Rôle du Cours d’Introduction en Bourse dans la Réussite d’Une Cotation: Réévaluation d’Une Société Cotée à la Bourse des Valeurs Mobilières de Tunis (BVMT)
Abstract
Dans le cadre de la dynamisation du marché financier des pays en voie de développement et le passage de l’économie d’endettement à la finance directe. La cotation de nouvelles sociétés en bourse contribue à l’accroissement de la capitalisation, révèle la transparence des entreprises, renforce leurs fonds propres et permet le financement direct des firmes. L’ouverture du capital au public par un ou plusieurs actionnaires augmente la part de financement de l’économie par le marché financier, permet de profiter des avantages de la cotation en bourse et leur offre une opportunité d’une plus value sur actions nette d’impôts (En Tunisie la plus value sur actions dégagée par les personnes physiques lors de la première cotation n’est pas imposable. Elle doit être seulement déclarée). L’appétit d’accroitre la plus value sur actions peut l’emporter sur les avantages intrinsèques de la cotation. Une surévaluation de l’action peut être constatée et peut nuire à l’avenir de l’action sur le parquet. L’objectif de l’article est de saisir une éventuelle surévaluation de l’action lors d’une introduction en bourse d’une société de droit tunisien, détenue en majorité par des personnes physiques de la même famille. Ces derniers ont cédé 10% du capita, à travers une offre publique de vente (OPV).
Notre méthodologie consiste à se référer aux modèles d’évaluation théoriques des actions pour les confronter aux modèles utilisés au niveau du prospectus d’admission en bourse. Partant des mêmes hypothèses avancées par les actionnaires de la société, nous allons réévaluer l’action, tester l’éventuelle surévaluation et son impact sur la pérennité de l’action sur le parquet de la bourse des valeurs mobilières de Tunis (BVMT). L’introduction en bourse vise la recherche d’un financement direct pour le renforcement des fonds propres de la société, la bonne image de l’entreprise et le désengagement de l’un ou de plusieurs actionnaires du capital social. La vente de titres de participation par les anciens actionnaires doit se faire tout en prenant en considération les intérêts antagonistes de tous les intervenants et fixant la juste valeur d’introduction, afin de réaliser un équilibre gagnants/gagnants. Une déviation par rapport à l’équilibre peut nuire à l’opération d’introduction, tout en induisant les novices de la bourse en erreur et éventuellement se retirer de la cote officielle. A ce titre, l’encaissement d’une importante plus-value de cession, peut nuire à la pérennité de l’action sur le parquet de la bourse pour un initiateur de l’offre publique de vente. Les résultats obtenus ont montré que l’actionnaire privé, notamment l’initiateur de l’introduction à la bourse des valeurs mobilières de Tunis cherche son propre intérêt en termes de maximisation du produit de cession, indépendamment des nouveaux entrants et de la continuation de la cotation. L’opération d’introduction en bourse a échoué à moyen terme et s’est terminée par une offre publique de retrait (OPR).
As part of the revitalization of the financial market in developing countries and the transition from the debt economy to direct finance. The listing of new companies on the stock exchange contributes to the increase of capitalization, reveals the transparency of companies, strengthens their equity and allows the direct financing of firms. The opening of the capital to the public by one or more shareholders increases the share of financing of the economy by the financial market, allows them to take advantage of the advantages of stock exchange listing and offers them an opportunity for a net capital gain on shares. Taxes (In Tunisia the capital gain on shares generated by natural persons during the first listing is not taxable. It must only be declared). The appetite to increase the capital gain on equities can outweigh the intrinsic advantages of listing. An overvaluation of the action can be noticed and can harm the future of the action on the trading floor. The objective of the article is to capture a possible overvaluation of the action during an initial public offering of a company under Tunisian law, majority owned by natural persons of the same family. The latter sold 10% of the capital, through a public offer of sale (OPV). Our methodology consists in referring to the theoretical valuation models of the shares to compare them with the models used at the level of the prospectus for admission to the stock exchange. Based on the same assumptions put forward by the shareholders of the company, we will revalue the action, test the possible overvaluation and its impact on the sustainability of the action on the floor of the Tunis Stock Exchange (BVMT). The IPO aims to seek direct financing to strengthen the company's equity, the good image of the company and the disengagement of one or more shareholders from the share capital. The sale of equity securities by former shareholders must be done while taking into consideration the antagonistic interests of all stakeholders and setting the fair value of introduction, in order to achieve a win/win balance. A deviation from equilibrium can harm the IPO trade, while misleading the exchange novices and possibly withdrawing from the official listing. As such, the receipt of a significant capital gain from the sale can harm the sustainability of the action on the stock market floor for an initiator of the public offering. The results obtained showed that the private shareholder, in particular the initiator
of the introduction to the Tunis Stock Exchange seeks its own interest in terms of maximizing the sale proceeds, independently of new entrants and the continuation of listing. The IPO operation failed in the medium term and ended with a public withdrawal offer (OPR).
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