Nagel's Criticism Of Physicalism

Thomas W. Smythe, Thomas Evans

Abstract


The philosopher Thomas Nagel is well known for being skeptical of the claim that psychological states are purely physical. When physical science gives us a complete description of the world, it leaves out the point of view from which each of us is aware of their perspective on the world. This paper is a critical treatment of Nagel's problem with physicalism. We ignore the vast literature on the self.

Full Text:

PDF


DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2016.v12n17p78

DOI (PDF): http://dx.doi.org/10.19044/esj.2016.v12n17p78


European Scientific Journal (ESJ)

 

ISSN: 1857 - 7881 (Print)
ISSN: 1857 - 7431 (Online)

 

Contact: contact@eujournal.org

To make sure that you can receive messages from us, please add the 'eujournal.org' domain to your e-mail 'safe list'. If you do not receive e-mail in your 'inbox', check your 'bulk mail' or 'junk mail' folders.




Publisher: European Scientific Institute, ESI.
ESI cooperates with Universities and Academic Centres on 5 continents.