Effet de l’Ancrage des Anticipations d’Inflation Sous le Régime Intérimaire du Taux de Change au Maroc

  • M. El-Hassan Hachimi Alaoui Faculté des sciences juridiques, économiques et sociales-Agadir, Université Ibn Zohr, Maroc
  • Imane Saad-Allah Faculté des sciences juridiques, économiques et sociales-Agadir, Université Ibn Zohr, Maroc
Keywords: Crédibilité de la politique monétaire ; Ancrage des anticipations ; Régime de change; Réponses impulsionnelles ; Choc exogène

Abstract

L'objectif de ce travail de recherche est de modéliser les mécanismes qui influent sur l'ancrage des anticipations d'inflation dans deux contextes de régime de change distincts : le régime intérimaire en cours au Maroc et un régime de change flottant, simulé à travers un calibrage contrefactuel du modèle. Cette modélisation vise à offrir une compréhension approfondie des facteurs sous-jacents à l'effet de l'ancrage des anticipations d'inflation dans ces deux cadres, permettant ainsi d'analyser et de comparer les dynamiques économiques associées à chaque régime. En effet, cet article démontre que, sous le régime de change intérimaire qu’adopte le Maroc, l’ancrage des anticipations d’inflation, en dépit d’être un gage de la crédibilité de la politique monétaire, entraine un désalignement du Dirham en termes réels suite à un choc d’offre exogène. Cette causalité est déduite des résultats des simulations effectuées dans le cadre d’un modèle d’équilibre général dynamique, stochastique, semi-structurel et calibré pour le cas du Maroc. En effet, les simulations menées sous les calibrages factuel et contrefactuel permettent de graduer l’ancrage des anticipations d’inflation et de scénariser les effets de propagation du choc et le processus d’ajustement macroéconomique sous deux régimes de change, intérimaire et flottant. Ce faisant, les réponses impulsionnelles issues de ces simulations indiquent que le désalignement du taux de change réel, dont la durée s’étend sur le long terme, s’explique par la dérive du niveau général des prix, observée uniquement en présence d’un parfait ancrage des anticipations d’inflation, conjugué à la politique de stabilisation du taux de change nominal sous le régime intérimaire. Alors que cette déviation est compensée par une dérive conséquente du taux de change nominal sous le régime flottant, elle ne l’est point sous le régime intérimaire et finit par incliner la phase de récession et retarder la reprise économique. Dans cette perspective, le présent article prône un passage vers le flottement qui soit ratifié de la crédibilité de la politique monétaire, à travers l’ancrage des anticipations d’inflation, sachant que cet ancrage produit un effet récessif dans le régime intérimaire.

 

The objective of this research work is to model the mechanisms that influence the anchoring of inflation expectations in two distinct exchange rate regime contexts: the current interim regime in Morocco and a floating exchange rate regime, simulated through a counterfactual calibration of the model. This modeling aims to provide an in-depth understanding of the factors underlying the effect of anchoring inflation expectations in these two frameworks, thus making it possible to analyze and compare the economic dynamics associated with each regime. In fact, this article demonstrates that, under the interim regime adopted by Morocco, the anchoring of inflation expectations, despite being a guarantee of the credibility of monetary policy, leads to a misalignment of the real exchange rate following a supply shock. This causality is deduced from the simulations within the framework of a dynamic, stochastic, semi-structural general equilibrium model calibrated for the case of Morocco. Indeed, the simulations carried out under the factual and counterfactual calibrations make it possible to graduate inflation expectations anchoring and to script the propagation of the shock and the macroeconomic adjustment process under two exchange rate regimes. The impulse responses resulting from these simulations indicate that the misalignment of the Dirham in real terms, the duration of which extends over the long term, is explained by the drift in the general price level observed only in the presence of a perfect anchoring of inflation expectations, combined with the policy of stabilizing the nominal exchange rate under the interim regime. While this deviation is offset by a significant drift in the nominal exchange rate under the floating regime, it is not offset under the interim regime and ends up tilting the recession phase and delaying economic recovery. From this perspective, this article advocates a move towards floating which is ratified by the credibility of monetary policy, through the anchoring of inflation expectations, knowing that this anchoring produces a recessive effect in the interim regime.

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Published
2023-12-31
How to Cite
Hachimi Alaoui, M. E.-H., & Saad-Allah, I. (2023). Effet de l’Ancrage des Anticipations d’Inflation Sous le Régime Intérimaire du Taux de Change au Maroc. European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 19(34), 70. https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2023.v19n34p70
Section
ESJ Social Sciences