Hippocrates: Philosophy and Medicine

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Abstract

It is widely acknowledged that modern 'scientific medicine' is in crisis. Roy Porter in his magisterial book, *The Greatest Benefit to Mankind*, points out that 'these are strange times, when we are healthier than ever but more anxious about our health. According to all the standards benchmarks, we have never had it so healthy.' (Porter, 1997). This crisis has many aspects and may be explained by modern Western indifference to a holistic and Classical view of 'health' and the 'body' in favour of a stimulating and progressive medicine driven more by its 'scientific' projects to produce a 'mechanical' model of the workings of the body. This paper will look into the historical and conceptual meaning of 'health', the 'body' and the relationship between philosophy and medicine when they were first dealt with and reflected upon by the ancient *father of medicine*, namely, Hippocrates. The latter was the first European 'doctor' to have aimed at seriously putting medicine within the realm of a 'scientific' domain, one which denies its important link to philosophy.

Keywords: Philosophy, medicine, regimen, the four humours, the body

Introduction

The last quarter of the fifth century and the beginning of the fourth century BC saw the births of philosophy and medicine in Europe. While the written history of reason can be attributed to Plato (428-347 BC), the start of European medicine is identified with Hippocrates (460-377 BC). Distinguishing the latter is the fact that he resolutely wrote on medicine as such. In this period of time, both philosophy and medicine are understood and presented as *art*, that is to say 'techne' in ancient Greek. While philosophy deals with the soul, medicine concerns itself with the health of the body.

However, the term 'medicine' with its modern connotation, was not actually used in ancient Greece. It is rather the term, 'iatrike', or 'the techne of iatrike' which was employed. 'Medicine' is, indeed, a late Latin translation

of the ancient Greek term, 'iatrike'. On the one hand, the meaning of 'medicine' relates to the anatomical knowledge of the body adumbrated by the Greek/Alexandrian physicians –from the 3rd c BC until the Renaissance. On the other hand, it is related to the science and practice of the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease that began with the 17th c discovery of blood circulation and its rehabilitation of the medical cure.

This inaugurated the accelerated conversion of medical knowledge in the 20th and 21st centuries in biological and genetic medicine. Comparing the genealogy of the history of 'medicine' with its ancient Hippocratic inauguration, it is inaccurate to use this term instead of its Greek transliteration, ***iatrike***, especially that the latter in the 5th c BC, is an ***art***, a **techne** rather than a 'scientia'.

As a physician, Hippocrates is associated with two historical titles: the father of medicine (iatrike) and the Hippocratic Oath. The first title indicates that with Hippocrates *the techne of iatrike* has shifted from a divine explanation of disease to a rational and 'phyiological' understanding of its development. The second title relates to a short text, written by Hippocrates and in which he declares, 'I swear by Apollo Pysician, by Asclepius, by Health, by Panacea and by all the gods and goddesses, making them my witnesses, that I will carry out, according to my ability and judgement, this oath and this indenture …'. (Hippocrates, trans. by Jones, 1995). This solemn promise that a physician must undertake at the outset of his practice has marked the ethics of medicine ever since Hippocrates, morally binding the physician to the patient, to their needs and to the preservation of their secrets. Those two aspects of Hippocrates inaugurated a history of extreme tension between the ethical and scientific vocations of medicine, a tension that can only be reflected upon philosophically but which is denied by scientific medicine.

As a writer on the teckne of iatrike, which he defines as a matter of dieting the sick as well as the healthy, Hippocrates is associated with the vigorous attempt to separate iatrike not only from cult and ritual but also from philosophy. The essays which make up the Hippocratic Corpus, ambiguously more than sixty, have caused a great deal of debate, for only a few of them can be attributed to him with certainty. The writings of Hippocrates comprise a medical library made up of his labour, that of his students, and that of his rivals, the Cnidians. Despite the heterogeneity of the treatises, all the writers have dedicated their work on the techne of iatrike to the eponymous Hippocrates. Hence, the collective work is given the title, Corpus Hippocraticum.

This paper is divided into two parts: the first part reads and investigates the Hippocratic texts, *Ancient Medicine* (trans. Jones, 1923) and

Nature of Man (trans. Jones, 1931) since, thematically these two texts complete each other and best capture the emerging link between philosophy and iatrike, the second part elucidates and analyses Hippocrates' essays, *Regimen* I, II, III. (trans. Jones, 1931).

In *Ancient Medicine*, a polemical text composed between 430-420 BC, Hippocrates faces philosophy as a problem that requires to be examined and swiftly dispensed with, as this, in his view, permits an unimpeded exploration and account of the techne of iatrike. According to Hippocrates, whereas the latter is capable of reasoning, philosophy speculates and cannot think the body which, he maintains, is *full of disease* (trans. Jones, 1923) and thus requires a medical interference. Hippocrates' aim is to teach a techne which reasons but which is non-philosophical. To achieve his purpose Hippocrates decides to trace the origin of the techne of healing in order to prove that since its inauguration this art has been independent of philosophy. Yet, without realizing it, Hippocrates creates paradoxes that bring the techne of iatrike to a crisis because his claim to search for the origin of the self-sufficiency of iatrike is misleading and strictly subservient to the physician's aim, namely to free iatrike from philosophy.

Hippocrates structures *Ancient Medicine* around three main ideas: Firstly, that iatrike is an already established art; secondly, that it does not require a philosophical postulate in order to deepen its discoveries; and thirdly, that the study of techne can only be enhanced by an investigation in regimen. This third idea is outlined in the four texts entitled *Regimen* (*1, 2, 3*, and *4*). *Ancient Medicine*, however, marks Hippocrates' efforts to give a credible account of how the development of the techne of healing grew in parallel with a primordial change in food and drink. While Hippocrates' resolution to construct a history of techne is part of his plan to refute philosophy, it is also a means of justifying his impressionistic approach to the history of iatrike.

Hippocrates argues that 'iatrike has long had all its means to hand, and has discovered both a principle and a method, through which the discoveries made during a long period are many and excellent'. (p.15) While making this statement Hippocrates' concealed aim is to prepare the ground for the introduction of a better techne, one that entirely depends on regimen. However, hippocrates' thinking in terms of 'principle' and 'method' already puts his defence of techne in a questionable position: for such terms invite a philosophical reading of the history of iatrike as well as a medical standpoint which Hippocrates professes to possess. This physician, indeed vividly draws a picture not only of the exact beginning of iatrike but also of the way in which the ancients must have conducted their thinking in order to shift from strong and brutish living relying on crude and deadly food to a more human and healthy diet. Hippocrates explains that the ancients "thinking that from foods which, being too strong, the human constitution cannot assimilate when eaten,

will come pain, disease, and death, while from such as can be assimilated will come nourishment'. (p. 19).

Hippocrates' search for the inception and progress of ancient techne could be read as a device the physician employs in order to move on to the core of his thesis, that is to find a way towards a medical regimen, one which becomes the essence of the techne of healing. Yet, before setting the conditions for a thoroughly medical regimen, Hippocrates turns to his major obstacle, philosophy, in order to explain that, as a physician, he is under the obligation to promote the techne of iatrike and to expose the weakness and irrelevance of philosophy to his art. Therefore, in chapter twenty, Hippocrates argues that

certain physicians and philosophers assert that nobody can know iatrike who is ignorant what a man is; he who would treat patients properly must, the y say, learn this. But the question they raise is one for philosophy; it is the province of those like Empedocles, have written on natural science, what man is from the beginning, how he came into being at the first, and from what elements he was originally constructed. But my view is, first, that all that philosophers or physicians have said or written on the knowledge of nature no more pertains to iatrike than to painting. (p.53)

In this particular passage Hippocrates claims to have exposed and sufficiently attacked philosophy whose principles are espoused by some physicians. While implying a link between philosophy and iatrike, hippocrates' discourse does not actually evoke the content of that link. In his discursive account, indeed, Hippocrates only twice acknowledges the connection between philosophy and iatrike: "certain physicians and philosophers", and in *Nature of Man* where he methodically discusses the shortcomings both of the philosophers and of their advocate physicians. With regards to the physicians, Hippocrates notifies that there are poor and excellent ones. While the 'poor' physicians, according to Hippocrates, comprise the great majority and remain unnoticed and unpunished until a serious illness denounces their forfeited skills, the 'excelent' physicians are mainly those who, like Hippocrates, practice the art with honesty and prudence. Hippocrates' judgement about his fellows is usually concise and uncritical. It seems as if he delivered their misconduct to the care of fortune. By contrast, the fate of those who have encroached upon the art, the philosophers, are judged by him.

According to Edelstein, 'whenever philosophers tried to interpret for the benefit of others the significance and meaning of their own endeavours, they could not find any parallel more illuminating than that of philosophy and medicine' (Edelstein, 1967). For Edelstein, ancient philosophy in the fifth century BC began the debate of ethical concepts, such as 'justice', and found in the medical healing of disease and the preservation of health *an analogy*

which served to emphasise the significance of ethical concepts and to establish the truth of philosophy. Edelstein's analysis fuses the content of the Hippocratic Corpus with Platonic and Hellenistic philosophy; it moves freely and rapidly between different historical times and this results in a confused reading of philosophy and iatrike which merely looks at their relation from the perspective of *a helpful analogy*.

Chapter twenty, in Ancient Medicine, is still obscure because the content of what binds philosophy to iatrike remains unexpressed by Hippocrates and thus invites further deciphering of the physician's cryptic discursive techne. What is at stake in the above quotation, and indeed in the entire Corpus, lies in Hippocrates' engagement with a crucial question, "what is man?" Upon this question hinges the silenced and denied dialogue between philosophy and iatrike. However, in Hippocrates' view, the fact that 'certain physicians and philosophers assert that nobody can know medicine who is ignorant what a man is' confirms the fundamental error committed by the lover of wisdom as well as by the healer of pain. For, as Hippocrates continues his argument, 'the question they (the philosopher and the physician) raise is one for philosophy; it is the province of those who, like Empedocles, have written on the knowledge of nature' (p. 53). Hippocrates has almost split philosophy into one that equals techne and is endorsed by it and another which is the result of a bad thinking of the philosopher and the physician. Empedocles is, for Hippocrates, an example of a misguided philosophy.

Although Hippocrates' question 'what is man?' is primarily a philosophical investigation and although he provocatively seizes the same inquiry and dogmatically claims that such a search is a medical matter, it is important not to confine Hippocrates' discourse to a simple emphasis on what is philosophical and what is medical. Lloyd maintains that Hippocrates

refers to the inquiries that formed part of natural philosophy in order to contrast them with his own conception of the art of medicine, based on the ancient tried and tested methods. However, it is not as if his own ideal owes nothing to philosophy, which remains an indirect influence precisely insofar as it is by way of a contrast with it that he seeks to define his own view of medicine. It may thus be that the philosophical debate provides a stimulus to the exploration of the status of medical knowledge, even if that stimulus provoked a negative reaction to the styles of reasoning of the philosophers themselves. (Lloyd, 1995, p. 33)

while Edelstein sees in the relation between philosophy and iatrike a simile helping the philosopher emphasise his ethical concept, Lloyd accounts for that relation in terms of a 'stimulus'. In his view, what links philosophy to Hippocrates' description of techne lies in the *contrasting* knowledge experienced in each discipline, a contrast which favours and highlights the status of medical knowledge. Lloyd does not address the philosophical debate

which, in his opinion, stimulates Hippocrates to inquire into an unphilosophical medical knowledge. Similarly, in his essay, 'Philosophy and Medicine in Antiquity', Frede reflects on the relation between philosophy and iatrike and confirms that since antiquity they have been very 'close'. Philosophy, he asserts, with its theoretical ability to account for natural phenomena could assist iatrike in thinking human physiology, the way human beings function and behave, or fail to function. However, in the fifth century, Frede argues, there developed in 'medicine'

a tradition of independent thought concerning the origin, nature, and scope of medical knowledge in general. Part of the reason for this was the special situation of medicine. It conceived of itself as a growing subject ... Moreover, whereas the philosophers were mainly concerned with theoretical knowledge, the physicians' concern was eminently practical knowledge, on whose reliability much depended in a very obvious and concrete way. (Frede, 1987, pp. 225-242)

Frede's decision to bring the *closeness* between philosophy and "medicine" to an end is carried through his extensive quotations from *Ancient Medicine*, and particularly from chapter twenty. What Frede's separative gesture required was Hippocrates' textual affirmation. Iatrike, as Hippocrates maintains and as Frede repeats after him, is a growing subject and is allowed to find its way through *trial* and *error*. More rigorous than Hippocrates' text, Frede's essay deprives 'medicine' of 'theory' on the pretext that it is by definition a practical art and philosophy a theoretical one. Like other historians, Frede has not even attempted to give, for instance, the etymology of his frequently used term 'physiology' nor has he succeeded in showing the *closeness* of philosophy and 'medicine', as he claimed to do at the beginning of his essay. Therefore, as the connection between philosophy and iatrike is not directly articulated either by Hippocrates or by contemporary historians, the physician's alleged defence of this techne against philosophy still requires more textual and historical evidence.

As chapter twenty indicates, Hippocrates sees the philosophical enquiry undertaken by 'certain physicians and philosophers' to constitute a major failure for 'the question they raise is the province of those who, like Empedocles, have written on the knowledge of nature'. But, Hippocrates contends, 'clear knowledge about natural science can be acquired from iatrike and from no other source'. Besides the question 'what is man?', 'knowledge of nature' has an equally important weight in the debate between Hippocrates and the philosophers. In choosing specifically philosophical arguments, the inquiry into the nature of man and knowledge of nature, and then forcefully transferring their study from philosophy to iatrike, Hippocrates simultaneously acknowledges and denies the role and importance of philosophy. This Hippocratic gesture indicates that philosophy has thought

man and *nature* but the content and outcome of its contemplation did not satisfy Hippocrates. As a result, he swiftly condemns philosophy and turns his attention to an iatrike which has supposedly freed itself from philosophy. However, what Hippocrates declines to explore further is the underlying meaning of 'nature', the source that informs the shared characteristics of both philosophy and iatrike.

According to the sixth and fifth centuries understanding of *nature* (physis), there predominated two significant terms, 'cosmos' and 'micro-cosmos', which facilitated the acquisition of the knowledge of nature. In the surviving fragments of the early Greek thinkers, prominent among whom was Empedocles, there lies a deep concern with the concept of the cosmos. To these thinkers, cosmos consists in those laws that govern the world and make it orderly and habitable. These laws are expressed in Empedocles' theory of the four elements: water, earth, air, and fire. In his poem On Nature, Empedocles holds that 'out of Water and Earth and Air and Fire mingled together, arose the forms and colours of all those things that have been fitted together by Aphrodite, and so are now come into being …' (Burnet, 1892, fgr. 71).

For Empedocles the *elements* in the cosmos are fundamental, irreducible, and unmistakably distinct from each other. In his judgement, their mixture created the cosmos, whose life is sustained by a balance between those elements. Furthermore, the latter, according to Empedocles and other early thinkers, are endowed with the power to affect the micro-cosmos, i.e., man, to exercise an impact upon his/her health and to alert him/her to the ties linking their life to that of the cosmos. For Hippocrates, thus seeing and defining the world and man is precisely what he calls 'metaphysical' and 'philosophical'. In his view, Empedocles and other sixth century thinkers are mistaken in claiming to have found the first principles that govern the cosmos. Their abstract thinking, for Hippocrates, beguiled them into defining the essence of *nature* (physis). For Hippocrates, only iatrike is capable of conducting an inquiry into man, their nature, and the elements of which they are constituted.

Ironically, instead of turning away from the 'illusions' of philosophy, Hippocrates and other fifth century physicians, translated the paradigm of the cosmic constitutive elements into a medical theory of the four humours, which are *blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile*. In *Nature of Man*, written between 440 and 400 BC, Hippocrates objects to holding that 'a man is air, or fire, or water, or anything else that is not an obvious constituent of man' (p. 3). Similarly, Hippocrates objects to the physicians who 'say that a man is blood, others that he is bile, a few that he is phlegm' (p. 5). The human body, according to Hippocrates, 'has in itself blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile' (p.11). In ancient medical terms, these are bodily fluids called the

'humours'; they are thought to constitute the human body, to cause its sickness, and to sustain its health.

Hippocrates explains that, 'according to convention' these constituents of the body

are separated, and that none of them has the same name as the others; furthermore, that according to nature their essential forms are separated, phlegm being quite unlike blood, blood being quite unlike bile, bile being quite unlike phlegm. How could they be like one another, when their colours appear not alike to the sight nor does their touch seem alike to the hand? For they are not equally warm, nor cold, nor dry, nor moist (pp. 13-15).

The transition from the elements to the humours is accomplished by means of the four qualities. That is to say that, like air blood is *hot* and *moist*. Like water phlegm is *moist* and *cold*. Like fire yellow bile is *hot* and *dry*. Like earth black bile is *dry* and *cold.* This contrast between the elements, the humours, and the qualities is registered by another early thinker, Heraclitus, who maintains that 'cold warms up, warm cools off, moist parches, dry dampens' (Khan, 1979). This Heraclitean illustration points to the link he perceives between the physical changes in nature and man's subjective and bodily experience of this change. For Heraclitus, it is exactly the opposition between the elements, the humours, and the qualities which brings and maintains balance between man and nature.

This is further enhanced by the seasonal changes which, according to Hippocrates, as well as the early philosophers, play a decisive role in sustaining health: the periodicity of the four seasons coordinates man's nature with cosmic nature. Blood is thought to be more prominent in spring; phlegm in winter; yellow bile in summer; and black bile in autumn. Hippocrates explains that 'just as every year participates in every element, the hot, the cold, the dry and the moist – none in fact of these elements would last for a moment without all the things that exist in this universe' (p. 23). This regularity best depicts the closeness of philosophy and iatrike. It also reveals that every time Hippocrates speaks unfavourably against philosophy he is, above all, confirming it. This physician is convinced that 'so long as man lives he manifestly has all these elements always in him; then he is born out of a human being having all these elements' (p. 15). If these elements were to fail, Hippocrates asserts, man could not live. Therefore, other than being definitive of philosophy, the cosmic elements have now acquired the power through which life begins and withers.

This shows that Hippocrates is actively engaged with philosophy even when he would seem most to deny this movement. The latter has made the theory of the elements, the humours, and the qualities comprehensible to him and available for the art of iatrike. What strongly unites the philosopher to the physician in Hippocrates, is the shared conviction that the macro-cosmos and

the micro-cosmos are capable of explanation through *reasoning* about nature or 'physis'. For the philosopher as well as for the physician, nature, as the physical world and observable world, reveals a harmonious and balanced world because in it everything moves and finds meaning through its contrasting and recurring movements. This observation has prompted the idea that in order for man to be healthy the humours and the qualities inside him and the elements –and their qualities- surrounding him must reflect a harmonious life different from but resembling nature (physis).

From the point of view of Vivian Nutton, 'man is subject to the same physical constraints as the rest of the ordered cosmos, and an understanding of the body, within itself and within its whole environment, provides a way to control it when things go wrong (Nutton, 1995). Nutton's emphasis on 'control' is questionable because the early Greek philosophers and physicians' main preoccupation designated a deciphering of principles of nature (physis) and their translation into a healthy way of life reflected upon by regimen (diet). For by understanding the movements of the cosmic elements and of the bodily humours, an understanding realized by regimen, it becomes possible to foretell what might 'go wrong' rather than exercise 'control when things go wrong'. In this sense, cosmos and man become meaningfully interconnected in a reciprocal relation of *techne, physis*, and *regimen* (diet). For man cannot imitate physis (nature) well unless his health is maintained and watched over by a dietetic physician, that is the eponymous Hippocrates. It is in this act of mimesis that the physician brings man to his healthy nature, interestingly one which cannot be his unless it resembles physis.

As clarified earlier, the fifth century knowledge of the 'physiology' of man does not entail a knowledge of his anatomy, but rather an attempt to draw an analogy between his body and physis. Accordingly, Hippocrates directs his techne towards achieving an understanding and a regularity of the humours, their increase and decrease in the body. He explains that 'when winter comes on, bile being chilled becomes small in quantity, and phlegm increases again because of the abundance of rain and the length of the nights. All these elements then are always comprised in the body of a man, but as the year goes round they become now greater and now less, each in turn and according to its nature' (Jones, 1931). When the humours are well-proportioned health takes the form of a *crasis*, i.e., of a good humoural mixture, which displays an ideal of physis inside the human body. Nevertheless, if a humour is defective it brings 'natural' and bodily regularity to a *crisis*. For Hippocrates, it is fundamental for the maintenance of health that none of the humours grows either too powerful or too weak. This is the result of a thinking that looks at the body both as belonging to a human being and to the cosmos. Like the elements which are native to the cosmos and are indispensable to its sustainment, so are the humours to the body.

It is within this cosmological background that Hippocrates' thoughts on regimen have developed, for since regularity of the humours involved health of the whole body therefore, in Hippocrates' judgement, only a regimen that would keep the two in check would make techne complete, real and unphilosophical. Equally important is Hippocrates' introduction of regimen as the 'advice to the great mass of mankind, who of necessity live a haphazard life without the chance of neglecting everything to concentrate on taking care of their health' (Jones, 1931, p. 381). Regimen, Hippocrates argues, is not a new idea but a neglected and unexplored concept in the techne of iatrike. Regimen takes the whole body as its main object of study; it takes into consideration a man who is in health, suffering from an illness, or recovering from it.

It is important to note that Hippocrates is a dietetic physician because he does *not use the knife*, prescribe drugs, or apply *phlebotomy* to a patient. According to Hippocrates, 'it is only when the art (techne) sees its way that it thinks it right to give treatment, considering how it may give it, not by daring but judgement, not by violence but by gentliness' (Jones, 1923, p. 211). By avoiding the employment of external remedies (drugs) and technical interventions (blood-letting and surgery), Hippocrates highlights his conceptual and philosophical reading and judgement of the body, of its intrinsic humoural and cosmic flow, and of its holistic regimen.

Dreams (Jones, 1931), Hippocrates' last work on regimen contains, as Jones remarks, the first occurrence in classical literature of a supposed connection between the heavenly bodies and health. Hippocrates notes that 'the signs that come up in sleep have an important influence upon all things' (p. 421). In *Dreams*, the physician appears as an interpreter of the body in sleep; he listens to his patients' dreams and suspects they carry a mixed message: divine and secular. This last treatise gives the impression of a reconciliation between Hippocrates and the gods whose popular interference with the body's ailments he has consistently either avoided or argued against fiercely. Nevertheless, the physician refrains from a random interpretation of dreams. For even though the *diviners* unanimously think that a necessary precaution is required they 'give no instruction how to take precautions, but only recommend prayers to the gods' (p. 423). Therefore, Hippocrates, who knows a great part of wisdom, imaginatively enters the body and allocates different ailments of the body, an act which enables him to prescribe the right regimen as dreams, he believes, encourage *a wise* reading of the body.

According to Hippocrates, it is a sign of health when 'the soul abides by the purposes of the day and is overpowered neither by surfeit nor by depletion nor by any attack from without' (p. 425). However, if dreams are violent and contrary to the acts of the day therefore, Hippocrates suggests, the body must be treated by an emetic followed by a light diet for five days

gradually increasing the intake of food and the amount of exercise. The latter consists of early morning long and sharp walks increased gradually. This exercise, according to Hippocrates, has to match the gradual increase of food. Hippocrates also suggests that with knowledge of the heavenly bodies, precautions must be taken by an appropriate change of regimen and prayers to the gods. For *to see the sun, the moon, the heavens and stars clear and bright is good* (p. 427) and such a condition could be maintained by adhering to the regimen in course.

In Hippocrates' view, the stars are in the outer sphere, the sun in the middle and the moon in the sphere next to the hollow. Were any of the heavenly bodies misrepresented in a dream it would signify excess of food and indirectly the qualities of one of the four humours will dominate. For instance to see the earth flooded with water means that the body is overwhelmed by moisture and a drying regimen is beneficial. Monstrous bodies in sleep indicate a surfeit of an unaccustomed food and therefore an emetic followed by a gradual increase of five days of the lightest food is beneficial to the dreamer. The physician's *gentle* intervention with the body is informed and reinforced by the patient's vision at night. This intervention remains reliant on judgement and performance of an adequate regimen, the voice of philosophy and iatrike.

Conclusion

This paper has introduced the thinking and writing of the earliest European physician, the eponymous Hippocrates. His distinct attempt to separate philosophy and iatrike has, to the contrary, highlighted and launched their formal inter-relationship, one which will be further developed and discussed by later philosophers and physicians. Hippocrates indeed has succeeded in understanding and making his written iatrike and prescribed regimen an illustrated example of the early thinkers' knowledge of nature and the cosmos. Hippocrates' search for a different identity, which can establish an independent techne, only finds meaning within the contemplation of earlier philosophy. In other words, philosophy and iatrike (medicine) can only be put apart at the expense of an imbalanced future pragmatic notion of the body and of medicine, as we know it today. 20th and 21st c medicine is a scientifically oriented field of knowledge that has forgotten its past strength, namely philosophy.

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