IS ISLAM USED AS A POLITICAL IDEOLOGY? WHY AND HOW? PJD MOROCCO AS A CASE STUDY

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Abstract
      The twentieth century saw a rapid rise of groups of Muslims who use Islam as an ideological weapon for their political ends. This is the current commonly referred to in scholarly and media writings as Islamism and its proponents are designated as 'Islamists', not Muslims, in order to stress that they are attributing an ideological dimension to Islam.Unlike some Islam oriented parties, the PJD (Party of Justice and Development) in Morocco does not focus on the following precepts: madawiyya (a return to the Islamic principles), shumuliyya (a comprehensive application of Islam in all sphere of life) and al da'awa al nidaliyya (a call for struggle to bring about the Islamization of the state and society). To demystify this exception, my approach draws on aspects of Adonis's study of the Islamic tradition (the Constant and the Changing), The Order of Discourse of M. Foucault 1971 and Lotman's idea on the study of text in relation to the outside world or context.

Keywords: Changing, Constant, Discourse, Islam, Islam-oriented parties, Political ideology

Instruction
      The twentieth century saw a rapid rise of groups of Muslims who use Islam as an ideological weapon for their political ends. This is the current commonly referred to in scholarly and media writings as Islamism and its proponents are designated as 'Islamists', not Muslims, in order to stress that they are attributing an ideological dimension to Islam.

      There are many Islam oriented groups, but as might be expected the use of scriptural language is a common characteristic of their rhetoric. For instance, they all use scriptural references as an immutable source of authority in the social, ethical and political spheres.

      While they do not always share the same strategies and goals, they nevertheless resort to the same sources of authority and deploy terms of references. For instance the central role that Islam occupies in their political activities, stressing that they are not simply Islamic political parties engaged in politics but they are political parties founded on Islam as an ideological platform.

      Unlike some Islam oriented parties, the PJD (Party of Justice and Development) in Morocco does not focus on the following precepts: *madawiyya* (a return to the Islamic principles), *shumuliyya* (a comprehensive application of Islam in all sphere of life) and *al da'awa al nidaliyya* (a call for struggle to bring about the Islamization of the state and society). To demystify this exception, my approach draws on aspects of Adonis's study of the Islamic tradition (1986) (*the Constant and the Changing*) , *The Order of Discourse* of M. Foucault 1971 and Lotman's idea (1980) on the study of text in relation to the outside world or context.

      My approach in this part draws on aspects of Adonis study of the Islamic tradition in which he identifies two currents: the constant (al thabit) and the changing (al mutahawil). According to Adonis, the constant is a current based on revelation, i.e. the religion of Islam, and provides the foundation of Arabic civilization/culture (thaqafa). It also ascribes to it a

priority of claim to authority based on its interpretation of the past. The changing, on the other hand, is a current that refuses to accept the Constant's priority of claim, and relies on its own differing interpretation of the same past. One of the characteristics of the constant is a theology that plays on the ontological status of revelation. He explains this status as one that transcends time and the categories within which time is subsumed, i.e. past, present and future.

If some radical Islam-oriented movements have opted for violence to change the *status quo* or reach power, the Moroccan case the PJD is an exemplary experience of a participatory Islam-oriented movement and/or party. In other words, in Morocco, the PJD displays another expertise wherein a pacifist Islam-oriented party moved to participation.

The search for change towards politics radically in the first case or gradually in the second one brings into light some remarks related to the PJD's approach towards change. I can mention two remarks. The first one is concerned with the changing and the transformation in the party (leadership and structure). The PJD reflects a type of transformation that responds to and interact with the crisis. This interaction occurs in tandem with the constant wherefrom the movement derives its ideology and vision, notably ethics and religious education. Nevertheless, this constant undergoes a revisit in the party's congress theses and electoral programs because of the oppressed cries. In other words, the leadership responds to either the needs of the oppressed (socially, economically, culturally or politically) or changes in the society (Burgat, 2003; Darif, 1999; El Ahmadi, 2007; Fuller, 2004 and Tozy, 1991).

The second remark is to the variable of change. Regarding this variable, this study has highlighted that change is apparently vivid in the PJD's action which started with Da'awa (Islamic youth) later MUR among all people in society to gain partisans. Once this is done, the movement moves into structuring its institutions because it has evolved in its vision. Hence, the PJD adopts new mobilization strategies to cope with the changing forces, relationships and positions. The variable of change is supposed to respond to and interact with the requirements of pragmatic action. According to Othmani[51], pragmatism is the sole key to end up conflicts within Moroccan Islam-oriented movement. Besides, he justifies the importance of the political participation. When he was at the helm of the PJD (2004 – 2008), he deemed the renewal of the Islam-oriented movement and/or party's discourse as a necessity dictated by the pressing pragmatism. In other words, it is a fundamental prerequisite to bridge the gap between the Muslim world and the West. The finding of change as a pragmatic tool used by the PJD to respond to a given context or to the monarchial priorities is a dominant feature in the party's ideological orientations. For instance, the findings suggest that the PJD political ideology in the electoral programs, the party *manifesto* and congress theses oscillates between some core principles of the Third way and some core features of political Islam. This aspect is due to and/or conditioned by the rules of the political game imposed by the regime and the requirements of the party participation in the political arena. These findings concur with previous studies. Moreover, this conclusion is supported by the findings from Boukhrass (2011) research which states that the PJD has not stepped over the threshold of acceptable mobilization in topics it chooses to campaign on. The PJD's electoral programs (2003, 2007, 2009 and 2011) are a good illustration for this point.

In this respect, the PJD's pragmatism usually pre-supposes its theorizing or a clear vision. The party vision is never prior to its action; hence, pragmatism is a distinctive feature of participatory Islam-oriented movements and/or parties. In this regard, the techniques of the PJD's production of ideology are pragmatism because the party claims it follows the dominant

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[51] See Othmani, S. D (2011). Fi Fiqh al Addine wa Siyyassa (On Juriprudence of Religion and Politics). Beyrout: Arab Diffusion

power (the regime). Besides, the PJD focuses on the innovation of doctrine and ideology in order to adapt to the governing reality. This finding is consistent with Belal (2012) and Wegner (2011) who found the pragmatism shapes the participatory Islam-oriented parties.

As Islam-oriented parties evolve, they are in the process of absorbing pragmatic elements. In other words, these may come to include major elements of liberal democracy as their preferred political vehicle. The PJD's endorsing liberalism is also clearly stated in the electoral program 2003. The PJD's political ideology orientations have demonstrated the party's savviness and ability to strike alliances with groups that do not share its ideology. In addition, the PJD's electoral programs manifesto and congress theses reflect the diversity of political ideologies that stretches from conservatism to liberalism while emphasizing more core principles from political Islam and the Third Way.

Overall, Esposito (1995) also found that Islamic law is the product of divine prescriptions and human interpretations conditioned by social contexts. Similarly, this study confirms that Islam, like religious traditions, is an ideal for Islam-oriented movements and/or parties, which has taken many forms historically and which has been capable of multiple levels of discourse, conditioned by reason or human interpretation and historical social contexts. In this respect, both Othmani (2011) and Raissouni (2004) state that although the period of prophet Med and the Medinian state remained the ideal paradigm, historically, there was no single, detailed model of an Islamic state.

Likewise, Abid El Jabri (2006) illustrates this point when he states that the notion of state in Islam wasn't depicted or regulated within religion; however, it was left to Muslims for debate according to their welfare and needs. The latter are conditioned by the era the Muslims live in.

For this reason, this study borrows some of Lotmanian semiotics Bernoussi (2012) which qualifies its pertinent ideas and ubiquitous implementations on texts and culture (mainly Russian) of paramount heuristic importance. According to Lotman (1980), while studying the formal features of the text, he contextualizes them in the outside world, the text's life. In other words, a text dictates the reading conduct. It is a matter of text/context relationship.

Unlike other Islam-oriented movements, the PJD with its da'awa partner the MUR seek to adapt Islam to the challenges of contemporary society; they are also concerned to frame its ideology through what is essentially an intellectual defense of the religious identity.

Besides, the party doesn't seek to bring about Islamic system of governance. Rather its primary goal is to adapt Islam to modernity, and influence political trends and developments to facilitate this. With this objective in mind, they approach the foundation texts on the basis of contextual hermentical theory rather than a literal reading of them. This point was supported by respondents in the semi-structured interviews (Belal, Tozy, Ben Hammad) and Nelly Lahoud (2005).

In the present study, the semi structured interview respondents from the PJD's and the MUR's leadership and scholars brought up the constant in the PJD's ideology. The constant is conditioned and shaped by some factors such as the monarchy and the Islamic law. Reams have been written on this issue Belal, 2011; Boukhrass, 2001; Darif, 1991; Tozy, 1991; Wegner, 2011; Willis, 2006. On the ideological level, there is a fundamental tension in Islam-oriented parties and movements between the notion that law must be based on God's word, thus confirms to the Islamic law or 'Sharia' and the idea that in a democratic system laws are made on the basis of majority rule by parliaments freely elected by people. According to the PJD's manifesto, electoral programs and congress theses, Sharia is a source, rather than the source of legislation.

Besides, in the PJD's manifesto[52], there should not be a split between religion and public concern in Islam. The party considers Islam both a creed and a law. Islam is not only values, rituals and ethics, but also a way of life that encompasses intentions, principles and rules. Hence, the horizontal relationship between the political and the religious in Islam is neither a split nor a complete fusion between the two spheres[53]. The religious is ubiquitous in the political which operates as a guiding agent, an inspiring spirit and the nation's power.

The relationship between religion and state in Morocco is a clear bond set up by the constitution (article 19). This article states that Islam is the official religion in Morocco. Besides, all legal texts are not prone to change since historically Islam has been and is still the fundamental pillar upon which the Moroccan state has been founded. This constant is clearly stated in the PJD's manifesto, electoral programs and congress theses.

In addition, the party insists on the principle of defending Moroccan society's Islamic identity through legislative and institutional means whenever that identity is threatened. This also involves a basic discourse founded on respect for religious morality. This conservative of the ideology tainted most the PJD's discourse in its electoral programs, manifesto and congress theses.

In this respect, Laroui (2003) defines ideology in its second meaning as a thought-pattern that calls for a myth far away and disconnected from the social reality, for instance the call for Islamic authenticity. In other words, the individual refutes reality and resists change. On the other hand, the Islam-oriented parties do not bring new projects; however, they turn to the past and bring back some claims, ethos and cultural components. Furthermore, they cannot find appropriate language to depict the new emerging realities. Therefore, they return to the past in order to interpellate memory in the name of a fertilizing utopia through the imaginary[54]. Similarly, Abid Al Jabri (2006) states that the tradition/religion (thurat) does not imply the history of a tradition that extends to the present; it also conveys the active sense of seeking to shape a political present by interpreting its identity in terms of a particular image of its past. For this reason, the PJD, in its electoral programs, manifesto, congress theses and electoral platforms, focuses on a/ reinforcing the Islamic Identity, b/ defending the Arabic language and c/ strengthening the Arabization policy.

This study takes the view that those movements that utilize the ideology of political Islam are not primarily religious groups concerned with issues of doctrine and faith, but political organizations using Islam ethics as an alternative ideology to attract, criticize, and de-legitimize the governing elites and the power structure whereon their authority and legitimacy are based. In other words, the movement or party's use of Islam is an instrument of political protest to delegitimize the hegemonic or status quo powers. These findings are consistent with the studies mentioned in the review of the literature, notably Burgat (2003) and Fuller (2004).

In Gramsci's conceptualization of ideology, its role as an instrument in unifying the masses - through education and preparation – remains its central function. Thus, Gramsci[55] is not interested in creating an ideology per-se, but he focuses on the role of ideology as a tool to unify divergent interests.

Political Islam is employed as a political ideology to unify a desperate group of individuals who are primarily unified through their opposition to the current elites. Through

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[52] . The PJD's manifesto issue 7. pp: 28- 29

[53] . Othmani, S. (2011) fi fiqh addin wa siyyassa. (On Jurisprudence of Religion and Politics). Beyrouth: Arab diffusion

[54] . Karl Marx in the eighteenth Baumaire of Louis Bonaparte wondered on the reasons that urged the French rebellions to express their experience through names, slogans and metaphors borrowed from the Antic Republic of Rome.

[55] . Gramsci. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks p. 349

the political Islam's core ideological pronouncements- equity, justice, freedom and brotherhood- the PJD seeks to preserve a degree of homogeneity and unity of action between diverse groups of individuals. However, the PJD provides an ideology that espouses ideas of social justice by applying the same concepts used by other ideologies, such as socialism and liberalism. Hence, the party's use of these terms remains 'rallying slogans' for the alienated and marginalized members of society (Darif, 1991; Tozy, 1994; Wegner, 2011; Willis, 2006).

Since the constitution defines Morocco as a "Muslim" state and not "Islamic", this study could barely consider the PJD as having a tendency of political Islam even if the party's electoral programs (2002,2007 and 2011 and the congress theses (1998 and 2008) and official manifesto (see appendix D) contain some core principles of political Islam ideology. Nowadays, with the coming back of religion, political Islam in Morocco cannot flourish because the constitution of 'Imarat al Mouminin' (the commander of the faithful) stands for the spiritual protection. Meanwhile, it is a preventive action which disseminates a realist culture of moderation as well as the respect of other opinions and creeds. Consequently, the monarchial institution is deemed crucial in managing the religious field and sustaining the political and cultural unity of Morocco.

The second factor that shapes the constant in the PJD's ideology is the monarchy. The PJD represents what might be described as 'legitimized Islam'[56] or ' State Islam'. The party does not question the Moroccan kingdom's political foundations. Besides, it does not endorse a revolutionary rhetoric of social change aimed at creating an Islamic State[57] . On the contrary, it holds that state and society are not to be Islamicized because Morocco is already a Muslim country[58].

Since its inclusion in formal politics, the PJD has made sure to accommodate the interests of the monarchy and not to challenge its actions in its electoral programs; manifesto and congress theses. The party has dealt with difficult tasks of appeasing the regime without losing its oppositional credibility. For instance, the PJD has amended its ideological orientations in the aftermath of May 16th, 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca. The PJD's leadership has adopted the doctrine of self-censorship. Besides, despite its focus on moral issues, the party has always been prudent to stress that it does not have a monopoly over religious matters. The PJD insists that it is not a religious party but a political one with an Islamic marji'iya (orientation) whose essence is the promotion of an ethical civil society[59]. Furthermore, the PJD avoids questioning the monarch's prerogative of being the commander of the faithful.

Overall, the PJD's acquiescent policy of subordinating its ideology and reformist goals to monarchial priorities is to escape exclusion, repression and harassment (Boukhrass, 2011; Zeghal, 2006). Likewise, since the post-colonial monarchy has strived to appropriate Islamic language and institutions[60] and has given then a content and a form that have strongly influenced the shape of the Islam-oriented movements and/or parties along with their ideologies. The PJD adopts ideological positions that are more concerned with political mobilization than the theological definition of their political practices and ideals.

Due to the context and the regime's restriction discussed in section two of this part entitled "the constant in the PJD's ideology", the party opted for pragmatism and moderation vis-à-vis the monarchy; this has resulted in factional alignments inside the party. Two groups within the PJD have generally coincided on their preference for a careful conduct in regard to the regime: the old Islam-oriented leaders (preachers) and the technocrats. Some of the older

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[56] . See Amghar (2007)
[57] . See Belal (2011)
[58] . See Othmani (2011)
[59] . Ibid
[60] . This institutionalization was on the first Moroccan constitution in 1962.

leaders (Benkirane, Othmani and Baha) have not explicitly called for changes in the nation-state, but tended to view the role of the PJD as more of a political instrument that, alongside the Islam-oriented movement organization (the MUR), injects more Islamic values into politics, notably ethics.

The PJD's political ideology is founded on a political and ideological vision emanating not only from the Islamic frame of reference in the Moroccan state and society, but also from the Moroccan cultural heritage and values[61]. First, they aim to alter the individual's demeanor in order to sustain the religious paradigm in society. Second, they target political reality[62]. This finding is in tandem with Melucci (1996) theory of new social movement[63]. In this respect, Melucci advocates the movement can shift from targeting the state to targeting society and everyday life or social codes. The technocrats (Boianou, Boulif, Choubani, Hamiddine, Khalfi and Rabah),in turn, wanted much greater role for parliament and the elected government, but wanted to achieve these changes through an increase in popular support which would allow them to form a cohesive government rather than by directly confronting the monarchy. Only a third group, the activists (Ramid and Raissouni), has been ready to denounce more openly interference by the regime in the party affairs (Belal, 2012; Boukrass, 2011; Darif, 1991; Tozy, 1994; Wegner, 2004 and Zegal, 2006). This was mainly prior to May 16th, 2003 Casablanca attacks.

Therefore, the PJD's ideology is characterized by tides continuities and discontinuities because there are several conflicting ideas among the PJD's elites' discourse. For this reason, this study has adopted a mixed method to approach the PJD's political ideology. First, the study worked on what the institution (the party) produces such as the electoral programs, congress theses and the official manifesto. Second, semi-structured interviews with different PJD's groups (preachers, activists and technocrats) were conducted to fathom out some conflicting and shared ideas by the three groups.

The event of May 16th terrorist attacks in Casablanca are of the utmost importance for understanding the PJD political ideology's trajectory before and since then. The party took a number of steps to preserve its legality that did not correspond to its policy preferences, ideology or the strategy it had devised to increase its power in the future. For instance, the party's endorsement of the personal status code "Mudawana" and the anti-terrorism law is an alienation from the Islamic part of the PJD's agenda. Belal and Tozy have stressed this point during the semi-structured interviews.

The second framework within which this study operates is the Order of Discourse by M. Foucault (1971). In the order of Discourse, Foucault states that the mastering of discourse and the powers they generate aims at this:
- Determining the condition of their application
- Imposing a certain number of rules on the individual who holds them
- Not permitting everyone to have access to them
- There is a rarefication, this time, of speaking subjects
- None shall enter the order of discourse if he doesn't satisfy certain requirements or if he is not, from the outset, qualified to do so.

To be precise, not all the regions of discourse are equally open and penetrable; some of them are largely forbidden (pp. 38-39). In fact, a discourse can pertain to the two categories aforementioned by Michel Foucault. For instance, da'wa (proselytizing) is open to everyone; nonetheless, it is definitely controlled by the state and its religious scientists (Ulama). Therefore, the PJD and the MUR, the party and the movement respectively, are

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[61] . The PJD sixth congress thesis: Democratic Activism is a Way to Reform. July 19th, 2008. p:20
[62] . Ben Kirane (1990). The Islamist Movement: the Problematic of the Approach. Casablanca: Al- Jadida Impremirie.
[63] . See the review of the literature, the section entitled: Typology of Islamist Movements.

bound to act within the order of discourse. Accordingly, the PJD's ideology remains moderate, balanced, progressive and positive towards the regime. In addition, religion seems to be less a matter of importance for the party. The PJD's electoral programs, congress theses, manifesto, electoral platforms and congress mottos have not devoted either enough or some space to religious issues. The election and party websites investigated in this study feature almost no religious content. In this sense, the party has been consistent with the role of the 'Commander of the faithful' in religious matters.

In Morocco, the religious basis of monarchic rule set limits for the Islam-oriented movements and/or parties' political agenda. The status of 'Commander of the faithful' and 'guarantor of the respect of Islam' together with the popular belief in the king's sanctity, has allowed the regime to control the production of religious meaning and to co-opt religious scholars.

Islam-oriented movements and/or parties should not trespass some redlines. In other words, they aren't allowed to operate in the public religious realm. The regime is tolerant when a movement or party provides religious education to its members. In fact, a discourse can pertain to the two categories aforementioned by Michel Foucault. For instance, da'awa (proselytizing /call for) is open to everyone; nonetheless, it is definitely controlled by the state and its religious scientists (Ulama). Therefore, the PJD and MUR, the party and the movement respectively, are bound to act within the order of discourse. Accordingly, their ideology remains moderate, balanced, progressive and positive towards the regime. In addition, religion seems to be less a matter of importance for the PJD. The party electoral programs, congress theses/motto and manifesto have not devoted enough or no space to religious issues. The election and party websites investigated in this study feature almost no religious content. In this sense, the party has been consistent with the role of the commander of the faithful in religious matters.

For the party, religion is no path for politics. Yet, since the party's use of the Internet in 2002, the PJD's websites gave links to those that were full of Islam-based rhetoric and language such as al Tajdid (Renewal) and al Islah (Reform). These latter are platforms for the founding movement (MUR) to disseminate its religious message. Besides, they feature links to Da'awa websites. However, in the aftermath of Casablanca attacks on May 16th, 2003, the websites refrained from doing so.

The PJD's case also fully demonstrates that legalized Islam-oriented parties can support, commit to, and abide by the rules of transparent electoral competition without necessarily abandoning their religious claims and moral conservatism. In this regard, the state and the legalized Islam-oriented party (PJD) resemble each other. Nonetheless, they must be read in a relation of continuity because state-controlled religious and political institutions orient and authorize the content of the Islam-oriented movement and/or party's language. As mentioned previously, the order of discourse is operating to tune and set redlines to the discourse/ideology produced.

Overall, there is continuity in the PJD's self-evaluation and reflection which keeps the party work constantly responding to challenges, be it political, social or economic. On the other hand, the discontinuity is the product of political context that shapes congress theses and political programs. In other words, the PJD's political ideologies have experienced several touch-ups either to fit a political context or to obey the order of discourse (see electoral programs 2002 and 2003 comparison).

The PJD's political ideology is heterogeneous because the core principles of political Islam overlap with other key cores from other ideologies. The party borrows concepts, ideas and visions from elsewhere.

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