Socioeconomic and Cost - Effective on Deforestation Compliancy Policies as Oppose to Pure Deterrence Model of Regulatory Compliance

  • Akintola Ismail Department of Sociology and Anthropology Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, Baze University, Nigeria
  • Bushi Kasimu Musa Independent Researcher And Consultant
  • Sule Magaji Economics Department, University of Abuja, Nigeria
Keywords: Socio-economic activities, self-enforcement, Legitimacy, Normative, Enforcement strategies, Deterrence, Regulation, Compliance, Regulatory cooperation, Degradation, Deforestation

Abstract

This paper analyzes the causes of regulatory compliance using traditional deterrence variables and potential moral and social variables. Selfreported data was used to assert the objective of this write-up. A group of persistent violators react neither to normative aspects nor to traditional deterrence variables, but systematically violate the regulation and use bribes to avoid punishment. From the results, it was also indicated that tree hunters adjust their violation rates with respect to changes in the probability of detection and punishment, but they also react to social and legitimacy variables. It is recommended that if the on-going deforestation, forest depletion and degradation are to be curbed, it is essential to have proactive and forward-looking policies anticipating social, economic and environmental changes to guide the development of the forest sector. Social influence plays a significant role in everyday social exchange-the body of empirical evidence demonstrates that the pure deterrence model of regulatory compliance, which focuses primarily on the certainty and severity of sanctions as key determinants of compliance, provides a partial explanation of compliance behaviour.

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Published
2019-10-31
How to Cite
Ismail, A., Musa, B. K., & Magaji, S. (2019). Socioeconomic and Cost - Effective on Deforestation Compliancy Policies as Oppose to Pure Deterrence Model of Regulatory Compliance. European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 15(28), 253. https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2019.v15n28p253