L’Importance du Cours d’Introduction en Bourse pour la Réussite de la Cotation Etude. Critique à l’Evaluation d’une Société Introduite sur le Parquet de la de la Bourse des Valeurs Mobilières de Tunis (BVMT)
Abstract
L’article enquête sur la détermination de l’objectif de l’introduction en bourse d’un actionnaire privé, à travers la reprise des évaluations de l’action et la fixation du cours d’introduction, pour un cas réalisé sur le parquet de la bourse des valeurs mobilières de Tunis. L’introduction en bourse vise la recherche d’un financement direct pour le renforcement des fonds propres de la société, la bonne image de l’entreprise et le désengagement de l’un ou de plusieurs actionnaires de du capital social. L’offre d’actions par les anciens actionnaires doit prendre en considération les intérêts antagonistes de tous les intervenants et fixer la juste valeur d’introduction, pour un équilibre gagnants/gagnants. Une déviation par rapport à l’équilibre peut nuire à l’opération d’introduction, induire les novices de la bourse en erreur et éventuellement se retirer de la cote officielle. En visant l’encaissement d’une importante plus value de cession, l’initiateur de l’offre publique de vente risque de nuire à la pérennité de l’action sur le parquet de la bourse. Les résultats ont montré que l’actionnaire privé, initiateur de l’introduction à la bourse des valeurs mobilières de Tunis cherche son propre intérêt de maximisation du produit de cession, indépendamment des nouveaux entrants et de la continuation de la cotation. L’opération s’est terminée par une offre publique de retrait (OPR).
The article investigates the determination of the objective of the IPO of a private shareholder, through the resumption of the evaluations of the action and the fixing of the IPO price, for a case carried out on the trading floor of Tunis Stock Exchange. The IPO aims to seek direct financing for the strengthening of the company's equity, the good image of the company and the disengagement of one or more shareholders from the share capital. The offer of shares by former shareholders must take into consideration the conflicting interests of all stakeholders and set the fair IPO value, for a win/win balance. Deviation from equilibrium can adversely affect the IPO trade, mislead stock market novices, and possibly withdraw from official listing. By aiming to collect a significant capital gain from the sale, the initiator of the public offering risks harming the sustainability of the share on the stock exchange floor. The results showed that the private shareholder, initiator of the introduction to the Tunis Stock Exchange, seeks his own interest in maximizing the sale proceeds, independently of new entrants and the continuation of listing. The operation ended with a public withdrawal offer (PWO).
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