

THIRD SECTOR AND LOCAL CITIZENSHIP: THE WAYS TO STOP THE GENERATING STRUCTURE OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN CAPE VERDE

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Abstract

This article analyses on the role of Third Sector/Social Economy in Cape Verde, as an attempt to construct a citizenship of Peace (and municipal community welfare), which would combat/neutralize the generating structure of underdevelopment. It also seeks to understand what happened in the post-independence period, the political strategies that have been developed to achieve this goal, and new forms of partnership between the state (becoming weak), the market (not so expressive) and the third sector (emergent), and analyze the costs of transitions of a political-economic system carried out in the absence of regulatory policies, as well as the importance of promoting dialogue and partnership between the social, political and economic actors, and the strengthening of tripartite institutions. It tries also to understand the dilemma of the Africans intellectuals in present days, as Amílcar Cabral (1978) pointed out. The dilemma between betraying Africa's interests and revolutionary mentality or becoming a liberal 'petty bourgeois' that follow Washington (and ex-colonizers) Consensus.

Keywords: Third Sector, Citizenship, Development, Intellectuals, Cape Verde

Introduction

The reflection on development is one of the most important intellectual issues of the moment, but we cannot forget two key points: i) that the task is not easy, and ii) the existence of widespread social crisis that affects, with various modalities and intensity, every countries.

The management of social transformations requires a strategic and pro-active guidance. The objectives of the development, economic growth, human development, poverty reduction, social equity, good governance and local autonomy became central, making and reinforcing the habit of seeing the world through the lens of historical experience, current situation and long-term interests to populations; acting in terms of self-definition rather than defined by other.

In Cape Verde, we know little about how the public, private and third sector or social economy interacts at local, national level. It's very important, in the economic perspectives, to examine three aspects associated with social economy/third sector: i) their role in the struggle against unemployment, ii) its contribution to increase the welfare; iii) its importance as a model for social change. Normally, all economies are mix and assume various forms of planned economies, market economies and social economies.

Social changes require participation and creativity (Majid Rahnema, 1998). Therefore, we tried to know how Cape Verde, aware of the historical and chronic deficit of citizenship, tried, through the promotion of the Third Sector/Social Economy, to build a local citizenship of peace in order to overcome/neutralize the generating structure of underdevelopment inherited with independence.

We assumed two basic and complementary premises. The first one strengthens that in Cape Verde, the associations and NGOs were for the Second Republic (1991-2001), what the consumer cooperatives accounted for the First Republic (1975-1991), *impaired intermediaries* in the State/Civil Society.

The second premise considers that the independence, despite many difficulties, has created in cities, towns and villages a certain citizenship of peace that made Cape Verdeans dream to live in Cape Verde and this was changed after 1991 by new social pathologies that rocked the peace and social balance.

Reflection on Third Sector

Internationally, third system or third sector has been seen as a new lever for employment policy, a new form of alternative economy, a kind of sociability, or a path to the development of a space for local democracy.

Since late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it has been observed a more pronounced fragmentation of the third sector institutions, starting to distinguish three subsets corresponding to three statutes: cooperative, mutuality and associations (Boccacin, 1993). Cooperatives were inserted into the market economy, occupying sectors of capitalist activities whose intensity remained weak, several types of cooperatives emerged (consumption, housing, agricultural). The associations had a role of social pressure and claims, mobilizing networks that incited the creation and supply of public services. The emergence of the welfare state has modified the role of mutuality; many initiatives have been organized to address issues related to disability at work, illness and elder people, rallying the members of a profession or locality. In some countries, mutuality are controlled by the authorities (Belgium and France), and had also transformed it in complementary insurance companies/schemes, or even managers of Social Security (Belgium and Germany).

In this perspective, Third Sector can be seen as: a) a set of social formations endowed at the same time with the characteristics of 'community' and 'society', b) a kind of 'collective action' with stable operating solidarity mechanisms extended (going from inside to outside of social formations concerned), c) a scope of production of common goods in the special sense of 'relational goods'.

A feature of the third sector is represented by the production of specific goods not available at state or private level. Some authors define them as relational goods because they are produced jointly based in solidarity aims. This *third* entity makes visible and stable at social level a organized solidarity action based on the presence of multiple elements.

Quite often, researchers reflect on welfare crisis to analyze a specific placeholder to the third sector. It emerges within the welfare society three types of actors who develop a crucial role: i) actors as citizens and consumers of services, ii) non-governmental bodies and forms organized under the tutelage of citizens, iii) new businesses/companies as third sector, mixed forms in the field of production and services distribution.

The use of the expression third sector stresses as a criterion of unification/differentiation of the sector, the development of another/third code of communication, different from the one circulating in the state (power/policy exchange), in the market (money/economic exchange). It is the code of the donation or solidarity.

Third sector or non-profit sector is every non-governmental organization that produces/provides services of collective interest and that is not bound in the distribution of income (of any kind: in cash or in-service) to its own members or at the moment of organization dissolution (Colozzi, 1993).

As many studies have shown, one of the heaviest and negative consequences of decades of totalitarian regimes was the emptying and paralysis of the resources of civil society, along with economic progress that seemed stagnant or in worrying decline. It is

possible that the severe shortage of civil society, the poor economic development and poor communication infrastructure, modern civil society organizations are in their infancy. There is a double threat in these countries; on the one hand, there is a wrong and simplified design, brought by the recent financial and industrial Western penetration, according to which democracy would be mainly from capitalist exploitation, on the other hand, there is the defense of national and ethnic identity.

The new forms of social relations are networks of collective action and associations that had their origins in civil society, and involving solidarity, cooperative and reciprocal or more generally pro-social motivations, operating profit and investing in a growing number of activities, as recreational, sporting, cultural and leisure activities, protection of environmental goods, promotion of rights, supporting scientific research, social services, health, care, training and education, finishing in various forms of international cooperation with several poor countries of the South.

Many expressions used to define the phenomenon were originated in the Anglophone countries. In the United States there's a strong tradition of organized actions, voluntary, non-profit that justifies the terminology production cited.

Probably the expressions that enjoy a more established tradition are charities or charitable sector, philanthropy, or philanthropic sector and voluntary sector. These feature organizations that develop pro-social actions to categories of persons who experience problematic existential conditions. Initially, these expressions were forged to designate organizations (one charity) or a type of action (the philanthropy) more than one sector of society (Stanzani, 1998).

Also in Europe exist many expressions to define the third sector. The most traditional expression is social economy. It sets a mode of action different from the economic market and a precise scientific discipline. This indicate precisely a pro-social orientation of economic behavior that accompanies reflections and experiences of the nineteenth century, it makes reference to a vast economic action based on the principle of the primacy of the person and guided by values as mutuality and solidarity.

The hallmark of citizenship is seen as the ability of the oppressed citizens to organize themselves (functional principle) around the true interests because, in the end, rights are manipulated and sometimes the State is unable to provide them. This view, unlike the theory of citizenship-balance, addresses the issue of the end of citizenship. The aim is to free themselves from oppression and exploitation of those who own and control the means of production, bringing equal control of production and distribution of benefits, self-actualization, and more dignity of workers, labor and justice.

The Neutralization of the Structure of Underdevelopment

When Cape Verde gained its independence from Portugal in 1975, it inherited a deeply underdeveloped economy with low level of production, highly monetized, based on a poor agriculture, a service sector holding a predominant position, highly dependent on foreign aid, poor satisfaction of basic needs in terms of nutrition, health, employment, education and income (Melo, 1986). The country had, and still has, scarce arable land, with obsolete techniques and exploration methods of production, social inequalities. The sector of agriculture was unable to secure employment and sufficient income for the rural population, and ensure the food needs and provide a national base for support in the industry sector. In that period, about 90% of the active population depended on agriculture.

Before we get into the analysis of inherited socio-economic structure, it is necessary to understand the evolution of capeverdean society. As Amílcar Cabral (1978), pointed out, in that period, when we analyse the Social Structure in Cape Verde (and Guinea-Bissau), its important to differences of the situation in the city(ies) and in the rural areas, as key to

sociological analysis. The social structure in the countryside consisted of: (i) Large Land Owners, (ii) Small land owners and (iii) land tenants.

There was a reduced number of white owners who could keep their land, amplifying them through usury.

The group of Small land owners was large and possessed one third of the land. It was a very diversified group, it had three types of attitudes in terms of independence: some wanted the independence from Portugal, ii) some were against and some were undecided. Those who were in favor of independence wanted to increase their properties; the ones against feared social and political transformations, they had doubts about the future land reforms. They adopted an ambiguous attitude. The small land owners represented in the rural area, the petty bourgeoisie.

In urban areas, the social structure was not different from other Portuguese colonies: (i) an important number of the urban population was connected to the land, (ii) a Small group were European. In the cities, there were: a) senior European officials, b) high qualified Cape Verdean officials, c) merchants and business men, who had certain amount of richness, d) an entire category of employees (in public and commercial sector); e) salaried workers f) people without work, the 'masses'.

There was no urban bourgeoisie, because the high qualified Cape Verdean officials did not hold own capital for investment, they were against the idea of national liberation. The merchants and business men were not considered a class, their money or capital didn't come from local accumulation process, they were dependent on the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Their ambition led them to a certain degree of nationalism, as a way to get rid of Portuguese and create their own businesses.

The petty bourgeoisie were constituted by employees (in public and commercial sector), small traders, students and all individuals exercising liberal professions. It was characterized by the adoption of an ambiguous behavior towards the political and social transformations. We could find in that period: i) the small conservative bourgeoisie, and ii) the 'rebel' petty bourgeoisie. It was among the rebel petty bourgeoisie, who had revolutionary aspirations, that we could find some identification with the masses (that face discrimination and permanent unemployment).

The economic structure as well as the political superstructure were from a colonial state: 'a people without autonomy, dependent, whose daily lives depend on a foreign State, that invaded the country with its troops, police, administrators, prisons and courts - instruments from a dominant State, aiming at maintaining the colonial situation in the country (Amílcar Cabral, 1978).

Renato Cardoso (1987), reflecting on the problems of underdevelopment in African countries, argues that the majority of these countries, including Cape Verde, had to face and manage, after its independence, a political and economic system which configured a true generating structure of underdevelopment (political, social, economic and ecological crisis). This structure was so dynamic that created and reproduced underdevelopment. The society inherited by Africans, the political, economic and administrative structure, that even the Africans helped to build, the social and economic system in which they were caught, and not destroyed, when they had their independence from European countries, were dynamic and generate underdevelopment, and parts of a system that would fail in the struggle for development.

These internal factors that generate the structure of underdevelopment come either from the dynamics of African societies, whether from the colonial and post-colonial situation. Its internal and external components are intertwined and complementary. The changes, of the process, should be global and structural, otherwise it would be not effective, and to be structural it should also be designed in its internal and external components. Often, these new

societies, especially when they emerged as a rupture with the colonial past, faced several internal difficulties within the colony, which had been raised to blindly believe in the values and the model of the colonizer, and faced external difficulties because former colonial power tried to perpetuate its domination in different forms.

The structure contains values, norms, facts and creatures that are justified only if understood as continuity, consequence and corollary of the past. In political terms, many of the colonial regimes outbound process emerge as copy and continuity of that process.

In the case of Cape Verde, Portugal had little interest in post-independent country, since the country had no natural resources like other former colonies. However, Portugal was interested in the cheap labor force that was used before and even during the period of independence (first in the plantations in São Tomé e Príncipe, in Angola, and later in Portugal).

The process allow us to think in terms of a plot between Cape Verde and Portugal. For the Capeverdeans post-independence leaders, emigration should be included in the country development strategies, it would be beneficial for Cape Verde, because the emigrant would send their remittances (part of their incomes) to the family members who remained in the mother land. Cape Verde would get advantages from it, given that remittances help on GDP growth and government revenues, and alleviate public spending. On the other hand, Portugal influenced and participated in this plot, given that with the departure of Portuguese emigrants to Central Europe (France, Switzerland and Germany), it could create a stock of cheap labor force from Cape Verde, which would fill this exodus of Portuguese. Between 1960 and 1970 more than one million portuguese immigrants leaved Portugal, half a million to France (Sousa, 2003).

When we discuss the process of development conduct in Africa, by europeans countries, we can observe that they turned the story into a program, a necessary and inevitable fate. The conqueror should take responsibility for economic development of the conquered region and at the same time, should accept the responsibility to look after the welfare of the native populations (Esteva, 1998).

In the Sixteenth, development continued to be perceived as a path defined by the economic growth with several stages, and 'integration' was the slogan that linked the social aspect to the economic one.

In the Seventeenth, the UN resolution established a project to identify a unified approach for planning and development, able to fully integrate the social and economic components in the formulation of policies and programs, aiming to the inclusion of every sector of the population, in order to produce changes and development. It should operate a structural change that favors the development of national and active sectors of the population to participate in the process, to achieve greater equality in terms of income distribution and give priority to human development. This second decade of development was a large dispersion, the 'big issues' such as environment, population, hunger, women, habitat or employment began to be in the forefront. In the 70s the perspective was for a human-centered development.

The 80s was defined as the 'lost decade of development'. The obsession with competitiveness, the fear of getting out of the race leads to accept the destruction of the entire scope of what was 'developed' in the last thirty years. The idea was re-development, the priority was for transnational projects as requested by the world market. Re-development includes the economic colonization of the informal sector. In the name of modernization and under the banner of the war on poverty, redevelop the South means, according to Esteva, launching the last and final assault against organized resistance to the development and economy.

For the people in the margins or periphery, extricate itself from the economic logic of the market or the planning, became the necessary condition for survival. People are constrained to confine itself to economic interaction in the sovereign base areas outside spaces where they organize their lifestyles. These spaces are the last refuge during the era of development.

The main actor of the new common spaces, the man from the community, dissolves or prevents shortages in their fanciful efforts to confront their situation. He searches for free spaces or, at least, for spaces that support its initiatives.

It seems that there's some difference between the perspective of independence leaders/intellectuals and nowadays africans leaders (politicians and intellectuals), in terms of vision, engagement and perspectives with African peoples.

Amílcar Cabral's concept of 'class suicide', his most controversial one, a possible and foreseeable "suicide" of the petty bourgeoisie as a class, is not fallacious and contradictory in itself. However, if we want to use the theory as a weapon like Cabral recommends, we should not be content with easy victories of words, given that Cabral was facing a crucial aspect of the revolutionary movement of the twentieth century, the question of 'how to prevent this same enemy to return again, in subtle ways, to control the power and so to abort the long process of revolutionary transformation of capitalist world economy in a global, egalitarian and democratic "socialist order" (Davidson, 1983).

Cabral sees the petty bourgeoisie the only group capable of driving and use the tools that served the colonial state against the people. In the colonial situation, the petty bourgeoisie is the heiress of state power. When it hold the power, we consider that it returns to history, emerging new internal contradictions. According to Cabral, if the petty bourgeoisie remains identified with the fundamental interests of the masses (workers and peasants), it will have to commit suicide.

A reformist petty bourgeois only lead to a neo-colonial solution. The revolutionary petty bourgeoisie has only one way, if do not want to betray itself: 'to strengthen its revolutionary consciousness; repudiate the temptations of natural embourgeoisement and request of its class mentality, to identify with the working classes'.

Betray the revolution or suicide as a class, is the dilemma of the petty bourgeoisie in the general framework of the national liberation struggle. The majority of the petty bourgeoisie in the former colonies states was not free from of isolation and has never left that feeling of inferiority.

The petty bourgeoisie is essentially 'marginal', once isolated from the African masses there is possibility to "return to the sources'. This "return to the sources' is an awakening a rejection of the dominant culture and authority. This return to the origins extends from individuals to groups and movements. The return will only have historical significance if it involves not only a real movement in the struggle for independence, but also a total and definitive identification with the aspirations of the masses, that rejects not only the foreign culture, but the foreign domination.

According to Wallerstein (1983), all revolutionary parties that came to power, discovered that the control of the state machine raised their political power. This feeling helped to decreased the atmosphere of a high degree of collective revolutionary consciousness and politicization. There were considerable social changes, but not as deeply as waht the working classes were expecting (Unequal distribution of income, corruption and arbitrariness).

As Amílcar Cabral argued, its the workers/peasants who must impose this class suicide to their representatives.' One of the key feature of African society in general, and Cape Verde, in particular, has been the inability of the mobilization of material and spiritual resources of the nation. The first obstacle has been the difficulty of mobilizing civil society.

There was a difficulty to define what civil society was and establish its parameters. The first problem arises at the level of national consciousness; many states were forged.

African states rarely organized power in order to mobilize the whole society. The state has emerged as an instrument to achieve the nation. The public authorities were trying to create little by little, a community in which each group identified with the community and the community identified with all its members. The power was often occupied by civil servants, who then tried to achieve economic and social power.

It's important to acknowledge that the nationalization of African society has served multiple purposes, especially the replacement of colonial power in many key aspects. At independence, the agents of colonial power, or foreign monopolies have occupied extremely important issues in the African economy and the only way to dislodge them was nationalizing these sectors. In some moments, the nationalization was due simply to the need to replace the colonial state, because it distributed water, electricity and other social services, everywhere. At independence, the new state was obliged to assume these obligations.

What we use to call State, the modern nation-state, appeared on the world scene after the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The concept would not have had the strength that had if the French Revolution had not subscribed it, linking the history of the State to the one of nationalism. The concept of state that emerges from this experiment had some distinctive features.

The new concept presupposed a closer bond between the reality of ethnicity, nation and state, giving the state a more central role in society than did the old regime and redefining the state as the precursor of modern institutions associated with industrial capitalism. Under the influence of the concept of nation-state, the state is always seen as impartial and secular referee between the various classes, ethnicities and interests (Ashis Nandy, 1998).

Gradually, the concept of nation-state has tried to discredit and scatter all other nations of the Third World as primitive. The process was enhanced when society after society intellectuals and indigenous political activists, who clashed with the colonial power, found in the idea of the nation-state the fuel of economic success and Western political domination. Only today, over seventy years after World War II, some social analysts began to seriously see the increasing inability of nation-state to meet the needs of civil society styles.

Many Eurocentric critics, including Max Weber characterized the non-western states as pre-modern. They knew or respected very little the different traditions of conceptualizing the state in other parts of the world. Predictably, this mythical pre-modern state advocated by the most outstanding European scholars resembled so remarkable to African-Asian version of the ancien regime. It was mythical, because it destroyed analytically the past of the non-western, making them collapsing in an ideal type, as in Weber's case, instead of increasing the understanding of those societies, they decreased them.

The new critics considers that the concept of the modern state always appears weak, out of touch and unable to cope with new problems and threats to human survival. And the concept has acquired a large institutional power and has a large base in the global mass culture. It became an axiomatic component of conventional wisdom or common sense. This paradox made impossible, or create difficulties to mobilize and organize political power, also in the South, to resist the pathologies of the modern state.

For the benefits of the state, a growing proportion of citizens are willing to tolerate oppression as a sacrifice, while patriotic citizen does this for the future of the coming generations. It is reinforced in the minds of many in the "Third World" countries that the state is one of the few conceivable tools to achieve progress and equality in the global context.

The idea of the nation-state has made its entry into the mainstream of society in the South by the colonial route. This experience has been internalized. When, after decolonization, indigenous elite gained control of the state apparatus, they quickly learned to

seek legitimacy in a native version of the civilizing mission. They seek to establish relationship between the type of colonial state and society. They found justification in theories of modernization that came into vogue after World War II. The role was to modernize and provide security to society. They used to call this sacrifices for the future of the country.

The development process controlled by the state, does not guarantee the development of society itself. There are a number of state in the world where development means the development of the state or the state sector. The appreciation of civil society and state reform through this control activity, can automatically lead to a redefinition of the sphere of the modern state. The consensus of the state about diversity, allows it to marginalize, democratically, grassroots initiatives of all kinds, and in particular those from the political parties.

All this situation has got historical consequences in Africa: the cold war impact, oppression, exploitation, systematic violence, restriction of freedom and human dignity, torture, world blocs, religious fundamentalism.

Reflection on Cape Verde's Development

Twenty years ago, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was a region of despair, outside Botswana, Mauritius, and Cape Verde. Democracy was a distant dream. There were more violence, corruption, no freedom of speech, violation of human rights.

Today, we are aware that African countries can not develop while they continue to function as clients of development and social institutions that have their own political agenda and economic organizations. Africa should not accept proposals for development that compromises their development vision and mission. The development in Africa must be based in African institutions and organizations, and the main component is people (Mararike 1998).

Cape Verde is a country of good news. The country is putting behind it the stagnation, and poverty. The old stereotypes of the sub-Saharan Africa don't apply to this country. Cape Verde initiated in 1991, after fifteen years of monolithic regime, a pluralist democracy after a brief transition period, completed by a political alternation and an extension of democracy through local power as a product of original historical process of the archipelago: geo-strategic position and historical opening to the world, ancient emigration, and some development of education sector (Fafali Kowdawo, 2001a).

Cape Verde, nowadays, tries to escape poverty and reach the Mecca of development. The country is out of the list of Least Developed Countries, is now advancing slowly to Lower Medium Development Country. The exit from a list to another does not means that the country is no longer vulnerable. This transition requires a careful approach to the country's sustainability and reduction of its vulnerabilities.

When we analyze poverty in Africa we faced two schools of thought: a) one that see the colonial legacy as the cause of African underdevelopment, stressing that the whole crisis that followed seems to have been the exploitation of Africans and the natural resources by European settlers; b) another cause that addresses colonialism and their attempt to fully integrate Africa into the global capitalist economy. For the first school, no continent was colonized for so long and by many European powers, and no civilization, cultures, indigenous traditions and social education were ruined as the African ones (Tirfe Mimmo, 1999).

Cape Verde is a country that started from zero in terms of economy, and in terms of many other goods and structures, but there was rigorous, careful, transparently and honestly investment of the donations from international solidarity, and good use of migrant remittances and sacrifice consented by the people, which was multiplied into wealth, more dignity, companies, factories, banks, insurance companies, merchant navy, services, qualified

personnel, etc., in reproductive assets yielding profits, producing work and created jobs for many workers (Pina, 2000).

Cape Verde is a country with some specific features: insular condition, small size, small population (Estevão, 2001). It belongs to the category of Small Island Economies (SIE), which creates a basis for economic isolation and difficulties in terms of relationships with international markets, with important consequences for its operation: i) poor diversification of the productive system, ii) weak institutional capacity, iii) distance and economic isolation, iv) very opened economy and v) strong dependence on foreign economy and market.

Over the past 15 years the country has had an annual growth in income per capita of 4.0% per year (Africa average is 3.2%), well above the global average of 1.9%. As result, the income of the average capeverdeans has increased by more than 67% (Africa average 50%) (Redelet, 2010).

Education, life expectancy has reach 72 and 74 years, for man and woman respectively. There's a vibrant democracy, liberty of press, competitive elections, better protection of human rights.

In 1991, after the liberalization of the economy and the introduction of democratic system, Cape Verde started to import models and methods inspired by liberals, leading to a deplorable situation, based on a bureaucratic minority that manages the economy and society, persisting in external consultation and technical assistance in projects that reinforce dependency.

Despite the vulnerabilities, structural poverty, environmental problems, scarce resources, excessive reliance on the international community, the country was able to invest in education and health, attracting Diaspora savings and FDI (Foreign Direct Investment). But the problem is that this move seems as *false development*, i.e. , Cape Verde is far from winning its economic sustainability, the country remains vulnerable and dependent on the international community. Even so, in recent years, the country has attracted thousands of citizens of the countries of West Africa, where the vast majority is in an illegal situation. Many enter the country based on the Free Movement Protocols between the ECOWAS countries. They come to Cape Verde due to the fact that the country garners freedom, social peace, political stability and some economic growth.

Cape Verde is, today, according to the credit policy of the African Development Bank (AfDB), a country with low average income (LMICs). The Gross National Product (GNP) per capita in 2010 was around \$ 3,270, well above the level of \$ 1175 per capita GNP of LMICs. Despite significant progress over the past two decades, the country continues to face some constraints and significant development challenges.

To respond to the decline in economic activity, resulting from international economic crisis (debt of euro zone), the Government adopted a public investment program (PIP) counter-cyclical to the 2010-2011 period. As a result, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) accelerated to 5.4 % in 2010, subsequently slowing to 5 % in 2011. Experts consider that the fiscal stimulus offset the contraction in private investment and maintained an adequate level of infrastructural development. Tourism maintained the trajectory of recovery in 2011, but the current account balance continued to deteriorate, mainly due to higher imports of capital goods, reflecting the government fiscal stimulus. In 2012-2013, the baseline scenario from authorities assumed a contraction of fiscal policy and prudent monetary policy. The real GDP growth was around 5 %, allowing foreign reserves to ensure above three months of import cover of goods and services, to safeguard the fixed exchange rate with the euro. During this period, inflation was around 3% below the figures recorded in 2011 (4.5 %).

The IMF and World Bank specialists, who visit developing countries, or their advocates in these countries, are rarely insightful and innovative theoretically. They prefer to

release arbitrary assumptions with no transparency, based on calculation, believing in adjustment of the prices. The assumptions are made to produce global explanations, not based on realism, (Amit Bhaduri, Deepak Nayyar, 1997).

Many intellectual and bureaucrats from the South did not reject the prevailing orthodoxy - the 'Washington Consensus' - because it is not good for their careers. The international system of reward offers interesting jobs, not only in the IMF and World Bank, as well in the university. It's easier to get a job when you accept norms. There are no opportunities for anyone who challenges the established order.

To the bureaucrats of 'Third World' countries, the reward system is even simpler: a few years at the World Bank and the IMF with high wages, pension in dollars, ensures a more comfortable retirement. The rule is to apply the guidelines of the IMF and World Bank and have the reward at the right time. These technicians can leave the government to the World Bank or vice versa, is an opportunity to make a career.

It's important to ask whether there really is something beyond the current development paradigm, tangible goals that can be identified and towards which Africans can aspire – new ways of understanding how wellbeing could be secured in the greater context of a human existence fully cognizant of the cultural, social, spiritual and natural dimensions of that existence (Stelan Andreasson, 2010).

There's a need to promote a communal effort at reinventing development and overcome the alienation that modernity brought to us. There's a possibility for communities and nations, especially Africans, to build a better present and future, based on principles other than those deriving from the dynamics of the global economy and competitiveness.

It's by rethinking the role of the intellectuals and politicians, as Cabral (1978) pointed out, the Cape Verde trajectory and the political economy of transformation that we can begin to understand whether the questions we ask are feasible to begin with.

Besides all gains, the country must strengthen and reform the institutions, and reduce persistent and unjust inequality, which liberal vision of global market, and even the global markets alone will not resolve (Southall & Melber, 2010).

Conclusion

Both PAIGC/CV - *Partido Africano de Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* - as MPD - *Movimento para Democracia* -, the two strongest political parties in Cape Verde, used instrumentally cooperatives (the former) and NGOs and associations (the second) to impose a logic of *Godfather* (authority, manipulation) in the relationship with civil society. We are not putting in question the usefulness and functionality of these instruments. It is clear that cooperatives, NGOs and associations contributed, and still contribute, to a relative socio-economic development of Cape Verde. We are concerned about the autonomy of civil society and coexistence under the shade of a hegemonic and authoritarian *godfather*.

Cape Verde is paying a cost of transition from a political-economic system carried out in the absence of regulatory policies, as well as the importance of promoting dialogue and partnership between social, political and economic actors, and the strengthening of tripartite institutions.

In our view one of the strategies used to combat or counteract the generating structure of underdevelopment and chronic citizenship deficit was, at an early stage, the use of some legacy of Amílcar Cabral, especially the principles of revolutionary democracy, the major international solidarity, good foreign policy, trained staff abroad and the maintain of a certain social peace.

However, the attempt of strengthening the nation and maintaining the social peace has created a situation in which public institutions gave little importance to the construction of

local citizenship. We think that this chronic citizenship deficit persists today through institutional practices that block the relationship/interaction between citizens and institutions.

The absence of reflections on the process of citizenship itself, which can be considered implemented and sediment, and some social changes that are taking place in Cape Verde are shaking the social peace in Capeverdean society. We also realize that a huge social cleavage is drawing, and the inability of the state to reduce chronic unemployment, some corruption, clientelism and a certain careless and abandonment of public service.

The generating structure of underdevelopment, inherited the period of independence is mobile, i.e., nobody can destroy it, even with the development of good public policy and projects. It can return at any time, with more energy, because there are internal and external conditions that propitiate it.

This structure was not totally rejected, it was fought, in certain way in people's mentality (because actions/practices start in the mind), and in the *modus operandi* of central and local institutions; and even the political elite can neutralize it, to the extent that their practices reinforce the foundations of it, to install not only in public institutions, but in society itself. The structure contains values, norms, facts and creatures that only justified if understood as continuity, consequence and corollary of the past.

A relevant indicator of the reproduction of this structure has to do with the fact that the local citizen stand and wait for the municipality to resolve his/her problems, the municipality, in turn, looks for the Central Government and the latter looks at the international donors. It's a cycle.

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