Préférence des Banques Centrales : le Cas de la Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC)
Keywords:
Conservatisme, Banque Centrale, politique monétaire, BEAC
Abstract
Dans cet article, nous proposons une mesure simple et fiable du degré de conservatisme ou de préférence de la Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC), fondée sur la courbe de Taylor et inspiré des travaux de Levieuge et Lucotte (2014). Contrairement aux indicateurs de conservatisme précédemment développés dans la littérature, qui sont fortement dépendants du modèle de l’économie et de la règle monétaire retenue, il s’agit ici d’une mesure purement empirique. Elle est facilement calculable puisqu’elle requiert seulement la connaissance des variances empiriques de quelques variables, et peut aisément s’étendre à un large ´échantillon de pays. Les résultats empiriques dans notre cas montrent une priorité accordée au soutien à l’activité économique par la BEAC sur la période 1980-2015.
In this article, we propose a simple and reliable measure of the degree of conservatism or preference of the Central African States Bank (BEAC), based on the Taylor curve and inspired by the work of Levieuge and Lucotte (2014). Unlike conservatism indicators previously developed in the literature, which are highly dependent on the model of the economy and the monetary rule adopted, this is a purely empirical measure. It is easy to calculate, since it only requires knowledge of the empirical variances of a few variables, and can easily be extended to a large sample of countries. The empirical results in our case show a priority given to supporting economic activity by the BEAC over the period 1980-2015.
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References
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8. Barro R. et Gordon D. (1983). Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics. Vol. 12 – July - pp. 101-122.
9. Berger H. et Woitek U. (2005). Does conservatism matter ? A time series approach to Central Banking. Economic Journal. N 115- pp.745-766.
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13. Calvo G. (1978). On the time consistency of optimal policy in a monetary economy, Econometrica. N 46 (6) - pp.1411-1428.
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16. Clarida R., Gali J. et Gertler M. (1999). The science of monetary policy : A new Keynesian perspective. Journal of Economic Literature - N 37 (4), pp.1661-1707.
17. Darabi K. et Samimi J. (2016). Central Bank independence and Central Bank conservatism : theory with an application to Iran. Journal of Money and Economy. N 11 (1)- pp.15-30.
18. Dennis R. (2006). The policy preferences of the US Federal Reserve. Journal of Applied Econometrics. N 21 - pp. 55-77.
19. Eijffinger, S. et Hoeberichts, M. (1998), The trade off between Central Bank independence and conservativeness. Discussion Paper N - 9644 - Mai, CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg.
20. Frappa S. et Mésonnier J.-S. (2010) : The housing price boom of the late 1990’s : did inflation targeting matter ? Journal of Financial Stability. Vol. 6, N°4 - pp. 243-254.
21. Fry M. (1998). Assessing Central Bank independence in developing countries : Do actions speak louder than words. Oxford Economic Papers. N 50 - pp.512-529.
22. Goodhart C. A. E. et Schoenmaker D. (1995). Should the functions of monetary policy and banking supervision be separated ? Oxford Economic Papers. Vol. 47, pp. 539-560.
23. Hallet A.et Proske D. (2018). Conservative Central Banks : How conservative should a Central Bank be ? Scottish Journal of Political Economy. N 65 (1), pp - 97-104.
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26. Herrendorf B. et Lockwood B. (1997). Rogoff’s “Conservative” Central Banker restored. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. N 29(4) - pp.476-495.
27. King M. (1997). Changes in UK monetary policy : rules and discretion in practice. Journal of Monetary Economics. Vol. 39 (1)- pp. 81-97.
28. Krause S. et Méndez F. (2005). Policy makers’ preferences, party ideology and the political business cycle. Southern Economic Journal - Vol. - 71 N°4 - pp. 752-767.
29. Kydland F. et Prescott E. (1977). Rules rather than discretion : The inconsistency of optimal plans. Journal of Political Economy. N 85 - pp.473 - 491.
30. Levieuge G. et Lucotte Y. (2012). A simple empirical measure of Central Banks’ conservatism. Southern Economic Journal - N 81(2) - DOI :10.2139/ssrn.2047420 -April (2012).
31. Levieuge G. et Lucotte Y. (2014). Les cibleurs d’inflation sont-ils monomaniaques ? Revue Française d’Economie. N 28 (4) - pp.49-81.
32. Levieuge G., Lucotte Y et Pradines-Jobet F. (2016). Central banks’ preferences and banking sector vulnerability. Laboratoire d’Economie d’Orléans. UMR. September 2016.
33. Lin S. (2010). On the international effects of inflation targeting. The Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol. 92 - N°1 ; pp. 195-199.
34. Lohman S. (1992). Optimal commitment in monetary policy : Credibility versus flexibility. American economic review. N 82 (1) - pp. 273-286.
35. Masciandaro D. (2020). Independence, conservatism and beyond : Central Bank design and central banker preferences in monetary policy economics (1981-2019). Working Paper - N 136 - Avril 2020 . Département d’économie et centre Baffi Carefin, Université Bocconi et Suerf.
36. Mourougane A. (1997). Crédibilité, indépendance et politique monétaire : Une revue de la littérature. INSEE, Document de travail.
37. Nakata T. et Schmidt S. (2018). Conservatism and liquidity traps. Journal of Monetary Economics. (Septembre 2018), doi : https ://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.09.005.
38. Nakov A. (2008). Optimal and simple monetary policy rules with zero floor on the nominal interest rate. International Journal of Central Banking - N 4 (2), 73-127.
39. Niemann S. (2011). Dynamic monetary-fiscal interactions and the role of monetary conservatism. Journal of Monetary Economics - N 58 (3), pp.234-247.
40. Nordhaus W. (1975). The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies, N°45 - pp.169-190.
41. Nosetti P. (2003). Les Banques Centrales et l’approche contractuelle de l’indépendance : Les enseignements du cas Néo-zélandais. Thèse de Doctorat en Sciences Economique. Université de Fribourg (Suisse) 08 Avril 2003.
42. Ozlale U. (2003). Price stability vs output stability : Tales of Federal Reserve Administrations. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. N 27 - pp.1595-1610.
43. Pasca N., Aragón E., et Marcelo F. (2012). Preferences of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru and optimal monetary rules in the inflation targeting regime. Estudos Economicos. N 42 (1)- pp.5 - 42 January (2012) - Portugal Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.
44. Penot A. et Pollin J.-P. (1999). Construction d’une règle monétaire pour la Zone Euro. Revue économique. Vol. 50 - N°3 - pp. 535-546.
45. Rivot S. (2013). Rule-based frameworks in historical perspective : Keynes’ and Friedman’s monetary policies versus contemporary policy-rules. Journal of Monetary Economics - N 52 (1) - pp.201-227.
46. Rogoff K. (1985). Can international monetary policy cooperation be counter productive. Journal of International Economics. N 18 - pp.199-217.
47. Rudebusch G.D. et. Svensson L.E.O (1999). Policy rules for inflation targeting. in Taylor, J.B (Ed.). Monetary Policy Rules. Chap. 5 - pp. 203-262. Chicago University Press.
48. Smets F. et Wouters R. (2003). An estimated Dynamics Stochastic General Equilibrium model of the Euro Area. Journal of the European Economic Association. pp. 1123-1175.
49. Smets F. et Wouters R. (2005). Comparing shocks and frictions in Us and Euro Area business cycles : A Bayesian approach. Journal of the European Economic Association. N°20. pp. 161-183.
50. Smets F. et Wouters R. (2007). Shocks and frictions in us business cycles : A Bayesian DSGE approach. American Economic Review. N°97(3) - pp. 586-606.
51. Steiner Y. (2003). Le coût réel de l’indépendance de la Banque Centrale : économie politique comparée de la Deutsche Bundesbank et de la Banque du Japon dans les années soixante-dix. Université de Lausanne, Institut d’études politiques et internationales.
52. Svensson L.E.O (1997). Inflation forecast targeting : implementing and monitoring inflation targets. European Economic Review. Vol. 41- N°6 - pp- 1111-1146.
53. Svensson L.E.O (1999). Inflation targeting as monetary policy rule. Journal of Monetary Economics. Vol. 43 N°3 - pp. 607-654.
54. Svensson L.E.O (2010). Inflation targeting, in Friedman B. et Woodford M. (éds.), Handbook of Monetary Economics. Vol. 3 - N°3 - Chap. 22, pp. 1237-1302. Amsterdam : Elsevier Science, North-Holland.
55. Tachibana M. (2004). Central Banks’ preferences in Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. Japan and the World Economy. Vol. 16 - pp. 81-93.
56. Taylor J.B. (1979). Estimation and control of a macroeconomic model with rational expectations. Econometrica. Vol. 47 N°5 - pp. 1267-1286.
57. Walsh C. (1995). Optimal contracts for independent central bankers. American Economic Review. Vol. 85, pp. 150-167.
2. Adam K. et Billi M. (2014). Distortionary fiscal policy and monetary policy goals. Economics Letters - N 122 - (1), pp.1-6.
3. Adjemian S. et Devulder A. (2011). Evaluation de la politique monétaire dans un modèle DSGE pour la zone Euro. Revue Française d’Economie. N° 1/Vol XXVI. 2011-pp. 201-245 - ISSN 0769-0479.
4. Alesina A. (1989). Politics and business cycles in industrial democracies. Economic Policy, N .8 - pp.57-98.
5. Alesina A. et Roubini N. (1994). Political cycles in OECD Economies. In T. Persson et G. Tabellini (eds), Monetary and Fiscal Policy, M.I.T. Press - Vol.2 - pp.99-136.
6. Assenmacher K. (2006). Estimating Central Bank’s preferences from a time-varying empirical reaction function. European Economic Review . N -50(8) - pp.1951-1974 DOI:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.10.003 - European Central Bank- November (2006).
7. Avouyi-Dovi S., Matheron J. et Fève P (2007). Les modèles DSGE : leur intérêt pour les Banques Centrales. Bulletin de la Banque de France - N° 161- Mai 2007.
8. Barro R. et Gordon D. (1983). Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics. Vol. 12 – July - pp. 101-122.
9. Berger H. et Woitek U. (2005). Does conservatism matter ? A time series approach to Central Banking. Economic Journal. N 115- pp.745-766.
10. Berlemann M. et Hielscher K. (2013). Effective monetary conservatism : A comparison of 13 OECD Countries. Scottish Journal of Political Economy. N 60 - pp.267-290.
11. Berlemann M. et Hielscher K. (2016). Measuring effective monetary conservatism of Central Banks : A dynamic approach. Annals of Economics and Finance. N 17 (1), pp - 105-132.
12. Bibow J. (2002). Keynes on Central Banking and the structure of monetary policy, History of Political Economy. N 34 (4)- pp.749-787.
13. Calvo G. (1978). On the time consistency of optimal policy in a monetary economy, Econometrica. N 46 (6) - pp.1411-1428.
14. Cecchetti S. et Ehrmann M. (2002). Does inflation targeting increase output volatility ? an international comparison of policymakers’ preferences and outcomes, in N.
15. Loayza, K. Schmidt-Hebbel et N. Loayza (Eds.), Monetary policy : rules and transmission mechanisms. Vol. 4 - Central Bank of Chile - Chap. 9 - pp. 247-274.
16. Clarida R., Gali J. et Gertler M. (1999). The science of monetary policy : A new Keynesian perspective. Journal of Economic Literature - N 37 (4), pp.1661-1707.
17. Darabi K. et Samimi J. (2016). Central Bank independence and Central Bank conservatism : theory with an application to Iran. Journal of Money and Economy. N 11 (1)- pp.15-30.
18. Dennis R. (2006). The policy preferences of the US Federal Reserve. Journal of Applied Econometrics. N 21 - pp. 55-77.
19. Eijffinger, S. et Hoeberichts, M. (1998), The trade off between Central Bank independence and conservativeness. Discussion Paper N - 9644 - Mai, CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg.
20. Frappa S. et Mésonnier J.-S. (2010) : The housing price boom of the late 1990’s : did inflation targeting matter ? Journal of Financial Stability. Vol. 6, N°4 - pp. 243-254.
21. Fry M. (1998). Assessing Central Bank independence in developing countries : Do actions speak louder than words. Oxford Economic Papers. N 50 - pp.512-529.
22. Goodhart C. A. E. et Schoenmaker D. (1995). Should the functions of monetary policy and banking supervision be separated ? Oxford Economic Papers. Vol. 47, pp. 539-560.
23. Hallet A.et Proske D. (2018). Conservative Central Banks : How conservative should a Central Bank be ? Scottish Journal of Political Economy. N 65 (1), pp - 97-104.
24. Hallett A. H et Prosk L D (2017). Conservative Central Banks : How conservative should a Central Bank be ? Scottish Journal of Political Economy. DOI : 10.1111/sjpe.12149. Scottish Economic Society (2017).
25. Hefeker C. et Zimmer B. (2011). The optimal choice of Central Bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty. Journal of Macroeconomics. N 33 (4) - pp.595-606.
26. Herrendorf B. et Lockwood B. (1997). Rogoff’s “Conservative” Central Banker restored. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. N 29(4) - pp.476-495.
27. King M. (1997). Changes in UK monetary policy : rules and discretion in practice. Journal of Monetary Economics. Vol. 39 (1)- pp. 81-97.
28. Krause S. et Méndez F. (2005). Policy makers’ preferences, party ideology and the political business cycle. Southern Economic Journal - Vol. - 71 N°4 - pp. 752-767.
29. Kydland F. et Prescott E. (1977). Rules rather than discretion : The inconsistency of optimal plans. Journal of Political Economy. N 85 - pp.473 - 491.
30. Levieuge G. et Lucotte Y. (2012). A simple empirical measure of Central Banks’ conservatism. Southern Economic Journal - N 81(2) - DOI :10.2139/ssrn.2047420 -April (2012).
31. Levieuge G. et Lucotte Y. (2014). Les cibleurs d’inflation sont-ils monomaniaques ? Revue Française d’Economie. N 28 (4) - pp.49-81.
32. Levieuge G., Lucotte Y et Pradines-Jobet F. (2016). Central banks’ preferences and banking sector vulnerability. Laboratoire d’Economie d’Orléans. UMR. September 2016.
33. Lin S. (2010). On the international effects of inflation targeting. The Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol. 92 - N°1 ; pp. 195-199.
34. Lohman S. (1992). Optimal commitment in monetary policy : Credibility versus flexibility. American economic review. N 82 (1) - pp. 273-286.
35. Masciandaro D. (2020). Independence, conservatism and beyond : Central Bank design and central banker preferences in monetary policy economics (1981-2019). Working Paper - N 136 - Avril 2020 . Département d’économie et centre Baffi Carefin, Université Bocconi et Suerf.
36. Mourougane A. (1997). Crédibilité, indépendance et politique monétaire : Une revue de la littérature. INSEE, Document de travail.
37. Nakata T. et Schmidt S. (2018). Conservatism and liquidity traps. Journal of Monetary Economics. (Septembre 2018), doi : https ://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.09.005.
38. Nakov A. (2008). Optimal and simple monetary policy rules with zero floor on the nominal interest rate. International Journal of Central Banking - N 4 (2), 73-127.
39. Niemann S. (2011). Dynamic monetary-fiscal interactions and the role of monetary conservatism. Journal of Monetary Economics - N 58 (3), pp.234-247.
40. Nordhaus W. (1975). The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies, N°45 - pp.169-190.
41. Nosetti P. (2003). Les Banques Centrales et l’approche contractuelle de l’indépendance : Les enseignements du cas Néo-zélandais. Thèse de Doctorat en Sciences Economique. Université de Fribourg (Suisse) 08 Avril 2003.
42. Ozlale U. (2003). Price stability vs output stability : Tales of Federal Reserve Administrations. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. N 27 - pp.1595-1610.
43. Pasca N., Aragón E., et Marcelo F. (2012). Preferences of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru and optimal monetary rules in the inflation targeting regime. Estudos Economicos. N 42 (1)- pp.5 - 42 January (2012) - Portugal Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.
44. Penot A. et Pollin J.-P. (1999). Construction d’une règle monétaire pour la Zone Euro. Revue économique. Vol. 50 - N°3 - pp. 535-546.
45. Rivot S. (2013). Rule-based frameworks in historical perspective : Keynes’ and Friedman’s monetary policies versus contemporary policy-rules. Journal of Monetary Economics - N 52 (1) - pp.201-227.
46. Rogoff K. (1985). Can international monetary policy cooperation be counter productive. Journal of International Economics. N 18 - pp.199-217.
47. Rudebusch G.D. et. Svensson L.E.O (1999). Policy rules for inflation targeting. in Taylor, J.B (Ed.). Monetary Policy Rules. Chap. 5 - pp. 203-262. Chicago University Press.
48. Smets F. et Wouters R. (2003). An estimated Dynamics Stochastic General Equilibrium model of the Euro Area. Journal of the European Economic Association. pp. 1123-1175.
49. Smets F. et Wouters R. (2005). Comparing shocks and frictions in Us and Euro Area business cycles : A Bayesian approach. Journal of the European Economic Association. N°20. pp. 161-183.
50. Smets F. et Wouters R. (2007). Shocks and frictions in us business cycles : A Bayesian DSGE approach. American Economic Review. N°97(3) - pp. 586-606.
51. Steiner Y. (2003). Le coût réel de l’indépendance de la Banque Centrale : économie politique comparée de la Deutsche Bundesbank et de la Banque du Japon dans les années soixante-dix. Université de Lausanne, Institut d’études politiques et internationales.
52. Svensson L.E.O (1997). Inflation forecast targeting : implementing and monitoring inflation targets. European Economic Review. Vol. 41- N°6 - pp- 1111-1146.
53. Svensson L.E.O (1999). Inflation targeting as monetary policy rule. Journal of Monetary Economics. Vol. 43 N°3 - pp. 607-654.
54. Svensson L.E.O (2010). Inflation targeting, in Friedman B. et Woodford M. (éds.), Handbook of Monetary Economics. Vol. 3 - N°3 - Chap. 22, pp. 1237-1302. Amsterdam : Elsevier Science, North-Holland.
55. Tachibana M. (2004). Central Banks’ preferences in Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. Japan and the World Economy. Vol. 16 - pp. 81-93.
56. Taylor J.B. (1979). Estimation and control of a macroeconomic model with rational expectations. Econometrica. Vol. 47 N°5 - pp. 1267-1286.
57. Walsh C. (1995). Optimal contracts for independent central bankers. American Economic Review. Vol. 85, pp. 150-167.
Published
2024-11-16
How to Cite
Soulemanou, & Tadadjeu, D.-K. (2024). Préférence des Banques Centrales : le Cas de la Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC). European Scientific Journal, ESJ, 35, 235. Retrieved from https://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/view/18768
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ESI Preprints
Copyright (c) 2024 Soulemanou, Dessy-Karl Tadadjeu
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