

TECHNO-BUREAUCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN AFRICA: BOTSWANA AND NIGERIA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

This work uses developmental state's paradigm in explaining how development in the Third World should be understood as a process in which states have to play strategic roles in planning and sustaining economic development. By comparing Botswana and Nigeria, the work establishes how the nature and character of techno-bureaucratic governance become necessary in the emergence and sustenance of developmental state in Africa. Such developmental oriented technocracy and bureaucracy should not only be autonomous and constitute the Weberian ideal bureaucracy, but must also be powerful, highly professional and technically competent.

Keywords: Techno-Bureaucratic, technocracy, bureaucracy, governance, developmental state, institutionalists, orthodoxy, merit, efficiency, recruitment, promotion

Introduction

Development theory and policy debate over the years have remained contentious between the neoclassical paradigm and the "institutional" development theorists. Though, the Institutional development theory was the dominant orthodoxy during the 1950s and early 1960s, the neoclassical paradigm and the neoliberal economic measures associated with it, dominates development theory and policy in the late 1960s, especially after the emergence of a unipolar world, to the contemporary time. This prevailing development paradigm tends to view the state involvement in the economy as negative and therefore should be minimalistic in nature, quite against the belief of the "institutionalists" who contend that market failure is responsible for underdevelopment, so the state should play important roles in enhancing development. Thus, as a major protagonist of the neoclassical development paradigm and neoliberal economic measures, the World Bank argues especially in suggesting the cure for the problem of development in Africa a substantial retraction of authority and reach of the state through the privatization of public enterprises (World Bank, 1989).

Four different factors were responsible for the dominance of the debate on the best theory and policy thrust for economic development by the neoclassical orthodoxy over the Institutional theory or developmental state theorists, at least from the beginning of the 1970s up to the turn of the 21st century. First, was the collapse of many centrally planned economies in the socialist states. Second, the failure of extensive state intervention in promoting import-substituting industrialization which had instead generated inefficient industries that must be bailed out with unproductive interventionist funds from the state. Third, "rent seeking" generated by cases of extensive involvement of the state intervention in the economies as a major agent of industrialisation. Fourth, empirical evidence on the experience of the most successful countries to emerge from the Third World (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) which showed that these countries have achieved economic development through an outward-oriented measures driven by a free market and private sector (Onis, 1991).

However, the failure of the neoliberal economic measures to rejuvenate the economies of most of the Third World countries, a reinterpretation of the East Asian development experience and the emerging interests of political scientist to look at the political characteristics of economically more successful developing countries have enhanced the emergence of a counter-critique of the neoclassical paradigm and the reemergence of the relevance of the developmental state thesis. Central to the position of the counter-critique of the neoclassical development paradigm is the argument that the development in the Third World should be understood as a process in which states have to play a strategic role in planning and sustaining economic development. This can be achieved by the developmental state which according to Adrian Leftwich “has sufficient power, probity, autonomy and competence at the centre to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit and nationally-determined development objectives, whether by establishing and promoting the conditions of economic growth, by organizing it directly, or by a varying combination of both” (Leftwich, 1994:381). This state is what De Onis (1999) refers to as a state where government is intimately involved in macro and micro economic planning in order to grow the economy. Chalmers Johnson distinguishes the “developmental orientation” of such a state from the socialist type command economy state, on the one hand, and the capitalist regulatory orientation on the other hand (Johnson, 1982: 19).

The developmental state orthodoxy suggests that for a state to be a developmental state, it must be stronger and autonomous state. An autonomous state enhanced by a powerful, efficient and autonomous bureaucracy recruited from the best talents available in the state. The bureaucracy and those with economics and technical expertise are given prominent roles in policy formulation and implementation in the developmental state. Technocrats and bureaucrats involvements in development process in a developmental state become invaluable because development planning requires a high level of economic and technical expertise. Thus, according to Peter Evans “the idea of developmental state puts robust, competent public institutions at the centre of the development matrix” (Evans, 2003:37). This is what Jayasuriya (2006) puts succinctly when he underlines the fact that institutions become the key to explaining development outcomes. Kunle Amuwo (2007) toes similar part when he holds strongly that “without a seasoned and development-oriented bureaucracy, state interventionism would, in all probability, amount to little more than the unwitting transfer of public resources to local capitalist class” (Amuwo, 2007:11).

Going by the above position, it is suggestive to note that extant literature on developmental state establish the fact that technocracy and an autonomous and efficient bureaucracy remain prime institution for the achievement of development by a state. However, it is important to point out that it would be grossly misleading and rather too simplistic to emphasise apparently technocratic and bureaucratic factors as a *sine qua non* for development by deemphasising the necessary political requirements of development. Therefore in order to take a holistic understanding of the process of development through the developmental state paradigm, the primacy of the nature, character, structure and purposes of the state which tend to concentrate in the state both the political will and the bureaucratic competence to establish developmental momentum must also be considered. Therefore explicitly there is a close link between *politics* and institutions ability to achieve development. Politics here is largely viewed within the context of the usage of the term by Adrian Leftwich as “all activities of conflict, cooperation and negotiation involved in the use, production and distribution of resources, whether material or ideal, and whether at local, national or international levels” (Leftwich, 1994:365).

Apparently, I hold unequivocally that there is a political base of the developmental state if technocrats and bureaucrats are considered relevant tools in the process of development. The relative autonomy of technocrats and bureaucrats in the formulation and

implementation of development policy is clearly the function of their political origins and the coalitions which supports them, while the authority and insulation of their economic high commands has flowed from the political power and support of the central political executives. The ability of the technocrats and the bureaucrats to deal with both the civil society and in particular with local and foreign interests, there is the need of political supports (Leftwich, 1995).

The relevancy of politics for a developmental state orthodoxy can also be located in the Peter Evans “embedded autonomous” argument which characterizes the relationship between the techno-bureaucratic elements and the private sector in the process of economic policy making and implementation. These institutions selectively link up with segments of civil society whose active involvement in the economy is necessary for productive transformation (Samatar, 1999:27). It is thus, the political base of the techno-bureaucratic structure that would guide against the overwhelming of the policy making process by a particularistic interest groups in the “embedded relationship” arising from the public-private partnership in the developmental process.

What the argument in the above paragraph suggests is that the processes involved in developmental policy making are to a large extent political in nature. Malcolm Wallis (1989) illustrates this when he underlines that “to understand how planning function it is important to be able to analyse it within its political context” (1989:45). The political context of a developmental state becomes more relevant upon the backdrop of the fact that it is possible for a state to have developmental structures without achieving development. Therefore any consideration of the state as developmental with the technocrats and bureaucrats as its containers must also clearly considers the importance of the nature and character of the state and politics in this process. It is on this premise that this chapter intends assessing the nature and character of techno-bureaucratic governance in Botswana and Nigeria in order to establish whether technocracy and bureaucracy in these countries represent structures that can enhance development.

Nature and Character of Techno-Bureaucratic Governance in Botswana

As I have stated under the introduction of this chapter technocracy and bureaucracy are important elements for a state to experience rapid economic growth and development through state-led policies and/or interventions. While I subscribe to the recommendation of an autonomous technocracy and the Weberian Ideal bureaucracy for the establishment and maintenance of a developmental state, I suggest that an autonomous and the Weberian ideal bureaucracy are not enough conditions for a state to be “developmental. This however, is not to water down the significance of an autonomous technocracy and Weberianness. This position only demonstrates that an autonomous technocracy and the Weberian ideal bureaucracy are not enough for a state-led development through techno-bureaucratic governance. Such developmental oriented technocracy and bureaucracy should not only be autonomous and constitute the Weberian ideal bureaucracy, but must also be powerful, highly professional and technically competent.

Amuwo (2008) regards these type of technocracy and bureaucracy as critical elements of state capacity when he opines that “an efficient, capable, disciplined, professional, skilled, and relatively autonomous bureaucracy, driven by a nationalistic political elite that privileges economic development” (2008:11). Therefore, the nature and character of technocracy and bureaucracy in Botswana as well as Nigeria shall be viewed in the context of their autonomy, Weberian ideal/rationality, professionalism, real power, authority and technical competence. These characteristics of technocracy and bureaucracy shall be examined with the view of establishing how these reflect in policies formulation, implementation and development planning.

An extremely meritocratic form of recruitment constitutes the starting point in understanding the developmental oriented type of bureaucracy under this discourse. The popular computer software terminology of “Garbage-in-Garbage-out” is relevant explaining how recruitment of technocrats and bureaucrats affect public service performance. The point being stressed here is that technocracy competence and bureaucratic efficiency are achieved by, among other things through the process of recruitment into the bureaucracy and the caliber of people appointed into cabinet positions. Thus the foremost factor that shaped the nature and character of technocracy and bureaucracy is the meritocratic recruitment. As Charles Harvey and Stephen Lewis (1990) remark, in Botswana, “considerable attention was paid, particularly within the civil service and the cabinet to putting able people into key positions and keeping them there for extended periods” (1990:9). Thus, the Botswana’s bureaucracy to a very large extent possesses one of the major characteristics of the Weberian ideal bureaucracy in the area of the appointment of personnel on the basis of qualification and experience.

This meritocratic recruitment into the civil service and cabinet positions in Botswana can be traced to the immediate post independence years of the country. Unlike much of the rest of African countries which embarked on the localization of their civil service immediately after independence at the expense of merit, Botswana embarked on gradual localization of its public service. Localising the public service in most of these African countries entailed quick and massive appointment and promotion of indigeneous bureaucrats in the military or civil service to positions previously occupied by white colonialists (Samatar, 1999). Botswana did not thread this pact followed by most African countries in order to enhance the efficiency and competence of the public service. The first President of the country, Seretse Khama clearly established this when he declared in 1967 that, “we would never sacrifice efficiency on the altar of localization” (Picard, 1987:205).

Therefore, in order to establish and develop a highly competent technocracy and bureaucracy and development planning, expatriates were retained in the Botswana Public service. The level of the total adherence to meritocratic appointment into the country’s public service was displayed with the headship of the Botswana civil service by a white Kenyan for several years after the country’s independence. These expatriates were only replaced whenever capable Batswanas were available to fill the positions occupied by the expatriates. The expatriates also assisted in building a very effective bureaucracy by training the local cadre of bureaucrats who later on take over the running of the country. As Du Toit (1995) suggests, the role of expatriates as upholders of the technical (and technocratic) standards of efficiency and effectiveness contribute to the functioning of the civil service as an effective and autonomous corporate group.

Apart from the meritocratic recruitment into the public service there is also high consideration for merit in the promotion of personnel in the service. As Balefi Tsie notes, “there are clear career paths and conditions of service for almost all categories of public servants” (1998:13). In the Botswana’s public service therefore, there are clear guidelines for promotions in the service, which is quite different from promotions based on patronage and/or ethnic considerations obtainable in most of the African countries. Line ministries in the Botswana’s public service set up their own promotion boards. The promotion boards comprised senior officers within the ministry and members of the Directorate of Public Service Management (DPSM), acting as support officers. This promotion boards review all promotions to ensure that deserving staff have been promoted, in order to drastically reduce biasness, victimisation and political considerations in the promotion processes (Scher, 2010). Promotion based on merit had to a very large extent increased the level of commitment of the bureaucrats and also ensures that competent people are promoted to relevant positions.

In order for a bureaucracy to be efficient and effective there is also the need for continuous training of the bureaucrats and for a developmental oriented technocrats training and updating of their technical expertise remains cardinal. As it is a common knowledge formulation and implementation of development policies require up to date technical and professional expertise, it therefore becomes pertinent for officers responsible for planning and development to update themselves with relevant knowledge surrounding the demands of the position they occupy. The basis of such training and development is necessarily to improve motivation, performance and productivity of the technocrats and bureaucrats. Foremost post independence Botswana technocrats and bureaucrats have taken training and personal development with utmost required attentions. As Harvey and Lewis (1990) point out;

“for more than a decade after independence it was common for visiting consultants or academics to give evening seminars attended by Ministers, Permanent Secretaries and other senior officials. In addition senior, meetings of cabinet frequently involved presentations by visiting experts, who were encouraged to share the comparative experiences of other countries both in Africa and all other parts of the world” (Harvey and Lewis, 1990:61)

More so, as Kempe Hope (1995) holds, the University of Botswana was established in 1982 among other things to perform the function of improving the quality and in expanding the quantity of the human resources needed for development. According to her “the university is used as a training institution for public servants, primarily for senior staff seeking professional and intellectual development in advanced public administration” (1995:57). Similarly, DPSM and ULCS engage in the training and education of public servants. The Botswana Institute of Administration and Commerce (BIAC) as well as the Institute of Development Management (IDM) also engage in training of the public servants in similar ways that the DPSM and ULCS does. Thus, in order to be developmental oriented high premium is placed on education and training of the technocrats and bureaucrats in Botswana. With the emphasis on education and training the Botswana public service enjoys the benefit of the supply of educated and competent individuals occupying various positions in the service.

The Botswana’s technocrats and bureaucrats also possess and improve their technical orientations through the “parallel progression” framework (Hope, 1995; Adamolekun, 1999). The PP framework is an incentive to provide career prospects for some specifically identified officers like artisans, technicians and professionals (notably accountants, engineers, architects and lawyers), by giving them the opportunity to progress upwards via two parallel lines in these relative areas of scarce manpower. The professional grades for these categories of official were opened up by three new grades, offering an optimum salary that was about 45% higher than the old salary grades of these categories of staff (Adamolekun, 1999). The basic objective of this framework is to attract and retain qualified and experienced officers with scarce skill who are required for economic development.

With the PP scheme the Botswana public service has been able to retain the services of qualified technical expertise and professionals in its fold especially with the gradual growth of the private sector. The PP has assisted the Botswana public service in not losing some of its capable hands to the private sector as witnessed in some other African countries. This is due to the recognition of the fact by the technocrats and professionals that the incentives and benefits they are receiving in the public sector is not different from what is obtainable in the private sector. In view of this, the Botswana public service can still boast of technically sound personnel and professional who continuously make the techno-bureaucratic governance development oriented.

From the foregoing it is never a misnomer to attest that the merit based appointments and promotion of technocrats and bureaucrats, their training and the reward system for

technicians and professionals have remained crucial in making techno-bureaucratic governance an important element in the developmental state of Botswana. In view of this, Botswana can rightly be said to have a powerful, competent and economic insulated bureaucracy which qualifies the country as a developmental state going by Adrian Leftwich (1995) six major components of a developmental state. Attention will however be shifted to an assessment of the impacts of the nature and character of technocracy and bureaucracy on the developmental policy making process in Botswana under the next section of this chapter.

Technocrats and Bureaucrats in the Development Process of Botswana

One of the basic characteristics of the Weberian ideal/legal rational bureaucracy is that bureaucrats should be politically neutral. That is, bureaucrats are not expected to be involved in the process of policy making, but rather they are only expected to implement policies made by the executive arm of government. What this suggests is that the elected political executives or appointed cabinet ministers are expected to make laws, while the bureaucrats take order from the executive for the implementation of the policies formulated. The top bureaucrats could at best play advisory roles to the politicians in the process of policy making. Going by this Weberian's principle of political neutrality for bureaucrats, it is only technocrats who are appointed by the executive head of government as cabinet ministers that can play any major role in the process of policy formulation.

The developmental state literature however negates this principle of political neutrality for bureaucrats in the process of developmental policy formulation and implementation. Instead of only focusing on the implementation of policy by the bureaucrats, the developmental state's orthodoxy holds strongly that bureaucrats remain necessary institutions for a state to achieve development. It is within this context that an attempt would be made under this section to examine the roles of the technocrats as well as the bureaucrats in the process of developmental policy making and implementation in Botswana, which have to a large extent assisted in enhancing the movement of the country from the league of one of the poorest countries in Africa in 1966 to that of one of the most prosperous country on the continent.

Theoretically, the Botswana's bureaucracy has been modeled along the Weberian's Principle of political neutrality, but as Somolekae (1993) remarks neutrality and autonomy remain relative concepts in Botswana. According to her, since independence, the official position of the government is that policy making is the function of the politicians while the bureaucrats should only be responsible for policy implementation. However, available empirical evidences show that in practice the bureaucrats and not the political leadership have dominated policy making in the country. Gilfred Gunderson clearly refers to Botswana as an "administrative state" in which "the administrative elites have complete control over the decision making process" (1971:7). And for Louis Picard the Botswana's bureaucracy remains "a major factor in policy-making process and a policy dominated socio-economic group" (1987:13).

Going from this, from the early years of Botswana's independence as I have noted earlier the expatriates who dominated the Botswana's bureaucracy were largely responsible for the formulation of policies and implementation, while according to Isaksen (1981:32) "politicians mobilized support at the polls. For instance as Charles Harvey explains, during the early years of Botswana's independence, the expatriate advisers briefed the cabinet and Members of Parliament on the technicalities and potentialities of macro policy. On the basis of this, policy options and responses are chosen. This tradition established at independence by the expatriates has remained to the present. The only major difference as correctly noted by Somolekae (1993:116) is that "the civil service contains far more African today than it did at independence". Thus development policy formulation and implementation have been

dominated by the technocrats and bureaucrats who are to a large extent technocratic in their modes of operation.

The roles of the bureaucrats and technocrats become more relevant in policy formulation and implementation when the government of Botswana had to (re)invent its institutions to move from routine administration to that of development planning and management. This transformation which took many years has the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP) as its brain trust. The MFDP has remained important in directing the process of development in Botswana (Raphaeli et al, 1984; Holm, 1988; Samatar, 1999; Taylor, 2002; 2003; 2005; 2012; Sebudubudu & Molutsi, 2009). The MFDP headed by the Vice-President is responsible for planning, budgeting and coordinates all development activities. The ministry also carefully monitors the implementations of all development projects. The overall mandate of the Ministry is to coordinate national development planning, mobilise and prudently manage available financial and economic resources. Further to that the Ministry is responsible for the formulation of economic and financial policies for sustainable economic development.

To ensure that the MFDP's remains effective in spearheading development agenda, there are planning units, staffed by professional planners responsible to the director of Economic Affairs of MFDP, in other ministries (Samatar, 1999). This ministry which is the driving force behind Botswana's development is most often than not headed and dominated by seasoned technocrats and bureaucrats. In fact in the exception of Ian Khama, the office of the Vice-President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning has been mostly reserved for seasoned bureaucrats and technocrats who occupied that position for considerable number of years (Taylor, 2003; 2009). Such technocrats include Quett Masire who was a founder and principal of Seepapitso Secondary school, *African Echo* journalist and director, and editor of *Therisanyo* (Democratic Party Newspaper) (Answers.Com, 2013). Festus Mogae who was planning officer Ministry of Finance and Development planning (1970), secretary economic affairs MFDP (1972-74), Permanent Secretary MFDP (1975-76), Permanent Secretary MFDP (1989-98) (Answers.Com, 2013), before becoming the Vice-President and Minister of Finance for this same MFDP in which he has being a bureaucrat occupying different positions for several years. Peter Mmusi who resigned in 1993 was also the Vice-President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning.

In fact during the period when Ian Khama was the Vice-President, because he was not a technocrat, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning was separated from the Vice-President's portfolio and a technocrat Baledzi Gaolathe was appointed as a substantive Minister of the MFDP. Gaolathe before becoming the Minister of Finance and Development Planning has served as the Governor of the Bank of Botswana (1997-1999) and a Member World Bank Board (1999). Similarly, Lt General Mompoti Merafhe who was the Vice-President to Ian Khama but who was not also the Minister of Finance and Development Planning from 2008 to 2012 has to be replaced with a technocrat Kedikilwe Ponatshego in 2012 because among other things the former's lack of bureaucratic and technocratic background to efficiently oversee the MFDP and eventually succeed Ian Khama as the President. Kedikilwe has before becoming the Vice-President and the Minister of Finance and Development was a career bureaucrat who has served as Assistant Principal, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (1970-73), Principal Officer MFDP (1973-75), Director of Financial Affairs MFDP (1976-77) and Permanent Secretary Ministry of Works and Communication (1977-78), etc (Brillonline, 2013).

When Kedikilwe was sworn-in as the Vice-President and the Minister of Finance and Development Planning, the government still retained him in his initial position as the Minister of Minerals, Energy and Water Resources before a substantive Minister was appointed to the Ministry. According to the government "this will allow him to continue to

play a key role in efforts to promote greater beneficiation along with growth in the local mineral and energy sectors, including Botswana's emergence as a mines to market global diamond trading and processing hub” (Scoop World, 6 August 2012:1). Given these illustrations, it is quite correct to assert that this powerful MFDP and other development related Ministries like Ministry of Energy and Water Resources have been dominated by professional bureaucrats and seasoned technocrats who determine developmental policy options and the direction of Botswana’s economy.

More so, it is instructive to point out that the separation of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning from the office of the Vice-President when Ian Khama and Mompoti Merafhe were Vice-Presidents shows the importance that the government placed on the reservation of office for technocrats and bureaucrats. What this quite exemplified is that the role of development planning has been entirely reserved for technocrats and bureaucrats who are trained and have the expertise in economic policy making, in Botswana. Thus, it is never an accident of history that the MFDP has been entirely occupied by bureaucrats and technocrats since Botswana’s independence in 1966 to date. Thus, ‘such a Ministry and its close links to the Executive has secured a balance between development planning and budgeting, as well as strengthening the capacity to implement national goals and demonstrating a commitment to economic development’ (Taylor, 2003:4).

Aside the domination of critical ministries that determine the economic development direction of Botswana by technocrats and bureaucrats, parastatals and boards relevant for the formulation and implementation of policies for economic development are headed and their composition dominated by technocrats and bureaucrats. One of such parastatal is the Bank of Botswana. The Bank of Botswana like any other Central Bank has the primary objectives of promoting and maintaining low and stable inflation, ensure an efficient payments system and keep the banking system safe and sound. To achieve these objectives, the Bank undertakes a number of functions, which include: formulating and implementing monetary policy, issuing currency, supervising and regulating commercial banks and other financial institutions, serving as economic and financial advisor to Government, implementing exchange rate policy and managing foreign exchange reserves (Bank of Botswana, 2007). The critical roles of this Bank in determining the economic direction of Botswana cannot be overemphasized. The importance of this institution is consistently matched with the culture of appointing bureaucrats as its Governor. For instance Mrs Linah Mohohlo who was appointed as the Bank’s Governor in 1999 has been at the central bank for 23 years as a civil servant occupying different positions. This means that she has been a bureaucrat at the Bank for more than 35 years (Bank of Botswana, 2012). Her predecessor as the Bank’s Governor Baledzi Gaolethe was also a renowned bureaucrat who has served in various capacities at the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning before becoming the Governor of the Bank.

Another reference point where technocrats and bureaucrats have constituted important elements in Botswana’s development process is their important representation in the DEBSWANA Board of Directors. The DEBSWANA Board of Directors consists of 13 members, with 6 of its members being the Botswana’s government nominees. Due to the importance of the mining industry and the premium placed on the important roles of technocrats and bureaucrats in determining the country’s development these nominees are always technocrats and bureaucrats. I will make reference to the technocratic and bureaucratic backgrounds of the 2009 government nominees to the DEBSWANA Board of Directors to support this argument. Eric Molale who is one of the government’s nominees to the Board was a District Commissioner Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing in 1991, Private Secretary MFDP in 1994, Chief Economist MFDP in 1994, Deputy Permanent Secretary Ministry of Lands and Housing in 1996 and Permanent Secretary Ministry of Local Government, before his appointment. Another nominee Solomon Sekwakwa was a Principal

Economist MFDP in 1998 and Secretary Development and Budget Division of the MFDP before his appointment (DEBSWANA, 2013).

Prior to his appointment as a Board member Boikobo Payawas the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water Resources, the post he holds effective 01 October 2010, was the Deputy Permanent Secretary in the same ministry, responsible for water and energy sectors'. Healsoserved, from April 2007 to October 2008, as Project Manager; Mmamabula Coordinating Unit, still under the Ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water Resources. During that time he was involved in issues of strategic importance in the ministry particularly in the water and energy sectors (Funding for Morupule B Phase 1, independent power producers (IPP) emergency water supply project, water sector institutional reform and preparation of NDP 10 for water, energy and mineral sectors). Boikobo Paya was once the Director of the Department of Water Affairs from April 2005 to April 2007, a department under the ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water resources.

Another member of the Board of Directors, Neo D. Moroka is a technocrat who has served as the Chief Executive Officer and Resident Director of De Beers Botswana. He however started his working career in the public service in 1980. In 1984, he joined Barclays Bank and moved up the ranks until he left to work for BP in 1991, first as the General Manager for BP Botswana and Managing Director for BP Zambia in 1999 (Ibid). One of the female members of the Board of Directors, Athalia Molokomme, taught law at the University of Botswana from 1981 - 1996, with periods of study leave in between, and has researched and published extensively in the fields of family law, women and law, customary law and employment law. In October 2005, she was appointed to the position of Attorney General of Botswana. Linah Mohohlo, the Governor of the Bank of Botswana is another female member of the Board of Directors (Ibid). Since the Diamond remains the major resources of Botswana the roles that these government nominees play in the Board to a large extent determine how much benefits the country gets from its natural resources.

The critical roles of technocrats and bureaucrats in Botswana's developmental process can also be located in the formulation and implementation of National Development Plan (NDP). The NDP is five-to-six year rolling plans which focused on an extensive process of project selection, prioritization and resource allocation. The planning process of the NDP involves a number of discrete steps. According to Sebudubudu and Molutsi (2009) these steps include: the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning drafting the Key Issues Paper (KIP). This KIP is a general framework which states possible issues to be focused on during the coming plan. On the basis of KIP, each sectoral ministry and department are given the opportunity to both comment on, and develop their Sectoral Key Issues Papers (SKIPs); on the basis of KIP and SKIPs, the MFDP produces Macroeconomic Strategy Paper, which defines total estimated cost allocation proposals for each ministry and sector; after this second step, the next step will be for each ministry and its broad stakeholders to work together to prioritise which programmes and projects will go into the plan; thereafter, these programmes and projects would be compiled into a draft plan which goes to the National Consultative Forum for discussion and modification. The NCF then has the opportunity to question, change and add new programmes and projects across sectors; the draft plan then goes to Parliament for debate and final approvals.

The process of the development of the Key Issues Paper, through the SKIPs up to the formulation of the final National Development Plan by the National Consultative Forum is dominated by technocrats and bureaucrats in each of these processes. The only role that politicians play is only at the level of debate and approval of the NDP in the parliament. In view of this, the NDP gives the technocrats and bureaucrats a great degree of roles in policy making than the politicians. This presupposes that "a technical document, drafted by experts

and then approved by elected representatives, serves as the blueprint for government policy” (Taylor 2002:13-14). As Ian Taylor while quoting Patrick Molutsi points out “once the new plan is approved, politicians’ proposals not in the plan are turned aside on the grounds that only emergency measures can be adopted until the next plan is formulated” (Taylor, 2002:14; 2005:48).

Similar to the above roles play by technocrats and bureaucrats in the formulation and implementation of the NDP is the role of Bureaucrats and technocrats in the area of mineral policy. The Mineral Policy Committee (MPC) made up of four Permanent Secretaries, undertook all the crucial detailed negotiations with the representatives of interested mining companies as well as having day-to-day responsibilities for mineral policy generally (Charlton, 1991). The setting up in 1995 of the Botswana Institute of Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA), also to some substantial level increases the impacts of technocrats and Bureaucrats in the process of development of Botswana. This institute which has a high-profile board, comprising of the governor of the Bank of Botswana, the managing director of the Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower, and the managing director of DEBSWANA represents another policy planning and implementation body dominated by technocrats and bureaucrats. This BIDPA is dominated by technocrats who help to enhance development policy management. The institute also evaluates government programmes implemented for some specific periods with an econometric modeling in order to enhance government capacity in macroeconomic policy analysis and also domiciled a training programme in policy planning and programming, in collaboration with the University of Botswana (Adamolekun, 1999).

Nature and Character of Techno-Bureaucratic Governance in Nigeria

Nigeria is a federal state with civil service at the central, state and local government levels. Therefore, the Nigerian bureaucracy comprises the federal civil service, thirty-six state civil services, 774 local government civil services, several federal and state government agencies, parastatals and corporations. An examination of techno-bureaucratic governance under this section shall basically focus on the federal civil service, agencies, parastatals and corporations. It is however pertinent to point out that the nature and character of techno-bureaucratic governance at the central level depict what is obtainable at the different states of the federation. That is, whatever characteristics and nature of the technocracy and bureaucracy at the federal level that I will examine can be used to generalize about the entire bureaucracy and technocracy in Nigeria.

Major discourse under this section shall be adequately based upon the background of how a former president of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo aptly describes bureaucracy and technocracy in Nigeria when he contends strongly that:

Over the years, the public services at federal and state levels lost the value on which they were established. Merit is sacrificed for expediency and opportunism. Retraining of hired staff hardly take place. It allows so-called ghost workers to infiltrate the service and ended up with a pay-roll that is totally at variance with output or productivity, parastatals are so mismanaged, looted, and badly ruined that they became an embarrassment to norms of efficiency, productivity, management and probity... Proliferation of parastatals as well as the creation of several agencies had resulted in unnecessary duplication of functions and in some cases, mandates... The management of these agencies appointed persons into the public service haphazardly with the result that most of them are now over-bloated and enormous resources are spent on their overheads (The Guardian Newspaper August 3, 2004).

The above statement from the former president of Nigeria shall form our basis of analysis and shall be done in a more elaborate form and which shall show a clear picture of the nature and character of bureaucracy and technocracy in Nigeria. From a more historical perspective, the Nigerian bureaucracy just like its counterpart in most of the post-colonial states was a colonial creation, which was not in any way directed toward any developmental agenda. It was purely established for the exploitation of these colonies with the mandate of maintaining law and order. It was post-independence developmental challenges of the country that gave the bureaucracy more roles other than its initial roles for which it was created (Fajonyomi, 1998). Immediately after independence, the Nigerian government embarked on the policy of indigenization/Nigerianisation of the bureaucracy which further placed lots of responsibilities and roles on the few less trained bureaucrats and technocrats.

However, with an enormous task placed on the Nigerian bureaucracy as the shopping floors of government business, Nigeria which at its early years of independence was categorized in the middle row of the rich countries in the world, slipped to one of the poorest countries in the 21st century, not in term of paucity of resources but on the level of poverty in the country. The decline of Nigeria from the league of the richest countries in the world to its present state of one of the poorest countries can to a large extent be linked to the nature and character of its bureaucracy and technocracy. As I have argued severally and with consensus of opinion in the literature that the roles of a competent, meritocratic, well-structured and motivated bureaucracy and technocracy are important for a nation to achieve development, the present state of underdevelopment of Nigeria can therefore be linked to a bureaucracy lacking these fundamental characteristics. I shall in turn discuss some of the characteristics of the Nigerian bureaucracy and the nature of its technocracy which have greatly impeded the country's development, especially under its democratic government.

Public service in Nigeria stipulates a checklist of requirements for entry into the service (Eme & Ugwu, 2011). Thus, theoretically public service positions are supposed to be filled on the basis of merit. However, in practice empirical evidences suggest that guideline for recruitment is not mostly adhered to in the recruitment of personnel into the Nigerian public service. The abandonment of the guideline for recruitment into public service inadvertently opens the gate of entry into the service for incompetent persons. This to a large extent affects the performance of the Nigerian bureaucracy in the area of policy articulation, implementation and evaluation (Adeyemo & Osunyanmi, 2009). Various reasons account for the non-meritocratic recruitment into public services in Nigeria. These categories of factors fall into structural (Nnoli, 1980; Yusufu, 1992; Adebayo, 2001) and political problems. The structural factors shall be majorly discussed under this section while adequate attention shall be given to the political factors under subsequent chapters of this work.

Taking a retrospective look at one of the major factors that have affected the efficiency of the Nigerian bureaucracy is the policy of indigenization/Nigerianization of the public service. It is on record that immediately after independence, the Nigerian government embarked on filling every public office occupied by expatriates during colonialism with its citizens. Ironically during this period there were few numbers of experts or technocrats who can perform the functions which requires technical expertise. Thus in the spirit of indigenization of the Nigerian public service the foundation for the non-meritocratic recruitment into the public service was laid. This continued several years after Nigerian independence despite some reform agenda by various governments in the country.

Furthermore, recruitment into the public service, especially those of junior staff on salary Grade Levels 01-06 delegated to ministers/extra-ministerial officers have mostly being done on the basis of the personal interest of the recruiting officer and for the reduction of rates of unemployment in the country. Phillips (1991) subscribes to this position when he asserts that too little qualified personnel are hired in the Nigerian public service at the top

levels and too many support staff. A service-wide study conducted by the Management Services Office of the Head of Service of the Federation in 2001 reveals that the Junior (unskilled) staff on Grade Levels 01-06 constituted about 70% of the entire workforce, while Grade Levels 15 and above (Managerial levels) constituted 7% of the total force (Guardian Newspaper, 24th May, 2001). The high number of junior staff in the Nigerian public service is linked to the fact such positions are used to reduce the high rate of unemployment in the country. Relatedly, most people who are recruited into the public service are those who couldn't find a place in the private sector which is known for the recruitment of the best hands and have remuneration far above those paid to the public servants.

The principles of federal character and quota system for recruitment into public offices have also impacted negatively on the meritocratic recruitment in the service (Eme & Ugwu, 2011; Ogunronfa, 2012). The term “federal character” was introduced to ensure equal representation of the various units or sections in the Nigerian bureaucracy and public offices (Maduabum, 2008). The 1999 constitution of Nigeria which adequately entrenched this principle states that:

The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies (Section 14(3) of the Nigerian 1999 constitution)

The principles of federal character and quota system are not entirely a wrong policy considering the rate of ethnic division of the country. However, in most instances these principles have been abused because in the spirit of implementing the principles purely personal and regional interests have been used in recruitment into public service and for political appointments in various ministries, agencies and parastatals. This has to a large extent affected the quality of those recruited into the service. Thus, these principles have frustrated professionalism and competence in the Nigerian public service. As Maduabum (2008) aptly argues “since access to employment is not open to everybody, the ‘lucky anointed’ few, who in most cases, do not have the required skills, perform responsibilities that are meant for professionals”(Maduabum, 2008:172).

The subversion of merit in recruitment into public service positions in Nigeria caused by structural problems explained above has also led to the over-bloating of the civil service and the numbers of agencies and parastatals in the country. Under a Harmonized Report of the 20 editions of a workshop attended by 1,902 Directorate Level officers in the Federal Civil Service, between 1999 and 2001 it was discovered among other things that there have been massive expansion in the size of the public service which had risen 350% between 1960 and 1999 compared with a national population increase of 160% over the same period (Eme & Ugwu, 2011). Similarly, from 1999 to 2012 the total strength of the Nigerian civil service has increased tremendously with no actual data of the staff strength available anywhere. It should be noted that as observed earlier under this section the bloating of the service is at the lowest cadre which accounts for 70% of the total workforce. And as Maduabum points out, “there is also a parading atmosphere of non-creative engagement of the remaining 30% at the officer’s level in productivity assignment” (Maduabum, 2008:641). What this suggests is that the Nigerian bureaucracy is over-populated with so many unmerited and unproductive civil servants and which has also resulted to a situation whereby 80% of the government budget is directed towards recurrent expenditure, while the remaining 20% is meant for capital expenditure.

Similar to the above point and as also stated earlier is the fact that there is proliferation of parastatals, as well as the creation of several agencies which has resulted in

unnecessary duplication of functions and mandates. At present the country has over sixty various parastatals and agencies who are without mission and vision statements, or clear corporate and individual schedule of duties. These parastatals and agencies have different board chairmen and members on the pay roll of the government, while at the same time having their independent staff that forms part of the bloated public service.

Promotion in the Nigerian public service also follows similar pattern like that of recruitment. Promotion at the junior and middle carrier level are mostly done on the basis of seniority and favoritism. Okafor (2005) puts this in a proper perspective when he holds that:

...Once ensconced in a bureaucratic position, officials are promoted primarily on the basis of seniority. Rules for promotion fail to differentiate between productive and non-productive workers (Okafor, 2005:67)

Officials at the directorate levels are however promoted on the basis of the principle of federal character and not on the basis of performance. That is why it is not uncommon in the public service to see civil servants been promoted to the position of Permanent Secretaries above those they met on the job and those that are more productive. This situation is made worse due to the fact that appointment as a permanent secretary which happens to be a vital decision making position in the civil service is done at the discretion of the president. The president while appointing the permanent secretaries mostly considers the need to fill slot of various segments of the country instead of matching employees' skills with the needs of the position.

Other pronounced features of the bureaucracy and technocracy in Nigeria is that fact that on-the- job training are weak and ineffective (Adebayo, 2001), poor remuneration of bureaucrats and technocrats (Ejiofor, 1987; Fajonyomi, 1998; 1998; Okoh, 1998; Onyeoruru, 2005). In fact remuneration in the public service is too low to attract the best in the society. This allows the private sector, such as oil companies, financial institutions, telecommunication companies, construction companies, etc to recruit the best. As Fajonyomi posits

“the disparity between the public and private wages is so wide that those who take up public service jobs do so for absence of something better... Consequently, the civil service lacks the high level competence required, not only to formulate development policies, but also to convince prospective investors on the actual state of the economy. (Fajonyomi, 1998:64).

Technocrats and Bureaucrats in the Development Process of Nigeria

Since the restoration of electoral democracy in Nigeria till the time of the administration led by President Goodluck Jonathan, it has become a common practice for each regime to constitute an economic team, especially at the beginning of their tenures. Members of the various teams are expected to manage the economy in order to promote economic development of the country and engendered an efficient and dynamic self reliant economy (Nigeria Intel, April 8, 2013). Most of the members and the leaders of this team are technocrats. Apart from the economic team and the National Planning Commission, some of the ministers and other aides of the president are either technocrats or bureaucrats. In fact, according to Kifordu (2011) 6.6 and 19.7 percent of bureaucrats and technocrats are recruited into ministerial positions between 1999 and 2007.

The Olusegun Obasanjo's administration who was the first president after the return of electoral democracy engaged the services of technocrats, though not as a cohesive group. These technocrats appointed by Obasanjo were accomplished individuals in their respective areas. Such include Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who was once a director at the World Bank and one of the Bank's Managing Directors between October 2007- July 2011. Okonjo-Iweala who holds doctorate Degree in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in

United States was also appointed minister of finance and the coordinating Minister of the Economy by the Goodluck Jonathan's administration. With her position as the Coordinating Minister of the Economy she heads the economic management team-comprising selected governors, ministers, manufacturers and the Central Bank of Nigeria. In her capacity she oversees the economic policy thrust of the economy (Masterweb Reports, 2013).

The National Economic Management Team in Nigeria is similar to the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) in the United States. It is an agency within the Executive Office of the President and it advises the President of the United States on economic policy. The team in United State is made up of renowned economists and policy wonks (Sahara Reporters September 09, 2012) The Nigerian team also has some technocrats and economists as members. Some of them include Barth Nnaji, a Professor of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering at the University of Massachusetts Amherst has on different occasion been a Special Adviser to President Goodluck Jonathan on Power and Chairman, Presidential taskforce on Power. Another member of the team that readily attracts attention is Mallam Sanusi Lamido, Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) (Vanguard Newspaper, 20 August, 2011). Though the Nigerian economic team is made up of some technocrats but majority of them are those that have business interests in Nigeria, such as Aliko Dangote, Femi Otedola, Aig Imoukhuede, and those that have been recycled in government over the years.

It has become the usual practice for different civilian governments in Nigeria to appoint some technocrats to embark on reforms in the financial sector, judicial sector, and public sector, among others (Mustapha, 2006). It is however instructive to note that the various administrations from 1999 to 2013 have witnessed economic team and cabinet instability occasioned by regular change of members of the team and ministers. Few examples are sufficed to buttress this position. At the end of the first year of the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, one-third of the 30 ministers were either rotated or replaced. By the third year, additional 12 ministers were replaced, and by the start of his second term of office in 2003, only four ministers from the first term survived their posts. In fact, Dr Okonjo-Iweala, an economist, who happened to be head of the economic team during the first term administration of Obasanjo was removed as a result of her rising public profile and 'demoted' to the post of minister of affairs while away in London negotiating the final phase of debt cancellation for Nigeria (Akinyoade, 2009). In fact Dr Shamsudeen Usman a seasoned economist who happens to be the longest serving minister (This Day Newspaper, 12 September, 2013) from 2007-2013 was removed as the Minister of National Planning under non convincing circumstances.

What the above also suggests is that the Ministry of National Planning which is very important to development planning was not also spared of the instability of office of appointed technocrats. The ministry has the mandate to determine policies relating to National Development and overall management of the national economy. The ministry aims at efficient planning that guides the growth and development of Nigerian economy to be among the leading economies in the world. Furthermore, it determines and efficiently advise on matters relating to national development and overall management of the economy for positive growth; and to ensure that plans and policies are properly implemented by all relevant stakeholders (whoiswho, 2013). Despite these important functions of the ministry and the need for long term planning no minister spent more than four years as a minister of National Planning. Usman remains the longest serving minister in the ministry who served for about four years in that position (before becoming the minister of National Planning he was the minister of Finance from 2007-2009).

What this scenario portends is that no technocrats and bureaucrats appointed to development relevant and ministerial positions occupied such position for a period of four

years. More so, only few ministers occupy their positions on expertise, knowledge and professional expertise. This has negative impact on development policy choice and outcome. Akinyoade attests to this when he points out that “respective ministers do not have enough time to digest their mandate and come up with plans that tie into the federal government strategic plans and business plans in a way that ensures effective achievement and monitoring of target goals” (2009:13).

Similarly, selected ministers are not given adequate opportunity to have independent choice in the formulation and implementation of workable strategic plans. This is informed by the fact that the hardly concentrate on their duties before they are relieved of their position. Most often technocrats are sacked from their position when general elections are approaching in order to pave the way for appointment of political loyalists that would help in securing victory in elections for the ruling party.

The above situation is made worse due to the fact that the bureaucracy which should serve as a gap for policy instability occasioned by instability of office of technocrats is not only inefficient, but also not autonomous. The end result of this is policy making that is dominated by politicians with limited role for the bureaucracy.

Conclusion

Using the developmental theorist argument to explain developmental outcomes prominently gives the bureaucracy and technocracy important roles in the process of development. Thus, an efficient bureaucracy and technocracy remain invaluable in the process of development. It is however important to point out that the nature and character of a country’s techno-bureaucratic governance determines development outcome. So, one of the logical explanation for the movement of Botswana from a state of underdevelopment to development can be anchored on the the autonomy and efficiency of techno-bureaucratic governance in the country.

Therefore, I argued strongly that in order to enhance development through a state-centric approach an autonomous and efficient bureaucracy and technocracy remain invaluable. Under this process of development the expectation is that seasoned technocrats and bureaucrats should be given the opportunity of occupying positions relevant for economic development. The technocrats and bureaucrats should not only be given prominent roles in these development relevant positions, but they should also be engaged in a rather considerable long period of time. This is of utmost importance because policy formulation and implementation requires adequate time for it to achieve its required goal. Going by this argument, it is expedient to point out that for African countries dreaming of development their bureaucracy should be efficient and autonomous, while technocrats should be appointed to development relevant positions, with a high degree of insulation from political and business interests.

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