

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: THE CASE OF THE NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT

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Abstract

This article analyzed the change at the New York Police Department (NYPD) after the appointment of William Bratton as police commissioner of the NYPD. It specifically argues the steps William Bratton took to effect a change and demonstrate elements of an effective change management process including the leader's role in driving that change. This article demonstrated how five phases of change implemented in the NYPD. These phases are 1) defining goals and future state 2) creating an environment for change 3) planning the change 4) executing and improving and 5) integrating and sustaining change. In the discussion part, this article discussed how this model and the tactics can be adapted to manage the change of other police organizations, mainly İstanbul Police Department which is comparable to the NYPD in many respects. The implication of this paper is that it is possible to change the police and police organizations to serve in a way that responds the needs of changing society. The prior thing is a strong desire and increased understanding of change process.

Keywords: Organizational Change, Police Organizations, Change Management, Leadership

Introduction

Change is inevitable. As we enter the 21st century, we have all witnessed a time period that the world, human life, and everything change even faster than before. Changing society, the impact of globalization and rapidly evolving technologies impose changes within the organization itself. Police organizations are not out of this process that calls for adaptive, creative, and immediate change that will respond the needs of the society. However, it is common to refer in literature that police organizations possess a culture with certain values and beliefs unique to the police occupation that challenge and resist to the change within the organization (Wood, 2004; Chan 1996; Barker, 1999; Maanen, 1975; Manning 1977; Siegel, 1999). Therefore, the story of change at the NYPD has received considerable

attention from the scholars of management, leadership, organizational behavior and communication. They strongly needed to understand how a police organization, with such a big population and long tradition, has changed in such a short time, and elements of an effective change management process. To understand the NYPD case is particularly important for other police organizations wherein change is needed. In spite of the differences in the culture, political atmosphere, society, resources and population of police organizations, there are certainly some points that are comparable and adaptable to other police organizations.

Within this context, the main purpose of this study is to narrate the change at the NYPD after the appointment of William Bratton as police commissioner of the NYPD. It specifically argues the steps he took to effect a change and demonstrate elements of an effective change management process including the leader's role in driving that change. A change management model that has been developed by evaluating the lessons learned from repeated change management initiatives is used to show in what ways the tactics, programs and projects used by Bratton fit into this model (PowerPoint, March 23, 2007). Finally, it aims to discuss how this model and the tactics can be adapted to manage the change of other police organizations, mainly police organizations in Turkey.

Literature Review

The Need for a Change at the NYPD

In the 1980s and 1990s, the situation in the New York City has certainly called for a change in police organization. Although there were some initiatives to change the philosophy of policing and organization itself in this period of time, none of them reached the results aimed at the beginning by 1994. After Rudolph Giuliani become the Mayor of New York, he decided that the NYPD was one agency that certainly need a leader who is able to initiate a change process to reach the aims he announced to the public before the election. Although New York City is known with its Democrat tendency, a Republican, Rudolph Giuliani, had been elected in 1993 largely for the campaigns principally on the issues of quality-of-life and crime. In this environment, reducing crime and selecting a police commissioner compatible with this goal was critical for the success of Giuliani. To reach these goals, Giuliani turned to William Bratton who was best known for his role in turning around the crime rate in subway system of New York City (Buntin, 1999; Steinhauer, 2006; Bratton & Knobler, 1998). Therefore, Giuliani selected William Bratton to be police commissioner of New York City on December 2, 1993, the number one police job in America (Buntin, 1999; Bratton & Knobler, 1998).

When William Bratton took command of the NYPD, the situation in

New York City was a mess. People were afraid of being a victim of a crime. New Yorkers certainly had a strong desire to be a way out of the danger and lawlessness they experience every day that made living in New York so uncomfortable (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Newfield & Jacobson, 2000). Surveys indicated that “more than half the people who had recently left the city did so to improve the quality of their lives and chief among the reasons they couldn’t do that in the city was crime” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 1). In addition to serious crimes, quality of life crimes and disorder had occupied the streets of the New York City. New Yorkers used to see men and women using the streets and sidewalks as outdoor toilets and using aggressive begging. When they stop their car at a traffic light, it was usual to see a guy, called squeegee men, in front of the car cleaning the windows with a filthy rag and demanding money for his efforts (Frum, 2006; Bratton & Knobler, 1998). In response to this situation, in 1990, Mayor David Dinkins was able to pass ‘Safe Streets’ legislation that increased the size of the police officers over six thousand (Vito, Walsh & Kunselman, 2005; Vitale, 2005; Bratton & Knobler, 1998). However, even this increase hadn’t seemed to help much by 1994. The police department seemed demoralized, dysfunctional and corrupted (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). The main philosophy was “stay low and avoid trouble” (Maanen, 1975, p. 222).

The way of policing was reactive. Officers would pace from one crime scene to another in response to radio calls, doing very little in the way of proactive policing for reducing and preventing crime (Mencimer, 2001). Many scholars asserted that crime was caused by social problems that were impervious to police intervention. However, Bratton had his own reasons to believe that police could have a significant effect on crime and crime could be reduced by using law enforcement expertise, leadership and management skills, and an inspired workforce (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Smith & Bratton, 2001).

When he was forced to resign his New York post in 1996 for stealing too many headlines, 27 months after the appointment, he had already received the national attention over crime reduction. Time magazine put Bratton on its cover in January 1996 to honor New York’s dramatic drop in crime (Steinhauer, 2006; Kasindorf, 2002). NYPD, within leadership of Bratton, was able to reduce crimes at a remarkable rate. “In 1993, New Yorkers reported 600,346 index crimes (murder and non-negligent homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson, the crimes reported in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports). In 1994, that number fell to 530,120, a 12 percent decline. In comparison, index crimes in the country as a whole had fallen just 1.1 percent. The decline in crime from 1993 to 1994 meant that 385 fewer people died. 13,461 fewer people were robbed and 3,023 fewer

people were assaulted” (Buntin, 1999, p. 27). The decline in crime carried on in 1994 as well.

Moreover, after the resignation, a survey conducted by a nonprofit public policy group found that 71 percent of all respondents approved of Bratton’s performance. He had been given credit for changing crime rate. In a similar vein, the approval rating of the Police Department had a 73 percent positive rating, up from just 37 percent in a 1992 poll (Kocieniewski, 1996). The results clearly show that the NYPD was not only successful in reducing crime but also increasing in public support within this process. In this regard, the question is what were the tactics, techniques, strategies and models used to turn around the NYPD to a success story.

Change Management Process: Case of the NYPD

When William Bratton initiated a change process at the NYPD, most probably, he did not have an idea of following a model to manage the change. He had spent his whole professional life in police organizations. He had the leadership skills and experience to turn around low-performing, demoralized, dysfunctional police departments in his career. However, it is doubtful to suggest that he was able to understand abstract notion and model behind the tactics he used to change the NYPD. Although he puts emphasize on change many times in his book, articles and speeches, he has never mentioned a change management model he used in the process of change at the NYPD and other organizations he used to work. When you look at the tactics he used to effect and manage change in the course of his career, you realize the elements compatible to change management model. The change management model used in this study has strong consistency with the process followed by Bratton.

This change management model suggests five phases each with a supplemental categories for effectively managing the implementation of change within an organization 1) Define Business Goal and Future State; 2) Create an Environment for Change; 3) Plan the Change; 4) Execute and Improve; 5) Integrate and Sustain (see appendix-1) (PowerPoint, March 23, 2007). The following section will demonstrate in what ways this model is compatible to change at the NYPD.

Define Business Goals and Future State: Before Bratton took the command of the NYPD; he had already proved that police could reduce crime. He had reduced crime significantly when he was leading to Boston Police Department and Metropolitan Transit Authority. When he was invited to an interview with Giuliani’s team, he told that his plan would reduce crime in New York by 40 percent in three years, with a 10 percent reduction in crime in the first year alone (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 1999). Although his plan and goals was consistent with Giuliani who was

willing to back up and provide him political authorization for the plan, the goals he declared for a city like New York seemed unrealistic to majority. After the appointment, he also declared his audacious goals to public by taking the risk of looking bad if he does not achieve them, but at the same time, he believed that articulating such audacious and bold goals was an important aspect of motivating the organization to perform and demonstrating public that he is confident and ambitious (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 1999; Smith & Bratton, 2001). In this way, he was able to inspire multiple audiences a vision to reduce crime. In fact, this goal was in a way consistent with the idea that police could have a significant effect on crime. In this respect, from the beginning of his duty, he intended to create an organization whose goal and mission was to control and prevent crime for a 'safe and clean city' not just respond to it (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Newfield & Jacobson, 2000). He had a compelling vision appeals to head and heart of the officers as follow, "We will fight for every house in this city. We will fight for every street. We will fight for every borough. And we will win" (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p.3).

However, police organizations which are believed to have strong cultural resistors to change (Wood, 2004; Chan 1996; Barker, 1999; Van Maanen, 1975, Manning 1977; Siegel, 1999) cannot be transformed simply by setting and communicating optimistic and audacious goals. Leaders should understand values, cultural dynamics of the organization (Schein, 1995). Within the light of this idea, Bratton asked consultants to carry out a kind of cultural diagnostic survey of the NYPD to see to what extent the organization's cultural values and priorities match his values and priorities (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 1999). The first thing that survey suggested was the difference in the priorities of managers and front-line officers on the ground. Managers valued "holding down overtime; staying out of trouble; clearing backlog of radio runs; reporting police corruption; and treating bosses with deference" rather than "reducing crime, disorder, and fear" which was Bratton's major goal (Buntin, 1999, p. 6). In contrast, officers on the ground valued "reducing crime, disorder, and fear; making gun arrests; providing police services to people who requested them; gaining public confidence in police integrity; arresting drug dealers; correcting quality-of-life conditions; and staying out of trouble"(Buntin, 1999, p. 6). They seemed to share Bratton and Giuliani's priorities. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to believe that if Bratton communicated his own goals, they would respond enthusiastically.

Bratton took advantage of this situation and communicated his desire repeatedly to reduce crime, disorder, and fear by taking back the streets through different channels. Throughout the process, Bratton and his team translated these goals and priorities into clear, achievable,

measurable outcomes and promoted an outcome-oriented culture. This helped them to demonstrate progress in the change effort. They also prepared strategies such as ‘getting guns out of streets’ and ‘reclaiming the public spaces of New York’ considering the priorities and their goals (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 1999).

Create and Environment for Change: Within the process of creating an environment for change, Bratton become a visible and involved leader that reinforces behaviors in subordinates that are consistent with change objectives. In fact, he mostly used the experience he got when he was the head of New York Public Transformation Agency. Within the description of Bratton, transit police responsible for the safety of subways “had nothing, they were nothing, they went nowhere” (Lardner, 1998). He needed to do something to increase their motivation and self-respect of officers which is mandatory for change. For this purpose, he initiated a process to change the old .38 specials with 9- millimeters by arguing that 9- millimeters would be safer and more effective than the old .38 specials (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Lardner, 1998). After he announced victory in his 9-millimeter campaign, he says, “They would have gone through brick walls for me” (Lardner, 1998). He was certainly aware of the clear, a symbolic show of respect of this initiative for the transit police who were used to be called as ‘off-police’ by the colleagues in other departments (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Lardner, 1998).

He and his team adapted similar processes for police officers psychology when he was police commissioner in New York. In his first weeks on the job, Bratton requested and received a handgun upgrade for the NYPD and improved bullet-proof vests. In a similar vein, he received new uniforms for the police force. “Those are all things that motivate people, particularly when you don’t have some of the traditional motivators that we tend to think of, meaning salary and benefits” (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, p. 85). They also made it clear that they back up the police as long as they act properly. They demonstrated their support and trust to police officers many times if there is not clear evidence of police wrongdoing. At the same time, policing style he supported was compatible with officers’ desire, letting them take more decisions on the ground, and moving them away from desk jobs (Economist, 1998). The result of these and other efforts was a clear increase in police officers’ morale which certainly create an environment for change.

He used the power of media not only to become visible as a leader representing the NYPD but also to communicate his messages to the members of the NYPD. He used the press not only to share the success of his new methods but also to call attention to police officers, who had done well, and to call them to a higher standard. In this way, a clear sense of goal has

been communicated throughout the organization. A story in the newspapers could have more impact on police behavior than any number of other tools. Bratton and Giuliani also backed up the police officers involved in confrontations with the public without clear evidence of police wrongdoing. The stories on the media on these issues clearly increased in police officers' morale and sent message that they trusted the police and would support officers as long as they acted properly which was essential to motivate front-line officers to reclaim the streets (Buntin, 1999; Lardner, 1998, Newfield & Jacobson, 2000; Vitale, 2005). In a similar vein, he used media to communicate his messages to the public to build confidence and provide a broad sense of legitimacy to the police. He was comfortable dealing with the media and using it as a kind of both internal and external public relations tool.

Bratton also took action to change the way of policing. Officers' main philosophy was to respond to crime, doing very little in the way of proactive policing for reducing and preventing crime. Bratton was a strong believer in the 'Broken Windows' theory of policing (Keeling & Wilson, 1982). He believed that changing the rules of the policing on the ground compatible with 'Broken Windows' theory of policing can change policing philosophy and practices needed to reduce crime. In other words, this style was developing culture of prevention and reduction crime rather than reaction. Fortunately, New Yorkers' desire for change provided a kind of support for this kind policing which is open to criticism for being aggressive.

Although Bratton was eager to encourage aggressive policing, he did not adapt the traditional model of a highly centralized, reactive bureaucracy. He believed that empowering employees throughout the organization is important in organizational change. In this regard, Bratton devolved a considerable amount of authority to New York's 76 precinct commanders. He was authorizing the precinct commander to be the police chief for his or her area and giving them the freedom to deploy their resources as they see fit. In this way, he was promoting leadership at all levels. Precinct commanders who get excited being a part of the plan were competing with each other to present Bratton with their most innovative ideas (Moody, 1995; Cordner, 1978; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & Smith, 2001; Buntin, 1999; Lardner, 1998; Vito, Walsh & Kunselman, 2005, Newfield & Jacobson, 2000). At the same time, they were held accountable for how they use that power and the results that they obtain.

An environment for change process at the NYPD could not be created by solely internal factors. In addition to internal factors, there are other important external factors at work as well. Major Giuliani was certainly supporting this initiative. Bratton developed close relationship with his many

constituencies, attending meetings, giving speeches on the church and neighborhood organizations in crime ridden areas. In this regard, he was also able to get support of external sources such as police union, public, media, and local and federal government. One example is that the New York City Police Foundation provided significant funding for the NYPD's initial development of Compstat (Moody, 1995; Vitale, 2005). He also provided funding for different kinds of police equipment by using several other external sources.

Even though being a role model for the members of the NYPD is essential in change process, in fact, he was not a fully successful role model for some reasons. He made his own people accountable but not himself to mayor. In addition, his life style was completely different from the ordinary police chiefs. He interested in having trips, being a part of New York High Society and spending money (Lardner, 1998).

Plan the Change: Methodical plan is essential for the change management because the following phases are based on the plan. However, the NYPD has not the plans and analysis even for tomorrow. Bratton certainly needed to determine gaps in current systems that must be addressed to plan and implement change. Within this mind, Bratton spent considerable amount of time taking briefings and discussing the situation with team members in order to determine gaps in current systems that must be addressed to implement change. He decided to set up a planning office involving key personnel and stakeholders for plan development and monitoring results, progress and projects. Planning should be made to prioritize and respond the gaps in current system. In this regard, he and his team studied all the issues and the first three that came out in rapid succession were guns, drugs, and youth crime. Those three were increasing violent crime in New York City (Newfield & Jacobson, 2000). He focused his attention this issues at the beginning. In a similar vein, another problem was lack of communication among precinct commanders and departments. Precinct commanders had not communicated with the officers for months and had not known the crime rates within their precincts. In response to lack of communication and other gaps in the system, beginning in January 1994, Bratton instituted major changes in police management: Compstat. Compstat was developed as a means to increase the flow of information among precinct commanders and departments, with particular emphasis on crime and quality of life enforcement information. It has been acclaimed as a new police management paradigm that is revolutionizing law enforcement management practice (Safir, 1997; Silverman, 1999; Vito, Walsh & Kunselman, 2005; Buntin, 1999; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & Smith, 2001).

Compstat was the essential governance model used in this process not

only to plan the change but also to execute and improve the change. This system connected all the various districts to headquarters and allowed precinct commanders to see maps showing the latest crime trends on their precincts, helping them shut down hot spots before they got out of hand and monitoring and reviewing police performance at the district level through regular meetings (Mencimer, 2001; Harcourt, 2002). Compstat's statistical maps were analyzed each week at a meeting of the city's police chief and precinct commanders. With the support of the system, the NYPD used the data collected routinely for assessment. They were able to know update data on crime trends and hot spots which was the base of the planning the change process, implementing the plan and monitoring the results of the plan (Pooley, 1996; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Buntin, 1999). Moreover, the data and regular Compstat meetings provided a ground for communication horizontally across organizational lines, exchanging of best practices and innovative strategies. This situation allowed different units to make modifications in their strategies according to practices and tactics which are proven to work.

Bratton and his team have also planned how to use the Compstat to hold 76 precinct commanders accountable for how they performed mainly to control crime (Safir, 1997; Silverman, 1999; Buntin, 1999, Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Vito, Walsh & Kunselman, 2005; Vitale, 2005). The Compstat meetings included information about precinct commander's performance on different issues: "personnel assigned, personnel absence rates, incidences of domestic violence and unfounded radio runs, radio car accidents, overtime expenditures, and summons activity" (Buntin, 1999, p. 19). Any precinct commanders knew that they were expected not only to have knowledge of the criminal activity within their areas, but to have also developed tactics to address those issues. Therefore, regular Compstat meetings established a measure of performance and accountability for achievement of the goals. Moreover, this system created outcome oriented culture by monitoring outcomes and achievements.

One of the gaps in the system was policing style. There was a need for transforming the way police think about their jobs and communities. Like most of American police departments, the NYPD focused on reacting to crime by rapid response and arrest rather than reducing and preventing crime. Even, police organizations were accepting no responsibility for reducing crime (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & Smith, 2001, Buntin, 1999; Mencimer, 2001). Although there were some initiatives to reduce the crime in former periods by using community policing philosophy, he believed that the interpretation of the community policing by former chiefs was totally inappropriate for a city as big and complicated as New York. He disagreed with the interpretation of community policing in a way to make

ordinary citizens the partners in combating crime. “Bratton wanted police-work to be done by the police: On the whole, Bratton believed reducing crime was the job of the police, not the citizenry” (Buntin, 1999, p. 10). Bratton believed that police could have a significant effect on crime and crime could be reduced by using law enforcement expertise (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Mencimer, 2001). Within this mind, the model he supported and used was the “Broken Windows” theory of law enforcement, the idea that tolerating such minor crimes as graffiti spraying, aggressive panhandling, prostitution, public urination, and turnstile jumping encourages serious violent crime by sending a signal that the community is not in control (Wilson and Keeling, 1982; Vitale, 2005; Frum, 2006; Mencimer 2001, Harcourt, 2002).

Execute and Improve: The most critical phase of change model is execution and improvement. There are so many inspirational plans that stay unimplemented. In this regard, the most critical achievement of Bratton and his team was to be able to put into practice most of the strategies they had planned in that time.

Compstat meetings were influential in entrenching the fundamental change in practices that the Bratton wants to bring about. “Sustaining any process requires constant monitoring. When observation and scrutiny are non-existent, the natural tendency is toward inactivity” (Vito, Walsh & Kunselman, 2005, p. 192). Therefore, the weekly meetings were fostering a sustainable process. Precinct commanders who were the leaders of their precincts knew that they are going to be held accountable for the results that they obtain and what strategies are they adapting to fix the problems. All precinct commanders had to be prepared and present coherent strategies to reduce crime. Half of all precinct commanders who showed up unprepared had been replaced by Bratton within this process. This model contributed to ensure that the strategies were being carried out. It was also a way to assess which strategies worked which didn't (Pooley, 1996; Buntin, 1999). These meeting turned to an effective tool to communicate and share successes and failures, and motivate each other. “Innovative tactics that seemed to work quickly came to light and were immediately communicated to everyone attending; just as failed tactics were quickly exposed” (Buntin, 1999, p. 16). At the same time, other departments started their own Compstat-like meetings (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & Smith, 2001; Buntin, 1999). As already mentioned, the results of these methods were significant drop in crime rates.

The NYPD was also focusing on the quality-of-life offenses in terms of ‘broken windows policing’ that Bratton had claimed to have an effect on crime reduction. In the first quarter of 1994, arrests of unlicensed peddlers, public drinkers, and squeegee cleaners increased 38

percent compared to the same period one year earlier (Murdock, 1996; Buntin, 1999). The NYPD also fought other types of quality-of-life offenses. This type of aggressive policing has also taken criticism, but the falling number of crimes certainly became a barrier to stop these critics.

Bratton was not alone in the planning and execution of the strategies, tactics, and projects. After he took command of the NYPD, he moved quickly to develop his own leadership team within the NYPD. This leadership team was certainly driven, dedicated, willing to take risks, unwilling to fail. Bratton was also open to take experts opinion in his professional life. One of those academics, George Kelling, founder of 'broken windows policing' and an influential criminologist, has remained a close adviser to Bratton ever since they met (Smith & Bratton, 2001, Buntin, 1999). He also benefited from some other consultants to make survey of the organization and to solve other organizational problems.

Integra and Sustain: The strength of the Compstat is that it is a management process that can be adapt to constantly changing conditions. It was certainly helpful to recognize the progress and identify deficiencies. Compstat sessions have become major vehicles for organizational learning. Precinct commanders benefited from the success and failures they learnt at the Compstat meetings. The development of this process has been attributed to the innovative strategies and the dynamic management processes. At the same time, other parts of the department started their own Compstat-like meetings. With the suggestion of Bratton, a special Compstat process for internal affairs was used to analyze corruption and increasing complaints for police misconduct (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & Smith, 2001). With the contribution of Compstat and other strategies, accurate and timely intelligence, rapid deployment, effective tactics, and relentless follow-up and assessment became the philosophy of the NYPD (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Bratton & Smith, 2001; Buntin, 1999; Vito, Walsh & Kunselman, 2005).

One of the biggest contribution of Bratton and his team was to build internal competency and depersonalized and standardized process. In other words, Bratton has achieved to institutionalize change and improvement. Most of the strategies and Compstat have been carried on by his successors.

Discussion

The NYPD case, specifically Compstat and broken windows policing, became an attraction for other public and business organization not only in the US but also in the other countries. Compstat has been replicated by many other police organizations as well as other business organizations. In 1996, Compstat was awarded the prestigious Innovations in American Government Award from the Ford Foundation and the John F. Kennedy

School of Government (Bratton & Knobler, 1998, Vito, Walsh & Kunselman, 2005). In 1998, representatives of over 150 police departments from foreign countries visited the NYPD for briefings in broken windows policing. For the first ten months of 2000, another 235 police departments from the US and abroad visited the NYPD (Harcourt, 2002).

Although there are certain initiatives to adapt the tactics and models used at the NYPD, it is still a challenging question whether these tactics can be applied to other organizations regardless of country, cultural, and political differences. It is no doubt that you can learn from other organizations. There are some successful implementations of these tactics in different organizations in different countries, but there are some failures as well. It is likely to be a number of things that might work generically in the US and around the world. At the same time, it is likely to be a number of things that might not work or might work only if certain conditions are existent. In this regard, the comparison and adaptation of the case of the NYPD should be made considering and understanding the realities of each organization within different countries.

The situation in Istanbul is comparable to the New York City in many respects. According to the 2000 census, the population was 10,018,735. It is the biggest and the most cosmopolitan city of Turkey. In spite of the low level of crime rates in the past compared to other big cities around the world, reported crime rates are increasing significantly in the last decade, at least on the statistical level. The immigrants coming from other cities of Turkey to Istanbul mostly live in ghettos as socially isolated communities. These ghettos have become out of control; center and origin of crime. People are afraid of being a victim of a crime. Media, with its sensational manner, has certainly played a negative role for the increased feeling of unsafe among citizens. A survey conducted in 2007 showed that nearly half of the people in Istanbul feel unsafe (Jahic & Akdas, 2007). The same survey showed that satisfaction rates and trust in police is also low (Jahic & Akdas, 2007). In addition, police officers are demoralized and willing to go to other cities. At the beginning of the April 2007, Governor of Istanbul declared that he had the petition of more than 15000 officers in Istanbul asking for a transfer to another city which indicates the level of dissatisfaction among police officers. Police officers complain about working hours, promotion system, economic conditions, superior-subordinate relations, and organizational dysfunction (Yuksel, 2006). The way of policing is reactive. Police is mainly responsible for responding crime, doing very little in the way of proactive policing for reducing and preventing crime. There have been a lot of calls for strong police action in the face of rising crime in Istanbul as well as other cities. This general picture demonstrates that the situation in Istanbul is comparable to New York City in many respects. The question is the change

management model and tactics used to manage change at the NYPD is comparable and adaptable to Istanbul Police Department.

If the case of New York City is considered at the level of change management model, there is no reason to think that the model will not work in the Istanbul Police Department. As already mentioned, this change management model (PowerPoint, March 23, 2007) has been developed by evaluating the lessons learned from repeated change management initiatives. The phases of the model as follow; define goals, create an environment for change, plan the change, execute and improve, and integrate and sustain seem to have a value for any change initiative. This study has already explored that the change process of the NYPD by and large fits into this model. In addition, this model gives a sense of understanding what to consider managing change and different steps that need to be followed. It means that any person in an organization that initiates a change process should be aware of the importance of having goals in the first step and creating an environment for change and planning the change in the second step before trying to execute and improve a change initiative.

On the other hand, the success of tactics used in each phase is certainly dependent on many internal and external factors. The first thing you should do is take a look at what is working elsewhere and then see what applies to your particular situation. Therefore, it is not reasonable to think that some of the tactics of the NYPD will work without any modification or understanding the circumstances and concerns surrounding the NYPD. There is a need to understand the situation of the NYPD, the US and New York within the process of change. The question is if Bratton did not have the resources – personnel and equipment-, political authority and support of the society, he could be able to lead to such a successful change process at NYPD. There is no easy answer for this question. On one hand, there were certain things that really necessities political authority, such as ‘broken windows policing’. On the other hand, there were certain things just as a product of management skills, leadership, and creative strategies. For instance, Bratton might not be able to put into practice ‘broken windows’ policing, if the government and society would say “we don’t want you focusing on the little things because we are concerned it might be seen as racially incorrect” (Frum, 2006). Similarly, Turkey has harmonized its laws and regulations to EU laws in the last decade. Using aggressive form of policing might be criticized as infringement of human rights which makes support of political authority for aggressive policing less likely in Turkey. However, it is likely to find a common ground for other types of policing which focus on reducing crime rather than responding it. Bratton has repeatedly proven that police work can reduce crime which might also work generically around the world. Within the light of this premise, the important

thing is to find out the tactics, methods, and policing style compatible to Turkey. Compstat was another important tool of change process at the NYPD. The belief that a department should adapt every tactical aspect of the New York City Compstat process might be misleading. Compstat certainly require a re-engineering of the adapting police department otherwise it will fail to achieve its purpose. However, there is no reason to believe that the idea of Compstat will not work in the police organizations in Turkey which experience lack of communication, transparency, and accountability. The enhanced accountability for results and exchanging failures and successes will certainly support change process and produce more pressure on officers to be efficient. In a similar vein, there are many lessons to learn from Bratton how to motivate officers in different ways. As stated by Bratton, when you don't have some of the traditional motivators, such as salary and benefits, recognizing and supporting police officers through different communication channels might work as well. For instance, Bratton was able to use media to advertise the officers who had done well, to share best and successful practices, and to back up the police officers involved in confrontations with the public without clear evidence of police wrongdoing. The stories on the media clearly increased in police officers' morale. The system works in reverse in Turkey. In spite of accusing media for having prejudice against police, leaders of the police organizations should look at to find a way to use media not only to motivate its personnel but also to build confidence and trust in public which is low right now. Turkey has highly centralized, bureaucratic police organization and little autonomy for city police departments which might prevent police departments from empowering the authority formally to the precinct commanders. However, there is still room to empower the authority partly to the precinct commanders. Therefore, it is clear that the tactics used at the NYPD have a value for police organizations in Turkey, but all the tactics might be considered in the frame of what is working elsewhere and then see what applies to the police organization you are responsible for.

Conclusion

The implication of this paper is that it is possible to change the police and police organizations to serve in a way that responds the needs of changing society. Change is constant and police organizations have also changed dramatically in the last two or three decades. If you are not responsive to change and manage the change in accordance with the contemporary values in the society, failure is inevitable.

When you talk about organizational change, people tend to consider it the responsibility of the highest authority. However, any department, any unit in a department even any personnel in a unit has its own responsibility

and power to manage the change. A captain in a police station can make a big difference in the scope of the borough she/he is responsible. Like most of organizations in the world, it is possible to count a long list of excuses as a barrier to change which itself is the biggest barrier to change. However, there are some good examples from some police departments in different cities of Turkey which subject to positive media attention. In spite of the lack of resources, personnel and government support, these examples show that there is a room for change whether in big or small ways. The prior thing is a strong desire and increased understanding of change process.

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Appendix 1

Table-1 Change Management Model

4 Levers	Leadership	Engagement	Organizational Systems	Measurement		
Main Phases	Categories					
Define Business Goal and Future State	Leaders develop and own vision appeals to head and heart	Create message of compelling rationale to illustrate need for change	Identify cultural accelerators and resistors	Establish clear indicators/measures that demonstrate progress in the change effort		
Create an Environment for Change	Leader visible and involved	Clear messages (communication plan)	Leaders reinforce behaviors in subordinates that are consistent with change objectives	Leader is role model for desired change	Conduct stakeholder analysis	Document responsibilities, align rewards/recognition
Plan the Change	Develop governance model to oversee the change	Develop project plan including communications strategy	Involve key stakeholders in plan development and monitoring progress	Determine gaps in current processes/systems that must be addressed to implement change	Create metrics to monitor results, progress and projects	
Execute & Improve	Encourage leaders to focus on results and the benefits to be	Communicate impact, timeline and requirements to constituencies	Share early experiences/success stories to bring others along	Use experts on change team to coach and facilitate	Address gaps in capabilities to execute the	Update plan based on progress/learnings

	derived when the change is implemented				change	
Integrate & Sustain	Recognize the progress and encourage moving forward to the next initiative	Build internal competency to manage future initiatives	Debrief successes and failures and modify the change management planning model based on lessons learned	Align organization metrics to assure change initiatives are incorporated as core component		

Source: (PowerPoint, March 23, 2007)