North America (Quebec) and several other developed and developing countries. The study focuses on evaluating and analysing the reported relationship between regional sub-state nationalisms, the process of globalisation --with an emphasis on economic globalisation- and the overall picture that emerges from the key findings of these studies.

The paper consists of three parts. In part I, some cases of sub-state nationalisms in developed countries are reviewed. In part II the result of studies on minority nationalism in relatively developed and developing countries are examined and in part III, a summary and analysis of the key findings is provided. Through an examination of the GDP figures, the relation between the level of economic development and the reported rise of sub-state nationalism is evaluated. A similar process is repeated for evaluating the relationship between the level of economic integration and the reported opportunities for sub-state nationalists and relevant trade data is used for this purpose. Other factors such as the impact of suprastate entities, and sub-state nationalists instrumental approach to globalisation are also considered.

The analyses suggest that the creation of opportunities by globalisation for sub-state nationalists is dependant on the level of the economic development and economic integration of sub-state entities and their host nation-states. The overall picture that emerges from analysis of the economic data suggests that it is mainly the minorities in developed countries that are reported to benefit from economic globalisation for the promotion of their nationalist agenda through peaceful means.

## **The Operational definition of key terms**

### *Globalisation:*

The process of increasing interconnectedness between various regions and countries, based on the global integration of market economies. When there is an emphasis on the economic aspect of globalisation the term economic globalisation is used.

### *Minority or Sub-State Nationalism:*

Within the context of this paper sub-state minority nationalism refers to minorities who are: regionally based, have a relatively strong, organized and cohesive form of sub-state nationalism and, in many cases, are represented by a regional government. These minorities often actively promote their nationalist goals and have a well-defined nationalist political agenda. 'Minority nationalism' and 'sub-state nationalism' are used interchangeably.

## **Part I: The Developed Countries<sup>100</sup>**

### **The Scottish Nationalism:**

#### **An Evolving Approach to the Role of European Integration**

Despite its unenthusiastic reaction to the expansion of European Union (EU and the process of European integration because of its potential assimilative capacity in 1960-70; the Scottish nationalist Party (SNP) gradually changed its position on EU and became a firm supporter of free trade and integration of European Union. The change of policy is such that according to Hamilton now "Scots consider themselves more European than do their English neighbours"(2004, p. 676). Suggesting that "globalisation is ... changing the nature of nationalism" Paquin indicates that

Scottish nationalism today supports free trade and it is outreaching. This new form of nationalism may disconcert many. Experts in nationalism have always considered there was a close link between nationalism and protectionism. In the past 20 years the face of nationalism has considerably changed under the influence of globalisation. They promote it by supporting the development of regional blocs and the liberalization of trade (2002, p. 58).

The contemporary Scottish nationalists recognize that globalizing national market economies have overlapped the state boundaries and the state-centric nationalist economic policies are no longer appropriate and effective for both state and sub-state entities. Globalizing economies has encouraged states to devolve some of their powers to the regions as a more efficient way of managing and integrating into the regional and global markets. From a Scottish nationalist perspective, the structural changes that are occurring in global economy, if used strategically, harbour opportunities for pursuing Scottish nationalist goals. For example, European Union, as a supranational entity, provides an avenue for bypassing London and projecting Scotland as a European nation. While supranational economic policies, if

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<sup>100</sup> In the context of this article the reviewed countries are divided into three categories according to their GDP per capita in 2010: 1) Developed countries with GDP per capita of above \$US 30000, 2) Relatively developed countries with a GDP per capita of \$US 10000 to 20000, 3) The developing countries with a GDP per capita below US\$5000.

understood effectively and used instrumentally, can provide strategic avenues for the expression and promotion of Scottish sub-state nationalist goals. Consequently Scottish nationalist parties now promote Scotland *in* Europe not *from* it.

### **Quebec and the Role of NAFTA:**

Going beyond a modernist approach to nationalism

As a regionally-based case of sub-state minority nationalism, operating within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) region, Quebec presents an interesting case-study for evaluating the impact of economic globalisation on the strategies of minority nationalists and the way sub-state nationalism interact with globalisation process in general. According to Fitzpatrick “ Just about everyone who follows international news knows there has been a strong autonomy movement in Quebec since the late 1960s, a movement embodied politically in the party now in power there, the Parti Quebecois “( 1999, p. 1). The broad-based mandate for Quebec nationalists was evident in the referendum on Quebec sovereignty in 1995. “The referendum was rejected... but by only 1.2% of the total vote...” (1999, p. 1). According to Fitzpatrick:

Quebec, as Canada’s only majority-French province, considers itself unique, and insists on the right to control those sectors of its social, economic and political life that it sees as essential for ensuring the ability of its people to flourish in their own distinct language and culture ... (1999, p. 2).

Similar to Scottish Nationalist Party, the Quebec nationalists are increasingly aware of the opportunities provided by integration in NAFTA region. NAFTA, in relation to Quebec plays a role similar to that played by EU in relation to European minorities. It provides an avenue for Quebec nationalists to bypass the Canadian state and look for greater recognition of Quebec as distinct from English Canada in NAFTA region.

Interestingly, English-Canada did not expect the Quebec nationalism to strengthen in modern economic environment. According to Dionisi:

Many Canadians had believed that Quebec nationalist sentiment would diminish with modernization and the economic advancement of the French-Speaking population. They were convinced that the emphasis placed by radical nationalists on the economic alienation and exploitation of the Quebecois in the Canadian federation would gradually offer less appeal as French speakers made economic strides. Instead, the economic gains have contributed to a growing confidence that may, ironically, lead to secession. Economists who favour sovereignty for Quebec argue that the shift to sovereignty would be quiet and not costly and that the long-term result would be an overall improvement. A poll published on May 12, 1990,

showed that 48.5 percent of the chief executives of 200 of Quebec's 500 largest enterprises thought that independence would have a positive effect in the long run. Only 13.3 percent foresaw a negative effect. Such optimism contrasts starkly with the hostility to the secessionist idea expressed by the business class in Quebec around the time of the 1980 referendum. Opponents of sovereignty at the time argued that it would cause big business and foreign capital to flee Quebec (91, p. 5).

The expectation of English-Canada for a growing integration of Quebec and consequential weakening of Quebec nationalism is reflected well in the post WWII modernist approach to nationalism where scholars like Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner stressed the global tendency toward increasing homogenization of the world and consequential weakening of nationalism because of globalisation of capitalist economies. However, the homogenising aspects of globalisation do not operate as smoothly and evenly as modernist theorist of nationalism may have hoped for. An evaluation of the impact of globalisation on nationalism suggests that, in parallel to its homogenising impact, the process of economic globalisation also highlights the threats to socio-cultural peculiarities of sub-state entities while relaxing the state control over minorities that have historically been suppressed by the centralist states. Furthermore, the *incompleteness* of minority national identities has created a situation where the sub-state entities are increasingly capitalizing on the empowering and *liberating* aspects of globalisation. In response to structural economic pressures of the modern capitalist economies an economic condition has been created that tend to empower the sub-state nations in the developed world. The implementation of new regional economic policies by the host states tends to empower the economies of ethno-historical regions hence economically strengthening the associated minority nations. Additionally, regional economic integration provides access to suprastate markets for their product and a platform for the expression and projection of sub-state national identities.

On the whole, these structural changes that have occurred in developed and globally integrated economies have created a condition that provides additional options to minority nations. Rather than entirely submitting to the *levelling impact* of globalisation (which is nonetheless fundamental characteristics of globalisation) sub-state minority nations can ride on its forces to promote their nationalist agenda.

The fusion of sub-state political aspirations and the opportunities created by economic globalisation facilitate the re-emergence of sub-state nationalism. The globalisation process and regional integration -- in this case NAFTA-- provides further support for Quebecois to pursue their nationalist agenda. In explaining the relation between globalisation and the increased economic self-confidence and secessionist tendencies among Quebecois,

Dionisi indicates that:

Like all secessionist movements, Quebec's grows out of two antithetical feelings: fear and confidence. The fear of being weakened, or even disappearing, if it stays in the union; the confidence that it can perform as well or even better, on its own ( 91, p. 1).

Quebecois use the opportunities provided by globalisation to confront the assimilative threats that this process creates and in the process Quebec nationalism has been restructured from an ethno-centric type to an increasingly incorporative form of nationalism. Referring to this structural change that has occurred in the nature of new minority nationalism Michael Keating argues:

... nearly all minority nationalist movements in western Europe, as well as in Quebec, have moved from a doctrine of ethnic particularism to a civic discourse based on territorial nationalism, explicitly including all citizens resident with the territory as members of the nation (2001, p. 28).

The change from an ethnocentric to a territorial and incorporative nationalism is a complex process. This transformation is fundamentally about readjusting nationalism to shifting circumstances that characterize the age of globalisation and challenges the underlying principles that supported and justified ethnic nationalism in earlier periods. Although modern minority nationalists have a measured approach to secession, because of its impractical nature in the modern conditions and its sensitivity for the host-states; an independent Quebec and Scotland is not off agenda for Quebec and Scottish nationalists.

### **Structural Economic Changes: The Creation of Opportunities and Constraints**

How can we explain the interaction between Quebec nationalism and economic globalisation?

According to Rudin" the greater economic and political power of French-speaking Quebecers ultimately helped shape both political discourse and historical writing over the past thirty years" (2002, p. 160). While Holitscher & Suter argue:

... in both Quebec and Scotland the observed rise in secessionist support may actually be a phenomenon of regionalism rather than globalisation. However, ... [where] regionalisation can be considered a policy response to the challenges of globalisation, and hence the growing lure of the secessionist option in our case studies [Quebec and Scotland] could be indirect consequence of globalisation process (1999, p. 284).

Quebec is increasingly relying on NAFTA for its security and protection which reducing its security concerns. Quebec's approach to sovereignty has also gradually changed. An independent Quebec is a move

toward symbolic rather than Westphalian sovereignty as an independent Quebec is still economically dependant on and constitutes a part of NAFTA region which also includes English-Canada. Nonetheless, the impractical nature of classical sovereignty in modern conditions has not stopped Quebecois secessionist tendencies. Interestingly, the economic factors that make Quebec's independence impractical seem to support its secessionist movement. According to Fitzpatrick:

the feasibility of an independent, not merely autonomous, Quebec, has been considerably bolstered in the last few years by analysis coming from several respectable quarters, including a prominent New York investment-Consulting firm, to the effect that Quebec is now quite capable economically of going it alone. Unless there were unwarranted withdrawals of international investment, considered unlikely, an autonomous Quebec would remain, as it is today, America's eighth largest trading partner. Of all the Canadian provinces, Quebec was the one that most vigorously supported adaptation of the North-American Free Trade Agreement... and few believe that despite America's often-expressed distaste for the dismantling of Canada, the U. S. would actually give a sovereign Quebec a very hard time over renewing this or any other important treaty by which it is currently bound as a Canadian Province (1999, p. 4).

Such analysis of Quebecois sub-state nationalism indicate that while Quebec is increasingly integrating in NFATA region economically, at political level it seeks further international recognition of Quebec as an independent entity and uses NAFTA platform for this purpose. Quebec nationalist policies points toward the psychological and identity aspects of nationalism that can not be explained through economic reasoning. Rather, in the case of Quebec nationalism, economic means seems to facilitate the expression of psychological factors that are at the heart of nationalism.

### **The Spanish Sub-State Entities:**

#### **A Greater Role for Bourgeois regionalism**

The Spanish sub-state nationalisms in Basque country and Catalonia are both regionally based and historically grounded. The nationalist movements among these minorities, particularly the Basque country, have experienced cycles of revival and repression. According to de Silvia:

under the French and Spanish monarchies the Basque Provinces enjoyed considerable autonomy. This was lost, however, when the French and Spanish states imposed uniform legal and administrative system over their territories... The question of Basque autonomy and the policy of state centralization became a more complex and prolonged problem in Spain, lasting throughout most of the nineteenth century... (1975, p. 229).

da Silva adds that "with the victory of Franco forces, the new Spanish

government mounted a policy of reprisals against those who had directly or indirectly supported PNV<sup>101</sup> or the drive for Basque autonomy” (1975, p.232). Despite Franco’s suppression of all forms of minority nationalistic assertion, “starting in 1960, a new wave of nationalist activity corresponding somewhat with the political relaxation of the Franco regime began to appear in the Basque region” (de Silva, 1975, p. 232). Later, as Holman (1996) and Hopper (1995) argue “the Spanish state had been dramatically reinvented, a succession of social democrat (PSOE) government between 1982 and 1995 ... dismantling the corporatist state machinery through privatisation” (quoted in McNeill, 2000, p.11). According to Burkowski (2000), despite obvious ideological differences between the PSOE<sup>102</sup> and PP<sup>103</sup>, the national economic policies of both parties have been characterized by increasing liberalization.

Philippe Gonzalez the Prime Minister of Spain (1982- 1996), was in a good political position to observe the re-emergence of what he labels as “petty nationalism” (1991, p.1). Although, it is not clear which specific minority nationalist movement he is referring to, Gonzalez blames globalisation for strengthening sub-state nationalism and argues that:

Globalisation is fostering petty nationalism which may seem to be paradoxical, at a time when the best thing to do is advance the process of political union, so that new global challenges can be met..... the fear inspired by globalisation phenomenon is strengthening narrow nationalism (1999, p.1).

Like the earlier example of English-Canada, Gonzalez also perceives the rise of minority nationalism as *paradoxical*. Perhaps Gonzalez also expected that with the advance of globalisation, nationalism, particularly the ‘petty’ ones should have disappeared.

How can we explain Gonzales's claim that ‘the globalisation of economic’ produces opportunities for Spanish minorities?

The process of European integration has produced structural changes in European Union's member states through restructuring national economies in line with the process of European economic integration. The Spanish minorities are aware of the strategic importance of the structural changes that have occurred in Europe and they often bypass the Spanish state to pursue regional nationalist policies.

In an analysis of the political context surrounding the recent opening of Guggenheim Foundation art gallery in Bilbao, McNeill refers to “....a collision between Basque extremism, ‘bourgeois regionalism’ and the

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<sup>101</sup> *Partido Nacionalista Vasco*

<sup>102</sup> Spanish Socialist Workers Party which was in power from 1982 to 1996

<sup>103</sup> Popular Party in power from 1996 onward



interests of a museum poised to become a global art corporation, providing a context for examining theories of globalisation in the European city” ( 2000, p.1).McNeill adds:

.... the supposed guardians of vulnerable cultural spaces, the PNV in this case felt better able to defend Basque identity with an American partner than with acquiescence to Spanish state cultural policy. While globalisation is often constructed as a colonising process, it could thus also be conceptualised as a strategic move--- a cultural *realpolitik* (2000, p. 16).

As in the other cases of sub-state nationalisms in developed world, Catalonia and Basque country are among the most industrialized regions in Spain. According to Bukowski, “Catalonia leads Spain in almost all economic indicators... [and it] was one of the first areas of Spain to industrialize, [and] beginning with eighteen century... Catalonia’s industrialization followed the ‘English model’...” (2000, p. 149). While de Silva asserts that “ the French Basque region is considered an economically depressed area without any significant industry... by contrast, the Spanish Basque provinces make up one of the more heavily industrialized regions in that country”( 1975, p. 229).

The level of industrialization and economic development is important as it provides the Catalanian nationalists with economic basis, where successful ‘regions’ can play a more powerful role in global or regional economies. According to Bukowski:

.. the modernist nationalist vision of Catalonia, ... is characterized by an emphasis on free trade and outward-looking development with a focus on Europe... One of the primary goals of the CiU<sup>104</sup> is to situate Catalonia as an important player in the European political and economic arena, a European nation within Spain. This goal has both economic and political dimensions. Economically, it means an outward-looking trade strategy and efforts to make Catalan industry and products competitive at the international level. Politically, it means active formal and informal involvement in European institutions and cross-border agreement (2000, p. 161).

Such economic and political policies by Catalanian nationalists are in line with the other cases of sub-state nationalisms mentioned above. While supporting this argument, McNeill also highlights the none-extremist character of new sub-state nationalism. He argues:

upon the restoration of an autonomous regional government from 1980, the PNV, won a succession of majorities in the regional elections, and throughout the 1980s and 1990s have pursued an ambivalent strategy of hostility to the Spanish state’s legitimacy, while distancing itself—

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<sup>104</sup> Convergence and Union, one of most important political force in the region, see the same source p. 159.

precariously—from extremist terrorism. It remains far more committed to independence than any other nationalist groupings in Europe, and its calls to strengthen institutions of economic autonomy, such as proposal for a Basque Central Bank, have been at the forefront of its policy programmes and reflects its ‘bourgeois’ profile (2000, p. 11).

Bukowski emphasizes the role of leadership in promoting regional sub-state identities through economic globalisation. He argues “[Catalan’s] economic goals and strategies stem from this [a greater degree of self-determination] political vision. With an almost messianic zeal, Catalan leaders promote free trade and competitiveness within the wider international, particularly European, arena “(2000, p. 164). For moderate Basque nationalist parties like PNV, globalisation acts as a vehicle for the promotion of their sub-state nationalism. According to McNeill:

Elites are capable of harnessing the ‘global-local’ interplay to gain a competitive position for their own ends. ... the PNV’s wooing of the Guggenheim was part of a longer strategy to reposition the object of its territorial strategy, the Basque Country—in global space, as a means of making Euzkadi, and their control over it, more robust (2000, p. 16).

While PNV sees opportunities in global structural economic changes, the radical nationalist parties, such as ETA, perceive the process of integration as a form of imperialism; a threat to distinctiveness of Basque people (McNeill, 2000). If a minority is promoting a primordial and inward looking nationalist agenda it makes them suspicious of the globalisation; as promoting ethno-cultural uniqueness through integration can be perceived as a contradictory process. In minorities’ response to globalisation, there is a constant interaction between the economic variables on one hand and the cultural and psychological variables associated with nationalism on the other hand. This may indicate that, for any comprehensive understanding of the nature of nationalism, one needs to go beyond economic variables. Following their study of Catalonian nationalism, Folch-Serra & Nogue-Font indicate:

Our case [Catalonia] shows that the singularity of some places may disrupt the ostensible universalizing force of globalisation. This ... confirms a conception of nationalism as a place-specific phenomena-transformed by the processes of globalisation, and yet not engulfed by the same processes. Rather nationalism has an ideological core which is to a certain extent, autonomous and independent of the structures of modernity; in other words, nationalism is a long historical precipitate and not a by-product of modernity, even if the latter might have given it a larger than life image. Because it is place-specific, nationalism depends on the bonds established by a community of agreement (a signifying community), which leads to a greater or lesser shared identity of interest in the society (2001, p.174-5).

Assessing the ‘ideological core’ of nationalism can assist in a deeper understanding of nationalism’s adaptability to economic globalisation. If the ideological core of nationalism doesn’t adapt to the global marketization process, it may constitute an obstacle on the development of such a process. Rather than doing away with nationalism the marketization process can create a more complementary form of nationalism that is consistent with its underlying economic logic and capable of accommodating its structural tendencies. As Clifford Greetz<sup>105</sup> has argued—the political modernization “does not do away with ethnocentrism, it merely modernize it “(cited in da Silva, 1975 p. 251).

Despite the strength of non-economic aspects of nationalism, the sub-state minority nationalists in developed countries are promoting national identity *in* not *out* of the process of economic globalisation. Minorities’ new strategy is often based on their economic and political self-confidence and favourable regional and global structural economic changes. These changes in European integrated regions such as Catalonia create space for surfacing of minorities’ frustrated nationalistic demands and provide new avenues for expressing ethno-regional identities. Such strategies are reinforced by the insecurity generated by fear of the assimilative and homogenizing aspects of economic –Globalisation. Consequently the processes of Europeanization have caused an increasingly vocal Spanish regional minorities and an embattled Spanish state that attempts to accommodate such demands by restructuring itself without disintegrating as a unified state.

### **Northern Ireland and Belgium:**

Instrumentalism and the important role of prior economic development

McGarry indicates that minorities use the opportunities created by globalisation *instrumentally*. In his study of minority nationalism in Northern Ireland, he indicates that there is an obvious difference in the approach of Irish nationalists and Unionist to the process of globalisation and European Integration. McGarry argues:

to the extent that Northern Ireland’s people and politicians think about Europe at all, the tendency is for them to see it through a nationalist or unionist rather than post-nationalist lenses. Nationalists... endorse European integration largely for instrumental reasons, just as nationalists do in Scotland, the Basque Country, and Catalonia. For them, European integration has the advantage of eroding British sovereignty over Northern Ireland and reducing the importance of the border with the Irish republic...Unionists are significantly more reluctant to embrace Europe,

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<sup>105</sup> Clifford Greetz, “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiment and Civil Politics in the New States, “in Geertz, ed. *Old Societies and New States* (New York, 1963), p. 154.

because it threatens British sovereignty and because European politicians are more sympathetic to Irish nationalism than to unionism (Keating & McGarry, 2001, P. 305).

The structural economic changes are also partially forced the states to retreat from their protective roles in the prior decades. Referring to the state of minority nationalism in Belgium, Laible argues:

Some regional actors in EU member states, including nationalists, have found that Europe provides economic, cultural and political opportunities long denied by their domestic governments.... However, the case of Belgium illustrates how the gate swings in two directions: regions may have greater access to Europe as the state weakens, but the decline of the gatekeeper also implies that the state loses the capacity to protect regions against the impact of international arena (2001, p. 241-2).

Interestingly, it is as a consequence of ‘gate swing[ing] in two directions’ that produces conditions favourable to minorities for the promotion of their nationalist agenda in both directions. On one hand the supra-state entities such as EU provide economic and cultural opportunities for the expression of sub-state national identities; on the other hand structural economic reforms weakens central states’ ability to support and subsidise their regional economies and consequential reduction in their legitimacy in the associated “ethno/historical region”.<sup>106</sup> These changes also create a condition that promotes economic self-reliance among sub-state nationalists and consequently reinforces minorities’ sovereignty projects. Ethno-historical regions’ self-reliance requires an adequate level of economic development that assists them for regional and global economic competitiveness. According to Erk, Belgium “was the first continental European country to undergo industrialization...”(2005, p.556). The case of sub-state minorities in Belgium illustrates the critical role of the level of economic development of both host-state and minorities for an effective and supportive engagement with economic-globalisation. While benefiting from the opportunities that come with regional and global economic integration, when the protective role of the minorities host states is weakened, the minorities’ ability for survival in global market ultimately depends on their own economic strengths and capabilities.

## **Part II:**

### **A) Minorities in Relatively Developed Countries**

#### **The Case of Taiwan:**

Yes to the economic opportunities, no to the reintegration with Mainland China

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<sup>106</sup> The terms are borrowed from Keating, (2007, p.3).

The relationship between Taiwanese nationalism and the process of economic globalisation is complicated. According Drover and Leung:

Taiwan's business involvement in the Greater China Triangle [Taiwan, Hong Kong and Southern China] creates a major political dilemma for the Taiwan government in furthering a nationalist agenda. On one hand, because of economic reforms and sub regionalization, it is being integrated into the mainland market. On the other hand, because of the One China policy, it cannot join regional and global organizations as a sovereign state in order to diversity its economic interests. Hence, the demand for an adjustment of political arrangements by the Taiwanese comes not primarily from ethnic consciousness but from the interests of political economy. ...essentially, Taiwan fears that "economic integration may undermine its bargaining power in negotiation about unification or its bid to become independent, at least in a de facto sense" ( 2001, p.14).<sup>107</sup>

Similar to the cases of the minorities discussed earlier, the Taiwanese approach to economic globalisation is equally instrumental and strategic. Economic globalisation in Taiwanese case translates into a growing integration with China. Despite offering excellent economic opportunities, such integration is also perceived as a growing threat to Taiwanese nationalism. Therefore:

to outweigh the pull of trade toward the China mainland a "Go South" [using Chinese mainland toward the creation of regional markets] strategy was launched by Taiwan in 1994.... By taking these economic measures, the government was attempting to prevent a "hollowing out"<sup>108</sup> of the state by over-reliance on the mainland market (Drover & Leung, 2001, p. 14).

Such strategies suggest that while the Taiwanese nationalists welcome the economic benefits of economic integration with China; they are also actively developing political and social counter-strategies to encounter the growing influence of China that is believed to undermine Taiwanese sovereignty project. The case of Taiwanese nationalism highlights that sub-state nationalists are selective, deliberate and instrumental in their approach to the processes of regional and globalisation economic integration. It reveals that sub-state nationalists change their strategies according to the implication of globalisation for their region.

Summarizing the impact of trade liberalization on Taiwanese and

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<sup>107</sup> Grover and Leung have quoted from, Tsang Shu-ki, 1996, p.28 - The Political Economy of Greater China, "in Chris Rowley and Mark Lewis, eds., Greater China: Political Economy, Inward Investment and Business Culture, Frank Cass, London.

<sup>108</sup> These terms are from Luo Qi, Economic interests vs. Political Interventions: The Case of Economic Relations between Mainland China and Taiwan," (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1998), p. 7).

Quebec nationalist strategies Drover and Leung add:

while different forms of nationalism are bound to condition responses, it is widely recognized that trade liberalization is influencing not only nationalist sentiment but it has also strengthened the economies of Canada and China, thereby undercutting, to some degree, the value of separation. .... In Taiwan, trade liberalization gives the government and the people space to counteract their mainland counterpart. In Quebec, it is used to assure the local populace that separation from the rest of Canada will not lead to economic collapse. Furthermore, it allows nationalists in both Taiwan and Quebec to affirm their identity in the international arena. On the other hand, trade liberalization also plays itself out in the form of political and economic alliances that are regional and subregional in nature. In the case of Taiwan, that strengthens the role of China; in the case of Quebec, the role of Canada. Hence, trade liberalization is a double-edged sword that gives scope to nationalist aspirations while moderating the outcome (2001, p18).

The Taiwanese case of nationalism demonstrates that, if the increasing global integration--or in the case of Taiwan regional integration--is considered a threat to nationalist aspiration, the sub-state nationalist elite are more cautious in their approach to economic opportunities associated with globalisation and develop counter strategies to balance the negative impact of economic globalisation, while also readjusting their breed of nationalism.

### **Tatarstani and Chechen Nationalism:**

#### **The Pursuit of Sovereignty in the Modern Conditions**

While Chechen aspiration for an independent state was violently suppressed by the Russians; the relative successes of Tarsastani sub-state nationalism -- one of the most industrialized region of the Russian federation-- in pursuing some form of moderate sovereignty project highlights other important characteristics of modern sub-state nationalism: the capacity for adaptation to new global order and seeking new means for promoting nationalist objectives. In the 'new global order'-- to use Michael Keating's term-- developed countries are increasingly willing to accommodate their minority nations' nationalistic demands through devolution of power to their regions. Such structural policy changes (in this case Russia) are increasingly imperative for states because as Graney maintains:

[it] is becoming more true for all states, devolving some aspects of state sovereignty by allowing or even encouraging sub-state units like Tatarstan to deepen their participation in transnational economic networks and political institutions, such as those of the EU, may in fact be the only hope that the severely weakened Russian central state has of transforming

itself and integrating itself into the post-cold war international system in an effective way (2001, P 283).

In his study of Tatarstani nationalism Graney argues that:

Tatarstan's political leaders have pursued the international sovereignty project in two ways. First, they have sought to increase the Republic's direct and unmediated political and economic activities in the international arena by establishing bilateral relations with individual states and by participating in international organization and transnational political and economic network. ....

Second, Tatarstani elites have attempted to gain the complicity of the international community in their sovereignty project by pursuing a type of 'anticipatory adaptation', wherein the Republic has made unilateral efforts to align itself with the dominant norms of the international community in the hopes of achieving new levels of 'international personality' (2001, P.266).

Tatarstan's approach to sovereignty is similar to strategies adopted by European sub-state nationalists where they strive for greater national recognition through para-diplomacy efforts that are often solidified by following tangible supportive economic policies mainly achieved through the promotion of regional and global economic integration of their economies.

Russia's different approaches to Tatarstani and Chechen nationalism illustrate that, depending on the circumstance and strategies of sub-state entities, host-states can be relatively incorporative or violently confrontational. In explaining these contradictory approaches of the host states to their minority nations, the internal variations in the level of economic development and global economic integration of the associated ethno-historical and regionally based minorities plays an important role. A higher level of economic development and a more comprehensive regional economic integration of sub-state regions, as well as the overall level of capitalist economic development of host state can empower the associated minorities for a more successful participation in regional and global economy and use such economic empowerment as an avenue for promoting their nationalist political agenda. The higher level of economic development of Tatarstan compared with Chechnya within the context of Russian Federation places Tatarstan in a better position to pursue its nationalist agenda through peaceful economic means.

Equally important is the way that minority nations pursue their nationalist agenda. A confrontational and extremist nationalist position, particularly of a secessionist nature by the minorities that is not solidified by on ground economic and political conditions is likely to attract a strong and often violent reaction from the host-states. A comparison between the ways the Chechen and Tatarstan nationalist pursue sovereignty in the modern conditions provide an insight into the reaction of Russian state. While

Chechen pursued full sovereignty through classical national liberation means (possibly because no other means were available to them due lower level of economic development), the Tatarstanis, are more moderate in their demands and these demands are often supported by tangible economic policies. Tatarstan's pursuit of sovereignty through para-diplomacy is matched by its efforts in promoting for global economic integration of Tatarstan's economy. This approach has solidified Tatarstan's political ambition through economic means, something that characterises the strategies of EU sub-state entities.

### **Turkey and its Kurdish Minority:**

Benefiting from economic globalisation while avoiding its political implication

Given the restraints and opportunities that Turkish European project offers, one would expect the Kurdish nationalists in Turkey to support the process of Turkish European integration and readjust their nationalist strategies accordingly. The classical nationalist armed struggle has become increasingly inappropriate in the context of a globalizing world and the violent means for pursuing political goals have largely lost legitimacy after the events of September 11. Kurdish nationalist elite in Turkey acknowledge the implication of such global structural changes and the Kurdish armed struggle has been largely reactive in nature and often a direct response to the militarization and securitization of Kurdish question. This created a vicious cycle of violent confrontation by the two parties in the past.

The Turkish state has so far had a largely paradoxical approach to globalisation and this is manifested in its efforts for joining the European Union. On the one hand the Turkish state aims at benefiting from the economic advantages that comes with its possible EU membership; On the other hand, Turkey has so far been largely unable to make deep internal structural political changes related to this country's Kurdish issues that EU membership requires in form of "improving its human rights record and better treatment of its Kurdish minority" (Yeilada, 2002, p. 96).

Some promising changes were initiated by Ozal who was "first Prime Minister (1983-89) and then president (1989-93)... [ of Turkey who] largely deviat[ed] from Kamalist tradition" (Ataman, 2002, p. 123). Ozal "even declared his half-Kurdishness in 1989" and initiated a series of political changes in recognition of multi-ethnic nature of the state of Turkey (Ataman, 2002, p.134). Whether the diversion from Turkish state's populist approach (that is inspired by Turkish nationalism), initiated by Ozal will be ultimately solidified by new Islamist Turkish leadership remains to be seen. In any case, according to Rumford "Turkey's political elites are increasingly aware that international treaties and conventions as well as European integration work to limit national sovereignty" (2002, p. 273). The continuation of changes



that Ozal initiated depends on the ultimate outcome of the conflict within the Turkish state and society, its approach to economic globalisation, and its willingness to seriously pursue Turkish EU membership project.

In spite of the importance of the political factor, the prominence of structural economic changes that are likely to occur in Turkey should not be underestimated. Turkish internal market pressures for regional economic expansion, Turkish European project within the new global economic order put pressure on this country to undergo structural economic changes. Any genuine structural economic changes are likely to liberalize the Turkish socio-political structure to a point that can also accommodate some of the demand of its Kurdish minority in form of devolution of power to regions as a consequence of new regional economic policies. However in the current circumstances, as Dulupcu argues, Turkey is "... resisting decentralization" (2005, p. 100).

In recent years, Prime Minister Erdogan pan-Ottoman policies, manifested in Turkey's revised foreign policy, is enhancing Turkey's regional and global standing and has strengthened Turkish economic performance. These changes are also reflecting in Erdogan's recent relaxation of Turkish security approach to its Kurdish minority. Pan-Ottomanism here is used in the sense that Turkey intends to expand its influence in Islamic world, particularly in the territories that formed Ottoman Empire. Appealing to historical ties and a modernized form of Sunni Islam constitute the core of this new Pan-Ottomanist approach. Recent Turkish proactive regional policies are increasingly moving toward the creation of a more inclusive Turkish state and the re-emergence of Turkey as a regional power. Given the Turkish approach to its Kurdish minority has been that of denial and suppression for around a century, it takes time to change the tide of popular opinion to support the structural economic and political changes that occurring in this country.

## **B. Minorities in Developing Countries**

### **Minorities in Mainland China:**

China and centralizing nation-state building process in the context of globalisation

China is a rapidly globalizing developing country and it presents a good case study for assessing how such countries are likely to deal with the issues of their minorities in the context of globalisation. According to Mackerras "China has 55 state-recognized ethnic minorities" (2003, p. 182). Mackerass argues that:

as the country has become more integrated economically and living standards have risen for the majority of people, even if not for all, separatism has generally tended to decline. The kind of separatist incidents that were

common in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Tibet have decreased in number and scale... on the other hand; Ugur separatist feeling seems to have increased quite significantly since the Baren township incident of April 1990. This is despite the economic progress and great strengthening of the infrastructure that has occurred since then (2003, p. 179).

In assessing the accommodation of Uyghur nationalism by the Chinese state Bhattacharya's (2003) analysis points to the superficiality of Chinese version of regional autonomy. In Uyghur case such regional autonomy is based on suppressing the ethnic and religious element of Uyghur identity and promoting China as a strong and united power.

According to Mackerass " if there is one overwhelming conclusion to this study [China's Ethnic Minority and Globalisation], it is diversity: in other words, globalisation has affected the various nationalities and areas in different ways and to differing extent.... globalisation processes are themselves very diverse. ..." (2003, p. 177).

From developmental and historical prospective, China aims at centralized nation-state building in the context of globalisation and wherever, there is an emphasis on building a strong centralist nation-state, it is usually occurs at the expense of that country's minorities. Centralization often translates into further suppression of minority nationalism and reducing their autonomy in running their affairs. This suggests that, in the context of China, economic globalization has not, for example, increased the space for an expression of Tibet nationalism. The Chinese case suggests that, in order to understand the impact of globalisation on any nation-state and its associated sub-state entities, while considering the interaction between the local and global factors, it is important to evaluate it from a historical perspective that is focussed on the particular nation-state under study as different states have different approaches to the functions of *state* and the nature of *nation*. As the Chinese case illustrate, the historical developmental trajectory and the current political and economic agenda of minority nations' host-states play an important role in given direction to majority-minority relationships. A backward looking or stationary host-state that is either incapable or unwilling to seriously engage in the processes of economic globalisation is a major obstacle on the way of associated sub-state entity in fully engaging and benefiting from the processes of economic globalisation.

Given the low level of economic developed of China as a whole, it is likely that China will suffer from minority related issues in ways similar to other developing countries. However, the overall structural tendency toward violent confrontation is likely to be offset by a rapid global economic integration of China. Furthermore, as there is significant internal variation in China in terms of regional economic development, the particular history of each minority and the level of economic development of its ethno-historical

region need to be considered in providing a detailed picture of relationship between Chinese state and relevant minority.

### **Other Cases of Minorities in Developing Countries:**

#### **Non-accommodating host nation-states**

The situation of minority nationalism in developing countries like, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, and many other countries suggest that although the minorities in these countries pursue their nationalist goals to various degrees, their host-nation states are less accommodating of minorities nationalist agenda. The regional minority nationalisms in these countries often operate within a restrictive majority policy-context of their host nation-states' ethnic majority which provide little opportunities to sub-state nationalists' for pursuing their nationalist goals peacefully. As the case of Tamil in Sri Lanka illustrates, nationalist struggles in these countries often leads to violent confrontation between sub-state nationalist and their host state. The developing states such as the ones mentioned are often preoccupied with promoting an outdated version of a strong and centralized nation state which has already lost its effectiveness in developed regions of the world. Despite acknowledging the importance of some aspects of economic liberalism associated with globalisation, the politics remains strongly centralist and assimilationist.

In her study of minority nationalism in oil-rich Niger Delta region in Nigeria Osaghae sees the restructuring of Nigerian state for accommodating minority nationalism as an essential requirement and argues that "... the appeasement strategy that is typical of top-down, state-led development process ...is far less adequate response to the challenges posed by self-determination nationalism( 2001, pp.18-19). She argues that " without some forms of restructuring to reduce state centeredness and simultaneously grant greater control over local affairs and resources, there is the danger that self-determination nationalism could become uncompromising separatist' (2001, p. 19). While the decentralization of Nigerian state may facilitate the accommodation of minorities demands the "...militarization of the Nigerian state since 1966 has led to the subversion of federalism and exclusion of minority groups from the decision- making process" (Anegbonde & Igbafen, 2007, p. 150).

### **Concluding Statements**

Similar to developed countries there are numerous cases of minority nationalism in developing countries but one of the main differences is the more violent nature of the latter. According to Fitzgerald, Stewart & Venugopal "almost all political conflicts relating to self-determination in developing countries are embroiled in violent conflict, or contain a latent potential for an escalation to violence" (2006, p. 9). Fitzgerald, Stewart &

Venugopal also suggest that there are global factors that contribute to such violence.

Such differences between developed and developing countries in the consequences of globalisation may suggest that global factors that influence developing countries are either lacking, are of different nature or they tend to produce different consequences.

It seems that in these countries globalisation is not a process of global interconnectedness based on integration of market economy and production processes as it has been defined within the context of this paper. Rather, as the negative role of trade in diamond in some African countries suggest such “global economic influences” often finances conflict" in the region (Stewart, 2006, p.20-43). The lack of genuinely integrated and effective production processes in under-developed countries may also explain why consequential opportunities that global economic integration provides to minorities are missing in these countries.

The overall pattern that emerges from the reviewed case of sub-state nationalism suggests that while minority nationalism is a global phenomenon, in the developed countries the pursuit of nationalist goals is largely peaceful, while in the underdeveloped countries is largely violent. Minorities in the relatively developed countries can swing either way, depending on internal economic discrepancies, regional economic circumstances and intervening political factors related to both minority nations and their host states. In the next section an attempt will be made to explain these discrepancies through providing an analysis of level of economic development and economic integration of the cases studies reviewed in section I and II.

### **Part III: Analysis of the Key Trends**


#### **The Impact of the Level of Economic Development**

The qualitative analysis of the case-studies referred to in part I & II suggests that the positive relationship between rising minority nationalism and the processes of globalisation is mainly reported in developed countries. The analysis also suggests that the minority nationalist strategies are changing in countries where regional economic development is at a level that enables them to effectively engage in global and translational economic activities. While minorities in most economically globalized regions enjoy opportunities in form of new regional economic policies, suprastate platforms to pursue their sub-state nationalist policies, in transitional places like Russian Federation and Turkey such opportunities, are in their very early phases of development and in the under-developed countries they are almost non-existent. This trend indicates that there is relationship between the level of economic development of a host-state and the creation of opportunities for

its associated minorities. This tendency merits further evaluation.

As figure 1 suggests, if we take GDP per capita as an indicator of the level of economic development of mentioned countries and their associated minorities that were referred to earlier, the data supports the existence of a positive<sup>109</sup> relationship between the level of economic development of a country and their associated sub-state minorities’ increased opportunities to pursue their nationalist goals.

**Figure 1** The relationship between GDP (2010) as a measure of economic development and the state of sub-state nationalism: The higher the GDP figure, the higher the reported opportunities and the use of globalisation tools by sub-state entities for promoting their sub-state nationalist agenda.



Source: World Bank available on <http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=GDP%20per%20capita&language=EN>  
 Accessed on 27 March 12  
 Source data for Taiwan:  
[World Economic Outlook, September 2011](http://knoema.com/pjeqzh#Taiwan%20Province%20of%20China)  
<http://knoema.com/pjeqzh#Taiwan%20Province%20of%20China>  
 Accessed on 27 March 2012

The minorities that were referred to in part I & II are represented in the above chart through GDP per capita figures for their host nation-states because unlike their host states there are no uniform GDP figures for sub-state entities provided by a single reliable source. Furthermore in the most of the above countries, the sub-state nationalist regions have a GDP per capita figure close to that of their host-state’s average. When this is not the case and minorities do not have a similar level of opportunities despite having high representative GDP per capita figures, the reasons for discrepancies are

<sup>109</sup> Positive in the sense, that the higher level of economic globalisation and integration, also leads to a higher opportunities for sub-state nationalism for the promotion of their sub-state nationalist goals which consequently leads to increasingly assertive, vocal and proactive minority nationalisms.

explained.

The countries with a high GDP per capita also have active sub-state nationalists that, as was mentioned earlier, are promoting their sub-state nationalism through free trade, new regional economic policy tools associated with globalisation. The sub-state entities such as Quebecois in Canada, Scots in UK, Flanders in Belgium, Basque and Catalan in Spain are reported to have a higher degree of a positive engagement with the processes of economic globalisation. On the other end of the scale minorities in Delta region of Nigeria, Tamil in Sri Lanka and various minorities in China are not expected to benefit from the processes of economic globalisation similar to that of developed countries.

To further examine this trend, the opportunities for sub-state nationalists are considered within a range of minimal to highest levels. These opportunities are of an economic nature and become available in form of effective and non-violent capabilities for promoting a nationalist agenda. The nature of such opportunities excludes the classical and violent struggle for self-determination pursued by minorities in different parts of the world. For example, Tamil Tigers' struggle for achieving their nationalist objectives is often marked by its violent nature and their achievements, if any, are also of a different character which is beyond this study. Tamil's lower capabilities to pursue a nationalist agenda via peaceful economic means (in form of suprastate platform, a globalized economy and new regional economic policies) and the level of development of Sri Lanka may explain why they use violent means in pursuing their nationalist agenda. On the contrary, the Scottish and Quebec nationalists are in the best position for pursuing their nationalist goals through economic means represented by their higher GDP per capita figures. The overall picture that emerges here is also consistent with the analysis provided earlier on the stage of sub-state nationalism in Quebec and Scotland. Similarly, there is also a correlation between GDP per capita in Belgium, Spain, Taiwan and Russia and the level of development of their associated sub-state nationalism of Flanders, Basque and Catalan, Taiwanese and Tatarstani sub-state nationalism respectively. The low level of economic development has a negative impact on the situation of Tamils in Sri Lanka, minorities in Nigeria and in fact in many of the developing countries that are not included in the chart.

The situation of the Kurds in Turkey is out of the ordinary. Despite a relatively high Turkish GDP per capita, the situation of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey does not provide a particularly encouraging picture. One explanation is that the GDP per capita figures for Turkey do not account for internal regional differences in that country. As discussed in part I, most of ethno-historical sub-state regions in developed countries are also developed and their GDP per capita is not radically different from their host-states'

national average. For example the GDP per capita for Quebec in 2008 is \$32496 compared with average for Canada which is \$ 37360.<sup>110</sup> On the contrary, many sources highlight the high disparities in distribution of GDP per capita between Kurdish region and other regions in Turkey. For example according to Bozarslan “in 2004 GDP per capita was \$2,146 in Turkey and \$3, 063 in Istanbul, it hardly exceeded \$1000 in the Kurdish provinces” (2008, p. 335).

Such radical differences in regional distribution of GDP per capita in Turkey explain the relatively inconsistent picture that Turkish position on the chart presents. However a rapidly growing Turkish GDP per capita (reported as US\$10, 093, 03 in 2010 by the World Bank) may lead to a decreasing level of violence in the long run if Turkish regional economic discrepancies in the level of economic development and global economic integration are decreased and the Turkish state take serious steps in promoting the global integration of its economy and implementation of new regional economic policies to promote the overall competitiveness of the Turkish economy.

Similarly, the Northern Ireland's GDP per capita is reported as 16.056 British pounds in 2007 compared to a GDP per capita of 19, 503 for Scotland which is very close to UK national average GDP per capita of 20, 057 British Pounds for the same year. This may explain a relatively more violent nature of confrontations in Northern Ireland (Mocroft, 2011).<sup>111</sup>

While there are no reliable data available to quantify the difference between Chechnya and Tatarstan there are large discrepancies in the level of the economic development and economic integration of these two sub-state entities within the overall context of Russian Federation. As referred to earlier, a higher level of economic development and economic integration makes Tatarstan more capable of pursuing its nationalist agenda through global integration of its economic activities and the attached nationalist political agenda.

### **The Impact of the Level of Economic Integration**

Given the developed countries are also among the most economically integrated regions points to the close relationship between economic

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<sup>110</sup> The data is from Board of Trade of Metropolitan Montreal available on <http://www.tableaubordmontreal.com/indicateurs/activiteeconomique/pibpercapita.en.html> accessed on 10 Mar. 09

<sup>111</sup> the data is adopted from: Mocroft, Ian, (July 2011) Government Expenditure on the Voluntary Sector in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, a summary report CGAP Working Paper 2.  
Available on:  
<http://www.cgap.org.uk/uploads/Working%20Papers/WP%202%20ian%20mocroft.pdf>  
Accessed on March 29, 2012.

development and economic integration. However, we need to bear in mind that the GDP per capita figures that were used to measure the level of economic development of countries covered by this study can be misleading. Some countries—for example Saudi Arabia and many Gulf countries—have a relatively high GDP but they are not economically integrated in the sense that this study is argued. Measuring the level of economic integration of mentioned case studies can help to overcome such shortcoming and assist in producing a more representative picture.

### **The Level of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a Measure of Economic Integration**

In the following table the combined figures for net inflow and net outflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as % of GDP of the countries that were discussed earlier are used to measure the level of economic integration of their associated sub-state minority nations' with global economy. While World Bank reports the net inflows and net outflows of FDI separately to demonstrate the level of economic integration of a country, this study combines the two figures for presenting a more comprehensive picture of the level of economic integration of the selected countries. Similar to economic development the data on the host countries' level of integration in global economy is used to determine the level of integration of sub-state entities as no reliable data is available on minority nation's specific regions.

Table 1: Sub-state entities are represented by their host states

Host Country	Minority Nation	Combined net inflows and net outflows of FDI as % of GDP	Rank in terms of level of available opportunity
Belgium	Flanders	13.7 %	1
United Kingdom	Northern Ireland	11%	2
United Kingdom	Scotland	11%	3
Canada	Quebec	7.9 %	4
Spain	Basque Country	6.8%	5
Spain	Catalonia	6.8%	6
Russian Federation	Tatarstan	3.8%	7
Russian Federation	Chechnya	3.8%	8
Turkey	Kurds	3%	9
Nigeria	Delta Region Minorities	2%	10
Tamils	Tamils	1.2%	11

Source: World Bank available on

<http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=GDP%20per%20capita&language=EN>


Accessed on 27 March 12

The overall pattern that emerges is represented in the Figure 2 is largely consistent with the qualitative analysis provided in part I and II on



the relationship between economic globalization and the reported rise of sub-state nationalism. Sub-state entities with a greater representative figure are also the entities that report a greater engagement with global and regional economies and tend to benefit more from such integration.

Figure 2:



Source: World Bank available at:  
<http://search.worldbank.org/all?qterm=integration%20with%20global%20economy>  
 Accessed on: 27 March 12

The higher the level of economic integration of a region, the higher the level of available policy tools for the minorities to pursue a minority nationalist agenda. For example, in relation to Flanders, where the level of integration with global economy is relatively very high and the level of FDI (combined net inflows and outflows) is equal to 13.7 % of Belgium's GDP, the Belgian state is almost on the edge of break up; Scottish nationalists are strongly pursuing their case for the independence. Although to a lesser extent, the same applies to Quebec in Canada, Spanish sub-state entities in Basque region and Catalonia.

The indecisive nature of the level of opportunities available to sub-state entities associated with the Russian Federation and Turkey is also reflected on the position of these two countries on the chart. While they are positioned higher than developing countries such as Sri Lanka and Nigeria, they are not in a situation similar to EU minorities. As it is the case with the Kurds in Turkey and Chechens in Russian Federation, the low level of

economic development and global economic integration of their associated ethno-historical regions may, at least partially, explain the violent nature of their struggle for a greater national recognition.

We need to bear in mind that while FDI figures are indicative of the level of integration of a country, they are not a perfect one. The problems that arise from using FDI figures for measuring the level of global economic integration of a country is that it may not take into account the more qualitative aspects of integration process. For example, it is possible that a high integration level of a country manifested by FDI figures is not a product of a genuine marketization process and global integration of an economy. Rather it may merely represent the higher level of trade transactions where the parties are not engaging in integrated production processes but rather they are involved in buying and selling the products that are produced in other countries. Dubai, in United Arab Emirate constitutes a good example of such important market places. On the contrary places such as Hong Kong, South Korea, some cities in China are engaging in global production processes to various degrees. Another issue that we also need to bear in mind is that the FDI figures can change significantly from one year to another.

### **Minorities' Instrument Approach to Globalisation**

Many of the mentioned cases of sub-state nationalisms in Europe and North American (Quebec) use the process of globalisation *instrumentally* to promote their version of sub-state minority nationalist political agenda. This may indicate, rather than being responsible for generating minority nationalism, globalisation is facilitating the surfacing of pre-existing sub-state nationalisms. This is evident in minorities approach to globalisation. Wherever sub-state entities benefit from economic globalisation they support the process. On the contrary, in the places where the processes of globalisation may undermine minorities' nationalist agenda, they develop counter-strategies to protect their nationalistic ambitions while benefiting from economic aspects of globalisation. To some extent, this is evident in the strategies of Taiwanese nationalists in their effort to manage the possibility of greater integration with mainland China. Similar strategies are adopted by the loyalist and Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland, where their negative and positive approach to the process of European Integration respectively is largely based on the implication of Europeanization for their political agenda.

### **The Role of Suprastate Entities**

The review of nationalist strategies adopted by minority nationalists in developed countries also suggests that the existence of supra-state entities such as European Union provide platforms and new avenues that facilitate

achieving sub-state minorities' nationalist goals. The creation of such entities also initiates structural changes in classical state that are required for a proper functioning of emerging suprastate entities. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the rise of sub-state minority nationalism is mainly reported in regions where such supra-state entities exist. As mentioned earlier Quebecois are increasingly using NAFTA platform to promote their nationalist goals while Scottish, Flanders, and Spanish minorities have a similar approach to European Union. The minorities in less globally and regionally integrated regions such Russian Federation, and Turkey have a low to moderate level of opportunities in this regards, often in a form of an indirect access to EU or other similar regional entities. While the minorities in the least integrated regions of the world have little or no opportunities.

One may argue that rather than the level of economic development and integration it is the existence of suprastate platforms such EU and NAFTA in developed world and the lack of similar entities in the developing countries that is the main factor behind the creation of opportunities for minority nations in the former and the lack of such opportunities in the case of latter, hence the violent and non-violent category divides. While suprastate entities have an important role in creation of opportunities; such entities themselves are the product of a market-based economic development and the regional integration of market economies. These suprastate are established in response to the need for expanding the nationalist markets and increasing their efficiency and global competitiveness through pooling of national markets and resources.

The level of economic development and economic integration is a better measurement for assessing the level of opportunities and constraints available to sub-state entities is particularly more evident in the countries which enjoy a moderate level of economic development and do not necessarily have access to suprastate entities similar to EU minorities. Taiwan and Tatrastan have not a direct access to suprastate entities similar to EU minorities but they have more opportunities than minorities in Nigeria and Sri Lanka because of their relatively higher level of economic development.

A similar pattern seems to be emerging in the relationship between level of economic development and level of violence. While the level of violence is minimal among minority nations in developed counties (Scotland, Quebec etc), it is highest among the minority nations in underdeveloped countries (Sri Lank, Nigeria etc). The indecisiveness of the level of economic development and integration in the relatively developed countries such as Russian Federation and Turkey may suggests that minorities in these counties can go either way based on the impact of other intervening factors including internal regional economic disparities. The level of regional

economic disparities within the host countries are also very important and the level of economic development of both minority nations and their host states both need to be considered to project a more accurate picture. For example, as discussed earlier, the existence of large disparities in the level of economic development between Chechnya and the rest of Russian Federation and Kurdish areas in Turkey versus the rest of the country. The role of intervening factors, such political repression, and ideological orientation of both state and sub-state entities should also not be underestimated.

### **The Changing Approach to the Nature of Sovereignty in the Modern Conditions and the Emergence of New form of Nationalism**

Another major characteristic of the new sub-state nationalisms is their particular way of pursuing their sovereignty projects. These sub-state entities have a tendency for distancing themselves from their historical host-states while at the same times they promote their national identities in suprastate entities, for example Scotland as European nation. Promoting this form of sovereignty through processes of globalisation and regional integration highlights the changes that are occurring in the nature of sovereignty in modern conditions. Given the depth and broadness of changes they need to be dealt with separately. Modern minority nationalism is also focused on increasing participation in global markets and the processes of global economic integration. A more intensive and extensive engagement in regional and global economy has a tendency to restructure and alter the content of the classical nationalism for adjusting it a globalizing world. These qualitative changes that are likely to occur in the nature of nationalism require further study that is beyond the scope of this paper.

### **The State of Minority Nationalisms in Developing Countries**

One of the characterises of minority nationalism in developing countries is its violent nature, something that is evident in many cases of minority nationalism in developing countries such as, Sri Lanka, and Nigeria. Of course minority nationalists' violent strategies is often a reaction to the aggressive and violent nature of the strategies adopted by their host nation-states and the overall militarization and securitization of minority issues by the multi-ethnic states in developing countries. Furthermore minorities often turn to violent means due to lack of alternative options such as capabilities for an effective and productive engagement with globalisation, an option that is available to minorities in developed world.

The second major difference between minorities in developing and developed countries is the persistence of multi-ethnic developing nation-states on pursuing a classical model of nation-state building with its

emphasis on a form of centralization that disregards the internal diversities and a top-down homogenization of language and culture that undermines minorities' unique cultural and linguistic heritage.

## **Conclusion**

This article's review of the studies and literature on the relationship between globalisation and minority nationalism identify some key trends in the nature of such relationship. On the whole, the positive relation between the two key variable of globalisation and the rise of sub-state nationalism is mainly reported in developed countries which also have globally integrated economies. In developed countries sub-state nations have an instrumental approach to opportunities that globalisation provides in forms of suprastate platforms, internal economic regionalism and globalisation of their economies that transcends their borders of their host states. Minority nations use their access to suprastate entities, regional economic forums and other available policy-tools strategically and according to their sub-state nationalist agenda. In their interaction with the process of globalisation, minority nations re-align their nationalist strategies and reformulate the nature of their nationalist agenda. An intensive and extensive engagement in global economy has a tendency to restructure and alter the content of the classical nationalism for adjusting it a globalizing world. These qualitative changes that are already evident among minority nations is developed world are encouraged by increasing participation in global markets and the processes of global economic integration are likely to change the nature of nationalism something that require further study.

In the relatively developed countries the host-state and sub-state relationship is characterised by its indecisiveness. Depending on the internal distribution of GDP per capita, level of development of sub-state regions, sub-state nationalist policies and intervening non-economic variables the relationship between the host state and sub-state entities can be that of relative accommodation to violent confrontation.

Contrary to developed countries, the situation of minority nationalism in developing countries is often marked by violence and the unavailability of capabilities in form of economic policy- tools and suprastate platforms that can support and sustain the promotion of sub-state nationalist agenda in non-violent ways. In addition to national and broader regional economic underdevelopment, the situation of minority nations in underdeveloped world is worsened by their host-states' pro centralization and ethno-cultural homogenization approaches to nation-state building in the modern conditions.

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