The Wealth Effect in WTO Dispute Settlements: Analyzing International Economic Law as a Normal Good
Abstract
The objective of the article is to introduce a theoretical endeavor aimed at evaluating the potential validity of empirical results within the realm of economic theory. The existing literature and empirical evidence indicate that wealthier participants within the World Trade Organization exhibit a propensity for regular engagement with dispute settlement mechanisms in the field of international economic law. This uneven pattern of utilization of the dispute settlement mechanism implies that the global institution, serving as a provider of global public goods within an economic context, assumes attributes akin to a normal good. The article argues that the discrete nature of the global public good leads to the normal characteristics of the good. The individual actions of member countries in the form of initiation of dispute are expected to contribute to promoting transparent trade flow because the respondent countries need to remove the trade obstacles. The authors aim to pinpoint the essential concepts and assumptions pertinent to International Economic Law and its application within the World Trade Organisation through synthesizing and analyzing existing literature, This methodological approach seeks to foster comprehension of the empirical patterns. The authors apply the pay-off matrix to the dispute settlement unit of any two member countries and explain to understand the relatively lower use of the dispute settlement unit by low-income countries. The result shows the need for structural change in the multilateral trade organisation if it were to keep itself relevant by meeting the demands.
Downloads
Metrics
References
2. Bown, C. P. (2002). The Economics of Trade Disputes, the GATT’s Article XXIII, and the WTO s Dispute Settlement Understanding, (781).
3. Bown, C. P. (2004). Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade
4. Disputes. World Economy, 27(1), 59–80. Doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2004.00588.XWorld Economy, 27(1), 59–80. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2004.00588.x
5. Bown, C. P. (2005). Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement : Complainants, Interested Parties and Free Riders. The World Bank Economic Review, 19(2), 287–310. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhi009
6. Bown, C, Keynes S. (2020) “Why did Trump end the WTO's Appellate Body? Tariffs. ” https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/why-did-trump-end-wtosappellate-body-tariffs
7. Davis, C. L., & Bermeo, S. B. (2009). Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication. The Journal of Politics, 71(3), 1033. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609090860
8. Guzman, A. T., & Simmons, B. A. (2005). Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in WTO Disputes. Journal of Legal Studies, 34(2), 557–598. https://doi.org/10.1086/430767
9. Head, K., & Mayer, T. (2013). Gravity Equations: Workhorse, Toolkit, and Cookbook. Handbook of International Economics, (313522), 63. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-54314-1.00003-3
10. Hoekman B. M. and M. M. Kostecki (1995) The Political Economy of the World Trading System: From GATT to WTO Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. xvii, 301; index
11. Horn, H., Mavroidis, P. C., & Nordström, H. (1999). Is The Use Of The WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased? The WTO and International Trade dispute settlement, (February), ALL. Retrieved from http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/2340.html
12. International Trade Centre. (2015). The Invisible Barriers to Trade. Retrieved from https://intracen.org/resources/publications/the-invisible-barriers-to-trade.
13. Kaul, I. (2001). Public Goods: Taking the Concept to the 21st Century. The Market of the Public Domain: Global Governance and the Asymmetry of Power, 255–273.
14. Kaul, I., & Mendoza, R. U. (2003). Advancing the Concept of Public Goods. Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195157400.003.0004
15. Magee, S. P. (2010). The optimum number of lawyers and a radical proposal for legal change. An American Illness: Essays on the Rule of Law (Washington, DC, School of Law, George Mason University), 3-4.
16. Rosendorff, B. P., & Smith, A. (2018). Domestic political determinants of the onset of WTO disputes. Review of International Organizations, 13(2), 243–272. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-017-9296-x
17. Smith, A. (1776) “An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations” retrieved from https://rauterberg.employee.id.tue.nl/lecturenotes/DDM110%20CAS/Smith1776%20Wealth%20of%20Nations.pdf
18. UNCTAD (2013) Non-Tariff Measures to Trade: Economic and Policy Issues for Developing Countries. Retrieved from https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/ditctab20121_en.pdf.
19. Varian, H. a L. R. (1992). Hal r. varian 1. Taxes (Vol. 23). Retrieved from http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/
20. WTO, & UNCTAD. (2012). Analyzing bilateral trade using the gravity equation. A Practical Guide to Trade Policy Analysis, 101–136.
21. WTO, Dispute settlement and retaliatory anti-dumping *, 1251–1268. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12601
22. World Trade Organization (2016), "World Trade Report 2016: Levelling the Trading Field for SMEs". Geneva: WTO.
23. WTO https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm
24. WTO Analytical Index: Guide to WTO Law and Practice (http://www.law.nyu.edu/library/printhttp://www.law.nyu.edu/library/print-wtoguide.htmlwtoguide.html
Copyright (c) 2024 Shilpa Samplonis Raut, Alexis Oviedo
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
.jpg)
